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Prefazione / Preface
M L*
Between  and , Rembrandt painted The Conspiracy of Claudius
Civilis, depicting a story from Tacitus’s Histories also known as “the
Batavian rebellion” (Fig. ).
According to the Roman historian, Civilis «collected at one of the
sacred groves, ostensibly for a banquet, the chiefs of the nation and the
boldest spirits of the lower class [. . . ] and bound the whole assembly
with barbarous rites and strange forms of oath». While acknowled-
ging the superior intelligence (for a native) of the Batavian leader,
Tacitus skillfully describes the assembly as a treacherous conspira-
cy: the secrecy of the reunion; the “barbarous” rites; the “strange”
forms of oath; etc. In transposing into a painting this verbal imagery
of secrecy and deviance, Rembrandt offers one of the first modern
instances of visual conspiracy theory: the chromatic tonalities of the
canvas transmit the impression of a scene immersed in dim light,
horizontally traversed by the luminous line of the massive table on
which the “strange” oaths are being uttered. Reddle hues predominate
all around, on the wall in the background as well as in the garments of
many conjurers, presenting the viewer of the painting with an image
that exudes the chromatic promise of blood to be treacherously shed.
Figures of conspiracy, then, abound: surly gazes converge toward
the symbolical core of the scene, the crossing of blades initiated by
Civilis, but all around and at the margins of the scene also cups of
∗ Massimo Leone, Università degli Studi di Torino.
. Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn; Leiden, Dutch Republic (now the Netherlands),
 July  — Amsterdam, Dutch Republic (now the Netherlands),  October .
. Oil on canvas;  cm ×  cm; Stockholm, Nationalmuseum.
. Publius (o Gaius) Cornelius Tacitus; Gallia Narbonensis (currently South of France),
– — Rome, –.
. Historiae, c. –.
. .–; Engl. trans. W.H. Fyfe ().

 Prefazione / Preface
Figure . Rembrandt (–) The Conspiracy of Claudius Civilis, oil on canvas, 
cm ×  cm, Stockholm, Nationalmuseum.
wine are raised, as though to hint at the inevitable intoxication of
conspiracy. One figure among all particularly stands out: following
Tacitus’s physiognomy, which is meant to parallel the face of Civilis
with that of other rebels and enemies of Rome (Sertorius, Hannibal,
etc.), Rembrandt directs all the topology of the scene toward the
sinister mono–eyed face of the leader, immobile in an expression of
poisonous resolution.
Rembrandt’s painting should be visually kept in mind by all those
who share a concern (be it scholarly or political, or both) for conspira-
cy theories. Since the Roman antiquity, and certainly even before, the
plans of action of enemy forces have been described and depicted not
simply as plain prefiguration of acts, but as treacherous conniving, held
in secret and cemented by unknown, barbaric rituals. “Constructing
the enemy” often implies, through history, the projection and pro-
paganda of an imaginary in which what is hostile is also dangerously
and barbarically secret.
In his visual wisdom, Rembrandt could not overlook the symbo-
lical importance of the detail handed down by Tacitus: the only eye
that Civilis opens on the scene of the conspiracy. What does this only
eye mean? Certainly, it bestows a certain monstrosity on the face of
the Batavian leader, thus contributing to depict him as an alien force
in society, as a traitor and as a conjurer. However, the only eye also
Prefazione / Preface 
underlines that which the visual conspiracy theory sees in the sup-
posed mentality of conspirators: the uni–directionality of their gazes;
the fact that, unlike “normal” people in society, they do not look at
the whole of reality but select into it a single line, the project that will
lead to their triumph and to the consequent disruption of society.
But again, is this mono–eyed character of conspiracies an intrinsic one
or is it rather the denigrating feature that an opposite ideology attaches
to any collective project likely to engender it? Is the conspiracy in the
only eye of Civilis or rather in the only eye that Rembrandt’s painting,
and Tacitus’s history before him, lends to the spectators, forcing them
to perceive Civilis and his acolytes as a gang of dangerous conspirators?
One of the philosophically most interesting aspects of the area of
study tentatively called “conspiracy theories” is that it presents itself
as inexorably and paradoxically multi–leveled: there is the supposed
conspiracy in history, such as that of Civilis who wants to overthrow
the Roman yoke and federates all allied forces around him through
binding rituals; there is the supposed visual conspiracy theory, which
attributes a pernicious intention to the gathering of enemies, depic-
ting it with monstrous and treacherous features; but there is also the
meta–level of the scholar who, by analyzing Tacitus’s historical text or
Rembrandt’s visual rendering of it, considers them part of a broader
and more encompassing conspiracy, meant at discrediting an enemy
faction. However, why not complicating further this superposition,
and surmise that scholars too are part of an even broader conspiracy,
which surreptitiously aims at seeding doubt in the customary, predo-
minant account of history, a sort of revisionism that relativizes the
perspective of the winner and revaluates, for political purposes, the
gaze of the defeated ones, showing that they were not conspirators
but “freedom fighters”? Why, for instance, in recounting the history of
Italian Risorgimento — the historical process that led to the indepen-
dence of the current Italian state — Italians do not talk of conspiracy
when dealing with “carboneria”, the secret insurgent movements that
eventually defeated the Austro-Hungarian domain?
That is one of the main challenges that students of “conspiracy
theories” must face: can we look at them with both eyes, and realize that
they all share some intrinsic logical features, as the very first creators
of the expression “conspiracy theory” (Popper, etc.) believed? Is there
an inherently logical fallacy in conspiracy theories? Or, on the contrary,
 Prefazione / Preface
are we doomed to look at conspiracy with one eye only, as we were
the symmetrical counterpart of Civilis, forced to see conspiracy or
conspiracy theories every time that plans of actions, or the theoretical
account of them, does not align with our ideology and desires?
The essays collected in this monographic issue of Lexia do not
cultivate the wild ambition to solve this riddle once and for all. They
rather seek to cast a fresh look at the issue of conspiracy, conspiracy
thought, and conspiracy theories, through combining semiotics and
other qualitative methods. Whereas the essays take distinct stances
as regards the logical sustainability of such or such theories, they
all share a common concern in trying to pinpoint the conditions in
which conspiratorial thinking proliferates: financial and economic
crises entailing major disruptions of the labor market and massive
unemployment; the reconfiguration of social and communicative
relations though the rapid evolution of unprecedented digital media;
the consequent shifting of political models; above all, the radical
change of the meaning of social relations, not only those among
people but also those among facts: when the socio–semiotic system of
ties that binds the elements of reality together and shapes them into
a more or less coherent semiosphere starts to disintegrate, the result
is often the emerging of a myriad of ideological contrapositions that
feed, in their turn, the various levels and meta–levels of conspiratorial
thought. On the one hand, anti–system political leaders promote
the emergence of a new representation of reality, in which occult
conspiratorial forces are finally unmasked; on the other hand, pro–
system agencies see a conspiracy in the conspiracy thoughts of their
adversary or denigrate them as mere illogical fantasies.
For instance, there seems to be no point of contact between those
who believe that the importance of vaccines is artificially inflated by
conspiratorial pharmaceutical companies and those who call these
theories “conspiracies”, or even accuse them of being part of a politi-
cal conspiracy aimed at subverting the democratic arena and taking
possession of it through heterodox and often violent rhetorical means.
Nevertheless, the lack of this point of contact has not a logical but a
semiotic nature. It is not through ‘scientifically’ demonstrating that
the former are wrong and the latter are right, or vice versa, that this
dividing trend in society will disappear. It would be foolish to believe
that people disagree and fight with each other because they believe in
Prefazione / Preface 
discrepant conspiracy theories; on the opposite, one has often the im-
pression that people believe in discrepant conspiracy theories exactly
because they want to disagree. They want to somehow vehicle and
also give vent to the tension that underlies society, and that does not
find other semiotic frameworks of expression.
Therefore, if the work of semioticians on conspiracy theories has
a purpose whatsoever, is not that of indicating, from a supposedly
superior vantage point, who is right and who is wrong, who is con-
spiring and who is not, who is creating a fake conspiracy theory and
who is unveiling a dangerous social secret. The purpose of semiotics
is, rather, that of indicating the discursive conditions that encourage
the proliferation of such conspiratorial or anti–conspiratorial thinking,
and simultaneously also the more difficult purpose of suggesting how
to reframe conflict in a different discursive framework, one that does
not simply create rhetorical conflict but casts the basis for social ac-
tion. For example, the problem of conspiracy theories on vaccines,
from a semiotic point of view, lies not in their supposed logical or
scientific fallacy, but in the fact that they are a means to voice a so-
cial preoccupation that would, otherwise, remain unexpressed, that is,
anguish toward the increasing deconstruction of scientific and also
medical knowledge in the new digital arenas. Semioticians and other
social scholars should, therefore, operate not for the debunking of
such supposed conspiracy theories, but for the creation of a collective
space in which the evident confusion of present–day digital scientific
communication could be raised as a problem, discussed, and possibly
redirected toward more convenient solutions.
As it has been pointed out by art historians, Rembrandt’s canvas
contains an odd detail. There is one more sword in the painting than
Batavians holding them. Rembrandt often introduced such bizarre,
visually illogical clue in his paintings (for instance, the double “right
hand” in The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp, ) so as to sti-
mulate a meta–reading of them. In this case, interpretation is quite
open, but one direction for it could be the following: in depicting
a famous conspiracy, and in visually interpreting the historical con-
spiracy theory of Tacitus, Rembrandt detached himself from it by
visually suggesting, through the presence of this extra sword, that
conspiracy often contains an element of violence that cannot directly
and univocally be attributed to an agent. We see the conspiracy with
 Prefazione / Preface
the mono–eyed point of view that ideology, the Histories of Tacitus,
and Rembrandt’s political clients lend to the viewer of the canvas; it
is a mono–eyed point of view that mirrors the mono–eyed vision of
the supposed conspirator ad infinitum. And yet, in these reflections
of accusations and hostilities, Rembrandt drops a puzzling semiotic
clue: what if this contraposition was actually the result of a sword that
is there but that nobody holds; a sword that is a symbol of unnamed
violence, circulating through society and calling for conspiracies and
anti–conspiracies while remaining completely anonymous? Such is,
perhaps, the most precious suggestion that, with usual irony, Rem-
brandt offers for the study of the subject of conspiracy: do not look
at who supposedly holds the sword, but concentrate, rather, on the
sword that nobody holds, and that nevertheless remains there, in the
center of the scene, instigating violence and counter–violence, con-
spiracies and accusations of conspiracies, divisions and enmities, until
someone (a painter, a semiotician) will be lucid enough to ask the
fundamental question: “but really, why are we fighting?”
The articles of the collection are divided into three broad sec-
tions, “Semiotics of Conspiracy”; “Geographies of Conspiracy”, and
“Themes of Conspiracy”. Most of them were presented at the two
symposia that the University of Potsdam (Prof. Eva Kimminich) and
the University of Turin (Prof. Massimo Leone) organized respectively
in March –,  and June, –, . Our deepest gratitude goes to
all those who took part in these events or contributed to their organi-
zation. Our moved thoughts go also to Umberto Eco, who accepted
to participate in a roundtable at the end of the Turin event, and to give
a lectio magistralis on conspiracy theories on the occasion of the laurea
ad honorem that was conferred to him on the same day.
Some other articles were received and selected through an inter-
national call for papers. All contributions went through double–blind
peer–reviewing and editorial reading.
Both the volume and the symposia benefited from a DAAD grant,
in the framework called “Hochschuldialog mit Südeuropa” (). We
thank the DAAD for such generous support, as well as the administra-
tive staff of the Universities of Potsdam and Turin that so effectively
worked for its management.
P I
LA SEMIOTICA DEL COMPLOTTO
PART I
THE SEMIOTICS OF CONSPIRACY
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Anti-Semitism (and Now Anti-Zionism) as
Prototype of Conspiracy Theory
A Theoretical and Textual Approach
U V*
 : L’antisemitismo (e adesso l’antisionismo) come prototipo
di teoria del complotto: un approccio teoretico e testuale
: This paper is divided in two parts, one theoretical and one textual
and historical. The first one analyzes the seminal proposal of a “conspira-
cy theory of society” made by Karl Popper in  and some dictionary
definitions. A general scheme of conspiracy theory is proposed and then
developed in semiotic terms, showing that every conspiracy theory is
linked to a second conspiracy, that of the “theorist”. In the second part,
anti-Semitism is presented as the prototype of this double plot situation,
with the help of some Biblical texts: from many centuries ago until now,
haters of Jews have used the theory of a potential Jewish conspiracy in
order to attempt at eliminating them. Five theses about the link between
conspiracism and anti-Semitism are presented in the conclusion.
: Conspiracy; Anti-Semitism; Conspiracism; Conspiracy Theory;
Narrative Program.
. Theoretical approach
In order to give a useful contribution on this matter, semiotics must
carefully distinguish between actual conspiracies and paranoiac con-
spiracy thinking (sometime denominated “conspiracism”), the result
of which is often described by the expression “conspiracy theories”
∗ Ugo Volli, Università degli Studi di Torino (ugo.volli@unito.it).

 Ugo Volli
(albeit somehow inaccurately from a semantic point of view, because
there is no actual theoretical dignity in these “theories”). This ex-
pression was introduced by Karl Popper in a marginal but important
observation in his seminal book The open society and its enemies (first
published , now ):
I shall briefly describe a theory which is widely held but which assumes
what I consider the very opposite of the true aim of the social sciences; I
call it the “conspiracy theory of society”. It is the view that an explanation
of a social phenomenon consists in the discovery of the men or groups
who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon (sometimes it
is a hidden interest which has first to be revealed), and who have plan-
ned and conspired to bring it about. This view of the aims of the social
sciences arises, of course, from the mistaken theory that, whatever happens
in society—especially happenings such as war, unemployment, poverty,
shortages, which people as a rule dislike—is the result of direct design by
some powerful individuals and groups. This theory is widely held; it is
older even than historicism (which, as shown by its primitive theistic form,
is a derivative of the conspiracy theory). In its modern forms it is, like
modern historicism, and a certain modern attitude towards “natural laws”,
a typical result of the secularization of a religious superstition. The belief
in the Homeric gods whose conspiracies explain the history of the Trojan
War is gone. The gods are abandoned. But their place is filled by powerful
men or groups—sinister pressure groups whose wickedness is responsible
for all the evils we suffer from—such as the Learned Elders of Zion, or the
monopolists, or the capitalists, or the imperialists. I do not wish to imply
that conspiracies never happen. On the contrary, they are typical social
phenomena. They become important, for example, whenever people who
believe in the conspiracy theory get into power. And people who sincerely
believe that they know how to make heaven on earth are most likely to
adopt the conspiracy theory, and to get involved in a counter–conspiracy
against non–existing conspirators. For the only explanation of their failure
to produce their heaven is the evil intention of the Devil, who has a vested
interest in hell.
Conspiracies are among historical facts, a kind of actually realized
or attempted political actions (with more or less success: there are
successful conspiracies and failed ones, which happen to be the large
majority). In history, of course we often find people secretly plotting
in order to harm or kill they enemies, take power, become the boss,
gain money they don’t deserve, but also in order to obtain freedom
from a foreign power or overthrow a dictator. Think of Brutus & co
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against Julius Caesar; of Pazzi family against Lorenzo de’ Medici, of
Lambert conspiracy against Cromwell etc. There are often “bad”, but
also “good” conspiracies, as the one attempted by the “White rose”, a
German secret society which tried to kill Hitler in .
On the contrary “conspiracy theories” are discourse moves used
in some communicative situations and consisting in explaining some
unpleasant features of reality as the result of a conspiracy; “conspiraci-
sm” is the habit to using this kind of communication moves and false
explanations.
In order to understand better this distinctions from a semiotic point
of view, it is useful to start the analysis with some dictionary definition
of the word “conspiracy”. Conspiracy is
a) an evil, unlawful, treacherous, or surreptitious plan formulated in secret
by two or more persons; plot; b) a combination of persons for a secret, unlaw-
ful, or evil purpose (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/conspiracy);
c) a secret plan made by two or more people to do something that is harmful
or illegal; d) the act of secretly planning to do something that is harmful or
illegal (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conspiracy).
Out of these definitions we can easily obtain some shared semantic
features of “conspiracy”: it is something
a) secret, surreptitious;
b) made by a group;
c) illegal, evil, treacherous, harmful;
d) realized or planned not necessarily realized
Some comment is necessary:
— A conspiracy is secret but to whom? Of course not to those
taking part in it. If some people “unmask” a plot in front of
an audience, as conspiracy theorists always claims to do, the
conspiracy is no secret for them nor any more for their audience
— but necessarily, before being “discovered”, the plot had to be
secret: it was something in stealth among us. This idea of an
enemy within is a strong beginning for this kind of paranoiac
thinking.
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— there is a necessary collective dimension of every conspiracy:
a single enemy is not enough. So who claims of unmasking
a conspiracy is obliged to explain how the group was assem-
bled, what its members had yet in common before enacting the
conspiracy. Because the conspiracy is always a minority action,
this preliminary character that qualifies the conspirators must
be something that make them different from us (the majority,
the people): for instance ethnic origin, political position, family,
religion etc. This attitude of group profiling easily leads con-
spiracy theorist to single out minorities as authors of the plots
they pretend to unmask.
— The illegality of a conspiracy is established by taking the point
of view of those against whom it is directed. Therefore, when
one speaks of conspiracy, he is already taking a position: a
narrative one (stating who is the hero and who are the enemies)
which is the ground for a political standing.
— what matters for conspiracy theorist in attributing to a certain
course of actions or to a group the guilt of conspiracy is its pro-
ject — not only the past actions or these in act in the present,
but also those that the alleged conspirators might try in the
future, or just as possibility: “they could act so and so”. This
displaces the conspiracy in the field of public’s fantasy or fear,
beyond the scope of actual actions. There are many exemples
of historical situations characterized by a popular “big fear”: for
instance what happened in the beginning of French Revolution
and shortly before, masterfully analyzed by Georges Lefebvre
(). On the contrary an achieved and successuful conspiracy
can easily described afterward as “liberation” or “getting rid of
criminals” etc.; the failed plots, who could overthrow the power
but were not able to do it, are of course described as conspira-
cies, at least by their enemies. Hence conspiracies are always
presented and judged mainly as dangers and chances, not as
accomplished actions. This is the reason why this indictment is
always very difficult to reject.
For the moment, let consider this frame from an abstract, semiotic
point of view: in a narration a conspiracy is a narrative program which
is secret from the point of view of the subject/hero and therefore
Anti-Semitism as protype of conspiracy theories 
of the reader; evil and harmful, following the axiology related to
the same point of view; made by people who are perceived as a
minority group. Let us elaborate this point. We must consider that
usually narrations (also third person narrations, if their focalization
is internal, in the terms of Genette []) are exposed from the
point of view of a hero/subject or from that of the helpers (who
consider the hero’s narrative program legitimate and good and any
resistance to its achievement evil/harmful). This suture to the hero
and the consequent positive assessment of his program is a very
usual position for the reader, who in the beginning does not know
who and how many are the possible resisters or adversaries (the
group of opponents), but suspects at all times that someone is plotting
to disrupt his hero’s action: this somewhat anxious uncertainty is
necessary to render the story interesting and the positive solution
joyful (for the hero and for the reader).
So it is evident that from a semiotic point of view that a sort of
conspiracy theory is a very common or even necessary presupposition
in every participatory reading of a story, and more specifically that the
role of conspirator is a position regularly attributed by the participant
of naive reader (Eco’s “first level reader”) to the antisubject and of
his/her helpers (adversaries of the subject). Narrations are always
about conflicts, where we feel placed next and we are led to support
the part narratively closer, that one of which we know the moves —
usually the hero. Enemies, adversaries, competitors are necessarily
mysterious — and evil. What they do against “our hero” is always
somehow a conspiracy.
Of course, the axiology and the related conspiracy theory could be
easily inverted, just changing the narrative look and choosing another
hero. Seen from a distance and without a partecipatory look, indeed,
in a narration we could often easily discern not one but two or more
conspiracies: one for every subject or group competing for the value–
object. If a subject is looking for a treasure or for a loved person, and
others want the same, the subject is a harmful intruder for them, as
they are for him/her. If some group is fighting for its freedom, the
enemy is an oppressor for them but they are a treacherous rebel for
this enemy. In the Odyssey we are called on to see (from Odysseus’
point of view, strongly backed by Homer) a conspiracy of the Suitors,
eager to steal his wife and the kingdom; but (for the Suitors, who are
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not backed from the narrator) there is an evil plot of a stranger; they
don’t know his identity and don’t care about his rights, but eventually
they see that he tries to harm their good life and social role. Hamlet
narrates the conspiracy of Claudius (from the point of view of Hamlet
and therefore of Shakespeare — or rather the other way around); but
you might be willing uncover Hamlet actions as a plot (from the point
of view of Claudius).
In this contest it is very clear that discovering conspiracies (or
pretending to unmasking them) is a very good way to support an
opposite conspiracy. Or rather one could say that the strategy of cha-
racterizing the interests, the narrative project and even the existence
of others as an evil conspiracy is a good strategy for letting one’s
narrative project prevail, at least in the minds and hearts of readers.
In the conspiracy theory there is a double–level semiotic opposition
— with a relevant actantial chiasm. At the enunciated level, “they”,
the conspirators (a secret and evil group) are the antisubject of “our”
legitimate activity. But at the enunciation level, “we”, the unmasking
subject (the narrator, the reader, a represented “good” group), are the
antisubject of their “evil” activity. One must note here two relevant
consequences. This double level is often shown by the fact that there
are two conspiracies within the conspiracy theory: the attributed one
(the one of the alleged conspirators), and the realized one, by the
alleged unmaskers. Their actions have the same critical qualities of
every conspiracy: secret, group, use of illegal means etc.
What matters most for me here is a multilayer structure of kno-
wledge and believing, which is generated by the narration and for
a conspiracy theorist can take the character of conspiracy. In every
narration there are different frames or layers of knowledge, or if we
want come back to Eco’s () terminology, different possible worlds:
a) what the characters know and/or believe (or rather: ( a) what
we understand they know and/or believe, (b) what they say to
know and believe, (c) what the author makes us believe they
know and belief );
b) what the author knows or wants about the possible word he or
she is narrating;
c) what the readers come to know and believe in different time of
the reading;
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d) what the critical reader (or “second–level reader, in Eco’s ter-
minology) come to know and believe.
There is a complex strategic interplay of these different levels,
which can become conspiracy–like. For instance at a certain point
Othello knows that Desdemona loves him, but later he believes he
knows that she betrayed him (this constituting a conspiracy against
him with Cassio and possibly Emilia), and we know that in reality it
was Iago who conspired against him and that Desdemona is actually
innocent; if we are second–level readers, we can wonder if Shake-
speare exploited racial and gender stereotypes in order to mislead
us etc. This is obvious in “artificial narratives”. As we saw, according
to Claudius, Hamlet is a subversive troublemaker, possibly allied to
Fortinbas, conspiring in order to overthrow him. According to Creon,
Antigone is a rebel, according to the Trojans Achilles and Odysseus
are bloodthirsty invaders, etc.
Of course this kind of analysis could be more elaborated, going
on in the path of deconstruction. One could observe that here, with
my previous remarks, I put myself (or pretend “naturally” to be) at a
third level, meta–unmasking the “unmaskers”. I act (or pretend to act)
as a cognitive meta–antisubject. But someone, for instance Umberto
Eco (for instance ), could counter my statements about Homer
and Shakespeare, noting that I am just “using” and not correctly
“interpreting” the text. This possible observation could be certainly
relevant, already in literature and fiction (“artificial narratives”), at
least if the goal of the analysis is understanding those stories, as they
were written and loved by generations of readers.
But in in what Eco (), following Van Dijk, calls “natural” narra-
tives (i. e. history, journalism, all that refers to the real world and not
just to fictional ones)? Here the question is more engaging, because
it entails a judgment about our real world, thus a possible political
engagement. We have to be careful, because conspiracy theories are
popular tools in political struggles, both in positive and negative form,
namely qualifying as conspiracy the simple existence of people appa-
rently opposed to the power, or denying that illegal secret political
actions are conspiracy.
Often, it is difficult to discern between political action and conspi-
racy. When Lenin secretly decided with his comrades to take power
 Ugo Volli
(illegally, of course, according to Russian law of that time, and har-
ming the other parties), was it a conspiracy? A Czarist judge would
probably have thought this way, and so did “bourgeois” witnesses
and historians. The propagandists of the revolutions, including some
famous chroniclers as John Reed (), argued the opposite. The
same could be said more or less for every revolution. And when later
Stalin invented and harshly repressed many (alleged) conspiracies (tho-
se of Trotzki, Bukharin, Kamenev etc, until the antisemitic alleged
“doctor’s plot” [Brent & Naumov ]), the majority of European
“pregressive” intellectuals (for instance Jean Paul Sartre) took position
supporting those conspiracy theories
Conspiracies are usually judged negatively by the public. Therefore
the conspirators mostly deny to be engaged in a real, or “bad” conspi-
racy, trying to justify their conspiratorial behavior by giving reasons
against their enemies, attributing them evil, illegality etc. — namely
telling people that the victims, not they, are involved in a conspiracy.
They were just resisting it. This way, conspiracy often presents itself
as reaction against an another (attributed) conspiracy. Ascribing con-
spiracies to the enemies is often the first step to disqualify and later
destroy them. In history, theories of conspiracies are not just gossip
or childish play, they are powerful political devices, weapons for civil
wars and (actual) conspiracies.
. The antisemitic prototype
The longest and most popular conspiracy theory in the history of
Western (and also Muslim) culture is the anti–semitic one. I will not
follow here the complex and substantially unfounded distinctions
between antisemitism, anti-Judaism, anti-Zionism, Judeophobia and
the various forms of ancient and modern hatred for the Jews, be it
religious, political, racial, economic, literary. Nor will I explain why
antisemitism is not generically hate of a (nonexistent) “Semitic race”,
but only specifically hatred directed against Jews. The discussion of
these questions being not possible here, I can only refer to the very
large scientific literature about this problem (cf. for instance Ben
Sassun , Niremberg ). Let’s define here antisemitism simply
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as hate of the Jews and the will to destroy them as individual or as a
people with its own identity and culture.
Anti-Semitic persecutions were always justified by progressively
elaborated theories of a “Jewish conspiracy”, a “Jewish danger”. The
real and homicide persecution of the Jews, often organized by diffe-
rent political powers, including the Catholic Church, were justified
by attributing to the Jews evil collective actions or projects as the
“deicide” of Jesus, the refusal to recognize the truth of Christianity (or
Islam or Communism) killing kids for taking their blood, poisoning
wells, being “parasites”, “capitalist”, “revolutionary”, trying to rule
the world or actually ruling it, etc. Namely in this frame there was a
Jewish conspiracy behind all the ills of the world. Antisemitism was
presented as the action of unmasking this conspiracy and fighting
against it.
Why the Jews? Jews are a small group, often dispersed among
another people, but able to mantain its different identity, language,
religion, habits. So they are perceived as different and secret. But they
are also among “us”, indistinguishable from “us”, behaving mostly like
“us”, speaking “our” language etc. while keeping different, following
a different religion and different habits and laws, eating other foods
etc. In the antisemitic discourse they have collective goals that are
their, not ours, and therefore must (or just could) be evil. They can
become a danger, just because they are different among us, they are
they and not us, but they are mixed among us. This idea of the Jewish
conspiracy is very old and widespread: analyzing it here is impossible
because of its vastity. The series of authors who shared and spread this
antisemitic conspiracy theory is very long, from Tacitus to Augustine,
from Ambrose to Muhammad, from Erasmus to Luther, from Voltaire
to Kant, Wagner, and of course Hitler. So, antisemitism is certainly the
oldest conspiracy theory living today, and in some way it is the proto-
type of all those theories. Of course I am not claiming that there are
no conspiracism independent from antisemitism. Popper for instance
in his seminal page, that I quoted before, speaks of the conspiracies
attributed by Homer to Greek gods. Many other examples are easy to
find. But antisemitism is the most detailed and developed conspiracy
theory, the most diffused and ancient one. Therefore it became the
model of many other similar theories, from the persecution of the
Templars, to the witch hunt, down until the political repressions of the
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last century. The construction of the figure of the alleged conspirators,
the attribution of secret links, the centrality of the charge of perfidy,
etc. are very similar. And often among the alleged conspirators some
Jew were included, or they were unjustly accused of being Jewish.
It is interesting to consider that there are very early representations
in Jewish scriptures of these antisemitic conspiracy theories, begin-
ning in the book of Exodus (which was written, following different
scientific opinions, between -X and -VII C.). It is useful to consider the-
se early self–descriptions by the victims of conspiracism , not because
they have to be necessarily considered as reliable historical evidence;
the historical value of the Bible was discussed for centuries and this is
not the place just to sum up this debate. But it is extremely interesting
to consider these passages as clues of a real historical experience, ex-
pressions in which the victims have kept memory of the persecution
they underwent.
The most important instance is found in Exodus : –:
And he [the Pharaoh] said unto his people: ‘Behold, the people of the
children of Israel are too many and too mighty for us; come, let us deal
wisely with them, lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that, when there
befalleth us any war, they also join themselves unto our enemies, and fight
against us, and get them up out of the land.’[. . . ] And the Egyptians made
the children of Israel to serve with rigour. And they made their lives bitter
with hard service, in mortar and in brick, and in all manner of service in
the field; in all their service.
The suspect of a possible future conspiracy serves as a pretext for
the actual deadly persecution. We can read also an Egyptian version
of the same history, even more conspiracy style, narrated by Flavius
Josephus ( p. –) quoting the Egyptian priest Manetho (living
around )
Under the pretext of recording fables and current reports about the Jews,
he (Manetho) took the liberty of introducing some incredible tales, wishing
to represent us (the Jews) as mixed up with a crowd of Egyptian lepers
and others, who for various maladies were condemned, as he asserts, to
banishment from the country. Inventing a king named Amenophis, an
imaginary person, the date of whose reign he consequently did not venture
to fix . . . This king, he states, wishing to be granted . . . a vision of the
gods, communicated his desire to his namesake, Amenophis, son of Paapis
(Habu), whose wisdom and knowledge of the future were regarded as
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marks of divinity. This namesake replied that he would be able to see the
gods if he purged the entire country of lepers and other polluted persons.
«Delighted at hearing this, the king collected all the maimed people in
Egypt, numbering ,, and sent them to work in the stone–quarries
on the east of the Nile, segregated from the rest of the Egyptians. They
included, he adds, some of the learned priests, who were afflicted with
leprosy. Then this wise seer Amenophis was seized with a fear that he
would draw down the wrath of the gods on himself and the king if the
violence done to these men were detected; and he added a prediction that
the polluted people would find certain allies who would become masters of
Egypt for thirteen years. He did not venture to tell this himself to the king,
but left a complete statement in writing, and then put an end to himself.
The king greatly disheartened».
The details of the two narrations are very different, but there are
some very important similar elements. What is interesting for us in
this first account of the antisemitic conspiracy theory, is the idea of
people living “among us”, but different, becoming powerful and well
connected who could become dangerous and therefore must be eli-
minated before they get the opportunity of attacking. The attribution
of a conspiracy is the premise for an attempted genocide.
The same frame present itself in the book of Esther (written in IV
or III C. BCE). Let us consider the story in its steps (http://www.bible-
history.com/oldtestament/bookofesther.html):
a) Queen Vashti, the wife of the Persian ruler Ahasuerus, is de-
posed for her refusal to appear before the guests of the king
(Esther );
b) The choice of Esther as Queen, after an involved process of
selection (Esther :–);
c) Mordecai discovers a plot against the life of the king (Esther
:–);
d) Haman’s plot to destroy the Jews (Esther –). Because of the
refusal of Mordecai to pay homage to Haman, a man “above
all the princes” in the Persian government, the latter influenced
the King to issue a decree calling for the extermination of the
Jews. Mordecai persuaded Esther to intervene, at the risk of her
life, on the Jews’ behalf;
e) Esther’s successful petition (Esther –:). Finding favor with
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Ahasuerus, Esther revealed the heinous plot of Haman. The
result was that Haman was hanged and Mordecai received his
long–deserved honor for having saved the king’s life;
f ) The deliverance of the Jews (Esther :–:). Although the
decree of the King concerning the Jews could not be rescinded,
it was counteracted by the issuing of another decree which
allowed the Jews to defend themselves;
g) The Feast of Purim (Esther :–). To celebrate their delive-
rance, the Jews instituted the feast of Purim. This feast is still
observed and is a time of great joy among Jews;
h) A description of Mordecai’s greatness (Esther ): http://www.bible-
history.com/oldtestament/bookofesther.html).
There is plot and counterplot and counter–counterplot. . . But only
the attempt to exterminate the Jews is ideologically motivated, this
way (Esther ):
. And Haman said unto king Ahasuerus: There is a certain people scattered
abroad and dispersed among the peoples in all the provinces of thy kingdom;
and their laws are diverse from those of every people; neither keep they the
king’s laws; therefore it profiteth not the king to suffer them. . If it please
the king, let it be written that they be destroyed.
This is the Hebrew text. It is worth considering the longer Septua-
ginta version (:b-g), which is clearer
Whereas I reigned over many nations, and had brought all the world under
my dominion, I was not willing to abuse the greatness of my power, but
to govern my subjects with clemency and lenity,[. . . ]. But when I asked
my counsellors how this might be accomplished, one [. . . ], Aman by name,
Told me that there was a people scattered through the whole world, which
used new laws, and acted against the customs of all nations, despised the
commandments of kings, and violated by their opposition the concord of all
nations. Wherefore having learned this, and seeing one nation in opposition
to all mankind using perverse laws, and going against our commandments,
and disturbing the peace and concord of the provinces subject to us, We
have commanded that all whom Aman shall mark out,[. . . ] shall be utterly
destroyed by their enemies, with their wives and children, and that none
shall have pity on them. [. . . ] That these wicked men going down to hell in
one day, may restore to our empire the peace which they had disturbed.
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The point is the same of the Exodus. Those to be exterminated are
attributed an evil plot against the kingdom and the whole mankind.
The conspiracy presents itself as a counter–conspiracy. But, for one
reason or the other, it fails and what prevails is the counter–counter–
conspiracy led by Mordechai (or in the Exodus by Moshe), which in
fact gives freedom and life to the oppressed.
But why do they have to be exterminated? Because they are “a
people scattered through the whole world, which used new laws, and
acted against the customs of all nations, despised the commandments
of kings, and violated by their opposition the concord of all nations”
(Esther). Because they are “too many and too mighty for us” (Exodus).
Well, not as many and as powerful as “we” are, but enough to become
a possible antisubject in a possible future story. The same pattern will
be repeated many times in history, up to Hitler and to the current
charges against “the Jewish finance” and Israel. But then there is
another charge. In a mythical past they refused to recognize our
laws, our Prophet, our Messiah, our Party. From a semiotic point of
view, we should remark that in these conspiracy theories, the first
step is a cognitive modality: some pepole is singled out because they
“refuse to recognize the Truth” (what “we” know as the Truth) and
therefore they should be blind or evil. The second step is a practical
one: being insensible to the Truth they could perform the Evil, they
are dangerous and wicked. But before that there is a negative identity
(“not to be”): they are dangerous because they refuse (or even cannot,
for “racial” reasons, as it was decided in Christian Spain after the
ouster of the Jew, well before the Nazi Germany) to deny themselves
in order to became part of “us”, tu let “us” assimilate them. Being
other, the Other, is their sin.
Conspiracy theories are cumulative, they persist in time and get
ever more detailed.
This happened for antisemitism, which went from the Egyptians
to the Romans and then on to the Fathers of the Church and to the
general Christian society, until the Shoah. In the beginning it is very
simple: . Jews are powerful, . they follow their laws, not ours .
therefore they could be dangerous . They must be destroyed.
Progressively this kind of thoughts become more complex. For
instance there are “figures” (in the semiotic sense) of the Jews that are
used for supporting the antisemitic theory of conspiracy, as the spider,
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the puppet, the octopus, the multitude of mouths, the leash — and
also the Star of David, used a sign of a secret identity or the strange
story about the “wandering” of Jews as a punishment for their “lack of
faith”. They are attributed negative physical characteristics, such as the
stink and a long nose, or moral ones like lust and insensitivity. There
are typical allegations against the Jews which express antisemitism,
such as the blood libel, that Jews kill the children to use their blood to
knead the unleavened bread they use for Easter, poison wells, spread
diseases, starve the people, practice usury.
All of these item were developed in some precise time of time,
most of them in Christian medieval and modern Europe. But they
are yet in use today, albeit mostly against the State of Israel (“the Jew
of nations”).To give just one example, the blood libel has become the
false accusation for Israel to collect the organs of the dead bodies of
Arabs killed in defense operations to make trade of them.
It is useful quoting here the European “working definition of Anti-
Semitism (http://www.antisem.eu/projects/eumc-working-definition-
of-antise mitism/):
Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as
hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism
are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property,
toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.
In addition, such manifestations could also target the state of Israel,
conceived as a Jewish collectivity. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews
with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for
“why things go wrong”. It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and
action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.
Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools,
the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the
overall context, include, but are not limited to:
Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the
name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical alle-
gations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as,
especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy
or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal
institutions.
Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined
wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts
committed by non-Jews.
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Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionali-
ty of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist
Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the
Holocaust).
Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or
exaggerating the Holocaust.
Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged
priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.
Examples of the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself with regard
to the State of Israel taking into account the overall context could include:
Denying the Jewish people their right to self–determination, e.g., by
claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or
demanded of any other democratic nation.
Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g.,
claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the
Nazis.
Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.
Antisemitism is thus also today the prototypical conspiracy theory.
I would like to conclude this paper by proposing four thesis about this
point:
a) Every form of antisemitism (including Christian and Islamic
anti-Judaism, anti-Zionism etc.) includes a form of conspiracy
theory;
b) Antisemitism is the most ancient and constant form of conspi-
racy theory and therefore constitutes its prototype;
c) Antisemitism did not end with the World War II, it continues
and flourishes today;
d) Conspiracy theories aren’t just another form of folk tale, they
are a form of communication war. The same is true for antise-
mitism. There is someone who knowingly spreads it — even if
they sincerely believe in it;
e) The figures of “classical” antisemitism are used now, in upda-
ted but well recognizable form, in order to isolating, blaming,
demonizing the State of Israel.
 Ugo Volli
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. Prolegomena
As background for the rising of conspiratorial interpreting, two deve-
lopments have to be taken into consideration. On the one hand, the
increasing individualization of our society, by which the interpretation
authority on official interpretation content has been more and more
dissolved. On the other hand, the development of new communication
techniques has initiated a profound societal change with regard to
how information is handled. Mistrust in official authorities, as well as
in official information has resulted in the claim that everyone holds
views of current events and of course also in the claim that these
views are the only true ones. Ever since the First Persian Gulf War,
but especially since the beginning of the European Financial Crisis, an
increase in individual interpretation attempts can be noticed. It is the
result of a growing skepticism about politics among citizens and their
doubting the truth content of official information. This explains the ri-
sing production of constructions of social realities and reality excerpts
with a conspiratorial nucleus. Thus conspiratorial interpreting in time
has become a part of the everyday self–evident handling of informa-
tion for whose part it has gained popularity. In consequence, we are
confronted with a variety of different points of view competing with
each other. The construction of reality, which was previously bound
to unquestionable aggregation of power, seems to be crumbling in a
mosaic of interpretation proposals — those in turn give individuals
the impression that they could or would have to construct realities
themselves. Therefore, the boom of conspiracy theories (CTs) has
particularly to be seen as connected to the increasing information
supply in the internet. Countless websites suggest to their visitors
that they have finally found the truth and the real causes behind the
disturbing developments. At the core, there is thus a competition
between interpretation patterns within the semantic field of societal
reality construction — a semantic field which is already stretched by
the media. Thus we have to focus less on CTs as narrative entities, but
on fragments of conspiratorial interpreting, exploiting and interrela-
ting all kind of information and interpretations of information spread
by the media.
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. Theoretical approach
According to Umberto Eco (cf. article of Massimo Leone in this volu-
me), the knowledge of our social reality is based on stories, offering
interpretation patterns for understanding and acting in everyday life.
CTs are also interpretation patterns which refer to events, develop-
ments in social reality and to individuals of public life. They are thus
to be seen as a component of social reality construction, as has alrea-
dy been pointed out also by the sociology–of–knowledge point of
view (cf. Anton/Schetsche  and Anton/Schetsche/Walter ),
anchored in a constructivist model of culture and society. As a start,
we therefore take the model of S. J. Schmidt who considers culture in
general as an operating system (Kulturprogramm) for society steering
all communicative, interpretative, evaluative and narrative processes,
thus the clusters of perception of social realities, social groups, events
or developments which always are connected with differentiation and
evaluation. (cf. Schmidt : –, –, Schmidt (Viehoff ) :
–, –) This operating system is providing the semantic
categories and the central cognitive concepts for differentiation and
interpretation. They offer its members guidelines for evaluating and
visualizing the naming of perceptions or differences in advance and
with this also for the practices of everyday life. It is therefore about
the process of orientation in semantic space which, in a way, creates
its own ontology via the prerequisites of its setting and the setting of
its prerequisites. This operating system is to be seen as a collective
construction kit for reproducing and securing a common world view
as well as its fundamentals of behavior. To this end it must be repro-
duced by the individual. The latter thus has to be conceived as a scene
of the production of meaning, from which also deviant applications
of the collective construction kit are emanating. (cf. Schmidt (Viehoff )
: ) In semiotic terms this means that semiosis should be seen as
a crucial point for the construction of social realities. Within a society
having a sophisticated system of media, the constructiveness of the
common view of social realities is going hand in hand with a multi–
level observation, which causes on the one side the unobservability
of the whole cohesion of the construction. On the other side in an
individualized society doubting its own interpretive agencies, the indi-
vidual as intersection point of social systems — and in our case more
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precisely of various interpretation patterns — consequently becomes
more active in observing and in producing digressive interpretations
of social realities. In the case of an exploitation of those digressive
interpretations, generally recognized interpretations of social realities
can be undermined, so that a decomposition of the common view of
social developments can be set in motion.
For the analysis of the social surface of this operating system mani-
fest in cultural rules, rites and laws, illustrated by myths, metaphors
and pictures, suitable concepts have already been presented, particu-
larly within discourse analysis, cognitive linguistics and semiotics. The
analysis of social paradigms (Foucault () ) and key metaphors
shows how social discourses and their patterns can influence people’s
world views by shifting the evaluative categories of the construction
of social reality, of the self and the other through linguistic or pictorial
means. On a cognitive level Max Black has, within the framework
of Filter Theory that is based on synoptic thinking, described the
interaction of implication systems in metaphorical transmission (cf.
Black , ). In pointing out the phenomena of mapping and
framing, Lakoff, Johnson and successors (cf. Lakoff, Johnson , cf.
Schröder ) have alluded to the principle of conceptualization as
inherent to the process of thinking and to bodily experience as well.
It is in turn connected to the metaphorical transmission processes of
hiding and highlighting, used particularly in political discourses (cf.
Wehling, Lakoff ). Within therapeutic application, reframing has
since also been popularized as NLP (Neuro-Linguistic programming),
based on the idea that by changing linguistic patterns, the perception
of oneself, of the other or of specific situations can be changed (cf.
Walker ). NLP has often been criticized as pseudo–science, but
recently its effects have again become subject of research.
Within Lotman’s concept of semiosphere (cf. Lotman ) Schmidts’
conceptualization of culture as an operating system can be visualized
and inspected in a holistic perspective. As a semiotic space, assembling
every sign system, used and produced by a society, arranged in various
subspheres, which compete with each other by a permanent transfer
of their elements, the semiosphere allows the insight in the processes
of transfer. It is situated in the spaces of the contact aureoles in between
the subspheres, conceived as a sum of bilingual filters of translation (cf.
Lotman : ). Thus like Schmidt Lotman conceives of the system
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as the starting point for the creation of any text, as well as world views,
images of the self or of the other etc.. Schmidt underlines also the fact,
that any programmatic set does only exist in its application, meaning
that the individuals’ interpretations can have much more impact than
is admitted by so called objectivist reflection, hiding the importance of
semiosis. In a socio–semiotic setting, which combines Lotman’s concept
of semiosphere with the structural semantics of Greimas (cf. Persello
), the development of CTs and their interaction with regard to
the semiosis can be unfolded. Hence, with Greimas’ semiotic square
the nature of Lotman’s translation can be specified as a transformation
having a precise ambition: the confrontation of two opposite narratives
and their internal programmatic settings in order to appropriate and
dominate.
Concerning semiotic research targeted on CTs, the combination
and reframing of interpretation clusters is described by the notion of
code text (cf. Madisson ). The code text is to be understood as
a base narrative which consists of two logics: one of a mythological
and Manichean kind (the world is in a constant battle between good
and evil) and a descriptive one (the conspirators are a highly organi-
zed subgroup, striving for world domination, the destruction of their
enemies, etc.). Such code texts are then combined with specific con-
texts. By purposefully employing symbols and metaphors, relations
are created between pop–cultural, everyday knowledge set pieces, as
well as mythical and modern fiction–fantasy narratives and historical
events or scientific interpretation patterns (cf. Madisson ; Hubbes
).
Since CTs against the background of sociocultural constructivism
are to be seen as a shifting of the perception of social realities by telling
competing stories, all claiming the absolute truth, these approaches
have to be theoretically combined and enlarged for the description
of how current interpretations of sociopolitical events are modified
to suit the recipient of the message — so that he or she can incorpo-
rate them into the propagated conspiratorial interpretation pattern,
destined to be itself adapted by the recipient; in short: how the re-
construction of reality construction is organized and simultaneously,
with regard to the recipients, how it is masqueraded as their own
autonomous act of cognition of reality and detection of truth.
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. Websites for ‘alternative’ information and terminological pro-
positions for the description of the generation and implemen-
tation of conspiratorial interpreting
Since around , there has been a boom of websites claiming to pro-
vide the pretended true information as well as true interpretations of
sociopolitical events. Around  of them have been monitored in Ger-
many because of their anti-Islamic statements. Their argumentation
strategies have therefore been analyzed within the scope of gauging
the danger of their discriminative effects (cf. Schiffer ). But these
websites are also a gold mine for the creation of CT discourse, as can
also be seen with the example of PEGIDA (cf. Dizdarevíc/Hamdi in
this volume).
In the following, one of this websites, PI News (Politically Incorrect
News), is analyzed in order to show how the interpretation of facts
and events and thus the construction of reality of their website visitors
can be influenced. What is demonstrated is the structure of a construc-
t’s reconstruction of social reality excerpts and the strategies of the
associated processes of re–interpretation as well as last but not least
the strategies which facilitate the implementation of the “PI truths” in
the website visitors own work of reality construction. Thus, we have
to deal with a fragmentation of reality constructs and a resemantiza-
tion of reality elements with the purpose to change the construction
of their meaning. For this, first of all a common ground is necessary.
It is produced by disposing of a selection of reality elements, social
subjects, interpretations generally discussed in media and politics,
popular pictures and common citations — which we call modules
— as well as an equally important set of semantic differentiations for
the re–evaluation. With all of this a semantic space is created, into
which the website visitors have to be invited. We call this courting.
Once entered in the semantic space, a process can be triggered, which
we call grounding — meaning that the visitor can look for modu-
les compatible with his own fears, hopes or speculations. Grounding
needs therefore a kind of mental meeting point. It is about keywords
of public discussions teasing the website visitor. At these meeting
points transmission and re–evaluation processes are initiated, because
in this moment two constructs are present and the new one has to be
truthified. Grounding, courting, re–evaluation and truthifying thus are
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the basic stages of the process for the re–construction of constructions
of reality. They can concur.
In the following analysis, I focus on the structure of the semantic
space of PI News and its meeting points to describe in detail how
grounding, courting, re–evaluation and truthifying is happening on
this website. This means how semantic differentiations are re–evalued,
how the interpretations of events, images of the self and of the other
are foisted on website visitors, and how their reflection is navigated
by the keywords, the code text and the pictures. (For the technose-
miotic functions on the level of the website’s lay–out, providing the
connection points to other websites cf. Erdmann in this volume.)
. Analysis of the website Politically Incorrect News
PI News was launched in  and contributed to by Stefan Herre,
Udo Ulfkotte and Willi Schwend, chairman of the Federal Associa-
tion of Civil Movements (Schiffer : ). As the most popular
right–wing populist and islamophobic hate–speech blog, it has been
classified as dangerous for the pluralistic society. In October  the
website therefore has been subject to an intentionally provoked DDoS
attack (Denial of Service), but instantly reacted with an emergency
blog service for its supporters. Therein the breakdown of the website
was explicated as a war against the German People and as a sign of a
beginning dictatorship:
The federal government has declared war on the German people and has
both the media and the asylum lobby as strong allies. The freedom of
speech shall be de facto abolished in social networks, such as Facebook,
[. . . ] PI — as a “battleship for freedom of speech” — therefore is a thorn in
the side of Quran–adherents, their lobbies, the left opinion–fascists, as well
as the dictatorship currently in the making, which have all been verbally
attacked and realistically depicted by us for many years.
As the citation illustrates, all kinds of characteristics ascribed to
conspiratorial thinking are observable on this website. It sums up the
. In January  PI-authors criticize being blocked again because of their ‘unadjusted
coverage’ on the incidents during New Years’ Eve  in Cologne (young women had
been sexually abused and robbed by refugees).
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nucleus of the CT, its keywords and the self–image of the PI-makers.
The home page’s headline first of all gives an overview to the website
visitor: Home, Contact, Guidelines, PI wants you, PI-groups, PI-TV,
Make a donation, Publishing on PI and PI in English; these categories
are to be seen as the main modules. On the vertical right and left
side of the webpage different submodules are available. In the main
module Guidelines the website creators do not only explain their moti-
vation and goals, they also provide the keywords of the code text. The
first text points out a basic right for information and individual opi-
nion and criticizes the political correctness of the mainstream media,
which are responsible for deficient or falsified information. Distancing
themselves as an in–group, the creators underline their commitment
for the right to information and individual opinion. Therefore, they
want to pick up taboo topics in order to contradict the dictate of poli-
tical correctness. Hence, we can formulate the following statement
as the basic code text of the conspiratorial reasoning of this site: the
political correctness of mainstream media is the origin of deficient or
falsified information. This code text self–empowers PI administrators
and supporters to search for allegedly true information. Thereby, a
legitimization of a search for the truth, as well as an authority over the
truth of the presented alternative interpretation patterns is initiated.
Psychological research on CTs already pointed out that the con-
struction of CTs is raising the self–esteem of conspiracy theorists and
creating in- and out–groups (cf. for example Hebenstreit ). Addi-
tionally, their supporters attest them the competence of screening the
only true interpretation of ongoing events. Thus, the dichotomy of
false and true follows the dichotomy of bad and evil, providing also
the PI visitors with an aura of truth — they become something akin
to warriors for the truth and fighters for basic rights. This is illustrated
by some other links, such as the one to the German Defence League,
which is pretending to fight against all fascist ideologies. This is visua-
lized by the picture of a chevalier with escutcheon and weapons (last
access June ), currently ( January ) you can see a chevalier in
armament with the angry slogan of the local league of Hildesheim:
“Stop the invasion. Otherwise we will do it”.
As another important characteristic of CTs, it has been stated that
while at the same time they present a culprit, they provide a release
for this act of denomination. We find this strategy of release in the
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next paragraph entitled “Constitutional law and human rights” of the
Guidelines. It details why the basic rights are in danger: apparently
due to multiculturalism eroding our civil rights. Multiculturalism is —
as is specified — the acceptance of Islamic ethics and culture which
at the same time are generating parallel societies. Those in turn are
denying the western basic rights. Therefore, as the authors conclude,
the principles of Islamic thought not only influence German citizens,
but also media and politics. This explains, from the perspective of the
PI creators, why official media present crimes like forced marriage
and honor killing as cultural assets. They thus distance themselves
from this kind of politically correct reporting. They do not want to
bow to multiculturalism, but instead take their duty as citizens (that is,
as patriots) seriously, which consists of showing solidarity with all the
people who do not want to ignore what is supposedly really going on,
namely the Islamization of Germany.
In conclusion, the PI creators point out again that mainstream
media information is based on political correctness and starry–eyed
idealism, and that everybody who says what is really going on will
automatically be defamed. Here, we can clearly observe a previously
mentioned characteristic of CTs: that while at the same time they
present a culprit, they also provide a release for this act of denomina-
tion. Concurrently, prejudice is presented as observation of a claimed
societal truth.
It is not astonishing that the next paragraph is entitled “Against
the Islamization of Europe”. The PI contributors present Europe
again as indoctrinated by the Islamic thought, law and culture. By
juxtaposing mosques, forced marriages and honor killings, as well
as juxtaposing immigration of Muslims and Sharia, they are drafting
a climate of danger and violence for women, Jews and Christians,
reminding the website visitors of the fact that in Islamic countries
there is no freedom of opinion and information, meanwhile also
reminding them of the fact that the Jihad is targeting the absorption
and domination of Western culture. Additionally, they also warn that
this goal is prescribed by the Quran.
The code text can thus be enlarged now as follows: The political
correctness of main stream media supports multiculturalism and
therefore is pro-Islamic. Thus, it is a citizen’s duty to criticize the
pro-Islamic self–censorship of mainstream media in order to prevent
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the Islamization by divulging information allegedly suppressed by
mainstream media. The dualist good and evil — or right and wrong —
scheme is evident. We also find it at the bottom of the page visualized
by cheerleader figures in sexist comic style wearing T-shirts with
banderoles: “Maria instead of Sharia” and “Islamophobic but sexy”. In
the course of , the growing number of migrants is observably used
as evidence for an advanced Islamization of Germany and its dangers
for German people. The latter is proven with faked reports about
migrants assaulting Germans, particularly the elderly, and touching
or even raping women. The aggression against women in Cologne
mentioned above therefore has been particularly welcome to PI’s
authors as they could be interpreted as further proof within the
framework of their xenophobic argumentation and their coverage
which is politically incorrect but true in their eyes.
The keywords ‘right for information’, ‘right for true information’,
‘political correctness’, ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘Islamization’ are the pil-
lars of the code text and the common theme of all reasoning presented
in the various submodules of the site. Thus, they are the meeting
points where re–interpretation and re–evaluation takes place. In order
to do this, suitable contexts in the sense of implication complexes
have to be provided for a shift in meaning and in constructs of social
reality.
Let us analyze the function of these keywords. The right to in-
formation is a general property and as meeting point gathers many
citizens since it appears neutral. This meeting point is therefore espe-
cially apt for courting. It is due to this that PI features a special category
(as one of the main modules) trying to motivate the website visitor
to participate. It has the title: “PI wants you! Good noses wanted!”
By this, website visitors are motivated to become active and provide
the page with information which is not presented in the mainstream
media. By using the metaphor good nose, PI creators advance website
visitors a good sense of truth, as the good noses are employed in cri-
me detecting. In using this metaphor, the website visitor as potential
informant enters the aura of working for justice and is released from
any denouncement in advance.
The front picture — the teaser of this category — contains itself
a message. By using the well–known Uncle Sam motif recruiting
soldiers, the importance of each single person is highlighted, who
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at the same time enter an army fighting for the truth. The various
battalions of this army are summed up in the category PI Groups
showing a map of the local groups in Germany, Switzerland, Austria,
Czech Republic and listing the respective contacts.
The deduced keyword ‘right to true information’ evokes an addi-
tional implication complex: that of independent thinking, which is
repeatedly triggered in several submodules, for example by the link
to a book illustrating why most people cannot see the truth: The
most popular brainwashing techniques of globalization fans. It ex-
ploits in a CT-typical way the enemy image, that the conspirators are
using as brainwashing techniques for blinding the masses (cf. Dizdare-
vic/Hamdi in this volume, Heading .). The description of the book
is mashing together popular techniques such as the above mentioned
Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP), common psychological ter-
minology and citations of literature or films, like  from George
Orwell or The Matrix () directed by Andy and Wachowski, into a
conspiratorial argumentation which intends to show website visitors
how they are programmed in their perception through politics and
its politically correct information. For this purpose, metaphors are
used which create a pattern of two possible self–perceptions: namely
as a victim of the conspiracy or as an autonomous, self–liberating
individual: “The strategies of external control and decision–making
for citizens that were not dealt with within the NLP literature . . .
show you how and why your legs are pulled”. The German metaphor
for pulling someone’s leg is to pull someone by the nose. The text
uses the expression pulled by the nose ring. The metaphor nose ring
suggests that an inherently strong individual, represented by the bull,
is put before the cart through brainwashing by foreigner–friendly
democrats.
The way this programming takes place is explained via the virus–
metaphor, illustrating how brainwashing works:
Those mental viruses circumnavigate the consciousness, turn o ff the indi-
vidual thought process and deactivate the very survival mechanisms that
the evolution has given us (individuals, communities, nations or societies).
They can thus be lethal.
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Figure . Submodule of PI-News: Foreign rule needs democratic censorship of language.
Do you like the Newspeak mind police?
These mental viruses are, as is suggested, the ‘globalization virus’
as well as the ‘guilt virus’. The former is coupled with the keyword
multiculturalism, the latter with political correctness, which prevents
the truth from being reported. In order to receive the truth, people
thus first have to deprogram themselves. Since the feeling of guilt is
“reserved for idiots”, there are links to further information on the
vertical right–hand side of the webpage, proposing for example a
“psycho–political communication coaching”, entitled “German libe-
ration psychology”, offered by Wolfgang R. Grunwald, “director
of the Institute for research on political brainwashing and liberation
psychology” or a link to the blog “Impulses for lateral thinkers and
self–liberation”. The last site in allusion to Orwells’ romance offers a
translation of “Newspeak notions” used in politically correct informa-
tion and a “Newspeak mind police” (Fig. ) commenting on the true
meaning of notions used in mainstream discourses.
. The ex–business–manager, ex–lobbyist and NLP-Master calls himself an expert for
commercial and political communication.
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The meeting point ‘right for true information’ thus is a place of a
deprogramming. And as is shown in the call “Detox yourself !”, de-
programming is equated with detoxication — from politically correct
information of course. The website visitor, who is called to coope-
rate, hereby acquires instructions for his own actions, for example:
“Throw the enemy’s effective psycho war weapon out of your life —
the TV. The same goes for mainstream newspapers!” The latter are
also depicted in the category Guidelines, namely the main German
daily newspapers. As alternative source of information, PI provides its
own PI TV documentaries and a list of books edited by the publishing
companies Kollateral and J. Fischer. The PI TV documentaries stage
current events in CT-specific scenarios and imply immediate danger.
On the homepage of the named publishing companies, visitors are
addressed with “Be courageous and use your intellect”. The titles of
the published books correspond with the code text and the keywords
of the PI News site, for example: “Black book of the alternative lying
press”. “How the alternative media drive us into a socialist global
government”. People who buy this books are, as is suggested, mem-
bers of millions of Germans who realize that journalists are bought
and thus that the mainstream press cannot be trusted. There are also
several books about the world power America and its conspiratorial
plans, or about the regime of the Rothschild family, as well as about
the new wave of migration, which of course is linked to Islamization,
and the therefore as absolutely necessary predicated patriotism. By
reading these books one will become an insider, as is indicated.
Enabled to know and to recognize the truth, (convinced) website
visitors themselves and their personal interpretations are truthified.
This turns them into heroines and heroes who enlighten the blinded
masses, even when they are defamed for it, as illustrated by a photo
posted on December ,  (Fig. , not available anymore).
It was taken at a PEGIDA demonstration in December  and
selected as the press photo of  by the PI administrators. The detai-
led interpretation beneath suggests the user a reversal of categories of
good and bad. This is discussed within the context of self–image and
enemy image:
A female PEGIDA demonstrator with a flag of Germany walks alone to-
wards the Black Block [left protesters] — she’s stopped by a policeman.
 Eva Kimminich
Figure . Pictorial submodule of PI-News: PEGIDA demonstration in December
, selected as the press photo of  by the PI administrators.
For our politicians she is a ‘trouble maker’, she belongs to the evil of this
country. The good people on the other hand are the black guys in the right
part of the picture. For us, this brave woman is a heroine [. . . ]. A brave
demonstrator with the colors of our freedom, a policeman, who knows the
distribution of power here, and on the right the minions of power, of the
Gaucks and Merkels, eagerly waiting to land the first punch. For us, this
symbolic picture is the press photo of .
The photo editing directs this heroism through a golden–red
lighting of the row of houses in the back, as well as through the
risen heroine that in the end is the defamed victim. PI’s authors use
photos purposefully for an emotional highlighting of the nucleus
of their CT and particularly of the role models, since they are the
idealized prototype of the courted website visitor.
Let us come back to the keyword ‘political correctness’. Its re–
evaluation is fueled by the connection with ‘multiculturalism’, which
is leading back to the central message: the apprehended ‘Islamization’.
It is truthified by various submodules of the webpage. First of all with
a counter for the dead bodies connected to Islamist suicide attacks
and by a series of personal reports in the categories “My way to the
critique of Islam”, “Like I experienced the enrichment of culture [Kul-
turbereicherei]” and “My love for Germany”. In the first one, avowed
critics of Islam report their alleged experiences with Muslims who
disdain Christian values and German Culture, or with having been
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called a “Christian pig” which made them change their formerly naive
and trustful mind as do–gooders. The notion “Kulturbereicherei” is
to be understood ironically. It reduces and taunts the argumentation
imputed to the globalists and left democrats arguing for multicultura-
lism. “My love for Germany” provides confessional texts from Polish,
Dutch, Indonesian or Ukrainian immigrants. On the one hand, most
of them point out that they encountered no problems with integra-
tion and that helpful Germans made their start into a new life easier.
On the other hand, they criticize other foreigners, particularly Tur-
kish and Arabian Muslims, because of their unwillingness to integrate,
which is why they should not live in Germany. Last but not least, there
is the example of a Portuguese on the issue of the German feeling of
guilt because of Hitler — thus reminding the attentive website visitor
of the “guilt virus”, explained in the submodule analyzed above, and
illustrating its effects. She therefore warns Germans against Islam,
as it is “more than a religion”, by appealing to the pride of being
German, and she even promises to leave Germany for the sake of
Germany and Germans in case of a potentially necessary politics of
expulsion:
I live as a foreigner in Germany, I go to work and thus earn the money to
be able and allowed to live here. I pay my taxes and also the parental share
for my child’s place in kindergarten. I’m glad that I may and can do this
[. . . ] but I can’t understand you Germans [. . . ] where is your pride? Do you
still think that you have to take responsibility for something that none of
you has done? I also take pride in my country in spite of the existence of
a Mr Salazar [. . . ] can’t you be proud of your country because there was
a Mr Hitler? Please realize that Islam is not just a religion [. . . ] Islam says
about itself that it will replace previous forms of government. Do what is
best for your country and your values [. . . ] and should the consequence be
the claim “foreigners go home”, I would freely return to my home country,
just because Germany and the Germans have grown on me and I don’t
want this Germany ceasing to exist.
By this kind of modules authentificating the predications by al-
legedly lived experiences, xenophobia and nationalism are not only
suggested but legitimized. They are also implicitly hidden in the va-
luation of the keywords by legitimizing political incorrectness as the
gateway for truth, as has been explained above. Facebook comments
show that this message is well received (cf. Erdmann in this volume).
 Eva Kimminich
Figure . Structure of reconstruction of construction of social reality and the
process of pre–orientation of semiosis
. Conclusion
Let us sum up: The structure of conspiratorial reconstruction of con-
struction of social reality excerpts and the process of reinterpretation
and implementation can be schematized by a set of lego pieces (Fig.
).
The kit delivers social realities by formulating them in simplified
modules; on the one hand they offer common knowledge pieces,
implications and interpretations, on the other hand the CT typical
re–interpretations are offered, characterized by a specific code text for
organizing the modules provided by the website into a set of bipolar
semantic categories for (re)evaluation; last but not least they provide
personal reports generating authenticity for the main predications
in order to truthify them. The interpretation of reality and reality
excerpts which can be constructed therefrom is pre–oriented through
this, meaning infiltrated by alternative — in our case conspiratorial —
constructs. The pre–orientation of semiosis happens:
. Not all strategies could be analyzed here, for example the thruthifying by citations
of familiar politicians by being re–contextualized or deformed.
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— via the choice of content from the offered exchangeable mo-
dules (for predications, for authentification of predications, for
re–interpretation and re–evaluation of interpretations) within
the PI website as a subsphere.
— via the code text which insinuates the combination and chaining
of modules
— via the marking of the modules with teasers in behalf to beco-
me mental meeting points for an argumentative pre–orientation
of the website visitors’ cognition.
That is, they are, on the semantic level, marked with generally
known highly discussed keywords, quotes, metaphors, neologisms
(like “Kulturbereicherei”) or image motifs, which grab the attention.
The cognitive work of the courted website visitor thus is merely
to combine the right sets of categories with the implicated complexes
presented by the modules in the secluded semantic space of the PI
website. The contents of the modules and submodules correspond
with themselves; some of them are transmitting predications and
interpretations, others are destined to truthify the main predications
and the keywords of the conspiratorial interpretation as could be
observed with the analysis of pretended autobiographical letters and
reports or by an allegedly scientific research. The thereby generated
constructions can vary, but they are all made with the same material,
thus they cannot deviate much from the code text, being the hidden
construction manual.
Thus the website visitors as potential adherents are given the im-
pression that they develop their own reality construct themselves
based on the detection of a truth, hidden or falsified by mainstream
information, which is permitting them the allegedly ‘true’ interpreta-
tion. This effect is on the one hand achieved by providing apparently
broad and impartial information. On the other hand by inserting
an alternative programmatic set for the evaluation of this informa-
tion. In terms of socio–semiotics this is what happens in the contact
aureoles between sub and main spheres of the semiosphere: the tran-
sformation or reinterpretation of interpretations of social realities into
deviant ones. It happens in the sense of a directed application of the
Greismasian semantic square and its dichotomist structure, opposing
a politically incorrect reporting (connected with the danger of Isla-
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mization, legalized xenophobia and patriotism) to the main socially
agreed programmatic set of a politically correct reporting (connected
with multiculturalism, globalization and do–gooding as result of a
successful brainwashing).
The last but nevertheless important observation, which can be
made, is that PI’s authors are impacting the process of semiosis by
externalizing its mechanism, the latter thereby becomes a blind spot.
Thus, step by step the combinations and possible interpretations of
the implicative complexes provided as a modularized construct of
social reality, meaning a construct reduced in simplified knowledge
and information packages, are steered — even if or precisely because
the website visitors is given the impression of being deprogrammed
or deprogramming themselves.
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Fondamentalismo, anomia, complotto
La semiotica di Umberto Eco contro l’irragionevolezza interpretativa
M L*
Behind the hieroglyphic streets there would
either be a transcendent meaning, or only the
earth.
Thomas P () The Crying of Lot ,
ch. 
 : Fundamentalism, Anomie, Conspiracy. Umberto Eco’s Se-
miotics against Interpretive Unreasonableness
: If one had to summarize the core of Umberto Eco’s philosophical
inquiry in one sentence, or slogan, it would be reasonable to argue
that most of his work has been devoted to investigate the limits of
interpretation. This inquiry entails two dimensions; on the one hand,
a theoretical line: showing that signs, texts, discourse, and culture in
general are not always open to the proliferation of meaning, but produce
signification in ways that are regulated by societies through established
patterns. These codes of interpretation can be continuously negotiated
and renegotiated, but nevertheless hold a central place in the processes
through which meaning is created, shared, and circulated in societies.
The second dimension, a moral one, intertwines with the first. Not
only do patterns of interpretation exist; they must also hold for social
communication to be possible. A society that does not share any codes,
and does not impose any limits to interpretation, is a disintegrating
society, where human beings are progressively deprived of what defines
and enables them as social and political animals, that is, language.
: Conspiracy Theories; Umberto Eco’s Interpretive Semiotics;
Fundamentalism; Anomie; Reasonableness.
∗ Massimo Leone, Università di Torino.
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. Eco versus Brown
Umberto Eco, uno dei padri della semiotica contemporanea e tra i più
grandi semiotici di tutti i tempi, si è spesso confrontato con il tema del-
le teorie del complotto. Molti dei suoi romanzi, per non dire la totalità
di essi, ruotano attorno a questo nucleo tematico. In alcuni casi, le teo-
rie del complotto costituiscono l’intera trama del romanzo, come ne Il
pendolo di Foucault (), il quale è senza dubbio il miglior testo narra-
tivo mai scritto sulle teorie del complotto, le loro dinamiche interne, e
le loro assurdità sociali. Umberto Eco è anche, risaputamente, uno dei
critici più feroci di Dan Brown. A prima vista, le opere dei due autori
si assomigliano: entrambi attingono all’erudizione storica e culturale
al fine di progettare trame investigative intricate. In realtà, gli approcci
di Brown e di Eco al mistero e al complotto non potrebbero essere
più diversi. Eco rappresenta narrativamente le teorie del complotto in
modo da coprirle di ridicolo, e incoraggiare i suoi lettori a disfarsene
quali mere sciocchezze. Dan Brown, al contrario, non satireggia le teo-
rie del complotto ma le alimenta, promuovendo una loro più ampia
circolazione nella società e, cosa ancora più inquietante, elevandone
lo statuto epistemico. Ai lettori “cooperativi” de Il pendolo di Foucault
di Eco viene richiesto di ridere delle teorie del complotto; i seguaci
de The Da Vinci Code di Dan Brown sono invece titillati a credervi e
diffonderne il contagio. Questo è il motivo principale per cui Eco ha
costantemente criticato Brown. La critica del primo al secondo reca
un messaggio morale che non solo è visibile nei romanzi di Eco, ma
risuona, sotto veste diversa, nel suo fondativo lavoro teorico.
. I limiti dell’interpretazione
Se si dovesse riassumere il nucleo della ricerca filosofica di Umberto
Eco in una sola frase o in un solo slogan, sarebbe ragionevole soste-
nere che la maggior parte del suo lavoro è stata dedicata a indagare i
limiti dell’interpretazione (Eco ). Questa ricerca comporta due
dimensioni; da un lato, una linea teorica: dimostrare che i segni, i testi,
i discorsi, e la cultura in generale, non sono sempre aperti alla prolife-
razione di significato, ma producono senso in modi che sono regolati
dalle società attraverso modelli consolidati. Questi codici interpretativi
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possono essere continuamente negoziati e rinegoziati, ma comunque
occupano un posto centrale nei processi attraverso i quali il senso vie-
ne creato, condiviso, e diffuso nelle società. La seconda dimensione,
morale, s’intreccia con la prima. I modelli d’interpretazione non solo
esistono; essi devono anche reggere nel tempo e nello spazio affinché
la comunicazione sociale sia possibile. Una società che non condivide
codici, e non impone alcun limite all’interpretazione, è una società in
disgregazione, dove gli esseri umani sono progressivamente privati
di ciò che li definisce e li abilita come animali sociali e politici, vale a
dire, il linguaggio.
La posizione teorica di Eco, e ancor più l’etica ermeneutica che
ne deriva, sono stati talvolta etichettati come conservatrici, o addirit-
tura come reazionarie. Niente di più sbagliato. Eco è stato un critico
franco, per esempio, delle ermeneutiche testuali dei fondamentalismi
religiosi, soprattutto quando, adottando il letteralismo, essi sostengo-
no che una, e una sola interpretazione di un testo sacro è possibile
(Eco ). Questo atteggiamento interpretativo imposta solo appa-
rentemente rigidi limiti al modo in cui un testo — che si considera
emanazione diretta dalla trascendenza — può essere utilizzato per
la produzione e la circolazione di senso ulteriore (Leone b). In
realtà, negare che interpretazioni alternative di un testo sono possibili
è altrettanto irragionevole, dal punto di vista di Eco, dell’affermare
che ogni interpretazione di un testo è possibile. La prima posizione
rifiuta l’idea che possa darsi una molteplicità di modelli culturali che
codifichino e decodifichino il significato sociale; la seconda ammette
questa molteplicità, ma non contempla modi inter–soggettivamente
ragionevoli per scegliere fra le alternative, o perlomeno classificarle
(Leone ). La maggior parte del lavoro teorico di Eco, così come la
sua controparte finzionale, può essere vista come un sofisticato, mo-
numentale tentativo di smantellare concettualmente queste posizioni,
mostrandone il pesante carico di conseguenze morali.
Come si mostrerebbero le società in cui queste due linee erme-
neutiche dovessero predominare? Un gruppo umano dominato da
un’etica interpretativa fondamentalista sarebbe molto probabilmen-
te repressivo (Leone ). Purtroppo, questo scenario non è solo
finzione, ma ha ricevuto molte incarnazioni nel corso della storia. È
all’opera anche in numerose società contemporanee. Ovunque un
testo sacro o un corpus di testi sacri sia istituzionalmente ritenuto il
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pilastro immateriale della società, si sviluppa una burocrazia interpre-
tativa al fine di collegare il potere e il suo controllo sugli individui.
Idiosincrasie che non si allineino con il modello imperante vengono
scartate, represse, perseguitate. Modi di vita che non siano conformi
alla norma, e considerati come pura derivazione dalla trascenden-
za senza mediazione umana, sono fuorilegge, banditi, i loro fautori
forzatamente convertiti o sterminati. Una società che adotti un’er-
meneutica interpretativa fondamentalista frustra l’innata propensione
umana alla creatività e alla costruzione d’infinite alternative.
Tuttavia, l’opera di Eco sottolinea con uguale se non maggiore
veemenza i rischi derivanti da un’etica ermeneutica che non riconosca
alcun metodo legittimo per la valutazione comparativa delle inter-
pretazioni. Secondo questo punto di vista, non solo i testi sacri, ma
anche i codici legali, per non parlare dei testi di finzione, sono aperti
a qualsiasi tipo d’interpretazione, senza confini in grado di porre un
limite, o almeno una serie di limiti, a tale proliferazione. Come è noto,
Eco ha identificato in una certa interpretazione del decostruzionismo
di Derrida, soprattutto nella sua versione statunitense politicizzata, la
principale fonte di tale stile ermeneutico (Eco ). Nietzsche può
esserne considerato come il primo sostenitore moderno: esistono solo
interpretazioni, non fatti.
Ci si potrebbe chiedere, allora, come sarebbe una società in cui pre-
domini questa prospettiva. Non sarebbe una società repressiva nello
stesso modo in cui lo sarebbe una società fondamentalista. Nessun
modello interpretativo radicale vi designerebbe gli insiders e gli outsi-
ders, i potenti e i reietti. Al contrario, si potrebbe avere l’impressione
che, in una società decostruzionista, qualsiasi cosa potrebbe andare,
dai comportamenti sessuali al gusto letterario, dalle interpretazioni
giuridiche alle scoperte scientifiche. In questo campo, tuttavia, Ronald
Dworkin sembra unirsi a Eco nell’esprimere una preoccupazione per
le pesanti conseguenze che tale utopia decostruzionista potrebbe sor-
tire sull’ordine sociale (Dworkin ). Un’ermeneutica senza limiti,
infatti, non sarebbe in grado di gestire i conflitti interpretativi. Si provi
a immaginare, con Dworkin, un giudice che, nel condannare un impu-
tato all’ergastolo, affermi che la sentenza deriva da un’interpretazione
dei fatti, ma che altre interpretazioni sarebbero possibili ed egualmen-
te valide. Oppure s’immagini un medico che prescriva un ciclo di
chemioterapia, adottando la stessa posizione ermeneutica. Le vittime
Fondamentalismo, anomia, complotto 
legali o mediche di tale atteggiamento interpretativo ne sarebbero
inorridite, chiedendo un risarcimento giuridico o un secondo parere
medico.
L’esempio indica che una società in cui le interpretazioni non siano
mai priorizzate non è né una società senza potere, né una in cui la
repressione del più debole scompaia magicamente. Al contrario, è
un modello di società in cui repressione e violenza proliferano senza
centro, seguendo un contagio irrazionale (Leone ). Da un certo
punto di vista, mentre il potere fondamentalista è relativamente facile
da rilevare e contrastare, quello decostruzionista non lo è, in quanto
nessuna burocrazia specifica lo gestisce. Potere, iniquità e squilibri in-
giusti saltano fuori in modo casuale, secondo schemi che sono difficili
da mappare, dal momento che non rispondono a un’agenda pubblica,
ma a pregiudizi privati non strutturati, i quali sono, tuttavia, facile
preda di manipolazione. Alla fine, le agentività più potenti trionfano
nelle società decostruzioniste come in quelle fondamentaliste, ma lo
fanno più surrettiziamente, senza milizie.
Uno dei grandi contributi di Umberto Eco alla discussione su
questo tema è consistito nel mostrare che entrambi gli atteggiamenti
ermeneutici dovrebbero essere scartati non solo in considerazione
delle loro conseguenze politiche essenzialmente antidemocratiche
(repressione dispotica / repressione anarchica), ma anche in termini
teorici e, quindi, obbiettivi. Il modello di semiosi di Charles S. Peirce,
come viene interpretato da Eco, offre un terreno concettuale per la
promozione di una società in cui i limiti non sono né imposti né
decostruiti, ma ragionevolmente e inter–soggettivamente negoziati
(Eco ).
. I fondamenti semiotici della ragionevolezza interpretativa
Il modello di semiosi elaborato da Peirce rende giustizia a due ca-
ratteristiche quintessenziali della cognizione umana. Da un lato, gli
esseri umani sono intrinsecamente inclini alla proliferazione del sen-
so (Leone ). Lo schema attraverso il quale Peirce ha cercato di
cogliere questa tendenza è aperto. Si apre all’infinitezza: ogni segno
punta verso un ulteriore segno, e così via e così via, senza possibile
battuta d’arresto. D’altra parte, gli esseri umani protendono allo stesso
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modo verso la stabilità: la semiosi si cristallizza in abiti che guidano
le cognizioni, le emozioni, e le azioni umane. Il problema delle due
linee interpretative sopra esposte è che negligono la dialettica tra que-
ste due funzioni cognitive egualmente essenziali e avvalorano solo
una di esse. Nell’ermeneutica fondamentalista, un unico abito viene
selezionato come dominante. La semiosi è bloccata in un interpretante
rigidamente codificato, immaginato come totalmente conforme alla
struttura intrinseca di un testo sacro. Qualsiasi tentativo di riattivare
il motore della semiosi introducendo interpretanti alternativi viene
annullato — spesso con violenza — attraverso la burocrazia ermeneu-
tica. Gli esseri umani che vivono sotto il giogo di un unico insieme di
abiti, rigidamente canonizzato, esperiscono, di solito, una profonda
alienazione. Essi sono spinti a trasformarsi in macchine, per le quali le
alternative risultano impossibili (Leone a).
Tuttavia, anche la società decostruzionista manca la dialettica tra
semiosi e abiti, sebbene in questo caso solo la prima venga sottolineata,
mentre i secondi vengono scartati. Per il decostruzionista politico, qual-
siasi abito è un nemico da respingere attraverso l’esercizio di ulteriori
semiosi. La bella creatività che gli esseri umani esprimono nella poesia
contemporanea incarna l’utopia di una società auto–governata, in cui
le differenze di continuo proliferano magicamente e si compongono
in un’armonia multiforme, iridescente. Questa presa di posizione etica
e politica, però — mentre lodevolmente reagisce al conservatorismo
e alla repressione autocratici — trascura che anche la poesia ha le sue
regole e i suoi codici, e che gli esseri umani tendono a classificare
per merito i propri poeti così come gerarchizzano i principi giuridici
o le ricette economiche. Ma la conseguenza peggiore dell’adottare
un’ermeneutica decostruzionista non è tanto l’anarchia letteraria —
che taluni potrebbero trovare anche divertente — quanto l’instabilità
cognitiva. Una vita senza abiti è un caos insopportabile. Una società
senza modelli interpretativi è tale per cui è probabile che vi emerga a
ogni passo il conflitto, e a ogni passo rischi di rimanere irrisolto.
Tra un modello ermeneutico che impone l’abito e ostacola qualsiasi
semiosi e un modello ermeneutico che impone la semiosi e ostacola
qualsiasi abito, la semiotica di Eco promette una terza via: lo svilup-
po di un metodo che sia in grado di selezionare le interpretazioni e
classificarne le qualità. Da questo punto di vista, la semiotica inter-
pretativa soddisfa le esigenze filosofiche anti–nietzscheane del nuovo
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realismo, in quanto fornisce alle sua pretese filosofiche una metodolo-
gia. Secondo il nuovo realismo, non è vero, come Nietzsche e i suoi
interpreti decostruzionisti affermano, che non esistono fatti, e che
solo le interpretazioni imperano. Il filosofo nuovo–realista sottolinea
l’importanza della realtà, e quindi dei fatti, nel guidare i movimenti
della vita sociale (Ferraris ). Il semiologo interpretativo non si
occupa principalmente di fatti, dal momento che, per definizione e
tradizione disciplinari, la semiotica si concentra sulla semiosi, e non
sull’ontologia che presumibilmente la sottende (Eco ). Tuttavia, le
interpretazioni veritiere sono i fatti della semiotica. La realtà che i nuo-
vi filosofi realisti reclamano altro non è, dal punto di vista semiotico,
che la rete di abiti interpretativi che una comunità inter–soggettivamente e
ragionevolmente accetta come modelli–guida in una certa fase della sua evo-
luzione storica e culturale. Si potrebbe anche sostenere che il vantaggio
della semiotica di Eco, rispetto alla nuova filosofia realista, è che la pri-
ma meglio della seconda sfugge a qualsiasi tentazione di abbracciare
un modello fondamentalista come abito imperante. Infatti, ciò che i
nuovi filosofi realisti chiamano “realtà” è, per i semiotici, un modello
d’interpretazione particolarmente consolidato. La semiotica quindi
non respinge indiscriminatamente l’affermazione di Nietzsche, ma
la qualifica insistendo sul fatto che le interpretazioni possono essere
classificate, e che, come Peirce per primo intuì, la priorizzazione delle
interpretazioni è esattamente ciò che si traduce in una sensazione di
realtà. Due questioni principali sono quindi in gioco. In primo luogo:
qual è la posizione delle teorie del complotto e dei loro sostenitori in
relazione ai diversi atteggiamenti ermeneutici esposti finora. In secon-
do luogo: qual è il contributo specifico della semiotica nel contrastare
i rischi del fondare una società sul concetto di complotto.
. I nemici dell’interpretazione ragionevole
Il notevole successo delle teorie del complotto nelle società odierne
non può essere spiegato in relazione a sole ragioni socio–politiche
ed economiche. Una caratteristica di queste teorie che è stata spesso
trascurata è che esse sono in grado di procurare un certo piacere
estetico. Analogamente al pettegolezzo o alle leggende metropolitane,
le teorie del complotto prosperano anche grazie alla noia. Coloro che
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ricevono le formulazioni di queste teorie vengono staccati d’improv-
viso dalla razionalità soporifera del discorso mediatico mainstream e
istantaneamente trasportati in un nuovo scenario, che assomiglia a un
romanzo giallo o a un film di spionaggio. Di fronte a una nuova teoria
del complotto, il pubblico è portato ad abbracciare la convinzione che
nulla è come sembra. C’è sempre una verità più profonda da scoprire
sotto la superficie della storia. Il piacere estetico di questa convinzio-
ne deriva da una sorta di micro–legittimazione. Gli psicologi sanno
molto bene che il successo dei segreti, e l’impossibilità paradossale
di mantenerli che da esso risulta, deriva dal piacere che le persone
sentono quando si comunica loro qualcosa che non è di pubblico
dominio. Dai pettegolezzi tra amici a quello raccolto dalle riviste, tale
piacere in ultima analisi deriva da un’idea illusoria d’inclusione, che
comporta anche un’esclusione corrispondente. La comunicazione di
un segreto determina immediatamente una separazione tra insider
e outsider, tra coloro che sanno che cosa realmente sta accadendo e
quelli che, al contrario, continuano a vivere in una beata ignoranza
della realtà (Quill ). Corollario di questo meccanismo è che le
teorie del complotto, per essere efficaci, non devono essere comuni-
cate attraverso i canali tradizionali. Operano in quanto chi le riceve e
assorbe può coltivare l’illusione che solo questi, e un piccolo numero
di altri adepti, siano depositari della verità.
La maggior parte delle teorie del complotto — come quelle che
sostengono che c’è una lobby globale la quale cerca di asservire il
genere umano attraverso sostanze chimiche rilasciate da aerei — sono
così poco supportate da prove scientifiche da essere spesso facilmente
ridicolizzate dal discorso scientifico e mediatico mainstream. Tuttavia,
tale derisione in realtà promuove le teorie del complotto piuttosto
che denigrarle. Per i loro sostenitori, infatti, essere ridicolizzati dalla
“massa ignorante” costituisce un’ulteriore prova di appartenenza a
una élite illuminata, al gruppo di pochi che sanno davvero dove sta la
verità. Il piacere estetico alla base delle teorie del complotto è quindi
quello di una deviazione dal pensiero dominante, la quale crea ipso
facto una comunità di salvati, cui è affidata la missione di comuni-
care la verità a coloro che sono invece asserviti dal potere e vivono
nell’ignoranza. Questo effetto estetico è il risultato di un meccani-
smo semiotico. Astrattamente parlando, può essere descritto come
una versione particolare dell’ermeneutica decostruzionista. Come
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l’ermeneutica della decostruzione respinge qualsiasi abito interpre-
tativo, sostiene che è un’imposizione del potere, ed opera per il suo
smantellamento, allo stesso modo, le teorie del complotto insinuano
che le credenze sociali e politiche tradizionali non sono altro che
abiti velenosi che lobby potenti instillano nei cittadini. Inoltre, come il
decostruzionismo, così il pensiero complottista mira alla riattivazione
della semiosi, principalmente denigrando le verità tradizionali come
bugie pubbliche.
Si deve tuttavia sottolineare, a onore del decostruzionismo, che
un’importante sfumatura differenzia questo quadro teorico dallo svi-
luppo consueto delle teorie del complotto. Queste non sono mai
poetiche. Non pretendono che ogni abito possa essere decostruito
attraverso la continua riattivazione della semiosi illimitata, come la
poetica di Derrida tipicamente suggerisce (Derrida ). Al contrario,
le teorie del complotto più banalmente sostituiscono l’abito corrente,
sostenuto dalla comunità scientifica e socio–politica, con quello di
una minoranza, solleticandone la sensazione di esclusività. Allo stesso
tempo, le teorie del complotto prendono a prestito dal decostruzio-
nismo l’idea che ogni contro–argomento possa essere smontato da
un’ulteriore declinazione della stessa teoria del complotto, e così via
secondo un andamento ciclico.
In conclusione, la risposta alla prima domanda di cui sopra (qual è
il principale atteggiamento ermeneutico dei teorici del complotto?)
è che essi abbracciano una versione banalizzata dell’atteggiamento
decostruzionista verso gli abiti interpretativi. Decostruiscono le cre-
denze tradizionali, ma solo al fine di sostituirle con visioni alternative
consortili. Prima di affrontare il secondo problema, cioè, il ruolo del-
la semiotica nei confronti delle teorie del complotto, bisognerebbe
sollevare la questione dei motivi per cui l’emozione estetica legata
a questo pensiero sociale alternativo non è distribuita in parti uguali
nel corso della storia, ma emerge con maggiore rilevanza in determi-
nati contesti sociali e culturali. In altre parole: se segreti, voci e idee
cospirativi intrinsecamente infondono piacere estetico — in quanto
legittimano i loro sostenitori attraverso il senso di appartenenza a una
minoranza privilegiata di salvati — perché mai le teorie del complotto
prosperano solo in alcuni periodi della storia? Rispondere a questa
domanda equivale a formulare ipotesi che spieghino il successo, nella
storia, degli atteggiamenti decostruzionisti. Diversi ordini di spiega-
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zioni sono possibili. La frammentazione della società è sicuramente
un elemento importante. Più i membri di una società si percepisco-
no come individui isolati — che non appartengono ad alcun gruppo
socio–culturale in particolare, non aderiscono a nessuna organizza-
zione politica, e sono privi di qualsiasi abito interpretativo forte —
tanto più essi saranno preda di complottisti che li designano come la
loro nuova comunità, come membri di una minoranza illuminata che
deve lottare per resistere alla sottomissione degli ignoranti al pensiero
mainstream. Nel contesto europeo attuale, per esempio, in cui l’ultimo
decennio ha visto un inesorabile declino del potere modellizzante
di formazioni politiche tradizionali come i partiti o i sindacati, nuovi
leader sono stati facilmente in grado di emergere e plasmare la loro
base elettorale attraverso la creazione o la circolazione di teorie del
complotto. In alcuni casi, la designazione di un colpevole aumenta il
potenziale identitario di queste teorie, dal momento che federa un
gruppo contro un nemico. Tuttavia, un elemento–chiave del succes-
so delle teorie del complotto contemporanee, il quale le distingue
dalla loro versione moderna e pre–moderna, è che esse non hanno
più bisogno di un colpevole. Si potrebbe invece sostenere che il vero
colpevole delle attuali teorie del complotto sia la maggioranza stessa,
il mainstream, e tutti gli abiti che cristallizzano un consenso sociale.
. L’eredità semio–etica di Umberto Eco
La semiotica non è uno strumento politico. I semiotici non dovreb-
bero impegnarsi pro o contro gli atteggiamenti culturali e sociali.
Tuttavia, i semiotici che analizzano le loro società non possono chiu-
dere gli occhi. Al contrario, essi devono mettere la loro metodologia
al servizio della consapevolezza pubblica. Al momento, questa consa-
pevolezza pubblica include anche il ruolo delle teorie del complotto
nello sviluppo della società. Che tipo di società è quella in cui le teorie
del complotto proliferano e legittimano i loro creatori, che accumula-
no, così, leadership simbolica e politica? Le conseguenze del prevalere,
nella società, di un’ermeneutica decostruzionista sono già state fatte
notare: una collettività che non si dota di modelli inter–soggettivi e
ragionevoli per il consolidamento degli abiti interpretativi è inevitabil-
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mente una società caotica, in cui i conflitti costantemente sorgono e
non vengono mai ricomposti.
Come è stato sottolineato in precedenza, però, il pensiero complot-
tista e la decostruzione non sono la stessa cosa. Il primo è una versione
grottesca della seconda, e porta a una sorta di dispotismo demagogico.
Una società dominata da teorie del complotto, infatti, non è solo una
società conflittuale, dove il pensiero tradizionale è continuamente mi-
nacciato da alternative complottiste. Più pericolosamente, una società
del complotto è una in cui il potenziale inquisitivo della decostruzione
viene disinnescato in modo sistematico. In effetti, una società in cui
il pensiero tradizionale non è mai messo in discussione da eventuali
visioni alternative, dallo smantellamento degli abiti interpretativi e
dalla riattivazione della semiosi, è essenzialmente dispotica. I critici,
e i semiotici tra loro, hanno il dovere di sfidare il pensiero e le cre-
denze tradizionali. Quando ciò non accade, la società va alla deriva
pericolosamente verso l’ermeneutica fondamentalista.
Tuttavia, il problema delle teorie del complotto più in voga è che
sfidano il pensiero tradizionale imponendo nuovi abiti interpretati-
vi la cui costruzione, però, si presuppone che non conduca mai alla
formazione di un’audience mainstream. In altre parole, le teorie del
complotto sono versioni alternative della realtà il cui scopo non è
quello d’introdurre un nuovo abito interpretativo condiviso, ma pro-
sperare in modo parassitario sulle spalle del pensiero ufficiale. I teorici
del complotto non vogliono soppiantare gli opinion leader tradiziona-
li, perché questa sostituzione eliminerebbe l’elemento–chiave della
loro forza, che è la capacità di vellicare l’opinione pubblica con la pro-
spettiva della segretezza. Il primo pericolo potenziale delle teorie del
complotto consiste quindi nella loro tendenza a depotenziare qualsiasi
tipo di visione alternativa della realtà. Le teorie del complotto pare
introducano più libero pensiero nella società, ma in realtà lo fanno
rifiutando un quadro comunicativo comune intersoggettivo e ragio-
nevole, trincerandosi in un’auto–indulgente posizione di minoranza.
Esse contribuiscono, dunque, alla natura incrollabile delle versioni
tradizionali della realtà. Per esempio, è molto probabile che la CIA
sia ricorsa a metodi non convenzionali, discutibili, e talvolta illegali
nel corso della storia; tuttavia, le teorie del complotto che accusano
la CIA in realtà non ne minacciano la portata operativa; al contrario,
contribuiscono al suo status d’indiscutibilità. La conseguenza peggiore
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che deriva da questo atteggiamento è che i colpevoli designati dalle
teorie del complotto non possono essere difesi ragionevolmente, dal
momento che sono accusati con argomenti che di solito sfuggono a
qualsiasi controllo razionale. Ciò è particolarmente preoccupante se
tali colpevoli non sono identificati nelle potenti istituzioni della società
(il governo, i servizi segreti, la polizia), ma in minoranze quantitative
o qualitative (gli Ebrei, gli Arabi, i migranti).
Quindi, la questione di determinare il ruolo e l’effetto delle teorie
del complotto nella società si riduce alla necessità di distinguere tra
teorie critiche e complottiste, tra ermeneutica decostruzionista ed
ermeneutica del complotto. Tuttavia, tale distinzione non può essere
fatta in termini di contenuti. Deve esserlo in termini di modelli argo-
mentativi. Le teorie del complotto, cioè, non mostrano la loro natura
in quello che dicono, ma in come lo dicono, nella retorica specifica
che esse adottano per comunicare un alone di segretezza, creare un’é-
lite simbolica, e riprodurre la separazione tra inclusi ed esclusi, che è
strumentale per l’esistenza parassitaria degli stessi complottisti.
Qui sta il ruolo principale della semiotica: individuare le linee re-
toriche e argomentative attraverso le quali le teorie del complotto
vengono create e alimentate nell’immaginario sociale. Nessun semio-
logo più di Umberto Eco ha fornito agli analisti culturali strumenti
teorici sofisticati e potenti per portare avanti tale compito urgente.
Riferimenti bibliografici
D J. () L’Écriture et la différence. Parigi: Éditions du Seuil.
D R. () “Law as Interpretation”, in W.J.T. Mitchell (a cura di), The
Politics of Interpretation, numero monografico di Critical inquiry, ,  (settembre):
–.
E U. (). Trattato di semiotica generale, Bompiani, Milano.
———, () I limiti dell’interpretazione, Bompiani, Milano.
———, () Interpretation and Overinterpretation; con R. Rorty, J. Culler, e C.
Brooke-Rose; a cura di S. Collini, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
e New York.
———, () Kant e l’ornitorinco, Bompiani, Milano.
F M. () Manifesto del nuovo realismo, Laterza, Roma.
Fondamentalismo, anomia, complotto 
L M. () Motility, Potentiality, and Infinity: A Semiotic Hypothesis on Nature
and Religion, “Biosemiotics”, : –.
———, (a). Breve introducción a la semiótica de la protesta, “C.I.C. Cuadernos de
información y comunicación” - Revista del Departamento de Periodismo III
(CC. Información, UCM), : –.
———, (b). The Semiotics of Fundamentalist Authoriality, in M. Leone (a cura
di), The Authoriality of Religious Law, numero monografico dell’International
Journal for the Semiotics of Law, , : –.
———, () Sémiotique du fondamentalisme religieux : messages, rhétorique, force
persuasive, l’Harmattan, Parigi.
———, () Semiótica de la burocracia, “L.I.S.: Lengua, Imagen, Sonido”, : –.
———, () “On Depth: Ontological Ideologies and Semiotic Models”, in K.
Bankov (a cura di), New Semiotics. Between Tradition and Innovation: procee-
dings of the . World Congress of Semiotics, online, IASS Publications & NBU
Publishing House (ISSN –); disponibile nel sito http://www.iass-
ais.org/proceedings/view_lesson.php?id=.
Q L. () Secrets and Democracy: From arcana imperii to Wikileaks, Palgrave
Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK; New York.

Lexia. Rivista di semiotica, 23–24
Complotto
ISBN 978-88-548-9931-5
DOI 10.4399/97888548993155
pag. 69–108 (giugno 2016)
Imposed Interpretation
Querying Contemporary Literary Criticism
J Z*
 : Interpretazione forzata. Un’indagine sulla critica letteraria
contemporanea
: Imposed interpretation is one of the basic characteristics and
fallacies of the contemporary western literary criticism. It happens th-
roughout the process when diversified theories of extra–literary origins
and even scientific rules penetrate into the interpretative discourse of
literature. Its symptoms include making biased judgments about a text’s
value or meanings with a pre–taken stance, forcing new but absurd
interpretation upon old classical works through reversed routes of co-
gnition, re–locating a text by distorting its language or transplanting
alien concepts. Imposed interpretation leads criticism far away from the
ontological existence of literature, and now its methodological imper-
fections are getting more and more apparent, like the reversion between
practice and theory, misplaced relationship between the concrete and
the abstract, and the split between the part and the whole. For the discur-
sive construction of contemporary literary criticism, it is necessary and
essential to strive for systematical and balanced development. Criticism
should on the basis of absorbing progressive elements of the times be
conscious of its multi–dimensional growth and the integration of theo-
ries and practice. The future of literary theories lies in their practicality
to literary creation.
: Interpretation; Hermeneutics; Semiotics; Deconstructionism;
Overinterpretation.
Since the beginning of the th century, for more than  years,
the modern western literary criticism has fundamentally questio-
ned and deconstructed people’s old understanding about “literature”.
∗ Jiang Zhang, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
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Important thoughts and schools, many theorists and critics, have
undoubtedly constituted the driving force to steadily push forward
contemporary literary criticism. However, looking back at the 
years’ development of the western literary criticism, we can equally
find many imperfections, faults and fallacies in addition to its glorious
achievements. Some problems are so closely related to the founda-
tions and essence of literature that if not dealt with cares they might
harm or even uproot the legitimacy of literary criticism. It is far from
rare to see in contemporary literary criticism deeds like cutting the
present from the past — history and tradition, conceitedly negating
other critical groups’ merits, swaying from one theoretical extremity
to another, ignoring the value of actual literary experience and se-
parating critiques from the real life, exhausting meanings of literary
texts with paranoid methods and languages, struggling for discursive
dominance and blindly defending the dogmas of one particular school.
To learners and practitioners of literary criticism in China, they are
easily led astray by their biased understanding about the western
theories during the past three decades. And what’s more, their too
ready and too stiff borrowing and copying of the western theories
have turned the spreading of the western theories and thoughts into
a “vicious circle” in which one misunderstanding of the original is
followed by another and one abusive usage leads to the next, so finally
the lack of ontological recognition of the word “literature”, a fallacy
already there lying under the building of the contemporary western
criticism, is exaggerated again in China and apparently reflected in
our critical practice in these years. In fact, this “vicious circle” has
long been realized by the Chinese academia and many critics have
made introspection about it. However, what is the fundamental defect
of the contemporary western criticism? How to logically identify the
fundamental defect, or the Achilles’ Heel of the whole system, and
find an exact term to fix it? The finding out of the fundamental defect,
as well as the naming of the defect in words, can be said the biggest
theoretical challenge to Chinese literary academia today, a challenge
demanding the critics’ research in depth and arguments in a compre-
hensive framework. This paper tries to do some experimental works
in this direction. For this purpose a core concept — imposed interpreta-
tion is proposed. The following illustration is developed around this
core concept, using this term as a clue to understand the development
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of modern literary criticism. Methodologically speaking this paper
will try to find some consensuses about criticism by combining empi-
rical observations with rational induction and deduction, and in doing
this a new perspective is expected to be found for the systematical
construction of contemporary literary criticism.
The term “imposed interpretation” refers to the critic’s practice
of deviating from the discourse of the text under scrutiny, dispelling
the signification system of literature, taking his theoretical stance and
mode of interpretation before his close reading and interpretation and
fitting the text stiffly to his own theoretical assumption and conclusion.
Let me first of all explain roughly about this definition. “Deviating
from the discourse of the text” means that the critic does not focus
on the content of the text, but turns his critical attention to the em-
ployment of certain theoretical languages not so related to the text.
The discourse and the text are so independent of each other that we
might say the text is used by the critic as a tool — like an excuse to
spread his doctrine or a footnote to serve his theory. “Dispelling the
signification system of literature” means that the critic interprets lite-
rary texts or literary phenomena not with the language of literature,
but with languages of philosophy, history, sociology or that part of
cultural studies irrelevant to literature. His research is almost empty
of literary reference, let alone theories of literary quality. To him, a
literary text is not a literary text, but a political, historical or social
text instead. “Taking his theoretical stance and mode of interpretation
before his close reading and interpretation” means that before the
real process of reading and interpreting a text, the critic has decided a
stance to prove in his mind, and then examine, choose and judge texts
from this stance and for the sake of this stance. The textual material
he uses is inferior to his stance, working around it as the stance’s
testimony. It is purely his stance not the text that gives rise to his
criticism. Theoretical stance is the core of his interpretation. Besides
stance, interpretative mode can also be a hidden priority set before the
real process of interpretation. A pre–set interpretative mode is like a
template for the text to be embedded in. Factors of the text not fitting
to it, however important, are cut out. Imposing interpretation with a
pre–set mode is a faulty skill more frequently seen in the application
of scientific theories in literary studies, like linguistic, mathematical
and physical theories. “Fitting the text stiffly to his own theoretical
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assumption and conclusion” refers to a critical attitude of teleology in
essence. Texts are interpreted not for the purpose of digging out their
deep meanings, but for going back to certain theoretical intention and
conclusion designed by the critic in advance. Conclusion exists before
interpretation happens, and critical reading turns out to be a process
of finding proofs for the conclusion and then realizing the critic’s
subjective intention. “Intention” and “conclusion” are two different
yet linked steps of this sequence: a critic holds an “intention” first;
then he draws a “conclusion” from this intention; then he looks for
texts that can lead to his conclusion and prove his theoretical intention.
Intention decides conclusion and conclusion demands textual analysis
in consistent to it.
Here we can see the main difference between my concept of “impo-
sed interpretation” and Umberto Eco’s “overinterpretation”: imposed
interpretation is reflected not only in an excess of interpretation, but
also in the interpreter’s motive and interpretative mode. These two
concepts indicate different motives: overinterpretation still focuses
on the “sacred” text itself, while imposed interpretation is more for
proving theories than for exhausting the meanings of the text. And
they have different interpretative modes: overinterpretation, poor or
not, does not take a theory as its standpoint, neither will trim text to fit
the theory; but imposed interpretation starts from a theory, treating it
as a given condition to select and interpret texts. With final conclusion
preceding textual reading, imposed interpretation follows a reversed
sequence of criticism making, which naturally deprives the criticism
of its ground.
Imposed interpretation has three characteristics. They are:
a) forced inclusion of the extra–literary, which means transplanting
theories or interpretative modes from other disciplines in force,
thus wiping out the ontological qualities of the category named
as “literature” and finally leading literary criticism away from
the discursive scope of literature;
b) subjective assumption prior to interpretation, which means a critic
has already in his mind some subjective assumptions or theo-
retical stance to prove, so he ignores the original intention of
the text and forcibly attaches certain meanings and value to the
text;
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c) reversed route of cognition, which refers to the frequently reversed
sequence of criticism, when interpreter sets out his criticism
from some presupposed theories or arbitrary conclusions, not
from the text itself, and thus his interpretation turns out to be
self–referential.
. Forced Inclusion of the Extra–literary
In contemporary literary criticism, forced inclusion of extra–literary
languages is a common phenomenon. Northrop Frye once says that
in his eyes, whether Marxist, Thomist, liberal–humanist, neo–classical,
Freudian, Jungian, or existentialist, they are all proposing, not to find
a conceptual framework for criticism within literature, but to attach
criticism to one of a miscellany of frameworks outside it (Frye, , p.
). Generally speaking, among the important critical trends of the last
century, except formalism and new criticism, basically all the other
theoretical schools have more or less transplanted elements from
other disciplines and proposed many terms, jargons, concepts and
cognitive models so alien to the traditional literary studies. When
theories and cognitive models originally not the least of literary refe-
rence are borrowed or directly copied by critics as material to develop
their unconventional criticism, the meanings of literary criticism in
the ontological sense is at the risk of being undermined. Not only
so, the long acceptance of the alien fields’ intrusion has changed the
configuration of contemporary literary criticism. It is noticeable that
in these years, when profound changes are occurring all the time
to the world’s geopolitical, economic and cultural lives, when many
issues are emerging as controversies involving conflicting interests
of different communities, the criticism offered by the discipline na-
med as “literature” is more and more relying on the input of the
other disciplines to update its discursive power. The input of the other
disciplines, realized by discursive imitation, transplantation, direct di-
version and so on, constitutes the most basic driving force to generate
our contemporary criticism of literature.
Considering the extra–literary origins of contemporary literary cri-
ticism, three kinds of origins can be roughly generalized here. The
first kind are disciplines also belonging to a broader category of human
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sciences and historically more closely related to the studies of literature,
like philosophy, history, linguistics and etc. Philosophy is especially the
reservoir of thoughts continuously stimulating the expansion of literary
criticism. Some prominent trends and schools in philosophy avail them-
selves of literary materials to fulfill their theoretical construction and
manifest their instructive power. Jacques Derrida admits in his Writing
and Difference that he often makes use of literary texts to develop his
thoughts of deconstruction (Derrida, , p. ). Conversely, literature
also makes use of the other disciplines. As Richard Rorty points out, it
was the department of English, not the department of philosophy, that
was opening more and more courses of philosophy. So Rorty proposes
that the so–called “literary theories” are actually intentional and syste-
matical attempts to politicize the functions of literature (Rorty, , p.
).
The second origin are theories springing up in political, social
and cultural movements and affairs. Theories for the purpose of
serving movements usually take on the color of avant garde and
advocate actions. Once introduced into the territory of literature,
they open a new and inspiring horizon for literary critics to run
for. Feminist criticism initiated by feminist movements, postcolonial
criticism and theories based on the worldwide anti–colonial struggles
and liberation, Roland Barthes’ change from structuralism to post–
structuralism triggered by the May  Events in France, queer
studies rising from people’s gradual attention to gender identity and
sexuality, ecocriticism nowadays popularly used as a kind of correction
to the worsening environmental situation, all these provide sufficient
examples to show the continuous interplay between literary criticism
and the outside agendas.
The third origin are the multitudinous observations, explanations,
principles and methods in the world of natural sciences. The findings
of the natural sciences are believed to be objective, reliable and pro-
bably universally true, so they are borrowed by literary critics who
intend to sharpen their critical weapons and interpret texts in a more
accurate, reliable and rational manner. This “scientific turn” can be
seen in the semiotics’ usage of the mathematical matrix to analyze
literary texts, the ecocriticism’s transplantation of the Chaos Theory
and the geocriticism’s incorporating the study of geographical space
and time into its critical practice.
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The routes for extra–literary influence entering into the world
of literary criticism can also be divided into three kinds. The first
kind is by formula shift, which is conspicuously seen in the semiotic
criticism. Algirdas Julien Greimas, one of the most important semio-
ticians and the leading figure of French structuralism, introduces a
structuralist analyzing method called Greimas Semiotic Square for
the study of narratology. His semiotic square extracts four key elemen-
ts from any narrative text. These four elements are paired concepts
constituting four corners of a square which is to map the logical co-
njunctions and disjunctions relating to the plot. This method relies
on a belief that it is the interrelations among these four elements —
contrary, complementarity and contradiction — that push the story
going forward.
The second kind of route is by inter–disciplinary transference.
Hermeneutic criticism developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer from the
hands of Heidegger is in essence an expansion of the philosophical her-
meneutics. In order to set up an ontological hermeneutics different
from the conventional methodological hermeneutics before the th
century, Gadamer turns his eyes to literature and arts. He has clearly
explained the reasons for his trying every means to explore people’s
experience of arts: the experience of arts playing a decisive role in
his philosophical hermeneutics; the experience of arts providing an
appropriate measurement to understand the essence of understan-
ding; the experience of arts also saving us from a misunderstanding
that understanding is a dominant tyrant (Gadamer, , p. ). “Ga-
damer’s study of arts is not from an arts critic’s research needs and
interest. Instead, it is part of his hermeneutics building” (Zhu, ,
p. ). Obviously, it is for the better development of philosophical
hermeneutics that Gadamer turns his attention to literary studies. His
aim is to enrich hermeneutics by referring to literature and to prove
the meanings of philosophical interpretation by literary interpretation.
The third route is trans–disciplinary borrowing. This borrowing rou-
te is most distinctly reflected in the criticism of space theory. Being a
professor of geography himself, Mike Crang uses geographical terms,
concepts and methods to study literary texts and opens a new dimen-
sion of interpretation. In his Cultural Geography, he proposes, “What
is perhaps more interesting is seeing how certain places and spatial
divisions, are established within the literary text. This comes through
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both in the plot, character and autobiography of the authors. ... The
creation of a sense of home — and homeland — is a profoundly geo-
graphical construction in a text. Such a ‘base’ is vital to geographical
knowledge about the imperial and modern worlds” (Crang, , p.
). Using his cultural geography to decode the meanings of space in
literary works, he re–interprets Odyssey, the ancient Greek epic, and
Les Miserables of Victor Hugo. To Les Miserables, he comments, “The
novel can thus be read as using the landscape to suggest a geography
of knowledge, by the state about the potentially rebellious poor, and
thus also a geography of state power” (Crang, , p. ).
Many textual techniques are involved if we want the trans–disciplinary
crossings natural, smooth, traceless and fitting specific contexts well.
Either using extra–literary theories to create literary signifiers or using
literary material to serve theories of other disciplines, demands supe-
rior theoretical manipulative capability and keen interest in literature
and arts.
One frequently used technique is “discursive replacement”. By
replacing the most primary language of a text with another kind of
language — language from certain extra–literary origin, this technique
leads critique to an elaboration of some extra–literary theory. This
technique might be labeled as “discursive regeneration” as well. It is
particularly noteworthy that this regenerated discourse is usually not
of the most primary intention of the text, or not of the most possible
intention of the author. First the background of understanding is
changed, then the analytic language gets changed, and finally the
target text is situated into a new framework of meaning–making.
The second technique can be labeled as “rigid embedding”, which
mainly refers to a kind of straight and stiff copying of extra–literary
theories. This technique usually first breaks the text’s structure into
pieces to change the original reference of the text. Then it pushes
the whole interpretative work into the formulas or logical chains of
extra–literary theories. It seems like that the validity of a theory is
proved through text reading, but in fact the validity has been set there
before the critique’s textual reading. It is quite like embedding a text
forcibly into an already existed theoretical ground. We say that it is
“forcibly” because those of the constitutive elements of the text, not in
conformity with the a priori theory, are wiped out, and the decoding
process is handled with the interpreter’s arbitrary will.
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Another technique which is very similar to “discursive replace-
ment”, but still a little different, is “word attachment”. Discursive
replacement happens on the level of interpretation as a whole, while
word attachment happens on an inferior word level and in rhetorical
details. Word attachment refers to the input of words from other di-
sciplines into literary criticism — words of concepts, notions, terms,
jargons and so on. Despite of the denotation and connotation gaps
between these words and the object texts, they are borrowed in order
to create a new dimension of interpretation. There are two kinds of
attaching methods here. One is “paste”, like the cut–and–paste method
in electronic writing. By directly pasting a word from some other di-
scipline, a formal similarity is established. Then this formal similarity
might lead to an equivalence in meaning. The other kind is “analogy”.
By finding an analogy between a borrowed term and the hidden but
innate meaning of the text, the critic gradually plants the text in the
field of some extra–literary theories.
One more textual technique worth mentioning here is “history
relocation”, that is anachronistically applying today’s theories to the
past literary texts or events, using the present as criteria to judge the
past. Whenever the text is born and whatever the core content of the
text is, it must be interpreted in the light of some later generation’s
perspectives and theories. It should be admitted that relocating hi-
story might add certain color of avant garde to old texts and even
enhance old texts to a new and higher level of significance, but still
such a technique should be handled with great care for its tendency
of neglecting historically determined elements.
We can take an example of ecocriticism here to think about the
functions of the above–mentioned textual techniques. The Fall of the
House of Usher is Edga Allan Poe’s well–known tale. This short and
horrible story has drawn many critics’ attention since it was publi-
shed more than  years ago. Interpretations about it vary, but it
is commonly agreed that the story is about people’s rationality and
subconsciousness, the inscrutable inside of our being. However, the
ecocentred reading of our time, by contrast, focuses on the outside,
on house and its environment, and finally reaches conclusions about
eco–system damaged beyond repair (Barry, , pp. –). Here
is how this critical approach proceeds. The first step is “discursive
replacement”. Although the story itself is a narrative about people —
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their relationship, behaviors and souls, the ecocritical reading treats
it as an ecological text about environment, by interpreting the sto-
ry’s backgrounds descriptions (like the environmental and climate
descriptions) as the most crucial content of the story, thus change
its motif and interpretative system. The second step is “word attach-
ment”. All the scattered descriptions about the environment in the
story are collected together by ecocritical reading, and then specific
items are singled out and given emblematic correlatives of ecology.
For example, the ancient house is no more a house, but the emblem
of entropy (a kind of negative energy within systems which tends
towards breakdown). The falling down of the Usher house is not the
final disaster of a building and a family, but a symbol of the Black
Hole of universe. The mind of young man Usher is also an entropy,
radiating negative energy. Usher’s morbid sensitiveness to light and
sound represents a system against the Nature, and so on and so forth.
“Rigid embedding” is also used in this critique. After naming the em-
blems and images from an ecocritical point of view, all these elements
and attached names should be organized into an ecological narrative.
Otherwise, the reconstructing work by an influential theory cannot
be said finished. Finally, if such an ecocritical reading is rendered as if
it were historical truth, it is anachronistically fitting a literary work of
previous age to a theory of subsequent age. After all, ecology ideas
like entropy and Black Hole had not come into being when Poe wrote
this story.
The practice of forced inclusion of the extra–literary has three
characteristics. The first characteristic is its forcefulness. Forcefulness is
shown in its borrowing discourses from other disciplines and planting
them in the soil of literature. Forcefulness is also shown in its tex-
tual analysis, when the interpreter tries to match the intention of the
text to his own theoretical intention, no matter what is the possible
intention of the text and what responses the text might arouse. Yet,
even with great forcefulness, this matching–up work still might fail,
and then it is the turn of the second characteristic — deconstruction,
deconstructing text to leave space for new arrangements of meanings.
Here the logic goes like this. If a critic’s emphasis is to use an extra–
literary theory to interpret a text, then his starting point is the theory
and the text is subordinate to it. But the truth is that more often than
not, texts, especially classical works, come into being earlier than
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our days’ popular theories. It is no exaggeration to say that no text
can fit all kinds of theories well. However, in order to achieve his
theoretical purpose, the interpreter must find means to force the text
into the framework of the theory of his choice. How to interpret
the text at his own free will? Here comes the third characteristic —
replacement, replacing the normal understanding of the text with new
sayings. There are replacements of the text’s theme — replacing it
with a new one, as well as replacement of the text’s original character
design — inviting a marginal character to the center of the stage, as
if he is the text’s hero. Replacement turns text into theory’s servant.
Forcefulness, deconstruction and replacements, these three characte-
ristics are of linear proceeding sequence: because the interpretation
is interpretation in force, deconstruction is a need to mend the gap;
following deconstruction, it is naturally discursive replacement.
Obviously, forced inclusion of the extra–literary theories always
leads to the practice of turning a blind eye to the constitutive elements
of the text under scrutiny and bending the text’s themes or reference
to suit the needs of theories originated from other disciplines than
literature. Often the result is double failures: literary criticism fails
to explain target texts, while target texts fail to prove theories and
criticism. Gradually literary criticism is losing its “literary” quality.
Thinking about the ill effects of forced theoretical application, two
questions still need further clarifying here.
The first question is, should the inclusion of extra–literary theories
be taken as illegal, when the tendency of cross–disciplinary clashes
and trans–disciplinary integration are so evident today and resear-
ches breaking the traditional disciplinary limitations are providing the
main driving force for social progress? We must admit that from a
constructive point of view, trans–disciplinary tendency and practice
have definitely broaden the vision of contemporary literary criticism
and paved new ways to a multi–dimensional critical space. This is
good for contemporary literary criticism to go beyond its circular
arguments on literariness in the narrow sense and bring more layers
of meanings to its social value. However, we shall at the same time
not forget that compared with the external theoretical facilities, the
intrinsic motivation is much more important for the sustainable deve-
lopment of literary criticism, and this intrinsic motivation is nothing
but literary practice by writers. So, literary criticism should first of
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all come from literary practice. Also, expansion by unbalanced depen-
dence upon the extra–literary theories is also a self–evident proof of
the weakness of contemporary literary criticism. Its weakness lies in
its lack of creative mind to find new discourse, to name new things,
and to condense new theories in literary works and practice. To put
it shortly, contemporary literary criticism fails to use the language of
literature to enhance people’s feelings about their being. Once again
it is emphasized here that the admit of the negative aspect of trans–
disciplinary theoretical borrowing is not equal to cutting off literary
criticism from the other disciplines and being contended with its own
discursive echoing. Trans–disciplinary researches can be vigorous plat-
forms for new theories come into being, and the whole development
of literary criticism throughout the th century is exactly guaran-
teed by this trans–disciplinary tendency. The main reason against
forced inclusion of extra–literary theories and research models is that
we must respect the principal characteristic of literature. Different
from philosophy, history, mathematics and many other disciplines,
literature is the expression by words of people’s ideas, emotions and
consciousness in literary ways. Literary ways feature individuality,
the individual’s mind power. How can we measure individuality with
something uniform? When we try to get the core of a literary work
via some extra–literary methods and theories, the basic facts of its
literariness shall not be violated. To literary criticism as a whole, its
borrowing from other disciplines to generate new critical theories will
not succeed in the true sense unless the borrowing practice is based
on and judged by the critics’ knowledge about the uniqueness of lite-
rary creation. Without the knowledge about and respect to literature
itself, any literary theory will sooner or later be lifeless. If the theories
literary criticism has fully equipped with fail to interpret literary texts,
the existence of theories will be questioned and mocked and the very
discipline of literature will meet its serious crisis. Blind transportation
of theories is harmful. The Sokal Affair, an impressive anecdote in
the th century literary critical history, is a thought–provoking case
of this harm (Ivi, p. ). In , Allan Sokal, an American physics
professor submitted an article to Social Text, an academic journal
of postmodern cultural studies. This article was a hoax article, ai-
ming to test the journal’s academic vigor. The journal did not identify
the mistakes about common science in the article or the nonsense
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connections Sokal established between science and postmodernism.
Sokal’s hoax article was published, and on the day of its publication,
Sokal revealed the truth to another magazine. The whole world was
shocked at this news. According to Sokal’s words, part of his purpose
was to show his dissatisfaction with literary criticism’s abusive usage
of new terms of mathematics, physics and other scientific fields. The
irony of Sokal Affair shall be taken as an alert that literary criticism
must be careful in its borrowing of extra–literary theories. Trans–
disciplinary borrowing might be more suitable and safer if it happens
on the research method level, instead of direct usage or repetition of
the others’ discourse.
The second question is, once a new interpretation to a target text
has taken shape, to what extent can we use this new interpretation
to re–understand and re–write history? This question is very similar
to an everlasting concern of hermeneutics. If we take a long enough
time span into our consideration, any understanding to a text is tenta-
tive. Nietzsche, Heidegger and Gadamer all share this view, especially
Gadamer who thinks every kind of interpretation is just adding more
meanings to a text instead of finding the meaning (Gadamer, p. ).
So it is reasonable that the meaning of a text is drifting, changing,
refusing to be fixed. A methodology called “critical presenticism” ri-
sing at the threshold of the st century tries to read the past with the
present, emphasizing the present reading and meaning of a historical
text. This is a response against various modes of historicist literary
studies, including the relatively late schools of new historicism and cul-
tural materialism (Barry, , p. ). The critical method of reading
history through the lens of the present is not necessarily problematic,
for it provides more space for literature to play its present–day social
roles. But, presenticism and historicism are two bifurcate roads after
all. The dimension of concrete history shall not be totally ignored
even in our teleological reading of an old text. To understand a text
historically is in essence to understand the text’s original discursive
scope, and this scope is a given condition for our analysis into the text.
Should a presenticist revision of the past violate this given condition,
the critique will turn out to be a groundless fallacy. Critical presentici-
sm, if manipulated well, can add new meanings to an old text, but it
cannot go too far to evidently distort the writer’s original reference
or to judge the meanings of a text with modern notions forcibly and
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awkwardly.
So, when we look back at old texts in the light of new theories,
we must be alert of theoretical abuse. New readings can be taken as
a kind of compensation to, not a replacement of, the primary text
itself. Maybe there is indeed something in accordance to a critic’s
theoretical presupposition. But if this “something” is just an accidental
coincidence or vague fragments of the writer’s thoughts, how can we
take it as the writer’s serious concerns expressed on purpose and then
to redefine the most fundamental motif of the text? New theories give
critics new light to read old texts, but if a critic wants to re–evaluate
everything and finally adapt the text, he is quite beyond his critical
authority. A primary text is a primary text. Interpretations are inter-
pretations. They are not identical. The primary text cannot speak for
itself. It cannot declare its own interpretation as the most authoritative
understanding. Interpretations are always from the critics’ individual
points of view. So the smoothest logic should go like this: text first,
understanding second; text determining understanding, understan-
ding depending on text; the absence of text naturally leading to the
absence of sensible understanding.
It is undeniable that in certain contexts, theoretical borrowing from
extra–literary disciplines has played positive and important roles. Yet,
proper and effective employment of extra–literary theories is not
possible without a necessary condition, that is the theory should be
able to arrive at the nature of literature. There are three layers of
meanings in this “arrival at the nature of literature”.
The first meaning is that the theory refers directly to literary works
and it belongs to the tradition of literature. Traditional literary theo-
ries and criticism focus on texts and comment on the texts’ literary
styles and aesthetic values. They refer directly to commonly agreed
works of literature and they should be consequently regarded as li-
terary theories and criticism. However, this tradition is interrupted
by the concept of “critical theory” which emerges in the s we-
stern society and has gained great popularity since. This concept is
not, or mainly not, for exploring the meanings of literature. It is not
interested in texts, especially literary texts in a narrow sense. It cares
about theories. The “theory” of “critical theory” is not confined to
literary studies. Actually it is much more intended for interpreting
things beyond literature. It outlines a trans–disciplinary area. Even
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if this area starts from literature, it now has gone beyond the world
of literature and targets at issues and theories of philosophy, history,
anthropology, sociology, political science and so on. But on second
thought, it might be more exactly to say critical criticism does not
target at theories either. Its exclusive interest is in the “society” — the
material world that is not constituted by abstract theories. Since litera-
ture is not the main interest of today’s “critical theory”, it is obviously
a fallacy to replace traditional literary criticism with it. In order to
see this fallacy more clearly, let’s once again look into the influencing
relationship between the field of literature and the external theories.
We can roughly divide their mutual relationship into two kinds: using
literature to interpret external theories and using external theories to
interpret literature. Using literature to interpret theories not of litera-
ture is the most commonly seen practice of “critical theory”. Freud’s
using Greek tragedy Oedipus The King to support his psychological
theory is a far evidence. Fredric Jameson bases his book The Political
Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act on his meditation about
classical works by Gustave Flaubert, Joseph Conrad, George Gissing
and etc. Although he makes excellent analysis into some literary text,
and his unique ideas are indeed a special and instructive contribution
to the enrichment of literary theories, his The Political Unconscious, in
essence, should not be taken as a book of literary theory or criticism.
It would be more accurate to call it a critical book about modernist
theories. Both his starting point and ending point are not in literary
things. He is a theorist using literary material to serve his theoretical
purpose. As to using external theories to interpret literature, whether
it belongs to literary criticism depends on whether the theories really
point at and belong to literature. The direction a theory pointing at is
where it belongs to. Difference of emphasis exists between pointing
at literature or at another research field. Take feminist criticism for
example. If its emphasis is on specific literary texts defined as feminist
writing, it is feminist literary criticism. If it is using literary texts to
advocate feminist theories, it is feminism, which expands into the field
of literature but should not be treated as literary criticism without
differentiation. In short, if an interpretation is made in the light of
some extra–literary theory and finally it goes too far in the theory
that it loses its focus on literature at all, then this interpretation is an
imposed interpretation if it still insists on its being literary criticism.
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The second consideration for a theory’s arriving at the nature of
literature or not is whether the theory can be settled down in the
study of literature for long and serve the needs of literature. The result
of settling down is an effect, a judgment, a sign. Viewed as a whole,
the western literary criticism of the th century has introduced many
theories from the other disciplines, but those adopted and used as
long established theories of literature are few, and those developed
into fine theoretical systems are even fewer. Terry Eagleton says that
there are two familiar ways in which any theory can provide itself
with a distinct purpose and identity: either it can define itself in terms
of its particular methods of enquiry; or it can define itself in terms of
the particular object that is being enquired into (Eagleton, , pp.–
). With a reference to his criteria, what theories borrowed from
extra–literary origins can be said of literary purpose and identity?
What methods become effective common methods of reading literary
texts? We are kept being provided with concepts and categories by
certain great “–isms”, but how many trends have proven sustainable
and systematic? New Criticism might be an exception. But how about
the other borrowed theories? Are they all suitable for the studies of
literature?
Third, literary theory exists in a literary way. What is a theory’s lite-
rary way of existence? The point is literary theory should be concrete
theory that can be put into specific interpretation of text. Compared
with theories of the other branches of social sciences, especially wi-
th philosophy, literary theory deals with literature, which concerns
neither everyday social phenomena nor abstract conception and co-
gnition. Literary theory focuses on the rules and history of literature,
specific methods of creating and analyzing literary texts. If a literary
theory does not care about textual or aesthetic things, but show great
zeal to criticizing the society, constructing ideas about issues not of
literary concern and participating in Hegel’s purely spiritual activities,
can it be still labeled as “literary” theory? Needless to say, theories
need evolution, evolution based on practice and in accordance with
practice. Literary criticism is a form of practicing literary theories, as
literary creations and phenomena are. Theory and criticism are two
interwoven entities. Theory is always reflected as theory for criticism,
and criticism is always reflected as criticism by theory. Without theory,
criticism would have been extinct long ago. Incapable of penetrating
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into criticism, theory would be too far away from literature. This is
dialectic of the triangular relationship among criticism, theory and
literature.
. Subjective Assumption Prior to Interpretation
The phrase “subjective assumption” is the key to understanding how
an imposed interpretation takes its shape. It refers to the practice
that a critic interprets a text’s meanings or evaluates its significance
not by strict logic deduction, but by certain preconceptions and a
priori arguments in their mind. A critique made out of subjective
assumption usually has its political stance, mode of interpretation or
theoretical conclusion first, therefore the whole critical text is nothing
but a textual design to prove his assumption. Subjective assumption
damages criticism by lowering it to the level of footnote making to
theories or social agendas. Subjective assumption is very likely to
bring three logic “traps” into critical texts.
The first trap is pre–taken stance before interpretation, which means
that a critic has already taken his stance of argument or political
gesture before his seemingly objective reading into a literary text. In
fact, his main purpose is not to tell the main idea of the literary text
but to declare his idea, to express his attitude, to show his concerns
about something quite possibly not literary at all. Especially when
affairs and theories not of literature are directly used by the critic,
his stance and intention will be more self–evident. Contrary to the
common understanding that a critic should find his ideas or draw his
conclusions from literary texts, critic with political stance ready in his
mind tries to find literary texts to satisfy his stance. He has a stance first,
then critical standards fitting his stance well, and then literary texts
fitting his standards well. Both the literary texts he chooses and the
interpretative process he takes serve his initial standpoint. The reason
for using literary texts to fulfill an extra–literary agenda lies in the
value of literature. As literary creations can reach the broadest readers
and the deepest feelings, the use of literary elements can greatly
enhance a pre–taken stance’s influencing and convincing power.
The second trap is pre–set mode of interpretation, reflected as a critic
fitting a literary text into an analyzing formula and then abstracting
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out meanings rather stiffly. Usually in this kind of critical trap, the
critic seems to be very confident about the analyzing formula he choo-
ses, holding it universally true and capable of covering any literary text.
Among the diversified schools of contemporary literary criticism, lite-
rary semiotics is the one that most features using analytical formula to
draw meanings from texts, especially when it borrows formulas from
physics or mathematics. Overwhelmed by formula methods, literary
theories and criticism will no more work as the artistic expression
of human thoughts and emotions. When criticism is simplified into
applying formulas to literary texts and literary texts are thus solidified
into dry relationship factors, the happiness and inspiration derived
from reading experience will be driven out and the critique turns into
a boring labor of solving mathematical problems.
The third trap is predetermined conclusion, which refers to the si-
tuation of conclusion preceding textual analysis. Obviously such a
conclusion is not out of a critic’s close reading into a target text and
logical deduction. Not for explaining texts, but for proving certain
arranged conclusions, it is a reversed order to normal interpretative
process. It starts from the ending point — the conclusion, and goes all
the way back to the initial point — the primary texts. The predetermi-
ned conclusion works like a deliberate tour guide, leading a critique
involuntarily moving to a designed place.
Elaine Showalter, as one of the most famous feminist critic, occa-
sionally shows the problem of subjective assumption in her feminist
criticism. She likes re–interpreting literary texts in history and her
feminist perspective often works as a pre–taken stance in her re–
interpretation. Her critical essay written in the s, Representing
Ophelia: Women, Madness, and the Responsibilities of Feminist Criticism ,
makes an anti–conventional reading to Shakespeare’s Hamlet. She re-
jects the traditional criticism of taking Hamlet, the hero, as the focus
of textual analysis, and puts Ophelia, Hamlet’s fiancée, a supporting
character in the drama, into the center of her understanding ofHam-
let. In this article Showalter proposes that Ophelia’s being neglected
in criticism is not an accidental phenomenon but the outcome of
patriarchal order. “The alteration of strong and weak Ophelias on the
stage, virginal and seductive Ophelias in art, inadequate or oppressed
Ophelias in criticism, tells us how these representations have overflo-
wed the text, and how they have reflected the ideological character
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of their times” (Showalter, , p. ). Showalter believes a feminist
view to interpret Ophelia iconography is very important. After sur-
veying a variety of art forms of representing Ophelia, Showalter asks,
“how should feminist criticism represent Ophelia in its own discourse?
What is our responsibility towards her as character and as woman?”
(Ivi, p. ) “To liberate Ophelia from the text, or to make her its tragic
center, is to re–appropriate her for our own ends” (Ivi, p. ).
The purpose of Showalter’s tracing into Ophelia’s historical di-
scourse is definite. First, to change previous standards and re–evaluate
this drama from a feminist point of view. In the view of feminists,
any literary text can be read as a text about woman and femininity,
no matter what the author’s original idea is and what the discourse
he lives in is. In fact, not just in individual literary works, but literary
history as a whole need to be re–read and re–written. To feminist
critics, women experience is the most important standard of assessing
literary value. Feminist position is their pre–taken stance and the be-
ginning of their critique making. This clear–cut frontier is extremely
necessary to shape the ground of feminist criticism.
The second purpose of Showalter’s feminist reading is to re–evaluate
characters, “to re–appropriate her for our own ends”. By inviting the
previously marginalized and distorted female characters to the center
of stage, standing there in spotlight as representatives of women, femi-
nist criticism finds a proper channel to express its revolting thoughts
against the patriarchal order and male dominating system.
The third purpose is to re–interpret the theme of Hamlet. It is no
more a story of a prince’s difficult revenge. It is actually a story of
an invisible girl named Ophelia, and this story is in essence a piece
of hidden history. Maybe, Shakespeare produces this hidden history
on purpose, which is a good proof that Shakespeare is conscious
of patriarchy and a good proof of long existed feminist thoughts in
literary history as well. To Showalter, her criticism is her duty for the
struggle for women.
However, under her subjective critical design, Shakespeare’s classi-
cal work is subverted. Though Shakespeare just gives a few touches
to Ophelia: her turning up in only  of the total  scenes and the love
between Hamlet and her is ambiguously mentioned by several lines
for flashback, she must be examined again with a new light. So some
details, details neglected by the previous Hamlet criticism, are picked
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out and their specific implications are uncovered. For example, the
flowers Ophelia wears when she goes mad suggests double images:
one is innocent blooming, indicated by the virginal rose of may; the
other is whorish contamination indicated by wild flowers and herbs.
The “weedy trophies” and phallic “long purples” which she wears
to her death and her disordered hair all images associated with femi-
ninity and sexuality. Her death in water is especially a reference to
female elements. “Drowning ... becomes the truly feminine death in
the dramas of literature and life, one which is a beautiful immersion
and submersion in the female element. Water is the profound and
organic symbol of the liquid woman whose eyes are so easily dro-
wned in tears, as her body is the repository of blood, amniotic fluid
and milk” (Ivi, p. ). Showalter’s defense for women is also made by
creating a textual coalition with other feminist critiques. She borrows
deconstructive words and symbols from the French psychoanalytic
criticism, saying that when Hamlet is joking with Ophelia that there
is nothing between maids’ legs, this “nothing” is actually a symbol of
Ophelia’s, as well as women–in–general’s state of being. “Deprived of
thoughts, sexuality, language, Ophelia’s story becomes the story of O
— the zero, the empty circle or mystery of feminine difference, the
cipher of female sexuality to be deciphered by feminist interpretation”
(Ivi, p. ). Be it textual analysis or theoretical reference, the purpose
of Showalter is quite clear. It is to prove that in the long history of
literature and arts, women are systematically contemned, insulted
and tortured. They are the object of contempt and misreading. So far
as feminism has illuminated, the images of women need to be recon-
structed, either by disclosing the male’s violence or by enhancing the
female’s fighting spirit. Not only so, feminism should also be widely
used as a criterion to judge literary practice and effects. However, the
problem, or the “trap” of a pre–taken stance arises here. Can the femi-
nist judgment about Shakespeare’s gender position fit his actual mind
well? When feminist criticism is applied to Shakespeare, shouldn’t
there be more legitimate proofs to guarantee its interpretative cor-
rectness? Compared with Showalter’s paper about Hamlet, one of the
most representative feminist critical works, The Madwoman in the At-
tic: the Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination,
written by Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, makes a much more
general and far–reaching critical attack to the dominant male’s voice
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in literary history. These two female literary critics scrutinize how
the nineteenth–century male writers have created female characters
and two categories of woman image are identified by them: the angel
and the monster. Both kinds are distortion and depression made by
man’s society to women. Both are the reflection of the deep–rooted
prejudice against women in patriarchal ideology. To Gilbert and Gu-
bar, text abuse and text harassment to women are all–pervasive in
the literary history, and they provide abundant examples to their fe-
minist criticism (Gilbert, Gubar, , pp. –). The influence of
this book is powerful, especially its efforts to totalize individual cases
into the historical phenomenon of male centrism and uplift feminist
criticism to the status of being universally effective. But, in spite of
welcoming it, we still need to think hard how much convincing power
the practice of categorizing writers by genders can possess?
Where shall we start our critiques? From which shall we draw con-
clusions: from close reading to text or from the so–called theoretical
consciousness?
One proposal is that theory is just a perspective to contemplate
text. That is true. When we are making criticism, we need a cutting
angle to enter into the text, a perspective. Criticism without perspec-
tive is not possible or serious. But, how do we choose or decide a
perspective? The most reliable method is from text, from literary
works. Imagine a text as a mountain, and now you are looking at this
mountain. Theory is the angle of your eyes watching the mountain,
that is your perspective. If you want to have a good view of the moun-
tain, you have to find a good position. When you are looking for a
good position, you naturally take the whole mountain — its height,
form and structure into your consideration. Subjective assumption
in interpretation is faulty, because it is like turning a blind eye to the
mountain’s specific features and stubbornly staying in an inappropriate
observation spot. No wonder the true face of the mountain is revealed.
Though some angles are faulty (too far away from a good and true
view), we must admit effective angles are by no means singular. There
should be multiple perspectives to observe the mountain to enrich our
knowledge about its “true face”. Similarly, there should be multiple
cutting angles to make criticism. Different theories bring new lights to
a text and find new meanings. I am not proposing a self–contradictory
argument here. Admitting multiple perspectives is not equal to ad-
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mitting every perspective is of no problem. Ancient Chinese poet Su
Shi (Ï轼 –) leaves us a famous poem about seeing different
sides of a mountain from different perspectives: “Looking from the
side it forms a range, from the end it forms a peak; From everywhere
looking at the mountain, it’s never the same” (洪看成岭侧成峰,远
近高华各不希. But what if it is a perspective from which you can
only vaguely see the mountain, or even worse that you cannot see it at
all? Such a perspective is my metaphor for inappropriate theory which
ignores or distorts text. Here comes the matching problem between
theory and text. But, how to judge whether they are matching or not?
The core standard for judging a theory matching or not is not how
influential or popular the theory is, but to what extent the texture
of the text can be explained by it. In order to tell the texture of the
text, it is necessary to study the text thoroughly and comprehensively,
viewing it as a whole.
Certainly theory can shed guiding light on criticism. But, if theory
becomes critic’s pre–taken stance and in order to advocate the stance
critics add something neither can be found nor justified in text, then
theory will stop playing its enlightening role and even lose its objec-
tivity and legitimacy. We might well imagine that if we extend the
practice of pre–taken stance to our understanding of literary history,
then we might try to re–interpret or re–write the whole history with
just one kind of theory and its discourse, as if this theory were the
only language that can decode history. Should we interpret literature
in this way, where will the truthfulness lie — the truthfulness of either
history as a text or a text as history? Theoretical assumption, if handled
rather stiffly as a screening tool in our selection of literary material,
will cause the problem of imposed interpretation, interpretation that
goes beyond the boundary of literary criticism. It is true that criticism
involves multiple perspectives and interpretations, but it should avoid
pre–taken stance, for critics holding them will be too easily to draw
conclusions detached from texts’ real content and backgrounds. Or let
me put it in another way, critics can take stance and have attitudes, but
their stance should be reasonable, resulting from objective analysis. In
order to explain the problem of “pre–taken stance” more accurately,
four questionable points should be clarified here.
The first question is what is the difference between “knowledge
background” and “pre–taken stance”. There should be no argument
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that a critic’s mind is not “tabula rasa” in John Locke’s words. Both
Gadamer’s “prejudice theory” and Jauss’ concept of “horizon of expec-
tation” are telling us that reading is not a  percent innocent thing.
Can a critic give up his prejudice ultimately and set out his critical
journey with a transparent mind? A subject’s knowledge background
is how much he is equipped with relevant knowledge. To human
beings, knowledge is the necessary condition of their cognition prac-
tice, including reading. For example, he must know certain words if
he wants to read and he must follow common logic if he wants to
express himself. Such knowledge is not the “pre–taken stance” I am
against.
Gadamer’s words of “prejudice” and “fore–conception” point at
an individual’s knowledge model, firmly held yet constantly revised
by him. His knowledge model is influenced and determined by both
collective and personal factors, like the historical phase he is in, his na-
tional, ethnical and cultural identities, his educational and social back-
grounds and his past experience. Though he is not conscious of his
knowledge model, this model is where his cognition starts. His fore–
conception cannot change his cognition object, so fore–conception
alone cannot decide cognition result. Gadamer is quite aware of this
limitation. He says that in order to realized understanding, one should
remain “open to the meaning of the other person or text” and hold
an as–a-matter–of–fact attitude, because, using Gadamer’s words, “a
person trying to understand something will not resign himself from
the start to relying on his own accidental fore–meanings, ignoring
as consistently and stubbornly as possible the actual meaning of the
text [. . . ]” Gadamer believes that interpretation (hermenutics) should
not be controlled by one’s accidental fore–meaning, not to mention
his consistently and stubbornly sticking to it and ignoring facts and
truth of his object. As to the dialectic relationship between “prejudice”
and meanings, Gadamer’s attitude is like this, “The important thing
is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself
in all its otherness and thus assert is own truth against one’s own
fore–meanings” (Gadamer, , p. –).
. The English translation of Gadamer’s direct quotation also refers to an English
version of Truth and Method translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall.
(Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall,
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Jauss’ concept of horizon of expectation is very similar to Gada-
mer’s fore–conception. Both refer to a projected cognition model
before reading practice; both possessed by us subconsciously; both
cannot change the hard facts about their objects at their free will. Ho-
wever, they are also different. Fore–conception is one’s psychological
readiness for cognition, while horizon of expectation is one’s expec-
tation about certain results, which is more specific and purposeful.
When it occurs that reality does not fit fore–conception or expecta-
tion, the former will revise its conceptions and add this revision to its
knowledge model, while the latter will adjust its vision to adapt to
reality and open a new horizon.
Neither prejudice theory nor horizon of expectation is identical
to my “pre–taken stance” , which indicates the a critic’s subjective
and deliberate choice of meanings. Before studying specific literary
text, a critic has already chosen his argument and taken his critical
stance; then he tailors his argument with supportive details from the
literary text, even though these details might be distortions to the
primary text. Stance leads to actions. A critic might adapt primary text
and revise reality just because of his stance. These aggressive gestures
are his sensible choice. Stance refuses changes. It intervenes text
and manipulates interpretation. Because pre–taken stance is always a
strong theoretical conscious leading to actions, it is more powerful
than fore–conception in critical practice.
In short, different from Gadamer’s fore–conception which is always
ambiguously revealed, imposed interpretation has its clear stand and
definitive goal to achieve. Gadamer’s prejudice might extend aimlessly
to any directions, while a pre–taken stance focuses on specific direc-
tion or directions. Besides, Gadamer’s prejudice occurs accidentally
and naturally in a criticastancel text, not so much on purpose. But a
pre–taken stance has a purpose. The difference between Jauss’ “hori-
zon of expectation” and pre–taken stance is also apparent: the former
refers to the readers’ aesthetic expectation, while the latter refers to
the critics’ theoretical evaluation; the former prefers to see “what a
piece of literary work should be”, while the latter prefers to talk about
“what a piece of literary work must be”. Obviously, critique with
pre–taken stance is critique developed from certain designed theory
London: Sheed and Ward, ).
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instead of literary text. Thus they easily fall into the state of imposing
meanings or values to literary works in force and turns literary works
into theories’ witnesses. A critic’s pre–taken stance can draw literary
works and practice over to their sides and be their partners, while his
knowledge background will not function in this way. That is where
the main difference of the two concepts lies.
The second is the difference between “theoretical guidance” and
“pre–taken stance”. It is good to have appropriate theories to gui-
de one’s research. Could it be that theoretical guidance is a kind of
pre–taken stance? Where can we draw a line between well–suited
theoretical guidance and ill–fitting stance? This is perhaps where their
biggest difference lies: the former, referring to the guiding light of-
fered by theory for a critic’s outlook and methodology, only serves
as an apparatus for orientation, not like the latter, which are specific
arguments and conclusions taken for granted before objective analysis.
In actual critical practice, theories providing “theoretical guidance”
should observe facts and facts are in turn in the position of correcting
theories. But pre–taken stance is not so factual and objective. They
perform as established criteria of reading and interpreting, with innate
formulas and conclusions. Researches led by pre–taken stance even
bend facts to observe theories. They set criteria for selecting facts and
tailoring facts to suit their formulas and conclusions.
Friedrich Engels has a clear yet profound view about such formula
like theories. At the end of the th century, a school of young critics
and writers participated actively in the German Socialist Movement
and they made copious critical attacks from a rigid perspective of
materialism to social movements happening in Germany then and
in history. However, many of their judgments and conclusions prove
wrong. To their incorrectness, Engels comments that if materialist
philosophy is used not as an enlightening method to study history but
as a fixed formula, and historical facts are tailored in order to fit in
this formula, then the so–called materialism will change to its own
opposite (Marx, Engels, , p. ). Engels further emphasizes that
theories should not be used as providing “stereotypes” or “labels” to
various things, for such usages prevent researches in depth. Back to the
understanding of historical development through materialism, Engels
says that it is necessary for researchers to make a thorough study
into history again, to study in details the conditions for various social
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situations, and then basing on these condition find corresponding
political, juridical, aesthetic, philosophical and religious views about
societies (Ivi, p. ). This is the way to attain the correctness of
historical materialism. Engels’ words are a three–fold reminder for
us: first, theories are not formulas or labels that can be so easily
stuck to things; second, any research with theoretical guidance shall
never or ever ignore the importance of studying the research target’s
whole existing conditions and situations; third, a critic should naturally
get his findings from facts, not forcibly using theories upon things
or tailoring facts to satisfy his theories’ needs. Otherwise, theories
will go to the opposite of their initial meanings of existence. The
dividing line is rather clear here: theoretical guidance taking theories
as methods of understanding things and respecting and allowing facts
to correct theories; while pre–taken stance using theories as formulas
and tailoring and distorting facts to prove theories. One is scientific,
while the other is formula like.
Engels’ comments reflects the main points differentiating theo-
retical guidance of historical materialism from forced inclusion of
extra–literary theories: the former used as a theoretical orientation,
the latter a fixed mode; the former based on facts and adjusting itself
to facts, the latter on its mode and tailoring facts to fit its mode; the
former for seeking historical rules, the latter for proving theoretical
correctness. Yes, obviously Marx and Engels are analyzing texts from
the stance and in the method of historical materialism. But they are
not labeling texts with theoretical terms and making imposed inter-
pretation, as reflected in their employment of historical and aesthetic
methods always mingled with their close reading into the texts, and
their drawing of conclusions always from textual contents.
The third questionable point is the possibility of a uniform mo-
de of criticism. The “scientific turn” of contemporary west literary
criticism has taken great efforts to search for theories or critical mo-
des capable of transcending their time and space and being equally
effective to all texts and phenomena. Semiotics and narratology are
two research directions typical of this turn. What they are striving
to find are the dominant factors and uniform forms in the world of
literature as well as of human beings in order to organize a pattern
universally true to explain multitudinous phenomena. According to
Fredric Jameson, structuralist seeking of superior “uniformity” is only
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an illusion as he says mockingly that structuralism is essentially a
replay of the Kantian dilemma of the unknowability of the thing–
in–itself ( Jameson, , p. ). Science of human arts, especially the
study of literature, is fundamentally different from science of natural
world on the aspects of research object and research route. Natural
science targets at the objective material world, whose existence and
operating rules are almost wholly independent of people’s wills. Scien-
tific workers’ personal preference and emotions cannot change their
research objects’ beings. Even research methods must be the same
as they should be. Literary creations are subjective things as they are
the results of writers’ individual spiritual activities. Since literary texts
are controlled by writers’ thinking and feelings, and thinking and
feelings are free and abstract things that cannot be regulated once
and for all; the structures, language and narrative forms of literary
creations are naturally should not be interpreted or distorted by con-
stantly identical formulas and theoretical molds. Besides, life is full of
vicissitudes, and writers’ feelings and understanding to life are indeed
vulnerable to sudden changes and backward development. Critical
formulas or molds cannot accommodate literary texts as reflections
of their creators’ big inner changes.
The forth questionable point is the fairness of criticism. Speaking
from the sense of epistemology, the most primary condition of critici-
sm making is an ontological awareness of the text’s existence. This
awareness includes three aspects or levels: ) what is written in the text,
which is the most objective part of the text; ) what the author intends
to represent and whether his representation is in agreement with his
intention; ) what are the actual effects of the text, such as readers’
understandings or response, and whether the effects are in agreement
with the author’s intention. These three aspects are the most basic
elements of fair evaluations. The fairness of criticism centers on the
fairness of his attitude to the texts. If imposed interpretation is made
for the sake of certain theories, the fairness of criticism will be har-
med or even lost. There is a concept of critical ethics involved here. A
fair textual analysis should be in accordance with the text’s content
and the author’s original intention. We take those written in the text
as the text’s content; while to those not written or represented in
the text, we cannot take them as content for granted. Critical ethics
is even more desired in our attitude to the author. When a critic is
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trying to force his own wills upon a text by deciphering out meanings
neither obviously intended by the author nor definitely proved by any
trace in the text, he is actually violating critical ethics. Of course on
the other hand, the complexity of a text demands the complexity of
its critiques, and the ambiguity of literariness eludes the capture of
correct meanings. There might be a great gap between the author’s
original intention and his actual textual representation, which asks
for debates and identifying works in depth. Possibly, a critic knows
a text better than the author himself, for he can identify something
already existing in the text but not realized by the author yet. Between
epistemology and ethics, there is a space big enough to hold all these
debates and explorations. Imposed interpretation is not operated in
this space. It sets a pre–determined conclusion as the goal of its elu-
cidation, then press what is not written in the text into the text and
what is not intended by the author onto the author. Such a critic is
so strong–willed that he offends both the logic procedures of episte-
mology and the rational principles of critical ethics. In conclusion, the
fairness of criticism is guaranteed by correct method of epistemology
and basic respect to critical ethics.
. Reversed Route of Cognition
Reversed route of cognition refers to the inverted order happening
in the process of theoretical construction and critical analysis, which
starts from the concepts and categories of certain theory and goes
all the way back to the theory itself. It is circular reasoning, proving
a theory by the theory itself. To put it more precisely, this kind of
criticism first takes a theory as its cutting angle to go into text. Then
following the theory, it cuts text into pieces. Certainly these pieces
are in line with its theoretical purpose, so these pieces are collec-
ted together to prove the theory’s legitimacy in turn. From another
perspective, we might say that reversed route of cognition is also
an upside–down mistake in its handling of part–whole relationship.
It uses its limited view and partial knowledge to replace the grand
whole picture, and replaces thorough textual analysis with inaccurate
imagination. Reversed route of cognition is definitely a wrong route of
epistemology. It moves from theory to practice though logically spea-
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king it should move from practice to theory. Contrary to the normal
rule of drawing out conclusions from practice, it is using conclusions
to fragmentize and emasculate texts. Reversed route of cognition is
the epistemological cause of imposed interpretation.
Reversed route of cognition leads to many problems of logical
disorder, of which the following three are especially noticeable.
First, it reverses the relationship between practice and theory. Theory co-
mes from practice, and literary theory should grow up in its learning
from literary practice. To this, J. Hillis Miller writes in his essay that
great works of literature are likely to be ahead of their critics. “They
are there already. They have anticipated explicitly any deconstruction
the critic can achieve. A critic may hope, with great effort, and with
the indispensable help of the writer themselves, to raise himself to the
linguistic sophistication where Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton,
Wordsworth, George Elliot, Stevens, or even Williams are already.
They are there already, however, necessarily in such a way that their
works are open to mystified readings” (Miller, , p. ). It should
be an unquestionable statement that theories of literature spring from
literary practice (i.e. works of literature). However, in the develop-
ment of contemporary western literary criticism, this statement is a
question, a big question.
There are some phenomena confusing and misleading our judg-
ment.
The first phenomenon is that some literary theories are transplan-
ted directly from extra–literary disciplines, and these theories have
spread widely, seemingly of great influence. This phenomenon leaves
us a false impression that theories can come from theories. Eagleton
says in the Preface to his Literary Theory, “As the book itself tries to
demonstrate there is no ‘literary theory’, in the sense of a body of
theory which springs from, or is applicable to, literature alone. None
of the approaches outlined in this book, from phenomenology and
semiotics to structuralism and psycho–analysis, is simply concerned
with ‘literary’ writing” (Eagleton, , p. vii). But I won’t so easily
take Eagleton’s words as truth. He is just describing a phenomenon.
We can easily find converse examples. On one hand, there indeed
exist theories springing from literature alone. For example, many
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remarks and theories in the ancient Chinese poetics is purely from
literature and for the literature, though they can also refer to and
interplay with the outside world. On the other hand, there indeed
exist theories whose coverage is so limited that they should not be
used beyond their proper sphere. Of course, limited or not is hard to
tell and we cannot exclude a theory’s possibility of influencing other
fields. But normally we shall not exaggerate a theory’s radiation into
other disciplines. Nor shall we go too far to make an ironic scene
that the main force of the practitioners of a discipline are not experts
of this disciplines, but of some other ones. Theories not of literary
origin but captured by the contemporary western literary criticism
are doomed to be washed out by the new tides, if they cannot get
proper transformation in its qualities to fit literary practice in depth.
The changing of literary theories in our times has constantly proven
this.
The second phenomenon is that some important schools of thoughts
set out criticism from theories and they use theories to operate ana-
tomy on texts, forcing texts to prove theories. This leaves a false
impression as well, as if theory can precede practice and higher than
life. Theory and practice, the reciprocal relation between them can
be viewed from two perspectives. One perspective is reality. Speaking
from reality, practice is obviously higher than theory because it has
more special and direct effect on changing the objective world. The
other perspective is universality, or uniformity, or totality. From this
perspective, some people believe that theory possesses more univer-
sality and thus is higher than practice. To them, theory is revealed as
a guide to practice. But, in fact, practice has universality, too. Practice
tells us principles true or not true. If the external conditions are simi-
lar, same practice can quite possibly reproduce same results, and this
sameness is where universality lies. The universality of theory comes
from the universality of practice (Lenin, , , p. ). According to
the virtues of epistemology, the order between practice and theory
should never be reversed.
The third disturbing but common phenomenon is that negation
from one theory to another theory is not based on literary practice
and reality, but purely on intellectual deconstruction. This kind of
negation leads to a misunderstanding that theories can get their gro-
wth and strength simply by speaking and playing within themselves.
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In fact, even if we are talking about a true case of a theory negating
another theory, it still needs to find its foundation in practice. Marx
and Engels have said the same thing, “The question whether objective
truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory
but is a practical question” (Marx, Engels, , p. ). Out of his insi-
stence upon practice’s priority, Engels criticizes Feuerbach of isolating
from historial practice. Feuerbach tries to negate Hegel’s theory of
morals by advocating an abstract ideal human “love”. To this, Engels
points out, “In short, the Feuerbachian theory of morals fares like
all its predecessors. It is designed to suit all periods, all people and
all conditions, and precisely for that reason it is never and nowhere
applicable” (Marx, Engels, , p. ). Even when Derrida has suc-
ceeded in using deconstruction methods to undermine the concept
of logocentrism and accelerated the replacement of structuralism
by post–structuralism, his achievements should not be taken as an
evidence to the legendary power of destruction a theory can obtain.
Hayden White has a sarcastic comment on Derrida, “He regards his
own philosophy as a transcendence of the structuralist problematic,
but he is wrong; it is its fetishization” (White, , p. ).
The entire focus of attention of theory must be practice. If not
founded in practice, if based on theoretical construction alone, if
produced from theories chasing theories, a theory would be a rootless
existence. A theory can realize its growth by logical induction and
deduction, but its coming into being, its birth, is sheer out of practice,
practice against which a theory must be tested. Theory originates
from practice. The growth of any theory must depend on literary
practice and experiences.
Second, it leads to misplaced relationship between the concrete and the ab-
stract. This misplacement is reflected in two opposite ways of hand-
ling concrete–abstract relationship in criticism. One way is setting
out from abstract theories and then dismantle or transform specific
texts to find material to justify the presupposed theories, instead of
moving from concrete literary practice and gradually rising to abstract
theories. The other way is refusing and resisting the abstract intellec-
tual work, using fragmentized reading to replace abstract theoretical
construction. Virtues of theory, like universality, integrity and stability
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are thus impaired. The right concrete–abstract relationship should go
like this: criticism starts from the concrete things and attends to them
all the way, rising from specific analyses to the abstract and general le-
vel; then the abstract, though originating from the concrete, provides
guidance to the concrete in turn. Specific analyses and case studies
should be enhanced to the abstract and general level, Otherwise, they
would stop at being fragments of limited significance. Semiotic litera-
ry criticism is one example of the abstract kind. It starts from turning
literary expressions into emotionless and senseless “signs”, and then
using methods resembling mathematics to do formal analyses into
the texts. The basic focus of literary semiotics is not of literary con-
cern. In Greimas’ study of narratology with semiotic methods, we can
see his abstract inference overwhelms his objective textual analysis.
Roland Barthes goes even far in abstract semiotics. Dispelling tradi-
tional concerns about authorship and signification system in criticism,
he argues that signs are signs and they do not represent anything
other than themselves. He even proposes that interpretation should
be made only from specific literature context and any reference to the
world out of the text is not trustworthy (Fangtong, , p. ). To
literary semiotics, abstractness is both the beginning and the end. All
the textual details are at the service of something abstract — abstract
idea or abstract signification, working as evidence demonstrating it.
Interpretations moving from the abstract to the concrete have
apparent imperfections.
The first imperfection is the emptiness of content, which happens
when concrete details of a text are silenced and enveloped in the criti-
cism’s seeking for abstract things. This problem is especially serious
in the case of deconstructive reading through abstract signs. This kind
of reading distills complicated messages about thoughts and feelings
in the text and renders the text as a pile of boring signs. With piles
of signs as its critical results, the text breaks into pieces, into unavoi-
dable fragments of content and thoughts. Michel Foucault criticizes
Derrida of always “remaining exclusively textual”. He says, “As an
interpreter and critic, he leads us into the text from which, in turn, we
never emerge. Themes and concerns that transcends the parameters
of textuality — above all, those that are related to questions of social
reality, institutions, and power — remain fully imperceptible from the
standpoint of this rarefied, hyperlinguistic framework” (Wolin, ,
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p. ).
Second, if we admit literature is in its essence aesthetic and it is a
unique creative world of human expression, we should then agree to
the statement that the concrete is more important than the abstract
to literature. In other words, in the strictest sense, literature is not
an abstract existence. Literature is concrete texts. Without concre-
te texts, without specific analyses into specific literary texts, there
would be no tangible existence of literature. Interpreted by senseless
and emotionless signs, the quality of literature would definitely melt
away and understanding would be a mystified thing. Once again I
would like to refer to Hayden White’s comments on Derrida here.
White criticized Derrida of attacking the whole critical enterprise and
bewitching understanding by an infinite play of signs. White says that
reading is traditionally regarded as a talent which all men in principle
possessed, and reading is therefore as an ordinary human activity. But
now, he says, under the imperative to mystify reading, reading takes
on the magical qualities and is seen as a privilege of a few exceptional
intelligence (White, , pp. –).
The third imperfection is the extremities it might cause. Sometimes
this kind of reading sticks to one simple abstract method and uses this
method to rather rigidly interpret diversified texts. Another practice
contrary to it — too much indulgence in specific text analysis — is
also narrow–minded. Miller is a skillful critic who has made disinte-
grated readings into a huge amount of books and endowed abundant
analyses of images to these books. However, Miller’s deconstructive
criticism is also problematic, which tends to disintegrate an originally
organized text into small parts and pieces, like a boy disassembling
his father’s watch but unable to restore it (Miller, ). Such kind
of deconstructive reading cancels out the wholeness of a text as well
as the abstract messages that we can reasonably draw from the text.
To understand and interpret literature in this way is to dismantle
meaningful texts into broken pieces and lay them there in disorder.
After all, only in an organic wholeness can the parts play their roles.
For the same logic, interpretation, however subtle and clever, is not
faithful and cannot justify itself if it drifts away from the text. Scientific
criticism is pretty aware that there should be an overall framework
governing the understanding of the text’s specific elements. With
a general knowledge of the text in his mind, a critic goes into the
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text’s texture and details and try to find out the interplay taking place
among them. Furthermore, “the abstract” under discussion now mu-
st be abstraction to a sensible level, based on the empirical knowledge
about factual and concrete particulars. Deconstruction is necessary,
but we should not just stop at it. The purpose of deconstruction is still
for meaning seeking, meanings abstracted from dismantled pieces
and bringing about spiral evolution. If there is no integration and
reconstruction of meanings following on, the value of the deconstruc-
tion is confined to merely a technical one — deconstruction for the
sake of deconstruction, not a literary one. When the focus of criticism
moves away from literary deconstruction to technical deconstruction,
imposed interpretation can be expected to happen.
Third, it leads to the split between the part and the whole. In the con-
struction of theoretical system, many theories and schools of literary
criticism cannot provide an organic part–whole relationship in their
interpretative methods, thus fail to create a relatively integrated and
self–contended system for themselves. Some theories and schools
start from their focus on textual parts and they do not go beyond their
initial concerns for textuality in the later development. They confine
themselves stubbornly to the close reading of the text’s atomic ele-
ments. Their practice is seeing the parts but not the whole. On the
contrary, some theories and critical schools starts from the whole,
the general grasp of the text, and their interpretation tends to be
rather vague and inexact, for their general and macro approaches to
reading texts always ignore researches into textual details and are fond
of groundless imagination and association. Take the New Criticism
for example. It absolutely emphasizes on the pure “inside study” of
literary texts, cutting out any linkage with the thoughts and theo-
ries of the outside world, especially theories of social and historical
criticism. This is where the narrowness of the New Criticism lies.
Hans Robert Jauss argues in his aesthetics of reception that literary
history is composed of nothing but how literary works are received
by the readers. His emphasis on the reception side of literature is also
a rejection of other literary elements and relevant studies. Such a
refusal is not only negligence to the value of other theories, but also
self–imposed isolation, limiting itself to a disadvantageous position to
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play more roles in literary history. Moreover, critical schools should
be conscious of the part–whole relationship existing in their attitudes
toward tradition and history. If the whole past history is regarded as a
broad background picture, then certain historical times, including the
time we are now in, are part of the wholeness of the picture. When
one important kind of theory claims itself to be a totally new one,
emerging like a sudden fracture zone in the history of literary study
and not belonging to the chain of tradition, it is a misconstruction
about its value and a wrong self–cognition. Ever since the Formalism
in literary criticism, the main trends of the western critical theories
are turning their attention from the author to the work. Researches
about the author are decreasing, until in the end sayings like “the
author is dead” are so popular. In the popularity of such sayings, the
necessities and benefits of social and historical researches are forgot-
ten. Structuralism is deconstructed by post–structuralism. Looking
back at the fracture–like clash brought by deconstruction, Derrida
comments, “Deconstruction was not primarily a matter of philosophi-
cal contents, themes or theses, philosophemes, poems, theologemes
or ideologemes, but especially and inseparably meaningful frames,
institutional structures, pedagogical or rhetorical norms, the possibili-
ties of law, of authority, of evaluation, and of representation in terms of
its very market” (Derrida, , pp. –). Deconstruction is a sheer
subversion not only to literature, but also to the past value system
as a whole. Sometimes, even on individual theorist we can see the
symptom of such a fracture–like negation to one’s past self. J. Hillis
Miller is a typical example. His personal critical experience has gone
through different stages and styles: from the New Criticism to ideo-
logical criticism, then to deconstructionist criticism. His continuous
self–denials are the embodiment of his perspiration and uplifting pur-
suits, of course. But meanwhile his changes are also the reflection of
endless changes happening all the time in the west literary criticism,
like tides of the sea forever chasing or being chased by the other tides.
Still there are two questions needing more clarification here. The
first question involves the construction model of the western litera-
ry criticism. Contemporary western literary criticism features rapid
changes and diversities, among which many theoretical schools ai-
ming at resisting the traditional and the popular. In order to achieve
their aims, they often first set up an orientation, then cut into the aca-
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demic frontier of that orientation from a specific angle, and then focus
all their critical attention on a core issue of this frontier. This model of
theoretical construction is a common practice, whose emphasis is on
bombarding at the focal point only, neglecting the work of wholeness
seeking, system building and other points covering. It is a model deve-
loped from a negative attitude, brave in negating something before it.
Its merits are obvious — fostering the fighting spirit of criticism and
stimulating revolutionary thoughts. However, the disadvantages of
this construction model are also obvious, and they are destructive, too.
This aggressive model favours theories heading for essentialization
and fragmentization, and essentialization and fragmentization will fi-
nally result in deconstruction. Too much deconstruction consequently
brings doubts to the meanings of literary criticism and the whole
discipline of literature. Since forced inclusion and transplantation of
theories from other disciplines is the main route of producing theories
in contemporary criticism, some theories are so alien to the study
of literature that we can barely find any connections and resonance
among these theories. The gaps between different theories, the con-
flicts among diversified schools of thoughts, the paradoxes within a
theoretical system and the self–contradictions of an individual theo-
rist, all these add much uncertainties and vagueness to the future of
criticism. Currently, any intention to grasp the world of theories from
an one–dimensional perspective is illusory. Since so, here comes the
second question: can we say from the construction model of contem-
porary criticism that literary theories and criticism should not expect
the wholeness of system at all?
What is the relationship between individual theories and the whole
theoretical system? What should the part–whole relationship be in
the world of critical theories? As it has been proved by facts that if
it is a mature discipline, theories circulating in it should be capable
of combining with each other to form into a more or less organic
system. Within this system, there are different academic directions,
distinguishing from each other yet compensating with each other.
During the developments of theories in this system, theories of one
direction might go faster than theories of the other directions, and
this direction, as well as the theories belonging to it, will be the avant
garde and can even play a leading role in this discipline. But, right be-
hind the pioneering job of this direction, theories of other directions
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should follow up from their perspectives in order to get a balanced
development and gradually establish a comprehensive system mature
enough to cover all the fundamental and crucial questions of the di-
scipline. So researches of different directions of this discipline should
keep proportional development, basically to the same level and depth.
If one direction breaks the balance, taking sudden and radical steps
forward, or if different directions separates from each other, seeking
no common discourse, the whole system would be under unhealthy,
unstable and incomplete growth. It is always such problems that cau-
se a discipline to be in eternal crisis: contradictions which have no
ultimate “right” or “wrong” solutions; debates which last forever for
the lack of common criteria, pointless negations which are made to
each other. When finally the legitimacy of theory is under question,
the development of theory will be deteriorated to empty talk. The
part–whole relationship in a theoretical system is somewhat like what
Roman Ingarden has observed from aesthetic experience. He says
that the true work of art exists as a complex constructed entity, a
synthetic of aesthetic values, and any treatment of one aspect of the
aesthetic values alone is not to the point. To him, aesthetically signifi-
cant qualities are qualities existing in the aesthetic object itself, and
appear only at the moments when the object as a whole is regarded
as an aesthetic piece (Ingarden, , p. ). Applying his aesthetic
vision to the study of literary theories, wouldn’t we find the same
principle? Judging from the theoretical development of the th cen-
tury, the conspicuous emerging of some theories and critical schools
does not necessarily mean that their founders are determined to deny
or abandon the work of systematic construction. They are also pur-
suing the wholeness of theories, only that the wholeness they want
is of duality. On one side, they strive for the wholeness of their own
theories, hoping to have an organic system. On the other side, they
want their theories to be able to replace the other theories and gain
absolute ideological dominance. Deconstructionism deconstructs the
central and all the past theories of rational tradition. If the past others
should be deconstructed for their centrism, how about deconstructio-
nism itself, which has taken the central position in its dispelling of the
others? Looking back at the changes of theories: formalism, the New
Criticism, structuralism, postmodernism, cultural studies and the
New Aestheticism, we can ask such a question: is there any a critical
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school who chooses not to present itself by negating history, not to
achieve its own wholeness and dominance by opposing the others? A
grown–up discipline should be a systematically developed one. How
can we judge whether it is systematically developed or not? Well, from
two dimensions. Diachronically speaking, it is capable of absorbing
all relevantly valuable fruits in history and consciously availing itself
of the fruits in its theoretical construction. Synchronically speaking, it
is capable of absorbing progressive elements from multiple sources of
its time, melting itself with those elements together to wrought out
a new and better system. “Being systematically developed” does not
merely refer to the development in quantities or scales, it refers much
more to a balanced development, with theories of different directions
equally growing, strengthening and interplaying. For systematical
development is a kind of inner driving force for theories as well as
an important sign of a discipline’s maturity. Any intention of using
one–dimensional and partial theories to replace the whole organic
system will finally go into a hopeless failure.
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is the only guarantee of existence, it is normal to assume that even
conspiracies become ‘speeches’. After briefly examining the characte-
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. Il discorso come complotto
Occuparsi del “Discorso del complotto”, anziché del discorso “sul”
complotto, significa trascurare la natura delle trame ordite da un grup-
po di cospiratori a questo o a quel fine e concentrarsi sui discorsi
che hanno la pretesa di svelare quelle trame, reali o fittizie che sia-
no, soprattutto fittizie. In pratica, ci interesseremo prevalentemente
delle teorie complottiste e del modo in cui queste teorie, ponendosi
linguisticamente e semioticamente come “discorso” e come “testo” di-
ventano veri e propri atti linguistici, vere e proprie azioni socialmente
rilevanti, veri e propri complotti fatti di parole.
Il discorso del complotto nasce quando la società non offre un
sufficiente grado di verità. L’onnipresenza dell’ipotesi del complotto
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non è sintomo di una società paranoica, bensì di una società che ha
visto diminuire esponenzialmente le possibilità di accesso alla verità
fattuale, a causa dell’aumento, parimenti esponenziale, della rilevanza
di ciò che non è esperibile. Il mondo rurale di cent’anni fa non era
più incline al vero di quello tecnologico di oggi, ma conservava il
valore della verità per la banale impossibilità di mentire sugli aspetti
davvero importanti dell’esistenza. In un’economia di sussistenza non
si può immaginare di mentire sull’abbondanza o la scarsità dei raccolti,
così come in un villaggio di duecento abitanti non si può mentire
sul tasso di criminalità, sulla sicurezza del vivere, sull’andamento
del clima. Gli spazi della menzogna si limitavano all’ambito del non
osservabile. Si poteva mentire sulle cause delle pestilenza (come ci
mostra magistralmente il Manzoni) solo perché queste risiedono
nell’infinitamente piccolo, oppure si poteva mentire in relazione alla
dimensione metafisica, ma sulla realtà tangibile la società non poteva
che essere sincera. Come questa situazione si sia evoluta è ben chiaro
negli scritti di Georg Simmel (), pp. –:
nei rapporti molto semplici la menzogna è molto più innocua per la sussi-
stenza del gruppo che non nei rapporti più complicati. L’uomo primitivo,
che vive all’interno di un ambiente ristretto il quale soddisfa le sue esigenze
con la propria produzione o con la cooperazione diretta, che riduce i propri
interessi intellettuali alle proprie esperienze o alla tradizione unilineare, ha
una panoramica e un controllo più facili e più completi sulla propria esisten-
za che non l’individuo appartenente a una cultura superiore. [. . . ] La nostra
esistenza moderna si fonda molto più di quanto si creda — dall’economia
che si trasforma sempre più in economia fondata sul credito, alla scienza
in cui la maggioranza dei ricercatori deve avvalersi di innumerevoli docu-
menti altrui che non possono essere direttamente controllati — sulla fiducia
nella sincerità degli altri. Noi basiamo le nostre più importanti decisioni
su un complicato sistema di rappresentazioni, la maggior parte delle quali
presuppone che ci si fidi di non essere ingannati. Ne consegue che nelle
relazioni moderne la menzogna diventa qualcosa di molto più catastrofico,
che mette molto più in questione i fondamenti della vita, di quanto non
avvenisse prima. Se ancora oggi tra noi la menzogna sembrasse un peccato
assolutamente veniale come lo era per gli dei greci, i patriarchi ebrei o gli
insulani dei mari del Sud, se la suprema severità del comandamento mora-
le non tenesse lontani da essa, la strutturazione della vita moderna che è
un’”economia creditizia” in senso molto più ampio di quello economico
sarebbe completamente impossibile.
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La nostra stessa esistenza è sospesa tra l’assoluta necessità di crede-
re, senza la quale non possiamo mettere in atto alcuna azione sociale, e
l’altrettanto assoluta necessità di dubitare che ci deriva dall’esperienza
della menzogna subita (ma, ovviamente, anche di quella agita). E la
necessità di dubitare ci porta a elaborare una miriade di discorsi sul
complotto, cioè sulla verità e sulla sua mistificazione.
. Rappresentazione e falsificazione
Molti discorsi del complotto perderebbero ogni credibilità se fosse
possibile, per la gran parte dei loro destinatari, passare dal discorso
all’esperienza, cioè trasformare il mondo possibile della narrazione
complottistica in un mondo reale. Ma che cos’è l’esperienza? Intuiti-
vamente, possiamo dire di aver esperito una realtà nel momento in
cui essa, e non la sua rappresentazione, è ricaduta sotto il dominio
dei nostri sensi. Da sempre la rappresentazione verbale della realtà
suscita più dubbi che fiducia, da sempre il racconto e il resoconto
richiedono un’accettazione molto cauta, ma la contemporaneità ci ha
indotto a dubitare anche di quella che sembrava la forma più oggettiva
di riproduzione del reale: l’immagine generata meccanicamente. La
visione, in passato prova suprema e inconfutabile della verità (basti
pensare a detti come “Vedere per credere”), perde, nella nostra epoca,
la sua connotazione di certezza e si assoggetta a tutti gli inganni della
mediazione, della conoscenza. In centocinquant’anni di fotografia,
in poco più d’un secolo di cinema e in circa mezzo secolo di televi-
sione, abbiamo imparato che le rappresentazioni visive, anche quelle
più oggettive all’apparenza, in fondo non differiscono molto dalle
narrazioni, abbiamo imparato che una rappresentazione non riprodu-
ce, ma costruisce; pertanto, il sigillo dell’esperienza non può essere
apposto che su acquisizioni della realtà operate dai nostri sensi in
maniera non mediata. Più la tecnologia avanza nella creazione di rap-
presentazioni fedeli (fotografie e riprese ad altissima definizione, audio
chiarissimi), più crescono le possibilità di falsificazione (fotoritocco
elettronico, sintetizzazione vocale. . . ) se non di creazione ex–novo di
realtà virtuali.
L’unico confine alla straordinaria potenza delle rappresentazioni
sembra allora essere la relazione diretta tra il nostro corpo e il mondo
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circostante; l’esperienza, scacciata dalla conoscenza, si rifugia in quella
residuale porzione della nostra vita dove gli occhi vedono cose che
stanno per se stesse e non per altre cose (ma esistono davvero oggetti
privi di valore segnico?), dove le onde sonore che giungono al nostro
timpano non sono frutto di sintesi o di registrazione, dove la tattilità
non è simulata: tutto il resto è dominio dei media.
Questo confine ideale tra realtà mediata e realtà non mediata ha poi
un corrispettivo fisico, una precisa demarcazione di spazi. A segnare
il limite estremo della rappresentazione è la superficie su cui essa si
dispone per darsi a noi, il supporto necessario alla materia segnica
per manifestarsi: la tela del quadro, la carta fotografica, lo schermo da
proiezione, il teleschermo, il monitor del computer sono le superfici
sulle quali l’immagine prende forma per offrirsi alla visione, ma sono
anche, al tempo stesso, le barriere che separano la rappresentazione
del reale dal reale.
Lo schermo è ciò che ci difende dall’irruzione del conosciuto nella
sfera dell’esperito, la distanza fisica tra noi e lui è anche una distanza
di sicurezza che ci impedisce di confondere la visione dell’oggetto con
la visione della sua rappresentazione.
Tutto questo è vero fino ad oggi, è vero nel cinema, nella tele-
visione, perfino negli attuali mezzi multimediali, ma c’è una nuova
frontiera che le tecnologie sembrano voler abbattere: la frontiera della
visione. A parziale ridimensionamento di quanto detto in precedenza,
il vedere non ha ancora perso del tutto il suo potere di veridizione; se
la sola visione non basta a garantire l’autenticità di ciò che appare sullo
schermo, essa, nel momento in cui si allarga alla sala cinematografica
o alla stanza che contiene il televisore o il computer, è in grado, se
non altro, di dirci ciò che è schermo e ciò che non lo è, ciò che è o può
essere finzione e ciò che invece è sicuramente realtà. Vedere, dunque;
vedere lo schermo e vedere i suoi limiti, e poi vedere il buio quale
presenza silenziosa del reale durante l’esibizione dell’immaginario. Ed
è proprio la visione del buio intorno allo schermo che le nuove tecno-
logie cercano di eliminare e senza quel buio si perde la distinzione tra
reale e rappresentato. Le tecnologie delle quali stiamo parlando non
sono futuribili, o almeno, pur necessitando di sostanziali migliorie, la-
sciano già oggi intuire le loro potenzialità. Pensiamo alle più semplici
tra esse, agli occhiali con micro–schermi e ai caschi per la realtà virtua-
le; si tratta di strumenti che, sebbene non ancora diffusi su larga scala,
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sono da tempo usciti dalla fase di pura sperimentazione. Tanto gli
occhiali quanto i caschi sono accomunati da un utilizzo che implica il
completo isolamento visivo dal mondo circostante, l’assoluta prevalen-
za della rappresentazione e l’annullamento del contesto di fruizione.
La visione cede il posto all’immersione e questa è indubbiamente
la tendenza dei media digitali, specie nel campo dell’entertainment:
la negazione della visione, il superamento del ruolo dello spettatore
nasce da qui.
Ma forse non è neppure necessario aspettare il futuro prossimo
per raggiungere quella condizione di immersione che assegna all’e-
sperienza un ruolo puramente residuale. Negli ultimi cinque o sei
anni, l’evoluzione delle tecnologie mobili ha imposto nuovi modelli
di comportamento: se prima c’erano luoghi e tempi per la visione
della realtà e altri luoghi e altri tempi per la visione, su schermo, della
rappresentazione, oggi gli occhi di milioni di persone restano fissi allo
schermo anche durante una camminata in città, durante un viaggio
in treno, durante una conferenza o una lezione.
. Finzionale vs. Fattuale
La continua immersione nell’universo delle rappresentazioni mette in
gioco costantemente la dialettica dubbio–fiducia; continuamente noi
dubitiamo della veridicità di ciò che viene rappresentato, ma, al tempo
stesso, non avendo alcun strumento esperienziale per dirimere il dub-
bio, non ci resta che la resa a un atteggiamento di fiducia vigile, salvo
poi diminuire progressivamente la vigilanza per l’eccesso di fatica
che essa implica; altrimenti detto, capire se ciò che ci viene proposto
come realtà lo è veramente diventa talmente faticoso che ognuno di
noi decide, su base puramente fideistica, cosa è credibile e cosa non
lo è. Per questo motivo, più la società si fa complessa e inesperibile e
più la finzione narrativa contenuta nel discorso del complotto riesce a
rendersi credibile almeno quanto altri tipi di costruzione della realtà
(quanto l’informazione giornalistica, ad esempio).
. Il contenuto di questo paragrafo riprende e sviluppa alcuni temi già presentati in
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Cominciamo a parlare di questa contaminazione a partire dalle
posizioni di Habermas (), p. :
le informazioni in genere finiscono per essere assoggettate a travestimen-
ti vari, vengono assimilate ai racconti (news stories) nel taglio come nei
dettagli stilistici; la severa separazione di fact e di fiction viene abbando-
nata sempre più frequentemente. Informazioni, servizi e persino articoli
di fondo attingono al repertorio della produzione amena, mentre, d’altra
parte, i pezzi letterari mirano in modo strettamente “realistico” a duplica-
re la realtà esistente sussunta del resto secondo un cliché precostituito, e
sopprimono i confini tra romanzo e reportage. La tendenza che così si an-
nuncia nella stampa quotidiana è già assai progredita nei moderni mezzi di
comunicazione di massa: l’integrazione dei campi, un tempo separati, della
pubblicistica e della letteratura [. . . ] comporta un particolare dislocamento
della realtà, per non dire un caotico aggrovigliarsi dei livelli di realtà. Nel
comune denominatore del cosiddetto human interest si sviluppa il mixtum
compositum di un materiale ameno insieme accettabile e gradevole, che so-
stituisce tendenzialmente l’adeguatezza alla realtà con la fruibilità e fuorvia
al consumo impersonale alla distensione invece di guidare all’uso pubblico
della ragione.
In Habermas domina l’idea che l’elemento narrativo massificato
corrompa la percezione del reale; un elemento narrativo che, oggi,
più che nella narrativa di genere o in quella popolare, è individuabile
nell’immenso flusso narrativo dei social network, i quali, a loro volta,
contaminano i mezzi di informazione tradizionali. Da questo flusso
nascono le mille teorie del complotto.
L’attitudine diffusa a cercare sempre disegni oscuri dietro il verifi-
carsi degli eventi nasce dalla non accettazione di quegli stessi eventi e
delle loro motivazioni ufficiali. Non accettiamo la versione governa-
tiva sugli accadimenti dell’ settembre perché ci fa male l’idea che
una struttura raffinata come quella della difesa statunitense sia così
vulnerabile; dunque ci pare più rassicurante credere nelle oscure tra-
me di qualche lobby americana, poiché questo significherebbe che
la potenza economica e militare nella quale l’Occidente ha riposto
ogni sua speranza non è poi, nel suo complesso, così debole. Non
accettiamo di credere all’origine naturale del virus HIV perché ci fa
male pensare che questo organismo mutante e letale sfugga comple-
tamente al controllo dell’uomo: meglio ritenere, come fa il premio
Nobel Wangari Maathai, che il virus dell’AIDS sia stato creato in labo-
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ratorio per essere usato come arma chimica. Paradossalmente quindi
l’ipotesi del complotto risulterebbe più rassicurante di quella della
sua assenza, perché sposterebbe le responsabilità dei fatti verso parti
della società che ci sono più note, più familiari, non necessariamente
per conoscenza diretta, ma per una lunga consuetudine mediatica e
finzionale: lo scienziato pazzo che crea armi letali o il finanziere che
corrompe i politici e i servizi segreti ci sono più noti (o almeno lo
erano fino agli inizi del millennio) di quanto lo sia stato l’enigmatico (e
fino al  sconosciuto ai più) Bin Laden. Il discorso del complotto si
nutre di stereotipi e trova dunque un habitat naturale nell’ignoranza.
. I complotti della menzogna
Qualunque complotto si basa necessariamente su una negazione della
verità, ma questa negazione può assumere due forme: l’occultamento,
cioè il segreto, o la falsificazione, cioè la menzogna. Chi cospirò contro
Hitler o contro Cesare tentò di tenere segrete fino all’ultimo le proprie
intenzioni: il complotto come segreto condiviso entro una ristretta
cerchia di iniziati (torneremo più tardi su questo aspetto). Al contrario,
chi complotta contro la società inventando complotti inesistenti più
che il segreto usa la menzogna, la falsificazione della realtà. Certo, è
probabile che, per mantenere il segreto, Bruto abbia dovuto mentire a
Cesare, ed è altresì probabile che chi diffonde scientemente menzogne
complottiste mantenga il segreto sulle reali ragioni di questa sedicente
“contro–informazione”, ma, anche contemplando la compresenza di
entrambi gli ingredienti, l’opposizione segreto vs. menzogna ci è utile
per comprendere il funzionamento sociale del discorso del complotto.
La grande forza dei complotti della menzogna risiede nel fatto
che le posizioni degli anti–complottisti sono perfettamente ribaltabili
in senso complottistico, cioè che qualsiasi tentativo di smontare una
teoria complottistica può essere smontato con la semplice accusa di
organicità al complotto stesso. Vediamo qualche esempio.
Una delle più classiche dimostrazioni della fallacia delle teorie della
cospirazione è fornita dall’utilizzo, in particolare da parte del nazismo,
dei Protocolli dei Savi di Sion, un’operina frutto di plagi e collazioni
. Per un approfondimento di questo tema si veda Cohn ().
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di testi vari che venne spacciata come documento ufficiale di una
misteriosa organizzazione rabbinica per il controllo economico e
mediatico del mondo. Se da un lato questo caso dimostra in maniera
esemplare come la tesi della congiura sia destituita di ogni fondamento
reale, dall’altro, proprio le conseguenze determinate dalla di ffusione
del libello, conseguenze che includono lo sterminio di milioni di ebrei,
confermano che i complotti funzionano ed esistono: il vero complotto,
quello antisemita, consistette nel far credere (e in questo senso fu un
complotto mediatico) che il falso complotto, quello dei “Savi di Sion”,
fosse vero.
La menzogna diventa complotto quando viene socialmente con-
divisa, quando, a livello collettivo, prevarica i diritti della verità de-
terminando conseguenze concrete che vanno al di là della semplice
negazione del vero. In questo senso, i “complotti della menzogna”
sono dei veri e propri atti linguistici performativi nell’accezione che
dà Austin () a questi termini. Riprendendo le parole dello stes-
so Austin, possiamo affermare che, più che mai, nella formulazione
mediatica di un complotto della menzogna il “dire” (nella particolare
forma del mentire) è un “fare”, è un produrre azioni socialmente
rilevanti. Gli esempi di questi complotti della menzogna sono innu-
merevoli, dall’Editto di Costantino, il falso medievale che legittimò
(e fu questa la conseguenza concreta del “dire”) il potere temporale
della chiesa cattolica, alla notizia sulle armi segrete di Hitler, che in-
dusse a continuare una guerra ormai perduta, fino al finto massacro
di Timosoara, del  dicembre , che diede una delle spallate deci-
sive al regime di Ceausescu. Soffermiamoci proprio su quest’ultimo
esaminandone la ricostruzione fatta da Claudio Fracassi (), pp.
–:
La prima fonte della notizia era stata anonima: un non ben identificato
“viaggiatore cecoslovacco” proveniente dalla città romena di Timisoara, i
cui allarmati racconti furono riferiti prima dall’agenzia di stampa ungherese
Mti, poi dalla tv di Budapest, e infine, di rimbalzo, dalla radio di Vienna.
Quel  dicembre  era una domenica, giorno di disperata carenza di
notizie nelle redazioni giornalistiche di tutto il mondo. Il lunedì successivo,
dunque l’episodio — che peraltro aveva un suo qualche fondamento visto
che a Timisoara il venerdì precedente c’erano stati effettivamente scontri
sanguinosi tra i dimostranti e la polizia di Ceausescu — trovò spazio nelle
cronache. [. . . ] La prima cifra degli assassinati fu di “trecento, quattrocento
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persone”. A fornirla erano, nelle cronache, “un medico ungherese”, oppure
“uno scrittore romeno”. Finché venerdì  dicembre, per la prima volta,
comparve, in un dispaccio dell’Adn, la cifra che poi resterà fissata nella
storia “ morti a Timisoara”. [. . . ] Il gioco delle cifre riferite da fonti
improbabili, per quanto suggestivo e utile a dare corpo agli articoli, sarebbe
forse rimasto tale se non fossero arrivate dalla tv ungherese (presto ripresa
da tutte le reti televisive del pianeta) le immagini delle “fosse comuni di
Timisoara”. Si trattava di strazianti immagini girate di notte, alla luce delle
torce elettriche. Appena esumati, ancora in parte ricoperti di terra, si vede-
vano molti cadaveri allineati: quasi tutti avevano una lunga ferita, dall’alto
in basso sul torace, frettolosamente ricucita. Il corpo di una donna dall’età
indefinibile giaceva supino con la stessa atroce ferita sul petto e sul ventre
e sopra di lei c’era il minuscolo cadavere di una bimba. apparentemente
appena nata. [. . . ] La verità delle “cose viste” rese credibile la menzogna
delle “cose sentite”.
Si seppe poi, quando si spense l’ubriacatura mediatica, che le vittime
degli scontri di Timisoara erano state complessivamente alcune decine. Si
rivelò [. . . ] che le salme riesumate dal “cimitero dei poveri” e riprese nella
notte dalle telecamere erano in tutto tredici: corpi di sventurati barboni.
alcolizzati, emarginati — sepolti nei mesi precedenti, senza cassa e senza
croce, dopo una rapida autopsia (la ferita sul petto). Si accertò che il corpi-
cino “strappato al grembo della mamma” era quello di Christina Steleac,
deceduta per congestione, a casa sua, due anni e mezzo di età il  dicembre
l. La”madre”sventrata, invece, era la settantenne Zamfira Baintan. una
anziana alcolizzata morta di cirrosi epatica l’ novembre.
Fondamentale, per il ristabilimento della verità, fu il lavoro di alcuni
giornalisti e la confessione del custode di un cimitero. Questi rivelò che
alcuni cadaveri ripresi dalla televisione erano stati riesumati appositamente
dal cimitero dei poveri, nel quale egli lavorava, mentre altri erano stati
prelevati dall’istituto medico legale qualche giorno prima. Disse inoltre di
aver raccontato la verità a diverse persone, fra le quali alcuni giornalisti, e
che nessuno aveva voluto dargli retta.
Il custode del cimitero non è quindi stato creduto ed è stato annove-
rato tra i complottisti vetero–comunisti. Dunque, il discorso del custode
sul complotto, che costituisce un tentativo di disvelamento del complotto
stesso, genera, attraverso un altro discorso del complotto, un immaginario
complotto di secondo grado. Basta avere un minimo di dimestichezza con
le triadi di Peirce per rendersi conto come il discorso del complotto sia un
chiarissimo esempio di semiosi illimitata: ogni discorso del complotto è
interpretante di un altro discorso del complotto e a sua volta oggetto di un
ulteriore interpretante. La presa di coscienza di questa semiosi illimitata ci
costringe ad arrenderci di fronte alla straordinaria e destabilizzante potenza
del discorso del complotto.
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. L’ovvio, il dubbio, la menzogna
Continuiamo a parlare di complotti della menzogna esaminando,
attraverso un esempio meno drammatico di quello precedente, l’uso
di una strategia discorsiva volta a impiegare la forza destabilizzante del
dubbio per infrangere la solidità dell’ovvio (in senso comune e non in
senso barthesiano), per minare alla base un sistema di significazione
socialmente condiviso. L’esempio è scelto, tra i milioni presenti in
Rete, per la sua semplicità, ma anche per la sua rilevanza numerica:
un video con oltre un milione e mezzo di visualizzazioni solo nella
versione italiana.
Il video in questione è accompagnato, su youtube, dal seguente
testo:
Bevi COCA COLA? Allora DEVI guardare questo video! SCONVOLGEN-
TE! Quando ho fatto questo esperimento non avrei mai creduto che sarebbe
potuto accadere tutto questo. Credo sia importante che la gente sappia cosa
mette dentro il proprio corpo tutti i giorni. Se avrai ancora il coraggio di ber-
la dopo questo video, almeno saprai cosa bevi e non potrai lamentarti delle
conseguenze! Enjoy (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-JUAwejo).
Sedicente autore del filmato (che in realtà sembra riciclato da una
fonte straniera) è tale Daniele Penna, personaggio molto noto a com-
plottisti e anticomplottisti per le sue decine di interventi che rimestano
nel consueto limo che va dalle scie chimiche allo spionaggio delle
nostre attività personali da parte di servizi segreti stranieri. Le im-
magini, accompagnate da una colonna sonora incalzante in stile film
dell’orrore, mostrano come, dopo due ore di ebollizione, un litro
e mezzo di Coca Cola si trasformi in una poltiglia appiccicosa che
incrosta la pentola, una poltiglia che Penna, attraverso una scritta in
sovrimpressione, compara al catrame.
Di per sé, il video e il suo apparato testuale, sarebbero solo un’en-
nesima dimostrazione di stupidità, ma i suoi processi di costruzione
del senso sono estremamente interessanti.
Se esaminiamo testo e paratesto del video, ci accorgiamo che Da-
niele Penna non mette mai in campo una vera menzogna, ma crea
un’ipotesi di complotto insinuando dubbi su ciò che, in quanto ovvio,
non dovrebbe suscitare particolare perplessità. La prolungata ebollizio-
ne di un liquido zuccherino determina, ovviamente, la formazione di
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un deposito denso di caramello; per trasformare la rappresentazione
di questo processo del tutto naturale in qualcosa di “Sconvolgente!”,
l’autore utilizza alcuni semplici espedienti di alterazione del senso.
In primo luogo, la musica associata al video determina un senso di
tensione, di suspense, e lo fa semplicemente sfruttando le compe-
tenze intertestuali dello spettatore e in completa assenza di qualsiasi
elemento in grado di creare tensione narrativa ad esclusione delle
frasi poste in apertura e in chiusura: «Osserva cosa immetti nel tuo
corpo a ogni sorso» (apertura), «La gente ha il diritto di sapere cosa
beve!» (chiusura). Né l’una, né l’altra frase affermano che il contenuto
della Coca Cola è nocivo, ma, inserite intertestualmente nel un flus-
so comunicativo del discorso del complotto, esse si prestano a una
interpretazione ben precisa, interpretazione corroborata dall’eviden-
ziazione di una somiglianza (innegabile) tra il caramello e il catrame. Il
testo di accompagnamento del video ha quindi un significato denotato
estremamente aperto, ma, al tempo stesso, un significato connota-
to che va così direttamente nella direzione della minaccia collettiva
da determinare l’oblio del buon senso e da far crescere il sospetto
del complotto. In altri termini, i complottisti trasformano l’ovvio da
elemento ad interpretazione obbligata, in elemento infinitamente so-
vrinterpretabile; potremmo dire che lo schema di ragionamento su cui
fanno leva è quello della Lettera rubata di Edgar Allan Poe: se il modo
migliore per nascondere una lettera rubata è quello di metterla in tutta
evidenza, il modo migliore per nascondere un segreto è nell’ovvio,
là dove nessuno andrebbe a cercare sfumature di senso. Usando cate-
gorie più strettamente semiotiche, potremmo dire che i complottisti
inducono il loro pubblico a diffidare dell’interpretazione dell’ovvio
(così rigida da sembrare predisposta dal potere), per passare all’uso di
esso e con l’uso, la semiotica di Eco (, ) ce lo ha dimostrato
ampiamente, si può dare al testo (in questo caso le immagini della
Coca Cola che si condensa) qualsiasi tipo di significato (la dimostra-
zione di un complotto contro la salute dei cittadini ordito dai poteri
economici). In tal modo, il discorso del complotto introduce anche la
componente iniziatica che, come abbiamo detto, è tipica dei complotti
basati sull’occultamento: coloro che sanno estrarre dall’ovvio un senso
secondo, il senso nascosto, rientrano in una ristretta cerchia di iniziati
che, avendo gli stessi poteri conoscitivi dell’altrettanto ristretta cerchia
di chi avrebbe ordito il complotto, è in grado di smascherare le trame
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che qualcuno vorrebbe occulte. Siamo di fronte a un gioco di specchi,
a un rimbalzare di segni che, nell’illimitato processo di semiosi, hanno
da tempo perduto il loro referente nel mondo reale.
. L’efficacia fattuale della finzione complottistica
Ma, avviandosi verso la conclusione, è opportuno tornare, con una
certa inquietudine, sul discorso del complotto come insieme di “segni
efficaci” (nella concezione di Louis Marin, ). Il discorso del com-
plotto, quello che ipotizza un complotto inesistente, è tutt’altro che
privo di conseguenze. Partiamo da una considerazione di Umberto
Eco (), p. :
Un complotto, se efficace, prima o poi crea i propri risultati, diviene evidente.
E così dicasi del segreto, che non solo di solito viene svelato da una serie
di “gole profonde” ma, a qualunque cosa si riferisca, se è importante (sia
la formula di una sostanza prodigiosa o una manovra politica) prima o poi
viene alla luce.
Il problema è la distanza che intercorre tra il “prima” e il “poi”.
Che una mistificazione venga scoperta prima o dopo aver prodotto i
suoi effetti non è per nulla indifferente.
Nel periodo intercorso tra il  dicembre , data della falsa strage
di Timisoara, e le rivelazioni circa il vero andamento dei fatti, la notizia
della strage ha agito con estrema efficacia nel determinare gli eventi
politici che hanno trasformato l’Europa dell’Est.
Allo stesso modo, il discorso sull’ipotetico complotto dei Savi di
Sion prima di dimostrare tutta la sua infondatezza ha giustificato l’O-
locausto. Tra “prima” e “dopo” qualche differenza c’è. Senza contare
che un discorso del complotto non è mai falsificato una volta per tutte,
dal momento che basta confutare l’autorità di chi lo falsifica per re-
stituirgli intatta tutta la sua forza corruttrice della realtà. Se vogliamo
condensare in un’immagine mitologica il senso della semiosi illimitata
del discorso del complotto possiamo pensarlo come l’Idra di Lerna:
ogni volta che una testa viene amputata (ogni volta cioè che il discorso
viene smentito), ne nascono altre due (altre due tesi che bollano di
complotto la smentita del primo complotto). Difficile immaginare
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qualcosa di più inquietante dell’Idra, specie se si considera la velocità
con cui, nell’era di internet, possono ricrescere le due teste.
Un secondo motivo di inquietudine è dunque legato alla diffusione
telematica dei discorsi complottistici, in particolare di quelli che fanno
leva sull’ovvio. Abbiamo visto, con l’esempio del video sulla Coca
Cola, quanto sia semplice richiamare l’attenzione di un milione e
mezzo di persone su una minaccia del tutto inesistente; esaminando
i commenti degli utenti possiamo ipotizzare (e la precisione è ab-
bastanza irrilevante) che un dieci per cento di quanti hanno visto il
video sia stato convinto della sua veridicità: si tratta di un numero
straordinariamente grande di persone.
Inoltre, il moltiplicarsi esponenziale dei falsi allarmi genera un
certo effetto “al lupo, al lupo”; sommersi da migliaia di falsi complotti,
i cittadini sono sempre più in difficoltà nel riconoscere le poche voci
veritiere e documentate, le poche “gole profonde” che, realmente
informate sui fatti, potrebbero contribuire a sventare i complotti veri.
Il dubbio che attraversa la società attuale non concerne la presenza o
meno di “gole profonde”, ma la destituzione di credibilità che può
essere operata ai danni di esse. Ciò che ci chiediamo costantemente,
angosciosamente, non è se qualcuno dirà la verità, ma se avremo i
mezzi per riconoscerla. E qui giova soffermarsi ancora su Simmel
(), p. :
Ogni menzogna, per quanto il suo oggetto sia di natura obiettiva, induce
essenzialmente in errore sul soggetto che mente, poiché fa sì che il bugiardo
nasconda all’altro la vera rappresentazione in suo possesso. La specifica natu-
ra della menzogna non nasce dal fatto che la persona ingannata si fa un’idea
sbagliata della cosa (questo la equiparerebbe a un semplice errore), ma dal
fatto che viene mantenuta in errore sull’intima opinione della persona che
mente. Veridicità e menzogna sono quindi della massima importanza per i
rapporti interpersonali. Le strutture sociologiche si differenziano fra loro
nel modo più caratteristico per la quantità di menzogne che vi vengono
attivate.
L’unico antidoto al discorso del complotto riamane dunque la
conoscenza, quella profonda e documentata, quella che la superficialità
dei nuovi media e dei social network in particolare sembra voler
cancellare definitivamente.
 Alessandro Perissinotto
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La inflación de la sospecha
El discurso de las teorías de la conspiración*
R G**
La fuente inequívoca de la vida social es la
estafa.
E G
 : The Inflation of Suspicion: The Discourse of Conspiracy
Theories
: Conspiracy theories often take the State as a suspicious actor play-
ing the role of the opponent and acting against its own citizens. These
discourses are built upon presuppositions and innuendos affording a
mono–causal and pan–deterministic plot where all historical facts are
triggered by one cause only: conspiracy. The essay focuses on the fea-
tures of suspicious figures in conspiracy theories and their connections
to other cultural presuppositions and innuendos forming a textuality
that establishes the veridictional strategy of conspiracy plots. The diffu-
sion of conspiracy theories jeopardizes the meaning of the State since
they usually attribute to it the role of the traitor or that of the trickster.
As a case study, the essay proposes an analysis of the mockumentary
Operación Palace () falsely revealing that the coup d’état on February
th  was schemed by the Spanish State so as to preserve its recent
democracy.
: Semiotics; Conspiracy Theories; Suspicion.
∗ Este trabajo se presenta dentro del proyecto de investigación I+D de excelencia
El periodista como historiador del presente. Análisis del documento en las nuevas formas de la
información (CSO-–-P).∗∗ Rayco González, Universidad de Burgos.
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. Papá Noel y otras conspiraciones benévolas
Todos hemos sido en alguna ocasión víctima de una conspiración
de algún tipo. Consideremos, por ejemplo, las innumerables con-
spiraciones que padres, abuelos, tíos y demás familiares han urdido
generación tras generación, para lograr engañar a sus hijos, nietos y
sobrinos a propósito de la existencia de Papá Noel, los Reyes Magos,
el Ratoncito Pérez, la Befana, etc. Todos estos casos comparten una
característica: la víctima, con el paso del tiempo, se transforma en
conspirador. ¿Podríamos considerar incluso estas conspiraciones co-
mo un rito de paso de la infancia a la madurez? Quizás no sea del todo
exacto tratar estos encubrimientos como conspiraciones (la mayor de
toda la historia sería la de hacer creer en la existencia de Papá Noel, en
palabras de Lévi-Strauss []), ya que no reciben una sanción social
negativa.
En todo caso, este ejemplo a modo de introducción nos permite
hacer un énfasis necesario en la distinción entre las conspiraciones
reales y las teorías de la conspiración. Profundicemos en el caso del
ser imaginario Papá Noel, cuya condición “real” no nos es revelada
más que después de indagaciones y descubrimientos, voluntarios o
involuntarios. En definitiva, preguntémonos: ¿cómo descubrimos que
Papá Noel es una fabricación o un simulacro sostenido por millo-
nes de conspiradores?; ¿cómo es posible que millones de niños en el
mundo crean en su existencia: es el resultado del efecto de una con-
spiración perfectamente orquestada o del efecto de su disfraz, cuyos
elementos, como la barba perfectamente blanca, la gruesa panza de an-
ciano y el elegante abrigo a juego con su gorro, generan lo contrario
precisamente de una sensación de realismo?
Los modos en los que se llega al conocimiento de la verdad son
. Goffman (:  y ss.) define fabrication como la actividad social enfocada inten-
cionalmente por uno o varios individuos para inducir a otro u otros a poseer una creencia
falsa sobre la realidad. Goffman destaca la idea de tener malas intenciones, aunque también
incluye la posibilidad de que existan fabricaciones benévolas. De igual modo, distingue
dos puntos de vista de la acción: el fabricator (el conspirador), para quien lo que ocurre
es la fabricación misma, es decir, él puede observar que se trata de una construcción; y la
víctima, para quien lo que transcurre durante la fabricación es aquello que es fabricado.
Goffman nombra a la víctima con varios términos de la jerga común inglesa, como dupe
(inocente), sucker (incauto), etc., que incluyen este matiz de “engañado” y “burlado”, que
se intenta mantener también en el presente artículo.
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básicamente dos. El primero de ellos es cuando un indulgente padre
desvela voluntariamente los secretos, tejidos con mentiras y fingi-
mientos (la estrategia de lo que es y no parece se elabora con tácticas
de lo que parece y no es), en los que el niño ha creído durante años.
El segundo, y quizás más común, es aquel en que el niño realiza una
dolorosa pesquisa que le permite unir las piezas de tan complejo puzz-
le. Complejo, porque nuestra mirada ha sido educada para creer en
la existencia de Papá Noel: una prueba de ello la tenemos tanto en
la frecuente decepción que suele traerle al niño o en el sentimiento
de superioridad de aquel otro que, en posesión de la verdad, se mofa
de quien todavía la desconoce. Cada pequeña táctica, enmarcada en
una estrategia global de persuasión, está perfectamente orquestada. Su
complejidad se debe también a una credulidad colectiva que inhibe
cualquier atisbo de sospecha: los adultos cometen grandes impruden-
cias lingüísticas y de comportamiento, actuando de manera temeraria,
tal vez porque saben muy bien que la credulidad del niño se construye
en un saber compartido contra el que el niño solo puede sospechar y
contra el cual no osaría enfrentarse. En definitiva, parece que solo la
confesión definitiva, cuando el adulto habla abiertamente del secreto
frente al niño, rompe con toda actitud de alerta y de sospecha previa
en el engañado.
En casos puntuales, el niño puede cerciorarse de tales lapsus y
comportamientos anómalos, refinando así su pesquisa. De este modo,
uno comienza a observar multitud de detalles que permitan definir
una posición epistémica: ¿debo o no creer en lo que veo o he visto?,
se pregunta el niño. En esa situación, pocos serán quienes apoyen la
indagación en una situación como esta: los padres y otros familiares
cercanos rechazarán toda duda y declinarán participar de tales sospe-
chas. Toda autoridad negará cualquier conocimiento. . . Los padres se
saben poseedores de una autoridad epistémica sobre sus hijos, hasta
que estos descubren haber sido víctimas de una benévola conspiración
que culmina con la transformación de rol actancial y de rol temático,
inaugurando así una nueva etapa de la vida: la víctima se convierte en
conspirador. Al contrario, generalmente la víctima o el objeto de una
conspiración no suele acabar nada bien. . .
En fin, solo se consigue una prueba concluyente cuando uno se
convierte en un nuevo conspirador, participando así de las maquina-
ciones de los adultos: como en cualquier sociedad secreta, lo que la
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mantiene es el secreto compartido frente a quien no lo posee, que
claramente es el niño crédulo. Así se apacigua nuestra decepción y
nuestro probable enfado. Incluso puede darse el caso de quien al vivir
el juego del otro lado, preferiría mantener todavía aquella ingenuidad
ya perdida.
Sabemos todos que esta es una importante experiencia semiótica
en nuestras vidas, en la que vemos signos de una realidad ilusoria, un
régimen de secreto, pero un día, gracias a una confesión o por acumu-
lación y ordenación de pruebas, nuestra actitud cambia y, entonces,
empezamos a atisbar esa realidad escondida. Y, de hecho, podríamos
decir que esto es un rito de paso: se revela un secreto y cambia nuestro
punto de vista y nuestra propia actitud hacia una determinada realidad,
que ahora sabemos que ha sido simulada. Pero, además, nos plantea
otro problema no exento de interés: ¿puede existir una conspiración
benévola?; o, dicho con otras palabras: generalmente se entiende el
término “conspiración” con valor negativo o de carácter malévolo, sin
embargo, ¿acaso no es posible pensar en una declinación opuesta?
. Sospecha y conspiración
Bajo la concepción del poder como una conspiración benévola o valor
positivo, algunos autores como Alain Dewerpe () y Luc Boltanski
() analizan las formas de relación entre el Estado, en su concepción
liberal, y el individuo. Por ejemplo, Dewerpe llega a hablar incluso de
una actitud de “sospecha cívica estructural” hacia el estado por parte
del individuo, lo que estimularía también formas de interacción y de
discurso, que podrían tener su correlato en las formas de interacción
y de discurso en el caso de Papá Noel.
En cualquier caso, para poder aceptar un hipotético estado de so-
specha debemos definir claramente qué significa sospechar. Para ello,
primeramente analizaremos el concepto mismo de sospecha y, poste-
riormente, describiremos sus procesos de interpretación, atendiendo
en especial a dos textos concretos: principalmente analizaremos Ope-
ración Palace (), un falso documental sobre una conspiración bené-
vola orquestada por todo el Parlamento español, que, por supuesto,
nunca ocurrió; y también trataremos como comparación Las sombras
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del M (), un documental que cuestiona el sumario judicial de los
atentados terroristas del  de marzo de  en Madrid.
De acuerdo con el Diccionario de la Real Academia, ‘sospecha’
significa: “imaginar algo por conjeturas fundadas en apariencias o indi-
cios”; también como “desconfiar de algo o de alguien”; y, por último,
como “considerar a alguien como autor de un delito o falta”. Lo que
salta a la vista inmediatamente son dos detalles que se pueden resumir
en una sola frase: la sospecha implica la virtualización (“imaginar”,
“conjeturas”, “apariencias”, “considerar”) de algo con valor negativo
(“desconfiar”, “delito”, “falta”).
La sospecha se sitúa en los límites entre las modalidades epistémica
y alética, como el umbral que sella la definitiva entrada al espacio de la
posibilidad, rechazando así el de la probabilidad. Según Greimas (),
la hipótesis implica un juicio epistémico entre dos polos: probable
e improbable. Y la culminación de la hipótesis es la verificación, que
nos sitúa en la modalidad alética, es decir, en el juicio entre lo posible
y lo imposible. La hipótesis entra dentro del campo de la acción
individual, mientras que la verificación se sitúa en el espacio de lo
social. Este proceso semiótico tiene que ver, sin duda, con la categoría
modal de la veridicción, que opone lo verdadero a lo falso, ya que se
relaciona con el referente, objeto no semiótico y extra–discursivo, y
con una isotopía narrativa aislada susceptible de poder establecer su
propio nivel de referencia (Lozano : –; ).En este sentido,
veremos más adelante cómo la sospecha es una isotopía de ciertos
textos, manteniendo en suspensión determinados saberes.
Es por esta razón por la que se establece una para–sinonimia entre
‘sospecha’ y ‘desconfianza’. Precisamente, la falta de verificación es un
atributo del estado de sospecha. La virtualización de un saber, todavía
solo probable, implica también una determinada actitud discursiva,
manifestada mediante el uso de determinados verbos modales como
‘creer’, ‘considerar’, ‘imaginar’, etc. El sujeto mantiene una cierta
cautela respecto a sus juicios, aunque ya se ha proyectado uno o un
conjunto de saberes de valor negativo. Goffman (ibid.: ) diferencia,
en efecto, la sospecha de la duda, siendo ambas dos versiones posibles
. En inglés se llega incluso a definir ‘suspicion’ como ‘cautious mistrust’, es decir,
una cautelosa desconfianza. La cautela implica ese estado epistémico de la hipótesis, donde
nuestra desconfianza no está verificada, ya que los saberes virtualizados que hipotizamos
no han sido actualizados.
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de la ambigüedad: la sospecha implica la posibilidad de que alguien
hurte una información que incumba o que pueda ser relevante para
el sujeto que sospecha.
La sospecha se sitúa en un paso entre la virtualización de un saber
desconocido aunque intuido y su actualización. La sospecha es la
transformación de un estado de probabilidad a su verificación en
el plano del discurso. La cuestión es cómo podemos describir ese
proceso y si podemos hablar de un estado de virtualización que nos
permitiera contrastar, eventualmente, un estado de sospecha.
El verbo ‘sospechar’ proviene del verbo latino ‘suspectare’, ver-
bo iterativo de ‘suspicere’, compuesto del prefijo sub- y del verbo
‘spectare’ (‘ver’, ‘observar’, ‘contemplar’). La raíz latina nos permite
subrayar la relación con la percepción, con las apariencias, con lo sen-
sible, que posee la sospecha. No obstante, se trata de una determinada
declinación de la mirada: es una mirada télica, dirigida a una finalidad,
que podríamos enunciar como un ver para saber (frente a otro tipo
de miradas, como la estética, por ejemplo). En esta mirada dirigida se
encuentra la autoconciencia de una carencia: se presiente la existencia
de un conocimiento que nos afecta, por tanto, sentimos el deber de
subsanar tal carencia.
La acción de sospechar conlleva una iteración de la acción de conje-
turar o de hipotizar. La sospecha se prolonga en el tiempo mediante
un ininterrumpido acto de imaginar la probabilidad de algo, ante la
cual el sujeto requiere su confirmación o su anulación. La actualización
de la virtualidad de ese conocimiento es, precisamente, su desvela-
miento o su descubrimiento, que permitirá dar un juicio veridictivo
satisfactorio.
La ausencia de pruebas incrementa la sospecha, ya que su presen-
cia permitiría la verificación, en términos de Greimas. Habría que
recordar aquí que la prueba, como el referente, sería, en principio,
un objeto no semiótico y extra–discursivo, aunque cabría entender-
lo, en nuestro caso, como una isotopía, es decir, como un elemento
recurrente dentro del plano del contenido. De forma semejante, en
el discurso de la historia observaba Roland Barthes (: ) que no
. En gramática, el verbo iterativo se refiere a una misma acción repetida sucesivamen-
te. ‘Tirotear’, ‘correr’, ‘deambular’ son ejemplos de verbos iterativos, porque la acción de
tirotear es la repetición de un tiro o disparo, la de correr es la de numerosos pasos repetidos
a una cierta velocidad, etc.
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se trata de un referente histórico que existe externo al discurso, sino
que el referente se construye dentro del discurso y es, en definitiva, el
mismo plano del significado al que reenvía. En el caso de la caza de
brujas, por ejemplo, el miedo colectivo puede generarse por causas
ignoradas por la propia sociedad y es precisamente esa ignorancia la
que crea un objeto mitificado causante del miedo, la bruja (Lotman
). La ignorancia guarda una especial relación con la sospecha,
porque en definitiva “quien sabe, no sospecha y quien sospecha, no
sabe” (Castilla del Pino : ). Cuando se sabe que no se sabe surge
la necesidad de la explicación: se virtualiza entonces un saber secreto
que reclama su derecho a ser actualizado.
Umberto Eco (: ) habla de un síndrome de sospecha cuando
un sujeto ‘sospechante’, en el afán de plantear constantemente hipóte-
sis y conjeturas que proyectan informaciones secretas detrás de todo
discurso, detecta en cualquier elemento del discurso un indicio de
ocultación. El paranoico es la figura del sujeto que padece tal síndrome.
El paranoico no es quien simplemente nota que un cierto elemento
o varios elementos cualesquiera están en un mismo contexto, sino
quien realiza una acción muy concreta a partir de dicha observación:
preguntarse o conjeturar misteriosas razones o causas que han permi-
tido que ese elemento o esos elementos estén en un mismo contexto.
El paranoico es quien ve también conspiraciones recurrentemente.
Recuerda Boltanski que no hay mucha diferencia entre el espía y el
paranoico, pues ambos están en la praxis del constante simulacro,
como también en la estrategia de hacer que cualquier cosa signifique
cualquier cosa (Sherman : –).
Esta diferencia entre las interpretaciones sana y paranoica es la base
. Roland Barthes dice textualmente: “el referente está separado del discurso, se
convierte en algo exterior a él, en algo fundador, se supone que es el que lo regula: es el
tiempo de las res gestae, y el discurso se ofrece simplemente como historia rerum gestarum:
pero en ningún momento, es el mismo significado el rechazado, el confundido con el
referente; el referente entra en relación directa con el significante, y el discurso, encargado
simplemente de expresar la realidad, cree estar economizando el término fundamental
de las estructuras imaginarias, que es el significado. Como todo discurso con pretensión
“realista”, el de la historia no cree conocer, por tanto, sino un esquema semántico de dos
términos, el referente y el significante; la confusión (ilusoria) del referente y el significado
define, como sabemos, a los discursos sui–referenciales, como el discurso perfomativo;
podría decirse que el discurso histórico es un discurso performativo falseado, en el cual el
constativo (el descriptivo) aparente, no es, de hecho, más que el significante del acto de
palabra como acto de autoridad”.
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de dos de las categorías principales de la praxis semiótica. Al aludir
a los límites de la interpretación, Eco proclama el modus, es decir,
la medida. La sospecha no es necesariamente patológica: también el
doctor, el científico, el historiador y el detective necesitan ejercitar la
sospecha en sus respectivas profesiones. Pero sus hipótesis, con los
saberes que estas proyectan o virtualizan, se mantienen dentro de una
medida racional, tanto en sus premisas como en sus conclusiones.
Este estilo paranoide de pensamiento es característico de todo di-
scurso conocido como “teoría de la conspiración”. Desde Richard
Hofstadter (), pasando por Peter Knight (), hasta Luc Boltan-
ski (ivi), entre otros, todos los autores que han analizado la relación
entre paranoia y conspiración han destacado la siguiente particulari-
dad: el discurso fuerza las conexiones entre hechos y líneas del relato
sin atisbarse nunca un fin. Se prolonga ad infinitum la sucesión de
vínculos lógicos y causales temporales, creando una progresiva ten-
sión hacia una conclusión que nunca es. En términos de semiótica
de la cultura, podemos decir que las teorías de la conspiración están
modeladas por conexiones lógicas y causales, es decir, la prueba se
construye mediante el número progresivo de conexiones o de sospe-
chas: el número de conexiones es proporcional a la fuerza de la prueba.
Su inflación permite pasar de lo doxástico a lo epistémico, de la mera
opinión a la certeza.
La inflación de sospecha coincide también con una particular ima-
gen del mundo: cada elemento mantiene siempre una conexión apa-
rentemente lógica con otros, todo está determinado entre sí. Esta
compleja articulación conlleva una mirada pan–determinista del mun-
do, donde todo está motivado, a semejanza de la literatura fantástica
(cfr. Todorov, : –). El efecto del discurso se construye so-
bre la idea de que el plano de las apariencias esconde el plano de la
inmanencia, lo disfraza de lo que no es.
Para construir tal efecto, lo cual conforma la clave del discurso de
las teorías de la conspiración, se juega con los lenguajes connnotativos
en sentido hjelmsleviano, que según Greimas conforman el sentido
común de toda cultura: lo que es innecesario explicitar. La extrema
consistencia de las conexiones entre los elementos que componen los
discursos de las teorías de la conspiración tiene dos consecuencias: en
primer lugar, un efecto de mayor tensión, debido a que su equilibrio es
precario; y, en segundo, los criterios lógicos y causales sobre los que se
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sostiene el discurso quedan en el espacio de lo no–dicho, reforzándose
así la idea de la innecesariedad de su explicitación. De alguna forma,
los criterios de construcción de la argumentación conformarían el
espacio del sentido común del discurso.
. Teorías de la conspiración
Se podría oponer, por tanto, las teorías de la conspiración a las cons-
piraciones. Las primeras son discursos que se construyen sobre la
inexistencia de pruebas o de evidencias, generando un aumento de
las sospechas sobre un sujeto o una institución que hurta determi-
nada información para actuar en la clandestinidad o en la ocultación.
Las segundas son casos históricamente comprobados o reconocidos.
Mientras las teorías de la conspiración funcionan precisamente en la
ausencia de saber, en la virtualización de una posibilidad de que una
conspiración haya acontecido o se esté produciendo, la conspiración
es un saber actualizado. Nos movemos siempre en el mismo univer-
so cognitivo, el del creer y el del saber: duda, sospecha, conjetura,
imaginación, etc.
Las teorías de la conspiración argumentan haber revelado un plan
secreto. Necesitan la aprobación del destinatario, que se convierte
en juez de la posibilidad de los hechos supuestamente secretos. Su
mecanismo se basa en la pervivencia en otros discursos, que podría-
mos llamar oficiales, de lo ‘inexplicado’: la ausencia de explicación
de ciertos hechos en esos discursos es lo que mantiene vigente una
teoría de la conspiración. En muchos casos se crean lagunas o fisuras
argumentativas en los discursos oficiales; en otros, son los espacios
de hechos inexplicados los que fermentan nuevas teorías de la conspi-
ración, como es el caso del asesinato de John F. Kennedy. La tensión
entre los discursos oficiales y las teorías de la conspiración no se puede
resolver, hasta el punto que podemos decir que ambos se necesitan
mutuamente. Cada teoría de la conspiración vive en los intersticios
argumentativos del discurso oficial, en una forma de parasitismo
discursivo. La primera rellena los huecos de los segundos, pero la
explicación conspirativa niega y rechaza la oficial, conviviendo así
en una respuesta negativa mutua. La versión conspirativa y la oficial
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de cualquier hecho, en esa forma dialógica, pasan a convertirse en
saberes virtualizados.
Las teorías de la conspiración se mueven dentro del universo de las
creencias. Su estrategia de persuasión es la de obligarnos a cuestionar
otros discursos, despertando de esta forma una necesidad por desve-
lar la verdad, es decir, de persuadir al destinatario que se encuentra
en el espacio de lo epistémico (/probable/, /improbable/, /cierto/,
/incierto/) y haciéndole despertar la necesidad de pasar al espacio
de lo alético (/necesario/, /contingente/, /posible/, /imposible/).
En este punto no encontramos diferencia alguna entre el trabajo de
historiadores y detectives. Por su parte, las teorías de la conspiración
no aspiran a ser probadas, sino que, al contrario, mantienen viva la
desconfianza respecto a otras narraciones o discursos sobre los he-
chos, que así desmienten.Las teorías de la conspiración despiertan la
necesidad de desvelar engaños en ciertos discursos, proyectan así una
indagación hermenéutica sobre las narraciones históricas. En palabras
de Goffman, toleramos lo inexplicado, pero no lo inexplicable. Y, de
hecho, en el núcleo mismo de las teorías de la conspiración se hal-
lan ciertas verdades que son consideradas inaccesibles. Y mientras se
las considere inexplicadas, las teorías de la conspiración mantendrán,
según cada caso, su vigencia.
. Crisis y teorías de la conspiración: Operación Palace ()
En un periodo de crisis social, política y/o económica, los nexos
causales entre hechos parecen romperse y es entonces cuando comen-
zamos a pensar que una instancia oculta se encuentra involucrada en
el transcurso de la historia misma. Como en la cruel aunque benévola
experiencia de Papá Noel, la inflación de la sospecha da pábulo a la
aparición de teorías de la conspiración, porque adoptamos así una
. En su obra Naming the Witch (), James Siegel analiza las acusaciones de brujería
que ocurrieron en Yakarta (Indonesia) durante las revueltas de  que obligaron a dimitir
al dictador Suharto. Como conclusión, Siegel plantea que la “bruja” es un efecto de un
acto de habla (speech act), en la terminología de J.L. Austin. Igualmente, las teorías de la
conspiración no son más que un efecto de speech acts: solo existen en los discursos y en
forma de dialogismo in praesentia, esto es, introduciendo explícitamente en su propio
discurso otras narraciones sobre el mismo hecho o el mismo conjunto de hechos que
pretende desmentir.
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determinada actitud epistémica hacia el Estado: si sabes que el Estado
miente, entonces debes poner al Estado bajo sospecha. Cuanto más
crece la intensidad de las sospechas, mayor aceptación cultural recibi-
rán las teorías de la conspiración. El Estado mismo se convierte en un
conspirador. ¿Podemos considerarlo de mera casualidad al observar la
reiterada coincidencia de momentos de crisis y el auge de las teorías
de la conspiración? Uno de los puntos que con mayor énfasis subraya
Luc Boltanski () a propósito de las conspiraciones es que el Estado
construye y conserva una cierta normalidad mediante la continuidad
de una serie de líneas causales en la experiencia individual de la vida
cotidiana y en el discurso histórico. Cuando lo casual aparece, se rom-
pe esta causalidad normal y entonces el mundo deviene un enigma
o misterio. Es en ese momento cuando empezamos a hacernos pre-
guntas sobre los hechos, indagándolos, mostrando dudas y sospechas,
porque el mundo se nos presenta así como un conjunto de signos que
necesitan ser descodificados. Dewerpe llama a esta indagación una
especie de “delirio criptológico”.
Un caso muy conocido en España es el del mockumentary titulado
Operación Palace. Emitido el  de febrero de  en el programa
Salvados de la cadena La Sexta, este falso documental sirvió como
efémeride del intento de golpe de Estado perpetrado en un mismo
día del año , que terminó fracasando. Muchos son los discursos
que han intentado explicar este acontecimiento a partir de los datos a
los que se ha tenido acceso, pero el éxito en la explicación total se ha
topado siempre con un espacio de sombras en el que, entre otras co-
sas, encontramos la conspiración militar, la Operación Galaxia, que lo
propició y cuyos nombres principales permanecen ignorados aún hoy.
Operación Palace toma como modelo o hipotexto otro mockumentary
anterior muy conocido, Dark Side of the Moon, en el cual se exponía
la teoría de que la llegada del hombre a la Luna con la misión Apolo
XI fue una gran conspiración comisionada por el presidente Richard
Nixon y que las imágenes fueron rodadas en estudio por Stanley Ku-
brick, quien por entonces estaba rodando precisamente . Odisea
en el espacio. En todo caso, Operación Palace se presentaba como un
documental con una sólida investigación. Durante los días previos, los
medios se hacían eco de esta emisión, anticipando que el periodista y
director del programa, Jordi Évole, había obtenido una información
de gran valor alrededor de la conspiración militar del -F.
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Según la historia narrada, el Gobierno de Adolfo Suárez planeó un
falso golpe de Estado. De esta forma, la retransmisión de Televisión
Española en directo desde el congreso habría sido previamente ensa-
yada y dirigida por el director de cine José Luis Garci, quien habría
recibido el Oscar a la mejor película extranjera con su Volver a empezar
() como reconocimiento a su colaboración. De hecho, Operación
Palace plantea que la diplomacia española habría ejercido una gran
influencia para que Garci conquistara la estatuilla de la Academia
americana.
El montaje del programa combinaba un conjunto de testimonios
con grabaciones de archivo, fundamentalmente del archivo de Radio
Televisión Española, y una voz en off explicaba la trama. Asimismo,
entrevistas a importantes políticos españoles que fueron diputados
nacionales electos en  y habrían participado, por tanto, en la conspi-
ración. De acuerdo con el argumento del documental, el plan habría
sido aprobado igualmente por el rey y se habría intentado reempla-
zar de esta forma el Gobierno de Adolfo Suárez por otro de unidad
nacional. Con este golpe de Estado fingido o ficticio se habría intenta-
do obtener la legitimación del proceso democrático recientemente
instaurado en España.
Es importante subrayar que no podemos considerar este discurso
como una teoría de la conspiración sensu stricto, aunque sí es la parodia
de una supuesta reafirmación de ciertas especulaciones entorno al
intento de golpe de Estado de  que se habrían ido desarrollando a
lo largo de los años. De esta manera, el texto copia estrategias propias
de las teorías de la conspiración, a las que daría así una respuesta defi-
nitiva. En fin, se trataría pues de la verificación final, que en realidad
no sería más que una burla. Pero, ¿de qué se burla este falso docu-
mental? Pues precisamente de las teorías de la conspiración y de sus
estrategias persuasivas. En este sentido, se refuerza la verosimilitud de
la trama al abrirse el mockumentary con la desclasificación de nuevos
documentos oficiales que habrían servido de punto de partida para
la investigación fingida cuyo culmen sería, así pues, el propio falso
documental. Estos nuevos documentos desclasificados cuestionan los
documentos registrados del asalto al congreso y otros, que habrían
sido tomados como los documentos verdaderos de lo acontecido. De
esta forma, se releen las grabaciones televisivas del congreso desve-
lando detalles aparentemente anecdóticos que ahora se convierten en
La inflación de la sospecha 
clave fundamental de lectura de lo que ocurrió. Se activa, así pues,
un síndrome de sospecha en el espectador, quien pasado un cierto
tiempo está dispuesto a desconfiar de todo lo que había creído ver en
los documentos anteriormente considerados oficiales.
Decíamos anteriormente que el programa tomaba como hipotexto
otro documental anterior, Dark Side of the Moon. Sin embargo, en
cuanto a la historia que narra, Operación Palace podría ser comparado
a Operation Gladio (), un documental que se emitió originalmente
en la BBC británica y que desveló la existencia de un ejército secreto
de la OTAN y de la CIA compuesto por ex agentes de la Gestapo.
La parodia del discurso de las teorías de la conspiración se observa
en algunas estrategias de Operación Palace. Por ejemplo, las constantes
citas de vídeos televisivos y de fotografías de archivo o de medios de
comunicación de la época son acompañadas por una voz en off que
suele repetir preguntas semejantes a estas: “pero, ¿fue realmente así?”,
“¿cómo es posible que el periodista viese la insignia de un teniente
coronel de la Guardia Civil desde su posición en el Congreso?”. En el
discurso de una teoría de la conspiración cualquiera no se respondería
a estas preguntas. Cuestionar las versiones institucionalizadas de los
hechos, pero sin responder a las sospechas creadas, es precisamente la
estrategia fundamental de las teorías de la conspiración.
Esto es lo que también ocurre en otro documental, Las sombras
del M (), a propósito de los atentados terroristas perpetrados en
Madrid el  de marzo de . En él no se plantea nunca una versión
alternativa a la versión que daba el dossier del juez instructor del caso.
Se limita, no obstante, a cuestionar esa versión anterior. De hecho,
se inicia con una voz narradora que dice: “dos años después, una
lectura detallada del sumario judicial revela que aquella versión está
plagada de sombras”. Todo lo que se afirma es que algo se esconde
detrás de la Historia. Por ejemplo, se nos dice: “pero lo que realmente
choca en los informes policiales es un detalle que parece haber pasa-
do desapercibido y que era lo más desconcertante: el informe de la
inspección del apartamento en Leganés decía que el cadáver de uno
de esos siete terroristas apareció “con los pantalones del revés”. ¿Qué
. Se refiere aquí al telecronista que retransmitía en directo la sesión desde el Congreso
de los Diputados en Televisión Española.
. Se refiere a los terroristas que se suicidaron el  de abril de  tras ser rodeados
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sentido tiene que aquel terrorista tuviera los pantalones mal puestos?
A lo largo de aquella intensa tarde habría tenido tiempo más que de
sobra para vestirse bien. ¿Es posible que alguien lo hubiese vestido
después de muerto? [. . . ] Lo cierto es que la versión oficial de lo ocur-
rido en Leganés ese  de abril de  se ensombrece tras una lectura
detallada del sumario”. Como se observa, la teoría de la conspiración
sobre los atentados se construye sobre una “lectura detallada” de una
versión oficial anterior, en este caso un sumario judicial. Esa lectura
se caracteriza precisamente por someterse a un régimen de síndrome
de sospecha.
Este documental, cuyo discurso se puede enmarcar dentro de las
teorías de la conspiración, construye su estrategia en un constante
interrogatorio sin respuestas de otro texto anterior que es tomado
como versión oficial de un hecho o de un conjunto de hechos. En
Operación Palace, por su parte, cada pregunta es respondida por uno o
varios supuestos testigos directos. La probabilidad se construye gracias
a la credibilidad de dichos testigos: políticos de diferentes espectros
ideológicos del periodo en cuestión y periodistas de un excelente
prestigio aparecen en el mockumentary.
Otra característica importante de la estrategia es la correlación de
hechos históricos sin vínculos causales ni temporales aparentes. El
argumento del mockumentary lo que parece explicar no es el intento
de golpe de Estado sino el Oscar que recibió José Luis Garci y su
vínculo con el F.
También se cuestiona las lagunas causales y lógicas que aparecen
en la versión oficial, intentando convertir las faltas de pruebas en una
prueba en sí misma de la existencia de una conspiración. Así lo que se
consigue es el efecto contrario: deja de existir el hecho completamente
azaroso y la historia se nos presenta como una secuencia de hechos
altamente causales. De este modo podríamos decir que las teorías de
la conspiración proyectan en el mundo una mirada pandeterminista
(Todorov ), en la que ningún hecho escapa a la causalidad. Otro
ejemplo más: en el mockumentary se señala lo altamente improbable
que no exista ninguna grabación del asalto militar de las instalaciones
de Radio Televisión Española. Se nos dice, por el contrario, que no
hay grabaciones porque no hubo tal asalto.
por la policía en el apartamento franco en el que estaban.
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Ligado a este pandeterminismo, la estrategia que domina el discur-
so lleva a vincular entre sí lapsus lingüísticos y comportamentales
y aparentes coincidencias, haciéndolas ver como errores de un plan
completamente previsto, por tanto dentro de un trasfondo de accio-
nes motivadas que escapan al puro azar. Todo hecho tiene una causa
definida. Por ello, aunque nos resulten inciertas, toda crisis debe ser
motivada y determinada por causas. Y qué mejor que colocar un gran
agente conspirador en la posición de causa general de la crisis, que
estaría entonces motivada por las acciones ocultas del Estado, imagen
perceptible de ese agente.
. Operación Palace y el valor del Estado
Finalmente nos gustaría analizar brevemente los efectos que Operación
Palace produjo durante su emisión el  de febrero de . Sin duda,
las reacciones más inmediatas se produjeron en las redes sociales, don-
de se pudo comprobar la eficacia veridictoria del discurso. Después de
la emisión del mockumentary se admitía con un intertítulo que todo se
trataba de un juego narrativo y que nada de todo lo que se había dicho
era verdad. Algún importante joven político español llegó a escribir en
Twitter: “Ojalá lo que dicen en el documental no lo hubiésemos leído
antes en investigaciones serias. . . a espabilar, que nos toman el pelo”.
Muchos fueron los que se sintieron decepcionados y reaccionaron
borrando inmediatamente los tuits, reconociendo incluso la ingenui-
dad de haber creído toda la historia que se contaba y luego atacando
furiosamente al programa. Estas reacciones lo que demuestran es que
el texto había sido eficaz, obligando al espectador a colocarse en la
posición del crédulo.
Otros simplemente felicitaron al programa por haberles hecho
creer en algo tan inaudito e improbable. En la mayoría de estas reac-
ciones quedaba expresada una desconfianza hacia el Estado, que era
mencionado como un sujeto conspirador. Es también verdad que la
conspiración planteada en Operación Palace tenía un objetivo social-
mente aceptado, el del mantenimiento de la democracia, aunque con
medios de dudoso valor social.
Quizás la crisis de confianza se deba a la atribución en el plano
axiológico de un valor negativo. Esto puede deberse en buena me-
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dida a la acumulación de experiencias negativas recientes de la crisis
económica. En todo caso, el semema Estado parece incluir el sema
“tramposo” o incluso “conspirador”. Recuerda Alain Dewerpe que
en los inicios del sistema liberal, el siglo XIX, políticos como François
Guizot hablaban del Estado como el arte de conspirar para el bien.
Recientemente Julian Assange () publicó un artículo “Conspiracy
as governance” donde señala a los partidos Republicano y Demócra-
ta estadounidenses como los grandes grupos de conspiradores de
la historia. De hecho, afirma Assange que el gran desarrollo de las
comunicaciones ha permitido que los conspiradores hayan cambiado
los medios para conspirar. Antes se usaba el asesinato, ahora el hurto
y la custodia de la información. Operación Palace propone una idea
. Se puede recordar aquí la definición estructuralista de Estado que da Pierre Clastres
(), quien lo restringe a la esfera de los tres tipos de la comunicación o de intercambio
sobre cuyos lazos se sostiene toda comunidad humana, según Lévi-Strauss: el intercambio
económico, el intercambio lingüístico y el intercambio de mujeres. En función de una serie
de privilegios socialmente otorgados a un grupo que constituye el poder político, el Estado
debe definirse como espacio externo a las reglas socialmente establecidas para dichos
intercambios, dándole así una posición privilegiada y excepcional respecto a la norma.
Quienes forman partes del Estado no deben cumplir necesariamente con el principio de
reciprocidad del don–contradón, sino que el Jefe de Estado, por ejemplo, debe recibir
aunque no devolver el valor de lo recibido. Por otra parte, el poder político ejerce la palabra
sin necesidad de obtener respuesta: los discursos políticos, en todas sus formas posibles,
generalmente poseen un carácter unidireccional. Esta característica otorga al Estado un
uso de la palabra excepcional respecto al normal intercambio lingüístico de su comunidad
o de su cultura. Por último, en muchas culturas el representante o los representantes del
Estado tienen el derecho a la poliginia, por ejemplo, contraviniendo la norma matrimonial
existente en su cultura. Por un lado, esta definición de Clastres nos permite escapar a la
definición monolítica de la sociología, para la que el Estado es una forma de organización
soberana que ostenta el monopolio de la violencia, que nos obligaría a declinar el Estado
exclusivamente en su forma coercitiva. Y, por otro lado, la interpretación del Estado como
“tramposo” o “conspirador” puede vincularse fácilmente a una esfera de uso desviado o
privilegiado de las normas que rigen las formas comunicativas. El Estado se funda sobre
una serie de privilegios y es observado como espacio fronterizo, que protege a la sociedad
frente a la naturaleza. Esta función protectora, señalada también por Clastres, está también
presente en el trabajo de Boltanski, quien describe al Estado como un agente que mantiene
una cierta realidad o una cierta normalidad en el transcurso de los hechos sociales.
. El privilegio de palabra al que aludíamos en la nota anterior, también queda manifie-
sto en el caso Cablegate de WikiLeaks, donde se proponía el algoritmo “a más información,
más transparencia y a más transparencia, más democracia”. Lo que parece ser el Cablegate,
más que un acto de transparencia, es un ataque a ese espacio privilegiado del poder, donde
se ejerce su particular derecho de palabra. Se usurpó así su derecho al secreto y, como
efecto, se generó la idea de una trama conspirativa al evidenciarse un espacio secreto del
poder. En definitiva, a más transparencia, más opacidad (cfr. Lozano) y el efecto de la
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semejante de Estado: un sujeto que engaña mediante la difusión de
información falsa y la custodia de la verdad de los hechos.
Además, en España durante la reciente crisis económica se dieron
a conocer informaciones sobre gobernantes y altos cargos políticos
vinculados a la corrupción, el fraude fiscal, etc. Todo ello ha actuali-
zado una desconfianza hacia los actuales representantes del Estado,
hasta el punto que algunos nuevos partidos han propuesto renovar el
“régimen de ”, año de la proclamación de la última Constitución
democrática que abrió la transición política desde el Franquismo. Al
usar el término de valor negativo “régimen”, se señala constantemen-
te que los actuales representantes han gobernado para ellos mismos
desde la llegada de la democracia. Hay que devolver las instituciones
a la ciudadanía, dicen. Operación Palace traza un retrato del Estado
cercano a esta idea negativa de manipulación de la información y de
uso restringido de las decisiones políticas.
En el caso de Papá Noel, con el que iniciamos el presente recorrido,
nuestra posición de víctima pasó a transformarse en el de sujeto
conspirador. La figura de Papá Noel es un medio de socialización, ya
que es una figura mítica que castiga y premia, ordenando la conducta.
Ello nos lleva a considerar la conspiración contra los niños como
algo positivo. En las teorías de la conspiración, el ciudadano suele
ocupar la posición del oponente, dentro del esquema actancial. ¿Hay
realmente una crisis del sentido de Estado? Es muy probable que
estemos renegociando su significado. Al menos podemos decir que
existe un resentimiento y un descontento ciudadano (incluso una
actitud de “sospecha cívica” en palabras de Dewerpe) que pueden
hacernos ver una conspiración detrás de toda institución estatal. Igual
que Yuri Lotman () nos mostró que no eran las brujas la causa
del miedo colectivo durante el siglo XVI, sino que es un miedo de
origen incierto lo que cristalizó en la aparición de la figura de la bruja,
también en el caso de la conspiración es la sospecha ante hechos de
causalidad incierta o completamente inesperados la que impele a la
construcción de una figura mitificada, la de un gran conspirador: el
Estado.
opacidad no puede ser más que engaño, conspiración o conspiracy as governance.
 Rayco González
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Suspicion, Denunciation, Revolt
On Textual Particularities of Conspiracy Theories
E J M C*
 : Sospetto, denuncia, rivolta. Sulle particolarità testuali delle
teorie del complotto
: In the article I reflect on the textual status of conspiracy theories
(CTs) from a semiotic point of view. First, I conceptualize CTs as a phe-
nomenon characterized by conjectural/speculative meanings (deriving
from an abduction process) concerning issues of disruption (infringe-
ment and deception). Documents play a decisive role in these messages
because they are explored as record devices through which one may
infer something and/or manage veridictive strategies to support it. In
this first part, I also propose the existence of two major CTs’ categories,
distinguished according to the abductive operations that specifically un-
derpin them: the ‘objective’ CTs, supported by facts, and the ‘subjective’
ones, merely based on personal views. In the second part of the paper, I
propose a semiotic background for the study of the CTs’ textualities, in
keeping with the Semiotic French School. Such epistemic background
allows one to outline some of the main axiological, narrative, and discur-
sive specificities behind CTs, which are therefore conceived as a kind
of ‘textual genre’. From this semiotic perspective, I conclude that CTs
are not just messages of complaint, anger, and confrontation but also
strategic texts of (re)mobilization.
: Conspiracy Abductions; Semiotics of Conspiracy Theories;
Conspiracy Axiology; Conspiracy Narrative; Conspiracy Discourse.
∗ Eduardo José Marcos Camilo, University of Beira Interior.
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. Conspiracy theories: opening remarks
CTs are that kind of texts whose specificity presents some difficulties
of recognition. Sometimes, are recognized as textual practices of deci-
phering mysteries/puzzles, finding some relationship with detective
or mystery stories. Consist of messages characterized by conjectures,
speculations. Other times, CTs are identified by the topics they report.
Here are those texts about betrayals, complots and frauds.
When not uttered by reference to specific contexts such as those
related to news production (news stories), literature (mystery novels)
or specific movie genres (thriller), CTs are considered to be a mea-
ning making practice socially devalued. This stigmatization is often
found in the most general contexts, eg., the ones of political combats
as well of the daily language practices. When it is intended to dub
someone as unrealistic, delusional, paranoid it is used the following
expression: “There you are with your conspiracy theories”. It is as if
these discursive practices were received as implausible, unrealistic.
Despite the need to assure a more consistent epistemic background,
we formulate the hypothesis about the role played by of the anxiety
in the CTs creation and spread because what is underlining these
complaint speeches against the complots and the trick is a fear of the
disorder, an anxiety concerning the disrespect of a commitment alrea-
dy agreed; the scare of a chicanery, a betrayal, the phobia about the
disintegration of an order (social, political, economical, sporty,. . . ) ag-
gravated by the boldness of the imposture. Hence the thematic about
the plot, the betrayal about something that was secretly subverted and
which is linked with a suspicion activity. Always concerns the rever-
sal of the institutions values on anti–values, as well the institutional,
social and intersubjective protocols and controls on abject realities
with their own social actors transformed on anti–subjects (traitors,
opportunistic, incompetent. . . ). This whole dynamics of negativity is
the hallmark of any CT.
. Conspiracy theories as conjectural textualities
Every CT is a theory in the prospect of being a speculative text (con-
cerning a negative topic — a complot as a disruptive phenomenon).
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In short, it is a conjecture, a cognitive process determined by the
abduction.
By ‘abduction’ we conceive what Charles Peirce considered to be
“this singular assumption instinct” (Peirce, : , apud Truzzi:
) or the inclination to entertain hypothesis (Truzzi: ). Any CT
abduction is a speculation on what Umberto Eco has designated as the
“effect of a particularly vicious cause (which in fact could be defined
as a violation of the rules in vogue)”(Eco : ). This means, that
any CT’s topic has always a disruptive specificity; it is defined by a
negative axiology.
One of the scopes of this essay implies to highlight how abduction,
conceived as a conjectural practice, is behind any CT. That is the
reason why we decided to explore the Umberto Eco’s studies on the
abduction operations classification based on the Aristotle’s Posterior
Analytics and on a very interesting text of Voltaire: Zadig (Eco :
–). Such essay was important for our purposes because it will
allow us to make some distinctions within the textualities of the CTs.
Here are this ones resulting from hyper, hypo and meta–codified
abductive processes or that others which are merely the product of
hypo–codified and creative abductions.
.. CTs based on hyper–codified abductions
Under hyper–codified abductions, the conspiracy theories are specu-
lations about complots resulting just from an inventory of indexical
signs (indexes) or symptoms where reality is conceived as the manife-
station domain of several phenomena in which only some are inferred
as ‘disruptive signs’. The scope of these theories is the world itself that
is always abducted as ‘corrupted’, ‘inverted’, in short, as a ‘pathologic’
entity.
In what consists this hyper–codified abduction process? Merely on
an inventory of signs: disruption symptom detection or index investi-
gation with respect to a set of codes or of «encyclopedias» that guaran-
tee their existence as «signs» — things that report others. Sherlock Hol-
mes, endowed with a peculiar semiotic intelligence that only admitted
what could be useful for the inquiry, dominated some of them. For
example, those about types of cigars and of tracks. In the case of CTs,
the «encyclopedias» always present a contractual/legal/normative spe-
 Eduardo José Marcos Camilo
cificity: they are sets of combinations, of commitments that generate
rights and obligations, expectations and hopes for the parties involved.
These normative «encyclopedias» are seen as the fundamentals by
which the phenomena of the (ir)regularity /(il)legitimacy may be
detected or investigated. By them hyper–codified abduction processes
are nothing more than a mere registration of symptoms and indexes.
.. The Hypo–codified abductions status under CTs
If hyper–codified abduction was connected to an exercise of the de-
tection, in turn, hyper–codified abduction is linked to a suspicion
practice.
Before the facts, it is necessary to move forward to a version of the
infraction modus operandi as well to the offender identity, a version
in which someone risks an effective connection between the symp-
toms and indexes already inventoried and certain subjects identified
as the infractors. This is why Umberto Eco stated that the hypo–
codified abduction always implies a ‘textualization procedure’ — a
consistent registry of a range of propositions (previously determined
by a reference/extensional value) about the same topic — a theme, an
‘aboutness’ conceived as «what–is–around–something» (Eco : ).
In CTs the topic is recurrent: an infraction and an infractor. In addition
to this one, other still exists with an ubiquitous status due its presence
was verified in the most diverse cultures and literary productions
(Propp, ): the theme of the imposture. Under this hypo–codified
abductive perspective, this topic is closely connected with a resent-
ment registry about a traitor’s demystification, denouncement and
punishment.
Considering the hypo–codified abduction as a sort of «version of
the facts», as a «believing–to–be» which specificity is very subjective,
then its existence imposes the emergence of criteria of validation
which are no longer extensional. This personal «version of the facts»
must make sense, to be plausible (and not necessarily to ensure a
reference). Umberto Eco stated that the key measure of this plausibility
. In this paper it was used the Greimas and Courtés’ English semiotics terminology
as it is in the Sémiotique. Dictionnaire raisonné de la théorie du langage and also in the 
Indiana University Press’ American translation
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is the probability. From all the alternative versions it will be acceptable
that one provided with more level of alethic necessity (having–to–be)
or possibility (not–having–not–to–be). Sherlock Holmes suspected
of somebody, not necessarily because he thought he had to be guilty,
but because there was a great deal of possibility of being it after all
indexes and symptoms concerning other agents have excluded them
as unlikely (Truzzi : ).
About this particularity of plausibility it should be noted, however,
that CTs hypo–codified abductions are characterized precisely by
their non–plausibility and this is a very interesting hallmark. The
landing on the moon was an hoax; American Republic is dominated
by aliens or by reptiles; Elvis Presley is alive and kicking and so on. It
seems that is not the probability that is the ‘engine’ of this abductive
process and the foundation of the CTs’ narratives, but precisely the
not probability, the unheard, the dazzling exception, contributing for
the establishment of a fragile relationship of the addresser towards
the addressee.
Under these so personal and extraordinary interpretations, facts be-
come modalised by the veracity and not strictly anymore by the true;
by the ways of ‘saying’ connected with a range of communication
processes criteria. Besides the ones of referentiality other variables
become also relevant such the ones concerning the contexts in which
the relationships between the addresser and the addressee are set-
tled as well what both consider to be the optimal conditions for a
true, false, lie or secret discourse (veridictive contract). An interesting
decalage between addresser and the addressee is always established
in the CTs. He is in possession of a set of symptoms and indexes
about an offense, an offender and a traitor that he considers to be
true (hyper–codified abduction). However he has created a version
for the addressee (hypo–codified abduction) which isn’t yet enough
plausible or else are the CTs’ own topics that are characterized by their
extraordinary extravagant scale. It is precisely under this décalage that
relies the usual CTs’ pragmatic stigmatization classified as delusional
narratives, because the facts or the ways in which are communicated,
are not enough convincing, forcing the addresser to increase his emo-
tive ethos to a level where he becomes a kind of Cassandra crying
truths which for him are absolutely evident.
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.. CTs Meta–codified abductions vs CTs creative abductions
It is under the meta–codified and in the creative abductions that the
previous versions of the facts already conjectured (hypo–abducted) are
checked. The messages are again enriched by an extensional dimen-
sion as if the (im)plausibility of the versions had to be supplemented
by the facts. The ‘textualized worlds’ must be sustained by the rea-
lity. The certitudes or the probabilities (the believing–to–be or the
not–believing–not–to–be meanings) must be supported by empiric
verification.
It is necessary to distinguish meta–codified abductions from crea-
tive abductions. In the first ones, the text derives from a personal as-
sumption for its verification by the facts. Some indexes and symptoms,
previously registered under the process of hyper–codified abduction,
and organized in a personal version (hypo–codified abduction) are (or
are not) empirically verified. In turn, under the creative abductions
these assumptions are not based on previous symptoms, neither on
indexes. They are strictly subjective assumptions, prejudgments about
which someone tries to seek phenomena to confirm them. This is why
there is an alethic determinism, a fundamentalism in such reports,
as if the world only could exist to confirm personal assumptions of
disruption.
Creative abductions imply that reality must suit the thoughts and
not vice–versa. In CTs based on creative abductions everything is
useful to confirm the (im)plausibility of the conjectures already hypo–
abducted: the polar star, a spot on the skin, a track, and so on. It is the
real world that conforms to a mangled mental world — one that is
fictionalized — and not unlike, this fictional world that is verified by a
(disrupted) reality.
The polarity underlying meta–codified abductions and creative
abductions implies the existence of conjectures (hypo–codified ab-
ductions) based on facts or on mere speculations. This dichotomy is
relevant and it lies at the heart of an objective or of a strictly subjective
suspicion, one which is based on a mere feeling.
Where is the foundation of this dichotomy?
Whereas the CTs hypo–codified abductions are embodied on a
suspicion process; whereas, from a textual/linguistic point of view,
the suspicion activity always is relied on the past (imposing the classi-
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fication of any CT under the field of a sanctionary narrative program),
then what is in focus is the contractual legitimacy of a certain perfor-
mative program. And this evaluation may present an objective and
real basis or a strictly subjective and imaginary one.
In Del Sentido II. Ensayos Semióticos (Du Sens II. Essais Sémioti-
ques), specifically in the chapter on the semantic status of the anger,
Algirdas Greimas enables us to explain this dichotomy from the exi-
stence of two types of expectation situations adjacent to two contrac-
ting processes types (manipulation programs). The situation of simple
expectation (connected with effective contracting processes) and that
of fiduciary expectation (reporting imaginary contracting processes)
(Greimas, : –).
The first stem from expectations connected with e ffective clauses
founding rights and duties for the parties involved in the manipulation
program. These clauses embody pathemic states of expectation that
are more or less satisfied according the later performative success of
the agents. What is abducted in the CTs are symptoms or indexes
of performative disruptions of this effective clauses and explored as
prosecution evidences. In contrast, under the fiduciary expectation
— adjacent to an imaginary contracting process (and thus connected
with an idealization of what should be the manipulation program, a set
of hopes and a range of very personal rights) — these symptoms and
indexes don’t exist anymore. They are replaced instead by personal
skeptic conjectures about what was the performance of the others
and what it should be; a set of speculations inscribed in a pathemic
framework of hopelessness. These personal feelings are connected
with a subjective pessimism which finds its meaning under a mode
of communication no longer interactive (addressed to the other) but
strictly ‘expressive’ (centered on the self ). Under this communicative
context, CTs become very personal discourses with all the peculiarities
arising of an exercise of a paranoid and a neurotic imagination (“There
are you with your persecution complex!”). Don Quijote is the most
paradigmatic example of this negative imagination.
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. Textual specificities
Let us focus on some CTs fundamentals from an analytical angle
focused on the Semiotics French School’s theories: Algirdas Greimas
(, , ), Jacques Fontanille (), Joseph Courtes (),
Diana Luz Pessoa de Barros (, ), José David Garcia Contto
(), José Augusto Mourão and Maria Augusta Babo (). The
purpose is to identify the most relevant specificities concerning CTs
as a textual genre.
.. Axiological particularities
CTs are characterized by those themes of a contractual mangling and
the accusation of someone. Although, from a narrative point of view,
they are under a cognitive sanction trajectory (concerning a suspi-
cion, a distrust) and a retributive one (connected with a prosecution
praxis), its genesis (its ‘being’) always reports to past manipulation
programs. The purpose is to abduct how a performative program was
inconsistent with what was settled within that manipulative program.
From a ‘contractual being’ what is abducted is a performative ‘not
being’. This is the reason why the practical purpose of each CT is the
discovery of the offenses and of the offenders as well its prosecution
and punishment.
The first axiological configuration reports a range of positive va-
lues and a euphoric pathemic framing which inscribes any CT under
the field of meta or creative abductions. Usually this configuration is
connected with the triumph of the discovery and with a veridictive
dynamics of a ‘lie demystification’. From the performative program
— which is apparently regular (the ‘seeming’) it is unmasked how its
manipulative foundation is mangled (the ‘not being’):”Eureka!”. Here
is the puzzle solution; the reconstitution of the offense and of the
offender. By contrast, the second axiological configuration is symme-
trical. It is negative, dysphoric, concerning the moral evaluation of
the offense and the culpability of the offender. The puzzle solution
(a mere cognitive finding) gives now rise to the charge framed by a
negative passionate environment which is typical of the dissatisfac-
tion or disappointment. These emotions may also give way to shock
whenever the offender’s performance was also classified as disguised.
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He becomes not only a traitor but also an impostor. From a discursi-
ve point of view, shock favors a strongly emotional and reproachful
record associated with the scandal.
.. Narrative particularities
The narrative subject around which revolve the conspiratorial text is
classified as an anti–subject. Who is he? What did he do?
He is both a rebel and an impostor. He is a rebel from the perspec-
tive of being someone who abdicated or betrayed the commitments
to which he had submitted himself under the manipulation programs.
Someone with performative skills to impose a domain of personal
freedom (the one of the ‘being able to do’) or of independence (‘being
able not to do’). From a strategic perspective, thus from a unilateral
point of view — that that is the one of that subject trying to manage
the manipulation program —, these states are the fundamentals of
manipulative dysfunctions. In addition, this rebel subject is also rated
as an impostor. Not only had the authority to resist the manipulation
strategies, but also the enough skills to camouflage such resistance.
The rebellion is hidden by an alleged compliance, requiring the perfor-
mance of a camouflage. This feature will lead to a narrative program
with a veridictive dual nature: on the one hand, it is inscribed in the
field of the appearances (the ‘seeming’) — it presents a conformity
value; on the other it is connected with the domain of a personal
resistance by which someone performs a rebellion exercise (the ‘not
being’).
In discursive terms, the narrative polarity rebellion / imposture
will be embodied in a set of dramaturgical roles that will coat the actor
simultaneously with a subversive and a sly ethos.
.. Discursive particularities
As the textual core of CTs is connected with that narrative programs of
cognitive and retributive sanctions, and by that means they present a
double dynamic (the one of the offense and of the offender discovery
as well of his prosecution and symbolic punishment), them their
discourse is characterized by a set of recurring specificities. They are
presented three, resulting from an exploratory discourse analysis.
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... The isolated position of the addresser
In the CTs messages it is usual the existence of someone who pro-
claims a truth about an offense or an offender, a betrayal, which is
often extraordinary or not plausible. Here is an interlocutive situation
that imposes the adoption of several veridiction strategies for the
legitimization of a subjective belief. Not only those that involve the
mobilization of extrinsic evidences — if there is any — but also of
intrinsic evidences, by which the (im)plausibility speech necessarily
requires a performative commitment of dramaturgical nature. The ad-
dresser strives to mean a personal sincerity, resulting on an increasing
emotional speech. Here he is as a Cassandra crying in the wilderness
of the desert or as the Restelo’s Old Man (Camões, Portugal, –
) He is the announcer of misfortunes that are totally transparent,
evident. How is it that only he can see them?
... The dialogism of mobilization
Although the discursive locus of this addresser is very fragile — con-
nected with very personal convictions — its legitimacy is evaluated by
that one of the addressee who never is considered as a neutral witness.
This means that CTs are not exclusively a discourse of symbolic prose-
cution and punishment, a veridictive message about someone’s guilt,
but also a mobilizing discourse. The addresser refuses to be satisfied
with a mere addressee’s acquiescence about an infraction. He wants
more: to shake him from his inertia, to urge him to a (re)action. This
feature is relevant because it presupposes a strategic specificity on
any CT, one by which the messages become part of a mobilization
rhetoric to raise a protest or a fighting behavior.
... The speech of disqualification
Because, from an axiological point of view, there is a negative en-
vironment and, from pathemic point of view, a dissatisfaction and
a disappointment framework, then the discursive record is one of
disqualification where the grotesque plays an important role. It is sup-
ported by a hyperbolic and a metaphorical language with oxymoron
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and paroxysms — symptomatic figures of passion and, at same time,
of an inter–subjective mobilization.
The grotesque involves the figurativization of social actors, insti-
tutions, even the very own genesis of that primary contractual ma-
nipulation programs (therefore, the past agreements, combinations,
treaties) as shocking realities. It requires a dysphoric imagination cha-
racterized by a more or less explicit registry of lessening, of kneeling,
with the purpose of arousing disgust (bathos). Here is a strategic
purpose rooted under the manipulative modalities of intimidation to
induce the disgust due the reversal of the «being» on the «not being»
and a subsequent reactive conduct of «reparation»; here is how the
demystification and prosecution plots are complemented by a speech
of abjection consisting on the downgrading and the revolt towards
some institutions and certain social actors.
These features are relevant because they allow to explain how CTs
messages presuppose a practical aim relating with the foundation of
(an)other program of manipulation. They are not messages strictly cha-
racterized by just a shocked discourse, but also by a (strategic) speech of
renovation or even of overcoming of the agents and institutions. That is
why we have considered how conspiracy discourse is closely connected
with the ancient To Prepon of the Greeks (a form of beauty with prac-
tical and persuasive purposes) or, specially, with the Decorum of the
Romans (an aesthetic practice endowed with moral purposes) (Sodré e
Paiva, : –). Firstly, it is necessary to accuse, them to induce the
shock to produce the confront and, finally to induce the (re)action.
. Conclusion
Conspiracy theories are textual practices of suspicion and accusation
through which someone performs a cognitive or a retributive practice:
he suspects and accuses. His judgment and punitive exercises fall on a
subject who is rated as a traitor and punished as an impostor. On the
one hand, he is an offender who betrayed the commitments to which
he had undergone; on the other hand, he is that person who tried to
hid such treachery.
From a textual semiotic point of view, this sanction will result on a
conjectural textuality through which it is exercised a suspicion. Hence
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the importance of the abduction and simultaneously of a registry of
resentment and blaming. These textual directions facilitate a strongly
passionate, hyperbolic and grotesque discourse dynamics, comple-
mented by an allegedly objective, impartial registry associated with
veridictive strategies to overcome the implausibility. This is an impor-
tant feature in the CTs because usually the messages do not report
what remains after eliminating the improbable and the unnecessary —
as is happens in the detective deduction — but precisely in all about
the unprecedented, the extraordinary, the extravagant. In addition,
when the allegations and the charges are not anymore supported by
documents that may ensure the link between what is spoken and
the reality, CTs become reduced to a subjective discourse about very
personal convictions. This specificity contributes for a communicative
dynamic in which the addresser finds himself alone proclaiming evi-
dences that only he sees. The message becomes less argumentative,
but strongly emotive, more visual than verbal, in which the demon-
stration is replaced by a spectacular and a grotesque exhibition of a
personal version of the facts. What is at stake here is a discursive practi-
ce connected with an expressive mode of communication determined
by conditions of validity which are no longer exclusively related to the
truth but also to the veracity.
In addition to an accusative dimension against which the CTs pre-
sent a strategic vocation (are messages in which are prepared new
manipulation programs with other clauses or involving other sub-
jects), it is also relevant to highlight their cognitive aspects. CTs are
assumption and conjectural texts. We classified such procedures as
abductive from the works of Charles Peirce, Umberto Eco and Mar-
cello Trussi. Depending the various types, which are nothing more
than means of conjecture, two main CT categories were identified.
Those based on facts supported by documents assumed as records
of the reality; and those that are highly subjective assumptions, fee-
lings, within which the documents became key strategic resources to
institute in the addressee’s convictions very personal versions. These
conspiracy theories are not anymore based on facts, but the addresser
appeals them for support their own convictions. Firstly, someone
suspects about something; afterwards goes to the world to discover
what contributes to support his pre–concept. Under this context, facts
are transformed into veridictory resources used to legitimize certain
Suspicion, Denunciation, Revolt 
convictions. Both categories presuppose the existence of distinct ab-
ductive operations under which the status of the documents acquire
peculiarities. In the case of hyper and meta–abductions they become
symptomatic or indexical records of mangling situations, enabling to
sustain their assessment or verification. Already, on the other hand,
with respect to hypo–abductions and especially creative abductions,
their status is merely intensional. Inscribed under the rhetorical field
of intrinsic evidences, the documents are united under the same voca-
tion: the one of to make believe about a ‘non being’ — something or
somebody not only extraordinary/extravagant but also illegitimate.
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importance of the website’s technological and semiotic code structures
for the development of conspiracist thinking. First, the article claims
that, although PI News presents itself as an alternative media website, it
does not conform to classic definitions of alternative media. With the
exception of the moderated comment section, the website does not
allow the interactive participation of users. Second, the article points out
that the code architecture of PI News triggers conspiracist thinking by
primarily presenting mainstream media articles that are remediated on
the website. A mosaic of conspiracist meaning, the article contends, is
not only created by rhetorical structures but also by multimodal and
structural enhancement, by hyperlinks that work as proofs and authenti-
cation, by user–generated content and feedback via comments, as well
as by intermedial performativity in Social Media. The technosemiotic
embedding of original news articles creates an underlying suspicion
without providing a coherent model of explanation. The content of the
website predisposes conspiracist thinking by presenting a corrective
point of view to the mainstream media and by calling on the receiver to
contribute a possible theoretical explanation or ‘enigma’.
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. Online patterns of conspiracist thinking
Mediation of information on the Internet becomes continuously easier
to access, and to generate, but at the same time also more complex.
On the one hand, terms like “user generated content” and intuitive
web design refer to a simplified usage with more outcomes. On the
other hand, the interrelations between web projects and other sites,
the intermodality and interaction between different types of content
become more elaborate: Interfaces guiding to Social Networks and
overall taxonomic structures (or folksonomies, cf. Alby ) enhance
the possible structures of old–fashioned hypertext.
This new mediality of the Internet also shapes the functioning
of websites that publish parts, fragments or suggestive patterns of
conspiracy theories (CTs). The most prominent German anti-Islamic
website with tendencies to CT thinking is Political Incorrect News
(PI News). This weblog presents extracts from official news cove-
rage, while concurrently speculating about collaborations of public
institutions or political organs, and about the threat of Muslim over-
population in western countries. These speculations are not an explicit
dimension of conspiracist thinking (cf. Kimminich’s chapter in this
volume), they are rather a hidden structural supposing. Articles on
PI News represent what we have called “fragments” and “patterns”
of an alternative social construction of reality that is also based on
the attribution of CT structures to a homogeneous or more or less
heterogenic group of enemies. Thus, we have to deal with texts that,
on the one hand, stimulate the identification with a certain approach
of thinking the world, and that, on the other, promote alternative
accounts to reality.
The paper aims at analyzing these suggestive procedures as medial
and therefore technological as well as semiotic structures. Hence,
structural codes and contexts become important. The paper fore-
grounds the pragmatic reception of such websites, instead of analyzing
from a rhetoric and textual point of view.
On these grounds, the paper first of all situates PI News among
other websites which have an ambiguous relation to the class of “clas-
. http://www.pi-news.net [accessed December , ].
. For a detailed pragmatic–textual analysis, cf. Kimminich’s chapter in this volume.
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sic alternative media websites”. It is to ask whether they also imply the
ethical and collective dimensions of general alternative online media.
Subsequently, the paper analyzes the framing of PI News concerning
its relation to “mainstream media” in order to understand its double
standard of dealing with official news sources. In a final step, the prag-
matic, collective sharing, spreading, commenting, and negotiation of
articles, as well as their technological embedding and intermediality
will be closely considered.
. Alternative media vs. mainstream media
PI News presents itself as “alternative news web pages” and claims to
be different than mainstream media. In a list that has been created by
the website ranking machine alexa.com, PI News is situated among
other web portals. As Alexa only registers web pages that are stati-
stically correlative (based on other user’s traffic), we can resume the
common features of PI-news by correlation to other websites as the
follows:
— Neo–nationalism;
— Against the power of the European Union;
— Oppositional to the actual political system in Germany;
— Against islamization of Germany / Europe, islamophobic;
— Against leftist politics;
— Against mainstream media and press.
Those common features contextualize PI News beyond main-
stream media in the realm of classic concepts of “alternative media”
claiming the same right of freedom of expression.
According to Leah Lievrouw (), alternative media are characte-
rized as follows:
— They are interventionist by subverting common–ground thin-
king and presenting oppositional meaning.
. Cf. http://www.pi-news.net///pi-auf-platz--der-alternativen-nachrichten-
seiten-in-deutschland/ [accessed December , ].
. http://alexa.com/ [accessed December , ].
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— Reading their contents requires subcultural literacy in order to
understand oppositional meaning–making.
— They often present the contents ironically in order to establish
an artificial distance to the official meaning.
— They are ephemeral, not institutionalized media.
— They function on a collaborative base, and they present hete-
rotopic content that includes a large scale of different social
groups as potential addressees.
Insofar, PI News may appear as alternative media. It may be an
interventionist attempt to deconstruct common political meanings. In
its self–framing in the website header, PI News states to offer „news
against the Mainstream”, and to be „pro-American, pro-Israeli, against
the Islamization of Europe and in favor of human rights according to
the German constitution”. In most cases, PI News publishes com-
mented snippets of newspaper articles, quotations of public persons,
and links to official sources. Via commenting and recontextualization,
an alternative world view is constructed. With this mixture of news
coverage and an anti–hegemonic point of view, the website seems to
integrate within the range of Independent Media Center (IMC).
IMCs like Indymedia present counter–information to the establi-
shed media in order to visualize an alternative point of view that is
coined by a socio–cultural ideology and a strong political account
(cf. Kidd ). As most “mainstream” online media resources, IMCs
make use of tags and categories to provide a knowledge structure
that organizes the archive of published articles. Such tags and catego-
ries aim at future retrieval, the contribution to a conceptual cluster,
attention–seeking, and the expression of opinions (cf. Marlow et al.
). Whereas Indymedia puts a focus on the retrieval and contri-
bution function of taxonomy by using tags like “Business”, “Crime”,
“Global”, “Indy”, “Movies”, “Politics”, and “Pop Culture” , PI News
uses tags and categories in order to discredit official media coverage
or politics: The term “Lügenpresse” (in English “Lying press”) that
was already used in Nazi Germany, the label “Propaganda” or again
“Swindle”, and “Political correctness”. Tags also use anti-Islamic neo-
. Cf. http://www.pi-news.net/ [accessed December , ].
. Cf. http://indymedia.org/ [accessed December , ].
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logisms like “Dhimmitude” (cf. Schiffer ) and “Eurabia” (cf. Hafez
).
In the case of PI News, tagging and categorization do not permit
to effectively retrieve or reframe articles. There is no general listing
of actual tags and hyperlinks only refer to the last twelve articles that
were uploaded to the tag. The polemic tagging mostly serves purposes
of attention–seeking and the expression of opinions. Tags join the
semantic dimension of commented articles — they intensify the refra-
ming of official news coverage by discrediting hegemonic structures
of the information society, or they directly focus on (Islamic) conspi-
racy, as it is the case with “Dhimmitude” or “Eurabia”. This denial
of legitimacy is part of the website’s code text as legitimate source
of information against mainstream conspiracies (cf. Eva Kimminich’s
chapter in this volume).
. From alternative media to a conspiracist blog
When it comes to the framing and goals of alternative web projects
like IMCs, as considered by Rainer Winter (), PI News differ from
the traditional concept of alternative media: Alternative media aim at
showing different and marginalized perspectives. They therefore use
the Internet in order to establish social diversity, plurality, and social
progress through the democratization of knowledge, the pluralization
of positions, meanings, and sources. This also results in a collaborative
website architecture, where — on different levels of participation —
every user can upload and publish content to the portal (cf. Pickard
). The work of the editorial team concentrates on moderation
and light editing of proposed articles (cf. Platon & Deuze ).
PI News is likewise pretending to be a collaborative project (cf.
Kimminich’s chapter in this volume), but is in reality based on a
non–collaborative blog architecture, which is also stated in PI News
guidelines. That means users cannot directly publish own articles
or media resources. Proposals for articles must be submitted to an
editorial team. Most articles are de facto written by the editorial team
or by guest authors. The main user interaction field is the comment
. Cf. http://www.pi-news.net/leitlinien/ [accessed December , ]
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option underneath every article. PI News has moderators for com-
ment sections and claims not to publish comments that are offensive
or feature hate speech, political extremism, calls for violence, but also
mainstream or leftist ideology. The comment section is closed after
 hours following the publication of the article. A disclaimer under-
neath every comment section states that PI News is not responsible
for opinions of commenting users.
We can hence state that this news website cannot clearly be la-
beled as “alternative media” in the collaborative and utopian sense
of the word. It does not set up an alternative account as another
open perspective on the world. Although it is legitimized by an anti–
mainstream–media discourse, this discourse is ambiguous for two
reasons: First, as Sabine Schiffer () has shown for the islamophobic
ideology of PI News, the website often reveals perspectives that be-
long to the common ground in Germany’s public opinion. It does not
defend radical alternative ideas belonging to a minority. And second,
PI News entirely relies on news coverage from established media as a
base and reference for their articles (cf. Kimminich’s chapter in this
volume). PI News maintains a blurry relation of authentication to
the mainstream media — the quotations serve as authentication, but
also as alienation strategy. This dialectical relation between authen-
tication and alienation is the main feature of the website: It uses the
ambiguous reference to mainstream media as its main code text for
conspiratorial argumentation (cf. Kimminich’s chapter in this volume).
PI News is not presented as alternative to, but rather as corrective of
official media coverage.
This double strategy results in a decontextualization of original
media material (cf. Schiffer : ). Content is republished and
yet recontextualized on the blog website. Schiffer therefore speaks
of an aggregation of loose content. In doing so, the website avoids
explicit meanings and opinions. The explicit meaning of an article,
the construction of an enemy and of a general world view, is a result
of a structural synopsis by the reader. But technical infrastructure
provides a perceptual framework of meaning. For example, hyper-
links can add another meaning layer to a text (cf. ibid: ). Hence, a
hypothesis of the following analysis is that PI News uses a suggestive
technical infrastructure or suggestive technosemiotic framing in order
to stimulate a conspiratorial meaning.
Technological and Semiotic Code Structures of Conspiracist Thinking Online 
. From a reservoir of fragments to a mosaic of meaning
Processes of technosemiotic embedding and collective processing
are results of the technological mediality of websites like PI News.
Features of technological mediality influence the subjective making of
coherent meaning. Since most modern websites provide interactional
and collaborative elements as well as features for quick sharing and
dissemination of content, the interaction with the user, the embedding
of content into the code or “architecture” (cf. Lessig ) of the
website, and the medial contextualization of content increasingly
becomes an important component of meaning–making (cf. Erdmann
; De Ridder ).
First and foremost, PI News is a reservoir for content fragments
and for information bits (cf. Kimminich’s chapter in this volume). But
it provides a suggestive infrastructure relying on four technological–
pragmatic axes:
a) Multimodal and structural enhancement;
b) Hyperlinks as proofs and authentication;
c) User generated content and feedback via comments;
d) Intermedial performativity in Social Media.
In the following analysis of an exemplary article from PI News,
these different axes will be illustrated.
.. Multimodal and structural enhancement
The technological and narrative structure of the website permits users
to embed the article into a coherent world view with conspiratory
tendencies. The article taken as example is entitled “Merkel: Germa-
ny is an immigration country”. The textual information is dominated
by a photomontage that shows German chancellor Angela Merkel as
a clown. A brief summary of an article from well–known German
newspaper FAZ can be found below, in which Merkel points out that
Germany is an immigration country and needs immigrants as skilled
. http://www.pi-news.net///merkel--deutschland--ist--ein--einwanderungsland/
[accessed December , ].
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workers. Therefore, she argues, Germany must intensify its welco-
ming culture. The content of this article does not provide a clearly
negative statement; it is to be seen as a quasi–neutral news report. But:
Apart from this content, the article is tagged with the category “Bunte
Republik” (“colorful republic”). The keyword denounces the German
ideology of multiculturalism as a central national debate since the late
s. As the article is, via the website’s architecture, directly related
to the opener picture and the keyword “colorful republic”, its content
becomes part of Merkel’s general pro–migration- politics — and here
nonsense–politics.
The contextual multimodal information serves as a framework and
question mark — concepts such as “colorful republic” or “dhimmi-
tude” and other keywords are not explained on PI-News. Likewise,
photos, graphics, and montages on PI-news are mostly not concreti-
zed by a display title. Picture descriptions are a feature of common
newspapers and news websites. Those general concepts and pictures
function as structural elements — media contents are embedded into
the editorial policy or the code text of PI News and are assembled
within other articles that deal with the same subject. Furthermore,
the content of the article is framed in a suspicious perspective. Multi-
modal information and keytags add a meta–information that claims
a critical distance to the reported facts. It functions as an examina-
tion: Is this another step to Merkel’s pro–migration politics? Will she
continue this way? Are migrants an inherent part of German society?
Multimodal bits of information can also add another frame to the
text, as is the case for the referenced YouTube video at the end of this
article. This video, starring controversial German journalist Hendrik
M. Broder, states that Merkel prosecutes the extermination of the
German race and intensifies the migration to Germany. The video is
entitled “Government wants to eradicate Germans”.
The meaning of the article is thus not constituted on the content
level, but on its technosemiotic enhancement through embedded
multimodal content, the categorization that clearly criticizes a domi-
nant ideology of political class, and the general recontextualization
of an article originating from mainstream media within a website
. Cf. Video on YouTube “Regierung will Deutsche ausrotten”,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Afq_DZwUo [accessed December , ].
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that states to offer an alternative world view by debunking official
mainstream structures of meaning.
.. Hyperlinks as authentication and explanation
Whereas tag keywords and internal links have the function to struc-
ture and to integrate the article into the website’s existing content,
external links are used as authentication strategies. PI News constan-
tly avoids giving explicit political positions. Authentication via links
that refer to newspaper articles allows to combine a factual dimen-
sion (in the given example, the “excerpt from FAZ” proves the actual
position that Angela Merkel gave in an interview) with a critical deli-
mitation. Other external links (the embedded video) provide counter–
perspectives to the given content, prove that Merkel’s position is
wrong and part of the liquidation program of the German nation and
people.
.. User–generated content and feedback via comments
The article does not stand alone: It is enhanced by the inscription
of collective reading processes that can be found in the comments
section below the article: Readers propose a coherent interpretation
of the seemingly neutral article. Those comments tend to construct a
powerful small caste of politicians that make decisions ignoring the
needs and opinion of the people; others stress the GDR background
and thus totalitarian character of Merkel. In fact, those comments are
crammed with hate speech, clear enemy images and scapegoating.
Focused groups and persons are Ms. Merkel, the class of politicians,
but also “negroes” or “welfare scroungers”.
The comment section therefore becomes a strategic discursive
place where people add the missing explicit dimension by attribu-
ting their subjective meaning to the text. It is striking that the more
than + comments in the example are entirely homogeneous —
no alienated world view appears, no critical dimension against the
implemented code text of the article. Even though PI News claims not
to be responsible for the comments and their authors, apparently only
positive comments are allowed and a critical stance is not perceived
as a potential function of the comments section.
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We can therefore suppose that the visible positive orientation
of the comments is an important strategic part of the article page.
Comments help to frame the article while giving potential readings.
.. Intermedial performativity in Social Media
PI News does not only publish its articles on own blog websites, but
it also uses the possibly large scale of coverage that is inherent to
Social Network Sites (SNS’s) like Facebook (cf. boyd ). In SNS’s,
technosemiotic functions of meaning–making are multiplied: Users
dispose of a quasi–automatic, one–klick Like–button that not only
states individual appeal to a content, but also helps to generate public
exposure. Furthermore, content can also be disseminated to individual
user networks through the sharing option. In the example in question,
the Facebook–entry has been shared  times.
Like many collaborative website architectures, Facebook also pro-
vides a comment section below the published content, but comments
gain visibility differently than on PI News blog page: Comments that
receive more likes are to be seen as dominant interpretations of the
article and are therefore easily adopted. In a filtered “Top comment”
view of the comment section — the standard setting for Facebook
pages — most prominent comments are published on top. This in-
frastructural logic improves the visibility of prominent, shared and
most liked comments; a function that is not implemented on PI-news
blog website. In the example, those comments represent Merkel as
a betrayer of the German people (another Nazi term). On the SNS
page of PI News, comments are also strictly moderated. No alternative
or critical stance can be found, which is even more striking as the
network clearly not only consists of fans of PI News but also of many
critical opponents.
Their presence in Social Media is another axis for PI News’ sugge-
stive architecture. Although the Facebook page is not directly linked
on the original blog site, neither embedded via Facebook API web
interface, Facebook provides not only a large scale for their articles
(which are normally reposted on Facebook with the same pictures and
. Cf. https://www.facebook.com/PI-News-, Post from June, ,
:h [accessed December , ].
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links). The most important feature of Facebook is the creation of visi-
ble networks that congregate supporters of, for instance, anti-Islamic
conspiracist thinking (cf. Shooman ).
As for the comments on the website, it is an important part of
PI News’ discursive strategy to avoid a critical visibility on own pa-
ges. Webpage and Facebook page become a gathering space for an
imagined community (cf. boyd ) of critical supporters — a space
without interfering voices. This imagined community becomes visible
via Facebook’s Like and Share function. Liked articles and comments
not only stand out between other content on the page. Likes, shares,
and comments also flag content that is relevant to and constitutive for
the community. Via websites and Social Media accounts, communities
of CT thinking are build.
. Mediated framing and performed suspicion
We can conclude that technosemiotic enhancement and the engraving
of the following social communication and negotiation of meaning
have different purposes: First and foremost, those options help to
disseminate the content and broaden the visibility. But the article itself
does not provide an alternative perspective on the news content, and
hence cannot be labeled as a clear attribution of conspiracy or rather
a CT.
The technosemiotic functions on the level of the websites provide
junctures of existing alternative interpretations and world views. This
can be seen in an incorporation of mainstream news coverage into
the frame of an anti–mainstream website. Particular markers and
labels like the PI categories contribute to shaping the reading of the
given article. Furthermore, the exhibition of existing interpretations
to the content in the comment sections enables a guided lecture of the
content. By using Social Media, some readings are prominently expo-
sed and dominate the general possibility of alternative interpretations.
We can say that technosemiotic functions on the Internet as well as
collective reading establish a new “dominant cultural order” (Hall
) that restricts the possibilities of meaning–making by implicitly
offering structures of explanation and ready–made enemies.
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The semiotic and technical code structures of PI News create a
new genre of CT thinking. It suggests a critical perspective based on
CTs and populist argumentation. PI News must therefore be situated
as a first level of CT thinking, it contains traces of suggestive systems
and explanation models (Anton : ) that nevertheless remain
implicit. We thus have to deal with a second order of CT thinking:
Possible explanation structures are proposed but not concrete, they
are reinforced by user comments and technical embedding, but still
remain implicit.
We can therefore conclude that these medial genres of suggested
CT thinking transform the basic concept of suspicion that, according
to Meteling (), is an inherent feature of CTs: CTs generally at-
tribute signs and meanings to something that is typically invisible
and unordered. The attribution of a conspiracy in case of no visible
conspiracy implies a basic ground of suspicious thinking. Hence, the
CT assumes that the conspirators want to remain invisible and inac-
cessible (cf. ibid. ). CTs therefore develop a “complicated dialectics
of visibility and invisibility” ( ibid. ). They constantly avoid a clear
separation between reference and imagination.
Meteling suggests applying Roland Barthes’ notion of hermeneutic
code to CT texts. Hermeneutic codes are textual elements, where
a question that calls for a solution is articulated. Once the enigma
is established, the revelation of its truth becomes the final goal of
the text. That is why CTs mainly consist of a hermeneutic action
which finds solutions to detailed problems that constitute the narrative
background for every CT plot (Barthes ).
Considering again the website of PI News, we may conclude that
we cannot clearly speak of a hermeneutic code. Those corrective
news portals can be specified as rather factual discourse — there
is no oscillating interdependency between fiction and factuality —
excerpts of true news–coverage are presented as evidence for an initial
suspicion. But the underlying suspicion is never explicitly revealed. Or
to adapt Barthes’ terms: The solution and truth is supplied, but the
enigma is missing.
Thus, we must deal with an invisible and inherent, performed
suspicion. The attribution of given explanations to an initial suspicion
is performed by the reader. PI News, as well as other populist news
portals, only provides connection points between news content and
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CT models of world views. Suspicion, as the underlying code text of
every CT, only becomes visible when readers provide written records
of their attribution. Comments and technological features of Social
Network Sites (likes, shares) are a means for reporting this reverse act
of meaning–making.
In the realm of existing nationalist or islamophobic CTs which state
the dominance of either Muslims or migrants in western countries
(with the help of local governments, media, and industry), websites
like PI News hold an important linking function. They generate new
publicity and followers, they provide a technical infrastructure to com-
bine different news articles, and hence create a condensed network of
meaning without providing explicit positions. They serve as frames
for and starting points of CT thinking.
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Always the Same Old Conspiracy Story
On Jürgen Elsässer’s Narrative Voyage from Left to Right
A D´, S H*
 : Sempre la stessa vecchia teoria del complotto: sul viaggio
narrativo di Jürgen Elsässer dalla destra alla sinistra
: The recently rising influx of refugees to Germany contributes to
fuel fears among conservatives that migrants might change the cultural
make–up of the country. This has opened up opportunities for certain
individuals to spread, about migrants, xenophobic conspiracy theories
that extremists then use to justify violence. The essay contends that
these narrations are dangerous, for they create and/or reinforce enemy
images of migrants and spread racist thought and action. By employing
Mari-Liis Madisson’s semiotic model of how conspiracy theories create
meaning, the article focuses on the case of one public figure producing
such rhetoric: Jürgen Elsässer. Three of Elsässer’s texts stemming from
different social contexts are cross–examined: one from his leftist past and
two right–wing texts from his more recent PEGIDA-allegiance. Elsässer
easily interweaves facts and public fears so as to create conspiracy theo-
ries, which in the past were about an alleged neofascist Germanization
of Europe and more recently focus on the presumed threat of Islamiza-
tion and Americanization of the continent. The article shows how an
author of conspiracy discourse can deliver fuel for public fears through
a cunning rhetoric, which retains conspiratorial narrative patterns and
concurrently obscure the author’s shift of political allegiances.
: Conspiracy Theories; Germany; Jürgen Elsässer; Right-Wing;
Left-Wing.
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. Introduction
We are experiencing a surge in conspiracy theories (further: CTs).
They have a certain appeal to us in their ability to seemingly explain
away all the evils of this world by employing simple to digest theories
and remedies. While at times ridiculous and harmless, very often
they are the motor of negative change in society, taking any form
from xenophobic hate speech to legitimization for wars and ethnic
cleansing. It is of no surprise then that certain individuals might
take the opportunity to use CTs and their popularity in order to
push their personal agendas. While this article is too short to prove
the real intention behind CT authorship, it will at least showcase
German publicist and agitator Jürgen Elsässer’s voyage from the
far left to the far right of the political spectrum over the course of
over  years. After a brief theoretical introduction to CTs (.) and
our approach (.), we analyze three of his texts (.) in their social
context and how his conspiracy–theoretical rhetoric both retains
narrative constants and changes according to context and audience.
The uniting characteristic of the three texts is that within all of
them Elsässer constructs an imminent threat to Europe’s identity
by an inside or outside enemy, through either a Germanization,
Islamization, or Americanization.
. Conspiracy Theories
CTs are a form of interpretative pattern which in times of inexplicable
change or catastrophes may offer simple solutions (Reinalter ff ).
Kimminich defines a CT’s meaning as a mainly “communicative phe-
nomenon”, which results from an increasing “individualization of our
society [while] the interpretation authority on official interpretation
content has increasingly been dissolved” (cf. Kimminich , in this
volume). CTs have to be analyzed by taking into consideration societal
context, as well as the interrelations to other prevailing interpretations.
They are not the same as conspiracies. The term theory is misleading,
as these possible musings on conspiracies are not theories in a scienti-
fic sense, grounded in worthwhile evidence or sound conclusions. At
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least some aspects of their argument are either at fault with evidence
or logic (Reinalter f ).
In CTs, various scientific and other forms of knowledge are in-
terwoven. CTs about e.g. the Jewish people require an extensive kno-
wledge in history or various social sciences in order to be disproved.
Furthermore, unmasking CTs requires an additional awareness about
cultural stereotypes and enemy images that have existed for a long
time and do not necessarily constitute factual knowledge (cf. Hubes).
We do not think that validity is of no concern to us, especially since
CTs sometimes have a harmful effect on society, yet we acknowledge
that the fact–checking is best left to the experts of the particular
field. In the past, there have been scores of examples for reports and
narratives, that had been labeled CTs to stifle criticism, which have
eventually proven to be true, such as e.g. the Watergate affair (cf.
Norton et al. –). As CTs are “systems of collective imagination”
(Groh as qtd. by Schönemann ) which always emphasize the hidden
secret behind the official story, they are often reluctant to deal with
criticism — depending on the conspiracy theorist’s rhetoric. Proving
said CTs wrong is thus often a futile endeavor (ibid.). What we can
do however, is to analyze the construction of CTs as interpretative
patterns. Inspired by both semiotics and sociology of knowledge, the
imperative of CTs will here be seen as “shifting perception of social
realities” and modifying the evaluation of events to “suit the recipient
of the message — so that [they] can [be incorporated] [. . . ] into the
propagated conspiratorial perception pattern” (Kimminich , in this
volume).
Conspiratorial narratives have existed throughout history and some
of the first systemic examples of widely–adopted CTs within medieval
Europe include the anti–semitic assumption of conspiracy by Jews (cf.
Anton –) as well as the witch hunts (cf. Schönemann f ).
Such narrations have enjoyed a growing popularity throughout the
th century, defying the results of an increase in education, political
emancipation and democratization, and may occur in religious world
. The confusion in terms here lies in the layman understanding of the word theory. Cf.
Reinalter (–) for a detailed examination of the terms theory and CT, as well as alternative
terms, i.e. conspiracy hypothesis, mythos or ideology. For the sake of recognizability, we
will stick to using CT.
. As proposed by Sociology of Knowledge (Cf. Anton –).
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views, as well as secularized ones. Witch hunts are still an existing
metaphor for improper trials, which may have resulted from CTs.
The Red Scare for instance resembled its medieval role model, yet
occurred within an enlightened and relatively secular modern society
(Norton et al. –; Jaworski ).
One reason for such a pervasive upsurge in CTs is the fact that real
government conspiracies have come to light — such as with the afore-
mentioned Watergate example. Another factor are the oversimplified
accounts of complex social phenomena in mass media, which are also
helping the creation of hastened conclusions ( Jaworski f ). This lack
of information and trusted sources meets with the new abundance
of information on the Internet, which has consequently shattered
the usually state, media or university bound privilege of knowledge
generation. This breeds skepticism and makes CTs more visible, while
at the same time opening them for public criticism.
We agree with Jaworski (ff ) that CTs are not just paranoia, even
though there seem to be psychological predispositions for CTs. Ho-
wever, psychology strictly differentiates between paranoia and CTs,
with the former being a symptom of mental illness (ibid.). One pro-
blem with pathologizing CTs is the possible dismissal of CTs as pa-
ranoid fabrications without their proper discourse or analysis. It is
counter–productive, as the conspiracy theorist is left with their CT
unchallenged and it is scientifically sloppy, since only a psychologist
or similar expert should diagnose paranoia.
As Shermer suggests, our evolved tribal tendencies of the past
make us «form coalitions with like–minded members of our group
and [. . . ] demonize others who hold differing beliefs» ().
Hebenstreit expands on similar observations of in–group vs out–
group creation, whereby in terms of complex social paradigms human
beings transfer this need of knowing who is in- and who is outside
onto today’s vastly more heterogeneous social groups ( ff ). And
while this process might have seemed failsafe once, it became faultier
in a more diversified society. The stranger thus became an easy scape-
goat. This shows how CTs are not just harmless fantasies, but can also
employ social actors with considerable political force.
. The entire campaign of the Bush administration preceding the Iraq-War was tech-
nically speaking an unfounded CT backed up by massive propaganda, resulting in the loss
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Philosophically, this in–group/out–group approach can be traced
back to the manichean schemata of good vs. evil found in the Abra-
hamic religious tradition (Groh ff ), — whereby the in–group is
automatically assumed as being good and the negative features are pro-
jected onto the out–group. It may be used to improve the self–image
of the own group. The metaphysical tradition of lore and religion also
allows one to assign even supernatural attributes to the enemy image.
Additionally, said manichean world view of good and evil entails the
solace that no world event can be a product of randomness (ibid ;
Reinalter f ). As factual knowledge is lacking and events become too
complex to fathom, this can be a reassuring mechanism. The bogey-
man created by said in and outgrouping is seen as the perpetrator
of the CT and can stem from a wide range of subjects from ethnic
groups to extraterrestrial beings.
In conclusion, it can be said that CTs exist in vast varieties and may
range from very simple to rather complex (cf. Pipes –).
. Madisson’s Semiotic Model of How Conspiracy Theories Crea-
te Meaning
Madisson (–) makes use of semiotic conceptualizations to de-
velop an encompassing model which explains the way conspiracy
theories create meaning. She sets out from Yuri Lotman’s two ca-
tegorical modes of consciousness, the mythological and the non–
mythological/descriptive one, which are both combined within con-
spiracy theories. The first one perceives the world binarily as one
of allies and enemies, good and evil, order and chaos, etc., while
the second one sees the world as very coherent and applies over–
deterministic models of causation wherein everything is causally con-
nected and both Self and Other are clearly structured. These two
inherently contradictory modes of how meaning is created can coexi-
of innocent lives and political chaos (cf. Goodman ).
. In one super conspiracy for instance, alien lizards, the Queen and Nazis are hidden
on the Moon and woven into a vast network of conspirators with a complicated set of
goals. This is the actual CT of the documentary Mondverschwörung (Frickel ).
. Other semiotic approaches to CTs have been developed by Cobley , Fenster
 & Hubbes .
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st within a given conspiracy theory since they are bound together by
a specific code–text, i.e. a meta–narrative of how certain evil groups
conspire against the innocent Self (cf. ibid. ff ).
.. The Code-Text as Organizing Principle for Conspiracy Theories
According to Yuri Lotman, the core narrative or code–text of a CT is
a particular «textual system with a rigid syntactic order [. . . ] [inclu-
ding] various sub–structures» (qtd. in Madisson ). It bears universal
features which show up in any given conspiracy theory and always
«tells the story about evil lurking behind particular events, while its
constituent parts, such as the delineation of the specificity of the ene-
my, the connections of particular events with other events, outlines of
the victims etc.» can stem from very different sources and cognitive
paradigms (ibid. ).
Thus, even highly contradictory elements and discourse fragments
can be combined through the code–text. For instance mythological
homomorphism on the one hand, i.e. the assumption that the root
cause of evil of the conspirers is visible at all levels and behind any
event, person, organization etc. is merged with descriptive relations,
such as cause and effect, chronology etc. on the other. Such a code–
text has to be in line with the cultural memory of a given society to
be accepted as valid and enables its adherents to apply it “without
much reflection to any given confusing event” (ibid. ). Madisson
builds on Lotman and makes out the two modes of signification, or
meaning–creation which are always at work within CTs with the
conspirers being seen as evil and their deeds always being perceived
as systematic (see fig.  for a visual representation). Such a delineation
of the enemy is always a central part of every conspiracy theory and
also functions according to the two logics.
.. The Mythological Mode of Signification and the Enemy as Non–own
According to Lotman, an atmosphere of distress and fear causes the
habitual patterns of thinking and perception to not function properly
and archaic models of consciousness reawaken. Mythological con-
sciousness is usually found within non–literary, oral cultures, where
everything that is known is tied to a sacral order recounted in a global
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metanarrative of a binary world of good vs. evil, friends vs. foes etc.
Chance, coincidence or diverse reasoning do not exist in this mode of
thinking, since everything is seen to happen for one singular reason:
the eternal fight between good and evil. This quasi–religious world
view enables its believers to immediately recognize new events as part
of the sacral metatext. This type of thinking is semantic, i.e. everything
carries meaning and the closer an event is to the core narrative the
higher it is in the hierarchy of signification (cf. ibid. ff ).
The enemy image as non–own is directly derived from this archaic
mythological type of thinking, which always dominates the CT di-
scourse in acute crisis, when its adherents are still very much under
shock and in fear and their emotions have not yet been tied to a
clear collective, descriptive narrative. At this point in time, the culture
“requires non–structures, an unordered, chaotic outside in order to
function” (ibid. ). This enemy as a non–own is constructed as the
Other with which the Self shares no common features at all and there
is no shared language to even describe the two realms. Accordingly,
this mythological enemy image is anti–individualist, meaning that any
single actor within the larger group of conspirers is always seen as
only representing the attributes of the larger collective. By perceiving
the outside as chaotic and illegitimate, the culture perceives itself as
well ordered and legitimate (cf. ibid. f.)
.. The Descriptive Mode of Signification and the Enemy as Anti–own
The descriptive mode of signification is tied to the non–mythological
consciousness which according to Lotman is based on a hierarchy
of different signs and language systems, such as «cause and effect,
chronology and logic, etc.» (ibid. ).
The explanations within this mode are very much based on highly
systematic and complex arguments and are very over–deterministic
with no room for chance. According to the pars pro toto logic, here
even the smallest of details is perceived as an essential part of the
grand scheme. One part of this logic of signification is that often times
a pseudo–scientific language, as well as ways of proving and arguing
are employed. Evidence is presented, commonsensical explanations
are disproven, predictions are made, and statistics are given, bibliogra-
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Figure . Visual schema of Madisson’s model of CT meaning creation.
phical remarks are made, etc. However, the conditions under which
the CT would be falsifiable are never named.
The enemy image corresponding to this type of meaning creation
is that of the enemy as anti–own, with the enemy being perceived
as a hierarchically ordered system of various subgroups, which all
fulfill specific tasks within the larger plot. The structuring principles
of the anti–own are perceived to be the exact reverse image of those
governing the Self. Also, the enemies are often times perceived as
omnipotent and amoral superheroes, who are rational and effective
and believed to have infiltrated the highest governing institutions of
the Self, having used brainwashing techniques on most of the people
(cf. ibid. ).
The mythological and descriptive mode of meaning creation and
their corresponding enemy images are inherently contradictive, but
narratively bound together by the code–text of the CT. This theore-
tical model will serve for and structure the analysis of the different
conspiracy theoretical texts by Jürgen Elsässer in chapter .
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. Analyses
.. Jürgen Elsässer
Jürgen Elsässer was formerly known as a journalist for various lefti-
st print and online media, such as Konkret, Junge Welt, Allgemeine
jüdische Wochenzeitung et al. (“Zur Person Jürgen Elsässer”). After
initiating a so called National Front (Volksfront) against the “Anglo-
American financial capital” in , his contract with the socialist daily
newspaper Neues Deutschland was cancelled (“In eigener Sache”).
Since then, he has sided with the political right (Radke, “Bewundern,
leugnen, abstreiten. . . ”) while claiming to gather critical citizens re-
gardless of political affiliation (COMPACTTV, “Jürgen Elsässer am .
Mai  in Berlin”). He concurrently started publishing the Compact
series of books, which expanded into a magazine in  (“Zur Per-
son Jürgen Elsässer”). The magazine presents alternative theories to
current events — we deem many of these theories to be CTs. Throu-
ghout his publishing career he has equally sided with different political
movements and before analyzing the three texts in the following we
situate them in the respective social context.
.. Case  (): Elsässer, the Anti-German Movement and the “Germani-
zation of Europe”
During the s, Elsässer was one of the earliest proponents of the
Anti-German movement, a leftist current by self–definition, which
sees German nationalism as inherently evil and the American and
Israeli nations as good. The Anti-Germans derive the core of their
world–view from the German guilt regarding World War II and the
Holocaust atrocities. With their slogan “Germany never again” their
demands include splitting up Germany as far as possible, getting rid of
German nationalism and standing in complete solidarity to Israel and
its protector, the USA. They therefore neither have an encompassing
systemic critique of capitalism, nor nationalism at their intellectual
base, but a clear black and white scheme of good Allied Forces vs. evil
German nationhood (Van Hüllen; James).
Within the book Had the Führer Lived to See This (ff ), published
by the Anti-German magazine konkret, Elsässer lays out a conspiracy
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narrative about the Germanization of Europe in an article carrying
the same title. He sketches out part of the code–text within the first
sentence of the article: «German foreign policy has, since the times
of the German Kaiserreich, followed two lines [. . . ]: The first line
is that of an economic interpenetration of Europe, the other is one
of territorial annexation» (ibid. ). According to Elsässer, these two
mechanisms are in the interest of the evil conspirers, i.e. the German
capital and work consecutively. This means that if economic interpe-
netration does not work, annexation through force will be carried
out.
... Mythological Logic, Cultural Memory and Enemy as Non–own
According to the anti–individualist orientation of the mythological
logic of signification (cf. Madisson –), Elsässer fleshes out this
narrative by simply equating different groups of alleged conspirers
with one another. Claiming that the first line of economic interpene-
tration has been «embodied during World War I by politicians like
Naumann, later Stresemann, till [German] reunification Genscher»
(ibid. ), Elsässer introduces the new narrative with an invitation
to re–evaluate German history. He also invites the reader to adhere
to the new narrative by alluding to cultural memory and equating
current politicians with the Nazis in an anti–individualist manner,
diminishing differences between the perceived conspiring groups:
«The [nd] strategy of annexation was pursued by politicians such as
Ludendorff [. . . ] later it was the Nazis, today it is the German national
current in and outside the CDU/CSU».
... Descriptive Logic and the Enemy as Anti–own
The descriptive logic prevails within this text, as Elsässer clearly por-
trays the conspirers as a hierarchically ordered group with different
subunits and specific tasks according to the two lines of firstly econo-
mic interpenetration and secondly annexation. The politicians carry-
ing out the first line of foreign policy are acting in the interest of the
German capital «able to compete globally, e.g. during the Weimar era
the electronics and chemical industries» ( ibid. ). The second line is
determined by the string pullers as the German capital “not able to
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compete [globally], the heavy industries, which would have lost out
against competition in case of further free trade policies”. By making
out these different strategies and subunits of the Other as anti–own,
Elsässer reaffirms the code–text and establishes pseudo–causal con-
nections by employing the language systems of logic, causality and
chronology.
Within the book, he also constructs a clear in–group of the Anti-
German movement, calling for a «small radical minority [and] diffe-
rent forms of action» (ibid. ) and closes the article calling the reader
to acknowledge the urgency of the narrative with a clear scenario of
an immediate military danger for Europe: «Meaning either Europe
will be tailored according to German interests — or we will try again
what we have tried between  and » (ibid. ).
.. Case  (): Elsässer, PEGIDA and the “Islamization of Europe”
PEGIDA is a registered NGO and the German acronym for the Pa-
triotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident, which also
spells its main goal (“PEGIDA Facebook Page”). In just a few months,
they gathered thousands of supporters, while inspiring rallies under
similar names in other German cities (Baumgärtner, “The End of
Tolerance? Anti-Muslim Movement Rattles Germany.”). Some of its
supporters commit violent outbursts mainly against refugee housing.
PEGIDA however claims to oppose only extremism in Islam, not the
religion itself (“PEGIDA Facebook Page”). Even if it is not always
openly advocating right–wing extremism, it certainly stands to rea-
son that PEGIDA attracts proponents of it (Kauschke, “Noch besteht
Gefahr”).
The connection to PEGIDA will be shown on Elsässer’s article
published in his own magazine Compact (“Terror Target Europe”
–; “Blood Trail to London” –) on the Charlie Hebdo attacks
(further: the Attacks). It stipulates that Anglo-American and Islamist
forces jointly conspire against European nations. This code–text is
a structuring framework for the whole article and already named
within the title and subtitle:
Terror Target Europe — The Paris attacks make it clear that the War has
arrived from the Middle East right at our doorstep. The dark spawns of
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Islamism, supported by the Anglo-American secret services, threaten not
only France (ibid ).
The US and UK governments and their secret services supposedly
ordered the terrorist act to undermine sovereign nationhood and fur-
ther weaken Europe in the global struggle for power by a continuous
Islamization. Thereby, Elsässer ideologically aligns himself with PEGI-
DA — indirectly inviting the reader into the in–group. The code–text
is later formulated as rhetorical questions, with which he lures readers
into adhering to the CT, making them think they had arrived at con-
clusions themselves and additionally preventing accusations of false
claims (ibid. ).
... Mythological Logic and Enemy as Non–own
Christian references of evil are used to describe the enemy, naming
the attackers the «most sinister spawns of Islamism, supported by
the Anglo-American secret services» (ibid. ), or «the most sinister
spawns of Sunnism» (ibid. ), and Elsässer thereby combines different
conspirer modules. Old fears of historic enemy images are projected
onto the new conspirators, speaking of the Muslim Brotherhood,
«whose interweaving and claims of world domination more or less
parallels those of the Communist International» (ibid. ).
Within the last subtitle The Patriots’ Moment Elsässer alludes to
the in–group PEGIDA as a resistance to what Elsässer metaphorically
calls the Ancien Régime, thereby assigning the movement the role of
the French Revolution (ibid. , ).
... Descriptive Logic and Enemy as Anti–own
The code–text claims the Anglo-American commanders of the at-
tack profit from Europe’s Islamization, since the continent is thereby
eliminated as a global competitor. The Islamists also benefit by gai-
ning control of the continent. An enemy image is thus constructed
wherein the conspirators are depicted as a hierarchically structured
collective (cf. Madisson , Schönemann ). Elsässer employs
e.g. simple parent–child–metaphors to portray these relations bet-
ween Anglo-American forces and Islamist groups: «Suddenly, the US-
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administration didn’t have to feed up small Sunni groups as partners»;
«IS is a foster child of US secret services» (“Terror Target Europe” ).
In the same issue another article shows this hierarchy through
image layout. On two consecutive pages (“Blood Trail to London” f )
photos of James Bond and the MI headquarters fill the upper third of
the page, while smaller images are placed below these in the margins,
depicting the perpetrators’ Islamist accomplices (see last paragraph of
this subsection).
The James Bond movie Skyfall stands for the corruption of British
secret services, whereas their headquarters on top of the page are
accompanied by a photo of the hate preacher and alleged MI protégé
Abu Hamza with the caption: «The two preachers of hatred were
protected by the MI for over a decade» (ibid).
In line with the logic of pars pro toto, the two main collectives,
Anglo-Americans and Islamists alike, are purposefully left open to
achieve interpretive flexibility. An exaggerated stereotyping is used,
for example when describing the attackers as a personification of all
Muslims or all Sunnis: «It cannot be refuted: the killers were Muslims»
(ibid. ). Sunnism is thus simply equated with Wahhabism and Salafi-
sm (ibid. ). With a multitude of personified sub–collectives of the
conspirators, Elsässer paints a coherent picture of a logistically and
organizationally overpowering enemy by equating amongst others:
American imperialism, Barack Obama, US administration, Great Bri-
tain, NATO, US imperialism, MI, MI, CIA, or: Brothers Kouachi, Al
Qaida, jihadists, Sunni brothers, Islamists, convicted terrorists, IS, etc.
.. Case  (): Elsässer, the “Americanization, Israelization and Islami-
zation of Europe”
In a speech which Elsässer gave on May th  (COMPACTTV, “Jür-
gen Elsässer am . Mai  in Berlin”) in front of a right–wing protest
entitled “Together for Germany” (Duwe, “Reichsbürger scheitern
beim Sturm auf den Reichstag”), he combines many of his earlier
CT modules into an eclectic grand narrative to be able to court both
PEGIDA, as well as the newly established PEGADA (Patriotic Euro-
peans against the Americanization of the Occident). The concrete
social context here is that of a Neo-Nazi/Reichsbürger movement, a
xenophobic conspiracy theoretical following, claiming that Germany
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has been under occupation since World War II by the Allied Forces,
as there has never been a formal peace treaty. Additionally, the basic
constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany is believed to
be not valid, but actually the constitution of the German Reich of the
Pre-Nazi era should still be so, since it was never formally abolished.
Also, there is the claim that the Federal Republic of Germany is no-
thing but a private enterprise, which is being controlled mainly by the
US government.
The larger code–text which Elsässer lays out throughout the long
speech is that the USA and its many institutions and agents, Western
and Islamist forces and the German government, conspire against a
patriotic self–determination and the union of the German and Russian
people by keeping Germany an occupied country and causing an Isla-
mization, an Israelization and first and foremost an Americanization
of Europe.
... Mythological Logic, and the Enemies as Non–own
The way Elsässer constructs the mythological meaning of the larger
CT within this speech is by employing various CT modules which ea-
sily link with cultural memory. One example for this is an equation of
modern day surveillance with National Socialist dictatorial control of
the German people. He depicts the enemy–images as homomorphic
resemblances: «[T]he new NS dictatorship is the NSA dictatorship»
(COMPACTTV, “Jürgen Elsässer am . Mai  in Berlin”). He also
employs the imagery of a monstrous kraken to stress their overwhel-
ming power: «This kraken has the planet in its grip with the help of
Google and other Internet giants and prepares it for the blows of the
American military» (ibid.). Equally, Elsässer restates the well known Fe-
deral Reserve Bank (Fed) module wherein all imperial actions by the
US are reduced to the makings of the Fed, personifying the evil. This
oversimplified, agency–based reasoning neglects any systemic and
structural understandings of reality: « [. . . ] the great financiers of
Wall Street united to bring a paper money monster into life, without a
productive basis, only able to survive through theft of resources from
independent states anywhere in the world. And those who oppose
this monster will be covered with war. It has been like this for a 
years» (ibid.).
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... Descriptive Logic and the Enemy as Anti–own
Again, in line with the descriptive logic of signification, Elsässer depicts
the conspirers as different subgroups which fulfill specific tasks and
stand in a clear hierarchy: «We will not stand by and observe how our
Shotgun Uschi [German Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen]
is once again sending our sons and daughters to Stalingrad to die
there, this time as ordered by Monsanto and Exxon for the profits of
American genetics and oil industries». In this speech,  years after
the first case was published, Elsässer reverses the roles and names the
American capital as the string pullers, while depicting German capital
as inherently good and victimized.
The in–group and mission statement he constructs complete the
CT-imagery and are used to frame the whole speech including an
immense variety of allusions to popular phrases: «My name is Jürgen
Elsässer and my target group is the nation. My goal is a national front,
we can also call it Querfront [third position politics], as it should
represent the cross section of the populace [. . . ] all united for national
sovereignty of Germany, our traditions and peace [. . . ] against the cold
war, the sanctions and for a new friendship of Berlin and Moscow».
(ibid.) And he closes his speech by again appealing to all European
nations and by indirectly alluding to the Communist Manifesto’s
famous finishing line: «Nations on an eye to eye level, from Lisbon to
Vladivostok. Patriots of all countries and religions: unite! We are the
people! We are strong and we will come back!» (ibid.).
. Conclusion
A wide variety of conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of
these diverse examples. Even though Elsässer went from one end
of the political spectrum to the other throughout the decades, his
narrative structures remain very similar. He always adheres to a clearly
conspiracy–theoretical world–view with imminent threats to Europe,
explicit enemy images and precise mission statements of having to
overcome and eliminate the different groups of conspirers.
While in the first example the danger stems from a dawning Ger-
manization of Europe with the evil German capital controlling Ger-
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man politicians, the second example evokes an impending Islami-
zation caused by the Anglo-American string–pullers controlling the
Islamists. Finally, within the third case the major threat stems from
an Americanization, Israelization and Islamization of Europe with
financial and US capital behind the transatlantic powers, who control
the German government, the Anti–fascist movement, etc. What uni-
tes these different CT discourses is their decisive agency–theoretical
orientation with no room for systemic understandings of capitalism
or structural analyses. They also share absolute social categories of
good vs. evil with no further distinctions. Equally, Nazi references
to delegitimize the political opponent remain a recurrent theme th-
roughout the years, as do Islamophobic tendencies, which unite the
three social contexts of the narratives from the Anti-Germans to the
Pegida and neo-Nazi crowd.
While the narrative structures are very similar, the rhetoric does
change. This in turn can be attributed to a radicalization on Elsässer’s
part on the one hand, with him employing many more tropes and
mythological enemy–images in the later cases. On the other hand,
social and media context surely play an additional role in determining
the form and style of the presented CTs. The first example remains
pseudo–scientific while being published in a leftist–intellectual con-
text, the second one — published in Elsässer’s right–wing populist
magazine Compact — is already a lot more lurid in its forms of expres-
sion. The final case of his speech in front of a neo-Nazi/Reichsbürger
crowd exceeds the other two concerning the ubiquity of mythical
enemy images and metaphors. It is also characterized by an abun-
dance of conspiracy theoretical fragments being combined into one
grand scheme. Thus, the dualistic world–view, which is a clear sign
of radical CTs, is central in all three cases, proving that conspiracy
theoretical elements are interchangeable and the overall narrative
structure is thus highly adaptive to actually changing realities as long
as the basic narration of conspiracy remains the same.
Furthermore, in the context of rising violence and radicalization
of Germany’s right wing movements, the danger of such CTs cannot
be understated. The task of deconstructing and countering narrations
with such dualistic world–views and enemy images remains a central
task for societal forces and academia alike.
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NWO Conspiracy Theory
A Key Frame in Online Communication of the Estonian Extreme Right
M-L M*
 : Teorie del complotto nel New World Order: un quadro–
chiave nella comunicazione online dell’estrema destra estone
: The essay concentrates on NWO conspiracy theories, a fra-
mework that, to members of extreme right online communities, has
become a very influential tool for mapping social reality. Extreme right
NWO narratives represent a decadent world, in which the malicious
structures of the élite secretly undermine the nation states, the white
race, traditional gender roles, etc., in order to retard people’s “natural”
values and ability for critical thinking and to subjugate them under
the élite’s global totalitarian regime. The viability of NWO conspira-
cy theories is guaranteed by their high capacity for semiotic modeling.
The framework of NWO allows interpreters to depict their ideological
opponents (e.g., political establishments, minority groups, mainstream
media) as malevolent or, at least, as ignorant forces manipulated by con-
spirators. At the same time, it is a tool by which extreme rightists can
identify themselves as moral and sagacious. The essay aims to explicate
how NWO conspiracy theories are constructed in online environments.
Besides a theoretical explanation, it provides examples that illustrate
central NWO frames, which currently proliferate in the online network
of the Estonian extreme right. The essay also shows how the NWO
framework enables individuals to connect seemingly incompatible or
even controversial discourses and signifiers into a single syncretic in-
terpretation. In order to explain these positions, the essay relies on Juri
Lotman´s concept of code–text and on Mary-Laure Ryan’s framework
of hypermedia narrative.
: New World Order (NWO); Conspiracy Theory; Online Commu-
nication; Estonian Extreme Right; Hypermedia Narrative; Code-Text.
∗ Mari-Liis Madisson, University of Tartu.
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. Introduction
Many researchers have outlined that the online environment is key
to survival of extreme right ideas in a post–war era where liberal
democratic worldviews and the protection of the rights of minorities
have become socio–cultural norms (Castells , p. ; Daniels ,
pp. –; Kaplan et. al , pp. –). Vernacular online com-
munities, based on similar worldviews, can operate as polarization
machines because they help to confirm and thus amplify people’s
antecedent views (Sunstein , p. ). Generally, extreme right
grassroots–networks do not have the ambition to develop into revolu-
tionary mass movements which will have the goal of systematically
undermining the ruling structures (Griffin , pp. –). Extreme
right networks may offer ready–made solutions and narrative frames
for particular individuals «in search of grand narratives and total truths
by transforming ill–defined resentments and hatreds into a personal
sense of higher mission to “do something about it”» (Griffin , p.
). One central frame of interpretation that dominates in extreme
right grassroots communities is the narrative of New World Order
(NWO) conspiracy.
The aim of this study is to explicate the logic of the construction
of NWO interpretations from the point of view of cultural semiotics.
It is important to note that this approach does not have the purpo-
se of resolving the existence of particular conspiracies nor does it
aim to judge the adequacy and validity of particular interpretations
of social reality. Also, the perspective of cultural semiotics does not
imply appraising conspiracy theory as a beneficial or harmful cultural
phenomenon; it rather treats it as a specific organization of infor-
. This work was supported by the IUT–, Marie Curie International Research
Staff Exchange Scheme Fellowship within the th European Community Framework
Programme (EU-PREACC project) and PUT.
. It is important to stress that NWO conspiracy theories do not proliferate only in
extreme right networks, there exists numerous versions of NWO theories articulated by
left wing extremists or by interpreters who do not accentuate their political agendas at
all. This article however, concentrates on NWO conspiracy theories that are articulated in
extreme right online communication.
. Both trends are present in academic research on conspiracy theories: many authors
treat conspiracy theory as paranoid style e.g. an inadequate or irrational, sometimes even
pathological practice of interpretation (see Hofstadter , Pipes ; Popper ; Sho-
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mation. The object of cultural semiotics is the functional correlation
of different sign systems (Ivanov et. al , p ) and the goal of its
studies is to explain how different sign systems model reality and how
they co–function. It is important to stress that cultural semiotics is
not interested in reality in its entire diversity but rather in sign–based
models of this reality; and in most of the cases those models tend to
be simplifying (M. Lotman , pp. –). This study approaches
conspiracy theory as a specific model or interpretational frame of
social reality that treats various (unpleasant) events or phenomena
as “the result of a group of people acting in secret to nefarious end”
(Birchall , p. ).
This article focuses on the semiotic mechanisms that function as
a basis for constructing the NWO explanatory frame, widespread in
extreme right communities, which depicts the systemic eradication
program of the white race, nation states, traditional family, etc. Those
frames are noteworthy because of their ability to connect seemingly
incompatible or even controversial discourses and signifiers into a
single syncretic interpretation. This study also explains an at first sight
paradoxical situation that in vernacular online communities where
text–creation is significantly influenced by the interactive participa-
tion of multiple authors and the plurality of different hypertextual
threads; predictable and rigid tendencies of interpretation still tend
to dominate. Besides explicating the general semiotic logic of NWO
interpretations this article maps some of the central topics of meaning
making processes in the online communication of the Estonian extre-
me right. The examples of NWO conspiracy theories were selected
during non–participatory observation in the Estonian extreme right
network, performed from September  to the end of April .
Taking into account the number of visits, activeness and the con-
centration NWO ideas, I analyzed content from the following blogs:
Rahvuslane [The Nationalist]; NS blogi [NS blog]; EESTI RAHVU-
walter ; Wood ). The opposite approach attributes to conspiracy theory a certain
legitimacy as a countercultural discourse. Conspiracy theory is understood as a framework
which enables individuals to facilitate constructive and democratically transparent commu-
nication and articulate one´s doubts about dominant institutions and regimes of truth (see
Birchall ; Bratich ; Dean ).
. http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com/.
. http://staap.wordpress.com/, since summer  available at new address
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SLIK BLOG [Estonian Nationalist Blog]; and social media groups
Eesti Käkkikeerajate Liit and [The Union of Estonian Skulduggers]
and Vabamõtleja [The Freethinker].
. Conspiracy theory as a frame of extreme right meaning crea-
tion
Umberto Eco has argued that in many cases the extreme right world-
view is based on an obsessive idea of international conspiracy. Extreme
rightists are often preoccupied with the idea that they are surrounded
by hostile forces but they also worry about the expansion of those for-
ces into inner–structures (Eco , p. ). Conspiracy theory is a quite
handy rhetorical tool for rationalizing the extreme right worldview
for its believers but also for other people. It gives extreme rightists a
chance to translate their feelings of intolerance, fear, anger and moral
superiority that exist mainly at the level of essential conviction into
a more tangible and explicit language that is transferable also to the
others. Juri Lotman has pointed out that the processes of articulating
cultural fears are classically characterized by: ( ) an idea that the ma-
jority is endangered by some minority; and () that the minority can
accomplish its malicious plans by communicating in a covert way, by
using secret codes (Lotman , pp. –). Conspiracy theory con-
nects the idea of decadent forces, acting in secret, with timely topics
and actual (unpleasant) events. Lotman (, p. ) has outlined that
the main feature of conspiracy is that the majority is personified in
the figure of a helpless child who is a victim of dangerous enemies.
Sketching an immoral, malignant and very powerful enemy, acting
undercover, makes it possible to present the interpreter´ s own views
as something ethical, transparent and justified. On the other hand, it
also the allows explanation of why the attempts of extreme rightists
to turn the world back to the course of “truth” and “morality” are
constantly failing.
http://koobas.net/
. http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com
. https://www.facebook.com/EKKL.org
. https://www.facebook.com/vabamotleja
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Conspiracy theories, articulated by the extreme right, usually fit
under the label of New World Order (NWO) (Ballinger , p. ;
Bratich , pp. –; Fenster , p. ). It is somewhat ironic
that the notion of NWO reached into the commonsense of the masses
via speeches that George Herbert Walker Bush gave during the Gulf
War ( January ). Bush referred to the NWO as a new peaceful
liberal democratic world that has overcome polarized rhetoric models
and is mobilizing the forces of different states for providing peace, se-
curity, freedom and the power of law as universal endeavors of human
kind (Spark , p. ). In fundamentalist anti–establishment infor-
mational space (of the radical–conservative Christians, the extreme
right, the radical left) NWO quickly acquired a very strong semantic
charge: it was seen as a pivotal point in the history of the genesis of
a global totalitarian regime (Fenster , p. ). Ideas of decadent
global control started spreading like a wildfire, especially after the arti-
culation of systemic NWO conspiracy theory in Pat Robertson´s book
„The New World Order”, published in  (see Fenster , p. ;
Castells , p. ). As NWO had become a notorious code–phrase
that evoked ideas of malignant conspiracy, it soon vanished from the
vocabulary of politicians (Spark , p. ).
To put it very briefly, NWO conspiracy theory talks about dread-
ful acts of a malicious covert group (which is usually believed to be
absorbed into a global economic and political elite) whose goal is to
create a global centralized regime: Totalitarian One World Govern-
ment. Extreme right interpreters see the undermining and ridiculing
(their) sacred and solid identity markers (race, national sovereignty,
nativism, (Christian) morality, traditional family and gender roles,
etc.) as the principal means of NWO conspiracy. It is believed that this
kind of undermining is organized in order to transform people into
a nebulous global mass with mixed bloodline and disoriented values
that is not able to think independently and fight against the totalita-
rian NWO system (see Madisson, Ventsel , p. ). The following
quotation represents the NWO framework, spreading in the extreme
. The term New World Order, especially when it appears in the utterances of public
authorities, still evokes similar interpretations. Estonian extreme right authors were quite
alarmed when the annual Lennart Meri conference that took place on May –,  had
a title “The North-South Split — Managing a New World Order”. They interpreted it as
an obvious indicator of the prominence of NWO forces in the Estonian administration.
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right network, in a quite accurate way:
And of course, the identity and individuality must be taken away from a
nation. It will be replaced with multiculturalism i.e. the lack of culture. Also,
elementary morality and traditions that have been the characteristics of
normal society and human nature will be liquidated. Instead, abnormal
views are imposed. The force of law and a silent guidance are used for that,
also children are brainwashed already at kindergarten and later at school.
It is often believed that the final goal of the NWO conspiracy is the
Orwellian world where a total control over the movements and even
the thoughts of people is achieved (Ballinger , p. ; Suits , p.
).
NWO conspiracy theories have an extremely syncretic nature, they
tend to mix fragments of Illuminati, Zionist, and Masonic plots (Ballin-
ger , p. ). In terms of conspiracy theory studies NWO is a super
conspiracy that models a far reaching pyramid structure of evil that
has affected the course of history for a long time (see Barkun ,
p. ). The top level of the pyramid is often quite vaguely articulated,
e.g. in the Estonian extreme right online communication the most
powerful manipulators are sometimes referred to as the Controllers,
the Masters, (international) elite or the top globalists. Alasdair Spark
points out that the uppermost level of the hierarchy is understood as
some very powerful, almost supernatural dark force. In some cases
certain enemy groups, pulling the strings, are also articulated, e.g.: )
the Zionists or ZOG (Zionist Occupation Government) a classic ene-
my from extreme right demonology, and ) the Bavarian Illuminati, a
secret society often connected with the cult of Lucifer (Spark , p.
). The Estonian extreme right network refers to both groups but
very often the uppermost level is believed to be connected with two
particular families: Rockefellers and Rothschilds, widely known for
international enterprises, especially dealing with banking.
It is believed that the second layer, the henchmen of the secret
cabal, is absorbed into the most influential structures of global politi-
cal and economic nomenclature. Structures that have less power in
global scale (for example the Estonian government) are also seen as
. http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com///rootsid-tostavad-pead-
vagivaldsed.html#more.
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minor sub–branches of the decadent system. One extreme right au-
thor points out that the Estonian government is also actually a Zionist
Occupation Government that is ready to make every wish of its Jewish
master come true. The main structures, being accused of having the
status of henchmen of conspirators, are international organizations:
The United Nations; the World Trade Organization, NATO, the Euro-
pean Union, especially the European Commission, the International
Monetary Fund, The World Bank, the Trilateral Commission; The
Bilderberg Group, The Club of Rome, etc. Other important areas,
assumed to be strictly manipulated by the secret cabal, are institutions
related with (mass)media, education and healthcare (see Spark , p.
; Song , p. ).
The lowest and widest layer of the pyramid is believed to be occu-
pied by the mass of ignorant “ordinary citizens” that are unwittingly
under the influence of the NWO system and thus alienated from inde-
pendent thinking and moral principles (Castells , p. ). Estonian
extreme right authors see themselves also as victims of totalitarian
global order but they feel superior than the masses because they can
see through the complex manipulations of the corrupted system and
they also are constantly working to disclose the conspiracy and to
make the others “open their eyes”. Actually, they think that they have
done a good job in making people aware of the malignant NWO
conspiracy, even so good that the global controllers feel threatened.
One article proudly states that:
Estonia is the world’s leading country in the sense of percentage of people
who know that – was an inside job of the global elite. And the elite is
panicking about that. As well as Estonian secret government and quite a
few bribed politicians and magnates who are deceptively representing the
people.
. E.g. see the following postings: http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com///matti-
ilves-salajuudid-sionistid.html, http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com///matti-ilves-
laulupidudele-luuakse.html.
. http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com///bilderbergi-kohtumiste-
avalikustamine.html.
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. NWO conspiracy theory in the online communication of the
Estonian extreme right
As indicated above, NWO rhetoric enables individuals to declare war
on the doctrines of tolerance, liberalism and cosmopolitism by depic-
ting a malicious plan of creating a multicultural society which leads or
has already led to eradication of some particular nations/nation–states
or the white race in general (see Fekete , p. , Griffin , p.
; Hainsworth , p. , Sommer , p. ). In the following, I
outline the most common NWO sub–topics of the Estonian extreme
right network and I also explain how conspiracy theories have adapted
to the signification peculiarities of online media. It has been argued
that the internet functions like a Petri dish for conspiracy theories
(Fenster , p. ) and that the possibility of hyperlinking matches
remarkably well with conspiracy theorists´ inclination to create all
kinds of associations between seemingly separate events, agents and
phenomena (see Bell , pp. –; Dean , pp. –).
Robert Glen Howard has pointed out that when interpreters re-
gularly visit specific sites that are connected by shared interests or
values they create “vernacular webs”. Frequent communication in ver-
nacular webs increases the perception of continuity and consistency
of ideas and thus deepens vernacular authority, which is perceived
as valuable because of its non–institutional or so–called participatory
status (Howard , pp. –, ). In vernacular webs of skeptical
knowledge there emerges a permutation of so–called typical elemen-
ts and key topics of conspiracy explanations which are syncretically
combined when suspicious events occur (see Barkun , p. ).
During my non–participatory observation in the Estonian extreme
right vernacular web I identified three (of course, it is a rough ge-
neralization) dominant topics of the NWO that seemed to recur in
different representations.
a) A conviction that /, the Great Recession, the Boston Mara-
thon bombing, the War in Eastern Ukraine, the Syrian Civil
War, the outbreak of Ebola, the rising number of refugees
in Europe as well as many other globally or locally alarming
socio–cultural developments, accidents and catastrophes are
seen as inside jobs of global elite. It was understood that those
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events were primarily designed for legitimizing strict control
methods (e.g. mass–surveillance program PRISM and other
data mining programs) that endanger the inviolability of private
life and also for causing an atmosphere of chaos and a mentality
of fear and disorder that retards the rational decision making of
ordinary people. The additional aim of organizing such events
is connected with the idea that it allows conspirators to acquire
the wealth of citizens, states and banks and thus make them
financially weaker and more easily manipulable.
b) Global warming is seen as deceitful propaganda, spreading via
schools and corrupted media systems. Actually climate is under-
stood to be cooling down. The main goal of this misconception
of global warming is to make people pay rapacious carbon dio-
xide taxes, so the global elite can acquire more control of the
resources of states and ordinary people.
c) Ideologies, deviant form the point of view of radical nationa-
lism, e.g. feminism, multiculturalism and egalitarianism are
understood to be elaborated by the NWO system. For example,
it is often expressed that feminism makes women repudiate
their natural needs and manners and the global elite is spitefully
propagating it to cause the extinction of traditional and moral
ways of living. Inter alia, authors stress that it has induced the
acceptance of sexual minorities, family nihilism, and a general
inclination towards relativism and toleration of everything. It
is sometimes pointed out that the Frankfurt School (also kno-
wn as cultural Marxists in the extreme right vernacular web)
has made a significant contribution to spreading such degene-
. See illustrative examples of this sub–topic: http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com//
/hando-tonumaa-kui-vastuseks-on-soda.html; http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com//
/uro-valetab-vaites-et-eestis-on-el-i.html; http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com///
david-icke-lahis-ida-konflikt-pohineb.html.
. See illustrative examples of this sub–topic: http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com/ /
/matti-ilves-kliima-soojenemise-asemel.html; http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com//
/ajatu-usa-fuusik-globaalne-soojenemine.html; http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com//
/kas-mage-vesi-erastatakse.html.
. See illustrative examples of this sub–topic: http : / / rahvuslane . blogspot.
com /  /  / naisliikumine-kui-uue-maailmakorra . html; http : / / koobas . net /
 /  /  / ajaleht-pedemees/; http : / / rahvuslik . blogspot . com /  /  /
riiklik-homopropaganda-lastele-sinu.html.
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rate ideas. As one blogger puts it: «Cultural Marxists are trying
to control the society by manipulating the language, media and
educational system, and they are achieving their goals by using
censoring–techniques, known as “political correctness”». The
decreasing number of white children and the maximization
of “tax slavery” are seen as the main goals of those deviant
ideologies.
Previously outlined sub–topics illustrate that NWO plots succeed
in uniting seemingly incongruous discourses (e.g. the discourse of law,
education, gender, economy, security, geology, etc.) and signifiers (the
Frankfurt School, the number of the white children, PRISM, banks,
feminism, the Boston Marathon bombing, the educational system,
carbon dioxide taxes, etc). Additionally, it is important to point out
that in their meaning creation extreme right webs combine various
means of hypermedia. The primary specifics of hypermedia texts resi-
de in using hyperlinks which allow the connection of various kinds
of text fragments, e.g. a hypertextual whole may incorporate verbal,
visual, acoustic and inter–semiotic elements (Landow , p. ). Esto-
nian vernacular webs of the extreme right aggregate large numbers
of hyperlinks which combine various semiotic modes and multiple
informational sources. For example there are represented: scanned
historical documents: articles, photographs, agreements form mu-
seum archives, essays, book fragments, comments and other kind of
textual material, contemporary white power music and adaptations of
old solider songs, and various radio shows (foreign and local), many
kinds of pictorial information which ranges from scanned war photo-
graphs to memetic reaction photoshops and rage comics which are
used for illustrating daily politics and ridiculing ideological opponents,
and heterogeneous audiovisual representations are used (mostly via
links to Youtube), e.g. filmed lectures or movies. The extreme right
vernacular communication also often has an international dimension.
It is a widespread practice to refer to content of like–minded thinkers
form all over the globe. Estonian extreme rightists share mainly links
to Scandinavian and Russian content as well as some sites that are
. http://koobas.net////kultuurimarksistid-suudistavad-koiki-oma-
vastaseid-vihkamises/.
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predominantly in English, e.g. Alex Jones’ blog Infowars and David
Icke´s blog are frequently quoted. By sharing links to other sources
of the vernacular web of the extreme right, the authors spread each
other´s content (sometimes bloggers present information in foreign
languages and add their translations, synopses and comments) and
also present their sympathy and acknowledgement of some sites.
The heterogeneous nature of extreme right (hyper)text creation is,
besides using different semiotic modes, also illustrated by the tenden-
cy to combine material from fundamentally different informational
spheres. This aspect is supported the by above mentioned listing that
pointed out that the vernacular web of the extreme right may present
fragments form historical archives and contemporary memetic ma-
terial basically next to each other. Several studies (Howard , pp.
–, Friedlander , p. , Laas ; Landow , p. , Soukup
, pp. – etc) have noted that the text processing opportunities
of hypermedia, e.g. convenient replicability, transformability and the
possibility to easily adapt texts/ text–fragments into new associations,
facilitates bricoleur authorship. Texts are often constructed of material
that previously exists on the web. That kind of bricolage tendency al-
lows crossing the borders between different textual spheres. Extreme
right online representations may present content from institutional
spheres of information (e.g. from sites of public institutions or home-
pages of private companies, newspaper articles, academic publications
etc) but also form less institutional spheres (e.g. Wikipedia articles,
blogs, forum commentaries, postings of different social networking
sites, etc.), from artistic and commodity texts, from individual and
collective creation, etc. It is noteworthy that extreme right authors
do not often explicate how the particular links or text fragments are
connected with the general message of their posting.
Thus, the informational sphere, including postings which discuss
different aspects of NWO conspiracy, does not constitute a coherent
textual system. Several researchers of hypertext (Eco , Ryan ,
p. ) have argued that the way how a particular interpreter navigates
the web–like textual complex can be paralleled with the way how a
reader approaches an encyclopedia or a database. Lev Manovich has
. See the explanation of phatic online–communication in Andreas Ventsel´s article in
present issue of Lexia, pp. – and Madisson, Ventsel ).
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even claimed that it would be useful to understand the database as a
primary symbolic form of the era of computer mediated communi-
cation. The form of the database functions as a list of some objects
and different fragments of this list are not regulated by a linear logic
or a central organizing principle (Manovich , p. ). These con-
sideration lead to the question: how is it possible that in a maze of
information which does not have a clear structure and which aggre-
gates various kind of discourses and ways of modeling extreme right
interpreters still very often reach predictable clusters of interpretation
which connect the ultimate cause of all kind of events and phenomena
with the idea of malignant NWO conspiracy? In the following I try
to explain the logic of the development of NWO interpretation by
relying on Marie-Laure Ryan´s approach of hypermedia narrative and
the concept of code text from cultural semiotics.
. The semiotic logic of constructing NWO interpretations
Ryan points out that usually the interpreters of hypertext imply that a
textual network is a set of information where to look for certain things
but not a constituent storyworld where to immerse oneself. The vast
majority of the interpreters will approach hypertextual systems as
some kind of information jigsaw puzzle. Interpreters try to put the
whole picture together of the text fragments that they reach in quite
random order. They try to match every fragment with a general narra-
tive pattern that is gradually developed in the interpreters´ mind. One
can pause while putting pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together. The sa-
me logic applies in the case of interpreting the hypertext. Interpreters
can construct a general mental whole in many steps which constan-
tly improve their initial vision (Ryan , p. ). Ryan also stresses
that approaching a hypertextual informational maze as a narrative is
likely when the interpreter is already familiar with the general plot. It
functions like putting a magnifying glass on certain aspects of a story.
New information is added to the familiar plot as a complementation
of some of its nuances or it is dismissed as insignificant (Ryan ,
pp. –).
For example some particular text fragment, presented in extre-
me right web, may specifically concentrate on details of the nature
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of some specific expert groups, e.g. conspirators who have specia-
lized in manipulating the media, affecting the educational system,
undermining certain nation states, coordinating the work of different
international organizations (e.g. NATO or United Nations), organizing
financial crises, etc. At the same time some other fragment may con-
firm the conviction of the inhumanly evil nature of conspirators, e.g.
one posting outlines that cancer, autism, retardation, Alzheimer’s and
Parkinson´s disease are often caused by the conscious actions of con-
spirators (The Bilderberg Group, The Council of Foreign Relations,
The Trilateral Committee, The Club of Rome), namely that they are
responsible for poisoning vaccines and contaminating food in order
to weaken the white race. Particular interpreters may not consider
all postings of a certain web page significant, s/he may dismiss them
as biased, inessential, controversial etc. But representations that seem
significant to a particular interpreter, e.g. if they confirm his/her pre-
vious suspicions or add some new nuances, then they find their place
in his/her general vision of conspiracy. The interpretation of hypertex-
tual mazes as sub–plots of NWO conspiracy theory becomes possible
and likely because of interpretational frames that already exist in the
conceptual horizons of members of the extreme right vernacular web.
Previously known fragments of presented content (e.g. the phrase
NWO, events like –, financial crises, some key characters, like the
Trilateral Committee, NATO, WTO or Estonian President Toomas
Hendrik Ilves) activate a frame of associations that is characterized
by extremely adaptive causal structure, so it enables individuals to
connect seemingly incoherent elements. Lotman´s concept of code
text helps to explicate how NWO interpretations are connected with
the collective memory of the extreme right community. Also, it allo-
ws explanation of what kind of communicative functions that kind of
seemingly redundant meaning making exhibits.
According to Lotman a code text is a textual system that originates
from the collective memory of a particular culture. A code text is
certain kind of interlink that, instead of being an abstract collection of
. E.g. see http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com///david-icke-lahis-ida-konflikt-
pohineb.html.
. http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com///vanglaplaneet-kirjutab-legaalsed-
m%C%BCrgid.html.
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rules for constructing a text, is a textual system with a rigid syntactic
order. The different signs of a code text can be divided into various
sub–structures, but despite this the code text remains unambiguous
“for itself ”: «on its own level, the code text is a unitary phenomenon
in both content and expression». A code text unites into a unitary text
elements which, for a so–called outsider perspective, would remain
unconnected. For a bystander a code text may appear as a diffuse
aggregate, but for those for whom the code text functions as a text of
collective memory, it becomes an essential landmark for interpreting
multiple events (Lotman , pp. –). The frame of conspiracy
theory can be treated as an important code text of the extreme right
informational sphere. Its text (message) is: this (i.e. in the case of some
particular event that is often perceived as unpleasant/dangerous) has
something to do with conspiracy (i.e. is some realization of a malicious
plan of a covert NWO group). The relatively universal role of the
code text of NWO conspiracy theory in the context of mapping and
valuating different events can be explained by the very high modeling
potential of conspiracy theory.
The NWO code text of conspiracy theory allows the connection
of events which have happened in various times, places and involves
different actors that seem incompatible for a bystander. Representa-
tions of NWO super conspiracy enable individuals to avoid all kinds of
ambivalence and randomness; every detail and event (it can be natural
disaster, social conflict, disease etc) is presented as an elaborated part
of an enormous system of a global conspiracy (Armstrong , p.
; Barkun , p. ; Campion-Vincent , p. ). According to
Marina Grišakova the modeling of events can be based on various ty-
pes of causality. Natural causality which is characterized by explicating
logical and physical relations and causality reduced to intentionali-
ty; are two most clearly distinguishable types. This causality, based
on intentionality, is very complex and it is usually difficult to depict
it in an unequivocal and clear manner because human motivations
and intentions tend to be interwoven and thus it is hard to decide
what is actually responsible for causing a particular change (Griša-
kova , pp. –). Interpretations referring to conspiracy present
the intentions of conspirators in a very homogeneous and clear–cut
way: evil. Conspiracy theorists usually believe that the secret cabal,
organizing actions that are threatening the general well being, is well
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aware of the harmful consequences of its deeds. Namely, conspirators
are perceived as essentially sinister because of their conscious evil-
doing. NWO narratives do not usually ask questions about historical
or socio–cultural contexts that have affected some tragic events. It is
understood that a horrible thing happened, first and foremost, because
there are evil forces behind it. The conviction of the evil intentions
of conspirators functions as an effective organizing principle and is
perceived as a factor which has motivated the course of the whole of
history (Fenster , p. ; Hofstadter , p. ). It does not mean
that conspiracy theories neglect the natural causality of particular
events. Quite the opposite. The dimension which explicates how a
particular event happened in specific (physical, social, historical, etc.)
conditions is sometimes depicted in an incredibly detailed way. The
reason why conspirators are perceived as extremely dangerous and
omnipotent is that interpreters presume that they have the capacity
to apply natural causality for serving their evil intentions, and they do
it in so sophisticated a way that most people would never notice it.
Thus NWO conspiracy theory acknowledges the diversity of va-
rious phenomena/relations but, at the same time, it assumes that dif-
ferent events are motivated by evil as the ultimate and all–embracing
cause. As various dimensions of reality are perceived as parts of the
same system of evil, the attributes that are essential for distinguishing
such structures are vague. Conspiracy theory may explicate a par-
ticular reference (e.g. local or global manipulators of NWO systems,
e.g. Toomas Hendrik Ilves or Herman Van Rompuy) but it will be
added to an endless row of the signs of the NWO system of evil. Leroy
Dorsey (, p. ) has outlined that conspiracy theories tend to de-
form the malevolent structures that they want to outline. Antagonists
thus have the face of an all–encompassing evil rather than the face of
different social groups or persons (Madisson , p. ).
. I have explained the vagueness of reference in conspiracy theories more thoroughly
in another publication, see Madisson : –.
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. Deepening the significance of conspiracy
As demonstrated before, the NWO code text is one of the key fra-
mes of interpretation of the extreme right vernacular web. It allows
the development of quite coherent interpretations that connect very
different, sometimes even controversial, informational spheres and
modalities. In the following I explicate the semiotic function of see-
mingly redundant communication (in the sense of providing new
information) that refers constantly to conspiracy in the light of a
concept of code text.
Lotman has outlined that text is functionally used as a code rather
than a message when it does not add new knowledge but translates
an already existing message into a new system of meanings (Lotman
, p. ). Peet Lepik has emphasized that in the case of code text we
have to distinguish: () the level of natural language and () the level of
cultural text. Of course, in the level of natural language code text has
semantics but as a cultural text it does not include new information.
Rather it functions as a pure syntagmatics or secondary code (Lepik
, p. ). Conspiracy theories share an invariant system of relations
which originate from collective memory. In concrete interpretations
this invariant frame is filled with particular content but if we consider
it form the analytical level then in different NWO interpretations
the interpreter is re–experiencing the same initial frame that s/he
previously knows.
The interpreter notices something obscure, suspicious, unpleasant,
etc., about some particular phenomenon and the code text of conspiracy
theory, previously existing in his/her interpretative horizon, is a likely
frame according to which the experience can be modeled and related
with the structures of cultural memory. Lotman has pointed out that
when the supplementary code and the message which is in the language
of everyday experience start to interact then the secondary semantics ap-
pears above them. It is formed of the shifts of re–transformation which
happen in the light of the supplementary code (Lotman , p. ).
Conspiracy theory functions as a trigger of cultural self–organization,
as a supplementary code. It converts everyday experience into its fixed
structural units which give it the features of a new (and more mea-
ningful) message (Lotman , p. ). The interpreter relates his/her
instant observations with elements of the code text. Lepik (, p. )
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has stated that the specific structural characteristic of a code text is the
authoritative sphere of reference which objects locate in an axiologically
higher sphere than everyday meanings (experiences). One important
aspect of the NWO communication, is that not only the events that are
perceived as a result of conspiracy become more meaningful but also the
conspiracy itself will become more confirmed and significant because
of frequent interpretations.
. Conclusions
The extreme right vernacular web holds a synchretic corpus of hyper-
texts that consists of various fragments that have different modalities
and that belong to different or even incompatible discourses and sphe-
res of meaning. Nevertheless, there seems to occur a quite coherent or
even predictable tendency of interpretation that reduces socio–cultural
developments to NWO conspiracy. Extreme right interpreters put
together the full picture of NWO from informational pieces that they
encounter in quite random orders. Every fragment of information is
correlated with the NWO code text that is already on the interpreta-
tional horizon of the members of the extreme right community. If
those fragments seem relevant, e.g. if they add some details about
the sub–systems of the secret cabal, or confirm the evil nature of the
global elite, then they will be added to the previously existing frame.
It is important to note that the process of re–appearance of the NWO
interpretational frame is paralleled with the growing significance of
the associations provided by this frame.
The vast modeling capacity of NWO conspiracy theories becomes
possible because it is based on the code textual set of relational asso-
ciations which originates in the collective memory of the extreme
right network. The code text of NWO conspiracy theories functions
as a specific textual invariant which maintains that behind all kinds
of (unpleasant) events or phenomena there is a conspiracy, i.e. a set
of covert activities organized by the malicious global elite. Those
interpretations are driven by a causality that is reduced to intentiona-
lity. Namely, conspiracy theories depict a world where the ultimate
cause of almost every socially significant event is connected with the
evil will of conspirators. Conspiracy theories also rely on descriptive
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or natural causality (e.g. natural laws and relations of logic) but it is
usually assumed that the sinister elite is very capable of using those
relations for their own benefit.
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 : Il complotto come politica della conoscenza storica: i
terrorismi in Italia e il caso di Romanzo di una strage/Piazza Fontana: The
Italian Conspiracy
: The article explores conspiracy theories through the interpreta-
tive category of the “politics of knowledge”. It argues that conspiracy
theories can play the role of a form of knowledge construction for dea-
ling with past historical events and have as their reverse particular forms
of ignorance (in particular, secret). The article draws on a semiotic per-
spective on conspiracy — in particular, on Umberto Eco’s and Jacques
Rancière’s reflection on semiosis and knowledge — but departs from the
pathologizing approach to conspiracy predominant in the literature. The
case study of the article is the representation of Italian terrorisms in Italy
— the so–called “years of lead” — and the conspiracy narratives that
are used in the elaboration of the different “unknowns” related to them.
By describing the different cultural responses to terrorist violence, the
article places conspiracy in a broader cultural and historical context, in
which the film Romanzo di una strage/Piazza Fontana: the Italian Conspi-
racy (Marco Tullio Giordana, ) is analyzed as one of the most recent
examples of conspiracy narratives. By representing the piazza Fontana
bombing and “stragismo” as the result of a very complex conspiracy,
the film exculpates the Italian society at large from any responsibility as
regards the violence that marked the s; through the three protago-
nists (Luigi Calabresi, Aldo Moro, and Giuseppe Pinelli), the movie puts
the audience and its different political and memory constituencies in
the position of victims.
: Terrorism; Years of Lead; Memory; Conspiracy; Piazza Fontana.
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. Introduction
Italian Republican history is marked by a very common and wide-
spread interpretative attitude that some call the “pathology of the
secret” (Fasanella, Pellegrino and Sestieri , pp. –), and which
is very frequent in the representation of Italian political terror of the
s and s. The piazza Fontana (), Brescia () and Bologna
() bombings, Aldo Moro’s kidnapping and assassination () —
to mention just some of the events of that period — are depicted as
“misteri d’Italia”, a representation that uses a conspiratorial mode and
that constitutes a sort of mythology in popular culture (Lombardi
). According to the Zanichelli dictionary, in  Italians started
using a neologism for describing the attitude of those who look for
what is secret: dietrologia, the discourse of those who look for what is
behind the happening of an event. And actually “dietrologia”, more
than “complotto”, is the most appropriate Italian translation for the
English word “conspiracy”, at least for that which concerns Italian
culture in the XX century.
Different genres and narrative formats have used the conspiracy
mode as a hermeneutical tool in order to textualise those historical
events which are marked by a series of “unknowns”. The noir and the
police procedural in cinema and literature have created a collective
imaginary that plays an important role in the construction of memo-
ry; similarly, cinematic investigations have helped in visualising the
“labyrinth of stragismo” (Wood ), the right–wing terrorist attacks.
What I propose throughout this paper is that conspiracy can be
analysed and interpreted as a specific kind of politics of knowledge.
In other terms, it is an interpretative practice that produces and deals
with “unknowns” and tries to make sense of them: firstly, by envisio-
ning a certain production and distribution of knowledge in society;
secondly, by representing identity, agency and intentions of those who
supposedly hold the power to govern events; thirdly, by offering vica-
rious forms of truth, when other discursive regimes — particularly
the judicial and the political — and subjects — particularly the State —
fail or are considered not sufficiently trustworthy or reliable, as in the
case of the “years of lead” in Italy. When they are used to construct a
memory of the past, conspiracy narratives make the historical events
knowable and usable in the public sphere and are a way to make sense
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of the past and of history.
In order to make this argument, the article brings together a se-
miotic approach to the study of conspiracy and historical events and
the literature on the Italian cultural response to terrorism, finally fo-
cusing on a case–study: piazza Fontana and the movie Romanzo di
una strage (Marco Tullio Giordana ), internationally released as
Piazza Fontana: the Italian Conspiracy. In the next section I will outline
my approach to the study of conspiracy, which departs from patholo-
gising and truth–functional perspectives. In the third section, I will
make reference to different cultural responses to Italian terrorisms
in which I would like to contextualise the study of conspiracy. In this
context, I will analyse Romanzo di una strage/Piazza Fontana: the Italian
Conspiracy.
. Conspiracy as production and distribution of knowledge and
ignorance
The semiotic approach to conspiracy is very much marked by Um-
berto Eco’s literary and philosophical work. For instance, in Eco’s
last novel (), the journalist Romano Braggadocio embodies the
conspiracy approach to history. In the turn of , the year of the
fall of the First Republic, Braggadocio explains contemporary Italian
history and its mysteries — including terror attacks such as piazza
Fontana, piazza della Loggia and Peteano — as the conspiracy of Be-
nito Mussolini (Eco , pp. –). According to Braggadocio, the
duce actually survived WW and was the puppet master behind those
dreadful events. Maybe to prompt the paranoid interpretation of the
reader, this revelation is told in chapter XV entitled May , which
is a very peculiar day in Italian history: the day of the  terrorist
attack in piazza della Loggia (by the right–wing terrorist organization
Ordine Nuovo) and of the  assassination of the journalist Walter
Tobagi (by the left–wing terrorist organization Brigate XXVIII Marzo).
Looking at Eco’s production, we can see in the experience of terror
the biographical and historical core that prompted the philosopher to
reflect semiotically on conspiracy.
On the one hand, Eco starts reflecting on paranoia in the s
on newspapers and magazines analysing terrorists’ texts (e.g. in 
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now in Eco , pp. –, in collaboration with Paolo Fabbri, and
in  now in Eco , pp. –). These categories will return to
be semiotically defined in the s and s. Already mentioned in
the Lector in fabula with the reference to the interpretation of Moro’s
letters from captivity (Eco , p. ), the spy story, conspiracy, se-
cret and paranoia will become objects for a semiotic theorization (in
particular Eco ).
On the other hand, since Il nome della rosa, I see in Eco’s literary
work a reflection about the good rules (the abductions of William of
Baskerville) and interpretative drifts (those of Braggadocio) for the
construction of knowledge about disorder, disruption and violence
(murders in a monastery or terrorism in a country). In an interview re-
leased on October  , although denying any connection between
the Il nome della rosa’s plot and Moro kidnapping and assassination,
Eco admitted that he started writing the novel as a form of reaction
to the kidnapping, to reflect upon the incapacity of the intellectual
to produce knowledge that could influence events and «to represent
an intelligence that struggles with a labyrinth» (Lilli , p. , my
translation).
In the same years, the whodunit — the genre of Il nome della rosa
—, the noir and the police procedural were some of the strategies and
genres that were used to give a narrative shape to Italian contemporary
history as conspiracy. Such production can actually be interpreted as
a cultural response to terror. In other terms, and this is the thesis
of this article, conspiracy can be interpreted as a tool for dealing
with the historical experience of Italian terrorisms, a way to produce
knowledge about it.
However, my position departs from an assumption that is very
much present in Eco’s first works on conspiracy: a pathologising ap-
proach. In his study of the hermetic semiosis and its legacy in the
Western philosophical tradition, Eco sketches two kinds of interpreta-
tion: “healthy” vs “paranoid” interpretation (, p. ). This dichoto-
my structures Eco’s approach to conspiracy that is dominant both in
the semiotic and non–semiotic literature: from Richard Hofstadter’s
seminal work () to Fredric Jameson’s position (conspiracy as a
“poor person’s cognitive mapping” [Jameson , p. ]), conspiracy
narratives are described as a pathological style of reasoning that di-
storts reality, in an extension of the psychological model to society at
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large. Such approach is quite controversial (see on this Boltanski,
pp. –; Fenster ; Urbano ; Demaria , p. ) and also
suggests (more or less explicitly) a truth–functional and judgmental
interpretative framework where conspiracy belongs by definition to
the domain of falsehood. I think that such an approach is not useful
to fully understand the social and political role of conspiracy theories;
indeed, it prevents us from analysing the many functions of conspiracy.
My proposal is to imagine conspiracy theory as a specific form of
knowledge that deals with specific forms of ignorance or unknowns.
In order to make this argument, I draw on Jacques Rancière’s philo-
sophical position. According to Rancière, each form of knowledge —
e.g. historical, judicial, scientific — has always “a particular ignorance
as its reverse” and is always constructed on a double level: “it is an
ensemble of knowledges [connaissances] and it is also an organised
distribution [partage] of positions” (, p. ). The knowledge that is
constructed in conspiracy narratives needs to produce its own unk-
nown: the secret. In Greimas’s terms, secret is the effect of meaning
of being and not–seeming, it is what is but does not appear (Greimas
). However, the secret is a necessary but not sufficient element to
define a conspiracy narrative. We need also to understand what type of
distribution of knowledge conspiracy implies. While what is “totally
unknown” is something that nobody knows, the effect of secrecy is
produced by the fact that there are those that do not know and those
who know, as a result of a power disparity. In this sense, conspiracy
is a politics, as it performs practices of division and interdiction (you
are not allowed to know), and it is about knowledge: it constructs the
unknown as secret and distributes knowledge in the narrative world
between those who are not allowed to know and those who know
and actually govern the world. Conspiracy narratives rely thus on a
system of positions that constructs a differential access to knowledge
in the narration, in which some are able and allowed to access reality
and truth, while others are not.
Conspiracy narratives allow the spectator/reader to have access
to knowledge, and whether such knowledge is true or not is not
interesting in this perspective. From a semiotic perspective, what
is really at stake here are the different meaning effects that these
narratives produce (including truth as an effect of reality). Sometimes
conspiracy narratives “represent a failure in the hegemonic process
 Daniele Salerno
because they signal the inability of a power elite to impose its own
view of events and history” (Wood , p. ); other times, they work
as a cathartic ritual by freeing the audience of any responsibility for
events; other times still, “what pretends to be a privileged access to the
truth is in reality its opposite: the mythically–inflected manifestation
of an inability to orient oneself in a complex social system” (O’Leary
, p. ).
. Terrorisms, forms of unknowns and forms of knowledge: from
imagination to dietrologia
At the end of the film Romanzo di una strage/Piazza Fontana: the Italian
Conspiracy, a text provides the spectator with information on piazza
Fontana’s history, trials and the deaths of Luigi Calabresi, Giuseppe
Pinelli and Aldo Moro:
La strage di piazza Fontana non ha colpevoli [. . . ]
Aldo Moro è stato assassinato dalle Brigate Rosse il 
maggio 
[The piazza Fontana bombing has no culprits. . .
Aldo Moro was killed by the Red Brigades on May 
]
These two descriptions epitomise two different constructions of
events linked to “black” (right–wing) and “red” (left–wing) terror,
their unknowns and the use of conspiracy narrations to deal with
them. The description of events that are linked to red terror usually
follows the linguistic structure “X killed Y” or “Y was killed by X”,
where X is the organization (e.g. Brigate Rosse, Prima Linea, Nuclei
Armati Proletari) and Y the victim (e.g. Moro); the description of
events that are linked to black terrorism usually follow the structure
“A bomb exploded at Y” or “A bomb killed Y people” where Y is a
. On piazza Fontana and its historical context see Cento Bull ().
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place (e.g. the Bologna railway station, piazza Fontana, piazza della
Loggia, etc.). or the number of victims.
In other terms, these two kinds of terror produce different unkno-
wns. While conspiracy narrations on red terror are about the puppet
master(s) who pulled the strings in the event, black terror appears as
actions with no human agency: grammatical subjects in sentences
are objects (like bombs). While the symbolic seal of red terrorism is
the five–pointed star of the Brigate Rosse, which stands for a group of
people, black terrorism is iconised by the hole caused by the bomb
in the piazza Fontana Banca dell’Agricoltura or by the picture of the
Bologna railway station clock, stopped by the explosion at . (An-
tonello and O’Leary , p. ). In media representations “the public
remains mystified about the roots, manifestations, and solutions to
terrorism [. . . ] and puts such incidents in the category of the “wrath of
nature,” much like an act of God or a freak of nature” (Farnen , p.
). This element comes from the different communicative strategies
of the two terrorisms: while red terrorism has claimed its actions with
a very aggressive communicative strategy, black terrorism elected to
remain always anonymous in the attempt to destabilize the political
system and make the blame fall upon left–wing organizations. As
Andrea Zhok argues, piazza Fontana and black terrorism slaughters
are explicitly designed “as a form of lie” (, p. ).
As Eco’s reflections testify, the two terrorisms asked for the mobili-
zation of different forms of knowledge and know–how. In those years
the question was: which is the form of knowledge that can help us in
understanding the “reality of reality” (Boltanski )?
Pierpaolo Pasolini’s response was particularly powerful and since
then has shaped the ways writers and intellectuals try to elabora-
te knowledge about violence and power (today for example with
Roberto Saviano’s Gomorra). Pasolini claimed the use of the litera-
ry imagination as a tool for dealing with the unknowns related to
terrorist attacks:
I know [. . . ] I know the names of the slaughter in Milan on  December
. I know the names of those responsible for the slaughter in Brescia in
 [. . . ] I know, but I have no evidence, I do not even have clues. I know
them because I am an intellectual, a writer, one who seeks [. . . ] to imagine
all the facts that are not known or that are kept silent (Pasolini , now in
Pasolini ).
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This text was published on the “Corriere della sera” on November
  with the title “Cos’è questo golpe, io so” [what is this golpe
(coup d’état), I know] and republished in Scritti corsari with the ti-
tle “Il romanzo delle stragi” [the novel of the massacres]. Pasolini
does not take the role of the investigator: he imagines as an intellec-
tual and artist, refusing any reference to the clue or the evidence as
epistemological tools.
Pasolini was murdered one year after that article and his legacy
and figure was used and claimed in a re–elaboration of the epistemic
modalities that he described in it for dealing with violence and the
“labyrinth of stragismo”. However, many of those who used Pasolini’s
legacy and article have gradually shifted towards two directions, so-
metimes co–present: on the one hand, towards what we can call, with
Carlo Ginzburg (), the evidential paradigm of the investigation;
on the other hand, towards the role of testimony, which has recen-
tly assumed a victimary connotation (De Luna ; Giglioli ).
For instance, Francesco Zucconi () shows how in L’affaire Moro
(Sciascia ), Sciascia’s narration was constructed around the axis of
the secret, paving the way to “dietrologia”. Sciascia’s book is one of
the examples of how the conspiratorial mode has spread across the
spectrum of cultural responses to political violence: from highbrow
cultural products to mid- and mass–cult examples like poliziotteschi.
The novel Romanzo criminale by Giancarlo De Cataldo (), which
has been turned into an acclaimed feature film and TV series, has
first used the Pasolini reference within a clear conspiratorial narrative
frame (Fabbri ).
I am going to analyse Romanzo di una strage/Piazza Fontana: the
Italian conspiracy, which makes a clear reference to Pasolini’s seminal
text, through this cultural and historical genealogy. The film tries
to deal with the unknowns of black terrorism using a conspiracy
narrative framework. But it also needs to elaborate a form of truth
which is offered both as the truth deriving from the investigations and
as the truth of the victims: Luigi Calabresi, Aldo Moro, and, partially,
Giuseppe Pinelli.
. On this topic see also Mazzarella ().
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. Piazza Fontana: The Italian Conspiracy. Investigative knowled-
ge and the truth of the victims
The movie is divided into ten chapters that I summarise very briefly:
a) Hot autumn: the movie is historically contextualised within the
period of demonstrations and protests that followed ;
b) The innocents: representation of the piazza Fontana slaughter;
c) The parallel investigation: the undercover spies who operate
among anarchists and neo–fascists are heard by intelligence
agencies and police officers;
d) The red lead: anarchists are officially blamed for the attack;
e) The interrogatory: Pinelli falls from the window of Calabresi’s
office and dies;
f ) Raison d’état: Moro reveals to the President of the Republic
Saragat what is behind the terrorist attacks and the role of some
elements of the state but decides to make it secret to save Italy
from a civil war;
g) The Veneto lead: the neo–fascist responsibilities emerge clearly;
h) To tell the truth: the trial for the death of Pinelli is opened
and another truth about piazza Fontana emerges from the
investigation;
i) Explosive: clues about different types of explosive that were
used in the slaughter emerge;
j) High tension: meeting between Calabresi and the head of one
of the Italian intelligence agencies (the ufficio affari riservati).
Calabresi elaborates the “double bomb” hypothesis. The movie
ends with the murder of the police officer.
The narration starts with the names of the victims of the piazza
Fontana slaughter and with the representation of the death of the
policeman Antonio Annarumma, who is considered the first victim
of the years of lead, during a demonstration in November . Luigi
Calabresi is called to go to the place of Annarumma’s death, while in
Rome the Minister of Foreign Affairs Aldo Moro starts his day with a
confession to a priest in which he declares to be ready to be the first
victim of a cathartic catastrophe (on the role of the ritual of confession
in cinematic representations see Tagliani ). The third protagonist
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introduced at the beginning of the movie is anarchist Giuseppe Pinelli,
who decides to expel fellow activist Pietro Valpreda, accused of being
too violent, from the Milanese movement. These first minutes clearly
inscribe the movie within a victimary narration, setting the identity
of the three protagonists: Calabresi, Moro and Pinelli.
Calabresi and Pinelli are actually victims according to specific po-
litical constituencies. Pinelli is the victim of state violence for the
left–wing movements (Dario Fo [] has dedicated to him one of
his most internationally recognised plays); Calabresi epitomises the
figure of the victim for the centre–right wing and catholic movements,
being for the Church also a servant of God (a process of beatification
is currently ongoing); Moro is obviously the victim par excellence of
those years but within a contradictory transformation of his image
that is also present in the movie: as Pezzini (, pp. –) argues,
Moro represented in the s and s the face and the language of
the power of the Christian Democrats, but after his assassination he
was transfigured into the character of a Greek tragedy.
Around these three characters we see the world of conspiracy
that is represented or evoked everywhere and is forged by the Italian
domestic intelligence agencies, members of the armed forces and
right–wing organizations. In the background are the foreign powers:
the US foreign intelligence agencies and embassy and a Southern
Europe which in Portugal, Spain and Greece was marked at that time
by the (neo)fascist dictatorships of Salazar, Franco and the Greek
military junta.
The movie also represents a grey area that includes the Head of
the State Giuseppe Saragat and the Prime Minister Mariano Rumor,
together with very controversial figures like that of Junio Valerio
Borghese, author of a last minute aborted coup d’etat in , who
calls piazza Fontana’s perpetrators ‘macellai, non soldati’ (butchers,
not soldiers). From chapter three, the narrative engine is represented
by the investigations, from which a very complicated tangle of lies
emerges. In this context the role of producing a trustful form of
knowledge is given to Calabresi, Moro and Pinelli.
Calabresi interrogates Pinelli. Since Pinelli resists and tells a true
version of the story that does not satisfy the corrupted part of the
police, Calabresi is ordered to invent a lie and fabricate a false docu-
ment to oblige Pinelli to confess the anarchist culpability in the piazza
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Fontana slaughter. Calabresi refuses to obey and while Pinelli “falls
accidentally” from a window, he is in another office destroying the
false document that had to deceive the anarchist.
The creation of false documents is also at the centre of a meeting
between Moro and a carabinieri officer that reveals to the minister
how different organs of the state are lying in order to deceive the
public opinion and the “good” part of the state. Moro receives the
results of another investigation that reveals the conspiracy behind the
terrorist attacks, in which neo–fascist terrorists acted on behalf of
other and more powerful subjects.
Moro reports the investigation’s results to Saragat but decides to
keep the document secret in the name of the survival of the Republic.
This narrative node is important in articulating the two Moros that
Pezzini () describes, the man of power and the victim of power: in
that scene Moro as man of power sacrifices himself and his integrity
in order to save the nation.
The ending of the movie offers its trustful knowledge on piazza
Fontana. Calabresi is violently attacked both from left–wing organiza-
tions and from some parts of the state. According to a false document,
fabricated in some ministry and delivered to the press, Calabresi
would be a CIA agent and this makes his position very difficult in the
face of the public opinion. Before his death, Calabresi meets the head
of one of the Italian intelligence agencies. Calabresi tells his hypothe-
sis: not one but two bombs. A bomb was left by the anarchist and was
not intended to kill. The second bomb was left some minutes after
by the neo–fascists and was intended to kill and put the blame for the
slaughter upon the anarchists. The head of the intelligence agency
confirms Calabresi’s version but actually clearing the anarchists from
any responsibility: the first bomb was placed by the neo–fascists while
the second, and bloodiest one, was ordered by foreign powers with
internal complicities. The piazza Fontana slaughter would be thus
the result of a series of almost embedded conspiracies, whose final
agency sits with foreign powers and in particular NATO and the US
with some neo–fascists organizations and elements of the state. What
does such conspiracy version of history imply?
Firstly, conspiracy performs here a very large process of absolution
for Italians and for what has happened since piazza Fontana. The
causes of the piazza Fontana slaughter and of the years of lead at
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large would not sit with Italian society but are to be found outside, in
the actions and agency of obscure foreign powers, even if with the
collaboration of some internal conspirators.
Secondly, the film allows us to identify Italian society at large as
a victim. As Daniele Giglioli () argues in his Critica della vittima,
conspiracy narrative is always victimary as its aim is to identify a
group of people that is behaving against “us”, with malevolent in-
tentions. The victimary role of Calabresi, Pinelli and Moro is here
pivotal. In fact, they represent different political (and memory) con-
stituencies in order to allow different audiences to perform a process
of victimization. In other terms, through Calabresi, Pinelli and Moro,
spectators belonging to a very large political spectrum are allowed to
feel victimised by external conspiracies.
Eventually, the movie promotes the production of a trustful know-
ledge again, through the roles of the victims. In order to be cathartic
and work as a form of knowledge production, conspiracy narratives ha-
ve to produce a form of truth. As I tried to describe here, truth–telling
is a practice belonging to the victims (and martyrs).
. Conclusion
Through the analysis of the cultural response to terrorisms in Italy
in the s, this article has put conspiracy narratives related to the
so–called “years of lead” in a broader category: that of the politics of
knowledge in the representation of past violent events. My proposal
has drawn on a semiotic reflection, and in particular on Eco’s works
on conspiracy theories and Rancière’s philosophical work on aesthe-
tics of knowledge. However, it has departed from the pathologizing
approach, which does not allow to analyse properly the different mea-
ning effects such theories produce in society and their occasional and
potential cultural function.
In the specific Italian context, the Italian terrorisms have produced
different unknowns that demanded the deployment of different forms
of knowledge and regimes of truth. Conspiracy theories are one of
them, and cut across the Italian cultural spectrum. My reading of
Romanzo di una strage/Piazza Fontana: the Italian Conspiracy describes
the different meaning effects that a conspiracy theory, as a politics
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of knowledge, tries to attain on behalf of its audience: an absolution
of Italian society at large; a process of vicarious victimization of the
audience through an identification with the three protagonists; the
production of a form of (trustful) knowledge that uses the victims to
produce a reconciliatory and cathartic effect.
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. Introduction: the position for the superiority of the Greek Ci-
vilization
In late s, the first private television stations were established in
Greece allowing people to express their opinions, which would not be
expressed otherwise that freely. However, this situation also allowed
people with extreme or absurd opinions to express themselves. In this
framework, some fans of conservatism in Greece, who identified with
the right–wing, extreme–right, even centre–right political parties in
Greece, took advantage of the concept of Greek civilization superiority.
They appeared in private television aiming at justifying that position,
by stressing the risk of the Greek civilization being threatened by
many enemies, each for their own reasons. The position about the
superiority of the Greek civilization was based on a series of opinions,
the most important of which, I believe, are the following:
Contemporary Greeks are the offspring of Ancient Greeks. That
position is the answer to Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer’s (  []: )
claims that after the long co–existence of Greeks with other peoples,
mainly Slavs (ibid: ) and Albanians (ibid: –), the genetic authenti-
city of Greeks has been compromised, based on certain passages of
Byzantine historical writers. The advocates of Greek superiority use
scientific facts. For instance, according to a world research conducted
by the University of Stanford, the University of Pavia, and other uni-
versities, the DNA of modern Greeks accounts for .% Caucasian
race without a Mongolian trace, although there were  years of
slavery (see Semino et al. ).
The Greek nation is unique because it is linguistically unique. In-
deed, the Greek language, which belongs to the Indo-European family
of languages, is one of the few languages with historic continuity
as linguists confirm that it has been spoken continuously in the sa-
me geographical area since ancient times. Christidis (: –)
typically state that «[. . . ] the wholeness of the Greek language is re–
interpreted as a historical uniqueness that proves the superiority of
the Greek language against the other European languages, which it
fertilized».
Indeed, the influence of the Greek language on the other European,
. All these translations from Greek into English are our own.
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mainly, languages was important. As a self–evident position, very
often, the conspiracists in Greece — and not only them — use the
two speeches of Professor of Finance and interim non–party Prime
Minister of Greece Xenophon Zolotas at the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development in  and  respectively. His
English–speaking speeches are considered historic and worthnoting
because they included mainly terms of Greek origin.
The Greek language was perhaps the first Lingua Franca in the
world, it was used to write the Gospel, and for that reason it is con-
sidered together with the Hebrew and Latin languages, according to
the Catholic Doctrine, one of the sacred languages of Christianity. As
Petrounias (: ) mentioned, «the religious currents of the era
and especially Christianity used the most common language, Greek,
to expand. Without the previous expansion of the Greek language, it
would not be possible for Christianity to expand, but then the fact
that the new religion used the Greek language, helped the further
expansion of the language». Actually, many Greeks consider that in
the Gospel is recorded one more point in favour of the importance of
the Greek civilization. In particular, it is mentioned that when Jesus
was informed by His students Andrew and Philip that the Greeks
have come to listen to Him, He uttered that «the hour has come for
the Son of Man to be glorified» (Matthew , –, Mark , –).
The Greek civilization is the basis of western civilization. It is also a
self–evident position which is adopted by the intellectual tradition of
Europe, a continent and a civilization which owes its name to Greek
Mythology. The influence of the Greek civilization is recorded in diffe-
rent times of world history. So, in relation to Roman times it is recorded
that «[. . . ] the general impression that people have about Roman and
Greek is that Roman culture is basically derived from Greek culture»
(McGeough : ), and even the clear position which is pretty popu-
lar in Greece that «the Romans conquered Greece with their army, but
the Greeks conquered them with their culture». But in Byzantine years,
Cunningham et al. (: ) state with great precision the influence of
the Greek language and the Greek civilization.
As has been previously mentioned, conspiracy theories in Greece
. In fact, not few researchers characterize this interaction as “open conspiracy” between
the Roman and the Greek aristocracy (Crawford  []: ).
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have as a common resultant the fact that the superiority of the Greek
civilization is threatened mainly by peoples who contributed less
to the world civilization, are envy of the special position of Greeks,
and/or attempt to vanish them or reduce their contribution to the
world civilization adopting some of their creations or their history.
Actually, it is people whom the Greeks would consider humiliating
to be compared with. In particular, Christidis (: ) records the
opinion that «Hellenism and Greekness are at risk by the northern
underdeveloped usurpers and the Europeans — foreigners — who do
not understand our historic rights, although we — that mythical “we”
— were the ones who civilized them».
The attempt of the Slav–speaking inhabitants of FYROM (Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) to claim emblems and the history of
Macedonians as theirs is part of this framework, although it is known
that, first, they are Slavs and Slavs descended to the Greek territory in
the th century AD, and, second, that they speak a Bulgarian dialect, a
fact that led Bulgaria to recognize them as a state but not as a nation,
and Lubcho Georgievski, FYROM former prime–minister, to receive
a Bulgarian passport. There is a similar attempt by Turkish guides
to present Greek and Roman antiquities of Small Asia as Turkish
monuments, a fact that has caused the sarcastic comments of Greek
tourists and of tourists of other nationalities.
Herzfeld (: –) states that «in the past many Greeks felt indif-
ferent or even loath for any suggestion that compared them with other
(and especially non-European) peoples». Herzfeld (ibid) purports that
«this fact alone however proves how strong has been the influence of
egocentrism that wanted Greeks molded by the norms of western
countries». But why would a people who proclaimed «all in good
measure» and considered non-Greeks as savages (even if this related
to the Other’s language) want to compare oneself with some civiliza-
tions but not with others? Could it be that this conspiracy notion was
imported to the Modern Greek culture? To answer this question we
should first answer what exactly we mean by “conspiracy theories”.
. Sapountzis & Condor (: ), in their research concerning Greek conspiracy
theories about the establishment of FYROM, observe that «[i]n the interview context,
respondents often used conspiracy narratives to present Greek concerns over the esta-
blishment of FYROM as a legitimate reaction to realistic (material) threat, rather than as
motivated by “mere” concerns over identity threat».
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. Theoretical approaches to conspiracy theory and urban legends
In everyday life, the expression conspiracy theories is connected con-
notatively to something concealed that is the result of superior pro-
cesses that common people cannot control and access. The term
conspiracy theory was introduced by Karl Popper (: ), who
described it as:
Whatever happens in society—including things which people as a rule
dislike, such as war, poverty, shortages—are the results of direct design by
some powerful individuals or groups. This view is very widespread [. . . ] and
in its modern form, it is the typical result of the secularization of religious
superstitions [. . . ] the place of the gods on Homer’s Olympus is now taken
by the Learned Elders of Zion, or the monopolists, or the capitalists, or the
imperialists.
The above definition indicates that religion, politics, and economy
are the three parameters on which a conspiracy theory can be built on.
Over the past few years, the first two parameters seem to have been
superseded by the last one as the idea that religious wars and political
changes have an economic background has been increasingly adopted.
However which person, which group, or even which country has the
power for something like that? If we consider correct the viewpoint
that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States remained
the only superpower in the world (to justify the nickname “world’s
leader” for the U.S. president) it is natural to relate first to the U.S.
leadership the conspiracy theories. As Tuckett (: ) states «[m]any
major events, for better or for worse, have occurred as the result of
people behind the scenes who have held the keys to the actions of
the world. Startling discoveries, often stretching far back into history,
can affect the very way our Western thought processes and behavior
patterns are conducted».
That is why Byford (: ) states that «[t]hroughout the world
conspiracy theories have also become a popular means of articulating
an opposition to the forces of international capitalism, globalisation,
. Similarly, the phrase “divide and rule” attributed to UK politics suggested its unof-
ficial participation in political, economic, and religious turmoil in various parts of the
planet.
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America’s military and political supremacy, and the more general rise
of a transnational political order». For Byford (: –):
Conspiracy theories are said to constitute a distinct culture — conspira-
cism — which encompass a specific system of knowledge, beliefs, values,
practices and rituals shared by communities of people around the world
[. . . ] the conspiracy culture is defined (but also sustained) by the tendency
among conspiracy writers to regurgitate, revamp and apply to new cir-
cumstances the body of knowledge, the explanatory logic and rhetorical
tropes expounded in texts, books, or pamphlets written and published by
conspiracy theorists in the past.
Very close to the concept of conspiracy theory is the term urban
legend or myth, which dates back to . Wilton (: ) specifies
that «[u]rban legends do not get their name because they necessarily
refer to events that supposedly happened in cities. Rather, they are
called that because they are tales, usually cautionary, told by people
who live in our modern, urbanized society».
As we will see next, the Greek case contains elements of both cases.
We will also find that a source of the Greek theories of conspiracy
and/or urban legends is the failure of a continued impact by a ci-
vilization that flourished in the antiquity, as is commonly believed,
continued to flourish and influence indirectly the world thought in the
Roman and Byzantine years, but did not manage to keep influencing
— at least to the same degree — the world and European reality after
the collapse of the Byzantine Empire during the Ottoman dominance.
. Leading Conspiracy Theories and Urban legends in Greece: a
representative survey
It is worth–noting that although the private television spread various
conspiracy theories in the Greek public, these theories did not become
the scope of broad scientific research in Greece, perhaps because of
their exaggeration, or even of the metaphysical element involved
in their expansion. Zizakou () mentions that Greek conspiracy
theories and urban legends tend to find lies and distortions behind a
. For Barthes, myths are the dominant ideologies of our time, a set of values, and
truth is no guarantee for them (Barthes  []: ).
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lot of significant personalities and stories. Antoniou et al. () found
in their recent survey that urban legends and conspiracy theories have
increased in the last years and are attributed to the low social trust of
Greeks and the lack of education. According to their data:
a) .% of the people who participated in the survey believe
that the Greek economic crisis was planned by various non–
institutional centers;
b) .% support the theory that the drug against cancer has
been found but not made available to the public yet;
c) .% claim that the attack on the twin towers was the result of
a well–organized plan of the U.S. to impose its foreign policy;
d) % of the survey participants also believing that Neil Arm-
strong’s moon landing in  was staged in a remote location;
e) .% of the survey respondents believe that Costas Simitis
has Jewish origins.
As we observe in the results of the survey by Antoniou et al. (),
the Greeks seem to be intrigued by conspiracy theories and urban
legends that involve mainly the international scene, but also those
that relate to the Greek reality. The graphs of the survey indicate
that conspiracy thinking is very popular to those with primary, high
school, lyceum education, and in the age group – years. The
combination of youth and lower educational level seems to favor the
expansion of conspiracy theories and urban legends, and I believe that
it is a global fact, not only Greek. What happens, however, when the
factor “economic crisis” in Greece is added?
. Conspiracy theories in Greece and crisis
During different types of crisis, political, economic, social, a wide–
spread phenomenon is observed, an outbreak, in terms of conspiracy
theories and urban legends. Especially for Greece, Mylonas (: )
states that:
The financial crisis has multiplied and exacerbated belief in conspiracy
theories. [. . . ] Increasingly the conspiracy theories circulating in Greece
 Evangelos Kourdis
have ceased to be plausible, while also multiplying in number. Thus, while
in the past an event would usually have two interpretations, the official and
the conspiratorial, nowadays it has three or four, if not more, competing
explanations. The financial crisis has evolved into a real economic crisis,
expressing itself in job loss and diminished purchasing power for the average
Greek. This has led the population to new levels of uncertainty about the
future, which provides a fertile ground for conspiracy theories to emerge
and spread.
Technology development contributed highly to the spread of these
theories since through the electronic press and the social media there
is a chance to widely spread these theories and especially through
the anonymity of a nickname. For Keely (: ), «[a] conspiracy
theory is a proposed explanation of some historical event (or events)
in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of
persons — the conspirators — acting in secret». However, as we will
see next, although the description of Greek conspiracy theories has
secrecy as its main characteristic, those who spread them not only
they are anonymous but also they strive for large publicity. How is
this explained?
As we will see next, this choice is based on the fact that these theo-
ries glorify indirectly the glorious past of the Greeks, by empowering
national conscience, operating in a unified way for the nation, and
infusing a vision to younger generations. As in the Old Testament,
the prophets who prophesied the fate of Israel were accepted by the
people as carriers of the Holy grace, and their words were the lodestar
for the Hebrew nation, I would dare claim that similarly the represen-
tatives of archeolatry and the Byzantine Empire are faced positively
by a large part of the Greek people.
The economic crisis in Greece is a favorable condition for their
expansion as the common denominator is the supremacy of the values
and the way of thinking of our ancestors. So it is not accidental that
the slogans of public demonstrations studied during the financial crisis
(Kourdis ) indicate the emergence of a new national integration
paradigm, based on a revival of the classicist values. This is why
slogans are condensed historical memory (the struggle of Greeks in
 against the Ottomans, in  against the Italians, and in –
against the colonels’ junta).
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It is interesting, as we will see next, that the economic crisis fueled
the Greek readership with new theories about new enemies of Helle-
nism — as, for instance, the Germans who are accused on a European
level of orchestrating the economic crisis — although negative stereo-
types were revived about them, in place of the positive stereotypes
that existed.
Especially for the Germans, the fact that in Germany there is a
numerous Greek community that transfers to Greece the positive
image that it receives from a people who is disciplined, hardworking,
with social welfare, a very good education system, and a very good
healthcare system, resulted in the negative stereotypes structured for
the only time this people came in contact with the Greek people, du-
ring World War II, mainly through the press, mainly TV and printed,
to revive stereotypes long forgotten and discarded.
. Hellenocentrism and archeolatry
The conspiracy theory I will present is Hellenocentrism/Archeolatry.
It should be mentioned that apart from Hellenocentrism as conspiracy
theory there was also Historical Hellenocentrism, a cultural–literary
movement in early th century Greece and had nothing to do with
the conspiracy theories. Vayenas (: ) defines Hellenocentrism
as «[. . . ] a conviction of the uniqueness of the Greek element and
its superiority over everything foreign — a conviction that usually
leads elevating Greekness to the level of an absolute value». Metsos &
Mossialos (: ) speak for «[. . . ] a country used to seeing itself as
the centre of the whole world suffering from what has been termed
as the syndrome of Hellenocentrism». The term Hellenocentrism
refers to the movement or wave of people and literature that express
views compatible with the syndrome of Hellenocentrism. This trend
seems to be represented by Kyriakos Velopoulos.
The term Archeolatry refers to followers of the ancient Greek reli-
gion and/or admirers of the ancient Greek civilization. Mouzelis (:
. For Vayenas (: ), Hellenecontrism is a kind of traditionalism that excludes
some of the most well–known writers of the time and overemphasizes the discovery of a
‘silenced’ Greek tradition (such as the writings of the general of the Greek Revolution for
Independency Ioannis Markiyannis, the popular art of Theofilos, etc.).
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) defines Archeolatry as «obsessive preoccupation with and blind
admiration of everything ancient». Currently, the term is often used
for generic movements about the superiority of ancient Greeks, in
various TV shows. As in mainstream conspiracy theories, Archeola-
trists are classified into religious and anti–religious enthusiasts. Some
conspiracy theorists of Archeolatry, such as Dimosthenis Liakopoulos,
are devout Christians believing that true Orthodoxy can protect and
guide the people against the anti–religious New World Order. On the
other hand, there are factions who oppose Christianity, which they
consider a part of the Zionist plot to exterminate the original Ancient
Greek religion.
.. The Kyriakos Velopoulos’ case
Kyriakos Velopoulos is a -year old Greek politician and former
parliament member, and television personality. Born in Germany,
his parents were immigrant peasants. He studied journalism. He is
a member of the Academy of the Greek language in Germany and
a member of the Union of Writers of Northern Greece. He was
a member of ONNED, the youth organization of the Right Party
New Democracy (ND) until , and ideologically defines himself
as belonging to the ‘patriotic ND’. He was a member of the Popular
Orthodox Rally, the nationalist populist party of Georgios Karatzaferis,
and in the  parliamentary elections he got elected as deputy of
Thessaloniki with the political party LAOS. In , a number of
former deputies of the populist and fairly Eurosceptic radical right–
wing LAOS, among them Kyriakos Velopoulos, deserted their party
in order to join the New Democracy party.
As a journalist he has worked in a number of radio and television
stations, such as TV Thessaloniki, Ermis, Best, Top, Orion, TeleAsty,
where he presented his two major shows The parliament and Greek
Vision, in which he promotes his books (see fig.). He is a cofounder
. See http://www.thenile.co.nz/books/Books-LLC/Epsilonism-Epsilon-Team-
Kyriakos-Velopoulos//.
. This political movement was covered by the conspiracy facet that «[t]he leader
of LAOS, Giorgos Karatzaferis, reacted to this development by suggesting that the US
and Israeli embassies in Greece were seeking to destroy his party» (Vasilopoulou &
Halikiopoulou : ).
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Figure . Kyriakos Velopoulos promoting his books
of the Hellenocentric association “Δίαυλος Ελλήνων” (Channel of
the Greeks).
The titles of his books are typical of his ideology. Below there are
Velopoulos’ most important books from , when the economic
crisis burst out, until now when the world economic crisis has been
transformed since  into a purely Greek crisis. It is also worth
mentioning that during the last decade Velopoulos promoted greatly
the book, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, published in Greece by
several extreme–right–wing publishers such as Ouranos and Mpimpis.
In , he republished the book Μακεδονία και ΄Υβρεις (Macedo-
nia and offenses) by Kadmos editions in Thessaloniki. In this book,
Velopoulos “reveals” all the statements by Greek politicians from the
past till now about the fight against provocative FYROM inhabitants
and foreign anti-Greek centers. Velopoulos attempts to shed light on
the dark sides of this national problem in relation to people who pull
anti-Greek strings and act within Greece against the Greek nation. In
my point of view, a historic linguistic perspective proves that FYROM
inhabitants are of Greek origin but unfortunately of the so–called
Janissaries, whereas certain documents reveal the obscure role of peo-
ple beyond suspicion who voluntarily or not betray Macedonia behind
the scenes while on stage they speak differently.
In , he publishes the bookΕλλήνων μυστικά (Greeks’ secrets)
with Kadmos editions in Thessaloniki. In this book, the achievements
of the ancient Greek spirit are described, which the whole world prai-
. See http://www.biblionet.gr/main.asp?page=results&Titlesid=
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ses and celebrates as these have unique features, and are portrayed in
the Arts, Sciences, History, Literature, Philosophy, with a strong hu-
man element. According to the writer, the ancient Greek civilization
is by definition an advocate of the highest good — spiritual freedom,
and the cogitation and insightfulness of ancient Greeks penetrated
successfully all the fields of knowledge, and had fruitful outcomes
which the humanity has been enjoying ever since.
In , the book Η Ελλάδα του 21ου αιώνα. Γεωστρατηγική —
Γεωpiολιτική Αλήθειες και ψέματα (Greece in st century. Geostrategy
— Geopolitics. Truths and Lies) was published by Kadmos editions.
In a time of directed information, the writer aims for the book to
become a treasure of knowledge for the pure Greek citizen and the
historian of the future, who would like to study unknown sources for
the Greek — and beyond — issues of the st century. Some of the
topics addressed are: the clash of civilizations, global government, the
dirty war of pharmaceuticals, the shocking data about “green growth”
and GMO products, the confidential Kissinger report, the Treaty of
Lausanne, Russia, Putin and the neoByzantine Sendersky circle, and
the geostrategical place of new Russia.
In , the book Η Ελλάδα στην piαγκόσμια σκακιέρα της γεωpiο-
λιτικής (Greece in a world chess game of geopolitics) was published
by Kadmos editions. The book states that countries, small or large (in
power or territory), run a race of empowering their role irrespective
of the price their peoples have to pay, and focuses on how the Big
Powers act in a framework of instability and insecurity worldwide.
In , Velopoulos’ book Epsilonism: Epsilon Team was published
by Books LLC in the USA in English. Epsilonism describes an escha-
tologist conspiracy theory trend, usually (but not always) revolving
around the so–called Epsilon Team, called that way by its emblem
that is a Delphic Epsilon “Ε” [“epsilon” is the fifth letter of the Greek
alphabet] connected back to back (see fig. ). The term was introduced
and propagated approximately around  through Greek magazines
. See http://www.politeianet.gr/books/-belopoulos-kuriakos-
kadmos-ellinon-mustika-.
. See http://www.zougla.gr/books/article/i-elada-tou-ou-eona-geostratigiki-
geopolitiki-aliies-ke-psemata.
. See https://www.ianos.gr/i-ellada-stin-pagkosmia-skakiera-tis-geopolitikis-
.html.
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Figure . Epsilon Team’ symbol
and books whose subject is conspiracy theories and the paranormal
(for instance, the Delphic Epsilon appears on ancient Greek monu-
ments, on Inca monuments, but also on UFOs). Usually, Greeks refer
to this conspiracy theory as “epsilonism” in a disapproving manner.
The Epsilon Team is viewed as a secret retaliation weapon meant to
attack and destroy anyone “threatening” Hellenism.
In the book Χρεωκοpiία και κερδοσκόpiοι (Bankruptcy and profi-
teers) published by Kadmos editions in , the author accuses the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central
Bank and the credit rating agencies of their leading and also obscure
and misleading role in the structure of world economic reality, calling
the readers to help Greece to free itself from the bankruptcy of the
spirit in the present and in the future of the country.
In , the book Η εpiόμενη μέρα. Προτάσεις για την οικονομία.
Μαζί μpiορούμε (The next day. Proposals for the economy. Together
we can make it) published by Kadmos editions involves the state of
big fear for the exit of Greece from the eurozone and the euro by
addressing the question if there is a solution for the suffering country
or the absolute destruction is the only way. In , Velopoulos
. See https://sites.google.com/site/programmeepsilonproject/greek-epsilon-team.
. See http://www.thenile.co.nz/books/Books-LLC/Epsilonism-Epsilon-Team-
Kyriakos-Velopoulos//.
. One of the main researchers of Group E, Gialourakis (: ) mentions that
«the members of the Group are members of secret Greek brotherhoods that hold in their
hands all the secrets of the Secrets, such as mind reading, beaming, the philosopher’s
stone, prediction of the future, the secrets of the soul (psychogenesis and immortality),
knowledge of the secret scripts, lost civilizations, but also mystical languages».
. http://www.biblionet.gr/book//Βελόpiουλος,_Κυριάκος/Χρεοκοpiία_και
_κερδοσκόpiοι.
. See http://www.kadmos.org/contents/el/d_politiki_epikairotita_.html.
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publishes the book Η κερκόpiορτα της piροδοσίας (The back door of
treason) where he develops that in Greece there are Greeks with a
glorious past, who love their country more than their own life, but also
people who live literally at its expense . In , the book Η Ελλάδα
στη δίνη της piαγκόσμιας σκακιέρας (Greece in the swirling world
chess game) was published by Kadmos editions. Velopoulos addresses
the inhuman reality the Greek people has experienced over the past
few years, which is due to the geopolitical place of Greece, according
to him, and its energy resources. In relation to its energy resources, a
clandestine war has been set in the world economic–political chess
games, unparalleled with any other in world history.
In , the book Η Ελλάδα της κρίσης (Greece in crisis) is publi-
shed by Kadmos editions. The author stresses that all the develop-
ments in the wider area of the Mediterranean are totally connected
with the issues of the Greek EEZ, energy and the large volume of
deposits in the basin of the Mediterranean. A number of scientific
findings prove that Greece has made huge mistakes in relation to the
mapping and delineation of its EEZ, and in the search for and extrac-
tion of hydrogen. Also, the writer mentions the fuel of the future, gas
hydrates, which is in abundance in Greece. There is extensive men-
tion to Papandreou family and the crimes committed during their
governance and how, based on them, Greece reached the bankruptcy
stage. Data are provided to show that the Greek political leadership is
driven by the German leadership. There is also mention to the death
of the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church, Christodoulos,
whose role in internal affairs was crucial, and data are revealed about
the fall of the former prime–minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, the
role of the secret services and the issue of wiretappings related to the
government of that period.
In , the writer publishes the book Πριν το τσουνάμι της Ελ-
λάδας (Before Greece’s tsunami) where he explains why Greece is
led to a definite bankruptcy, what exactly the country’s lenders want,
. See http://www.malliaris.gr/Η-ΚΕΡΚΟΠΟΡΤΑ-ΤΗΣ-ΠΡΟΔΟΣΙΑΣ-978-
960-6851-55-1.
. See http://www.malliaris.gr/Η-ΕΛΛΑΔΑ-ΣΤΗ-ΔΙΝΗ-ΤΗΣ-
ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΑΣ-ΣΚΑΚΙΕΡΑΣ-978-960-6851-63-6.
. See http://www.malliaris.gr/Η-ΕΛΛΑΔΑ-ΤΗΣ-ΚΡΙΣΗΣ-978-960-6851-73-
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which the geostrategical role of Greece is, and which the claims of
the international capital from our country are in terms of fossils and
ports. In the book, there is also mention of the political party Golden
Dawn, Islam, and Turkey. Going through international agreements
and treaties, it is proved that the memorandums signed and the way
they were imposed on Greece are illegal. The innovation of the book
is that it includes sample documents which the readers can use to
defend oneself legally against bank forfeiture and debts to the National
Insurance Organization (IKA in Greek) and the revenue tax office.
In , Velopoulos’ book Το 4ο Ράιχ είναι εδώ Η διάλυση της
Ευρωpiαικής ιδέας (The th Reich is here. The dissolution of the Eu-
ropean ideal) was published by Kadmos editions, where the writer
addresses the powerful narrative of the European values on which the
structure of a unified Europe was based. Unified Europe is a unique
undertaking in the political history of humanity, whose strengths are
tested and seems to have reached its limits. Germany plays an impor-
tant role in this course of Europe and, as indicated by the facts, it does
not seem interested in returning to the noble ideas once strived for
by Europe.
.. Dimosthenis Liakopoulos’ case
Dimosthenis Liakopoulos lives in Thessaloniki. He set up his own
publishing company and bookshops in Athens and Thessaloniki for
the promotion of his own books. These bookshops are now closed.
He keeps a website with online book sales.
In his TV shows (see fig. ) and internet publications, he presents a
conspiracy theory that is quite unusual. Being a high–school teacher
of physics, his work relates to mechanical engineering, electricity,
thermodynamics, mathematics, nuclear science, the philosophy of
natural science as well as optical fibres, microelectronics and astrophy-
sics. His work consists of apocalyptic texts and novels which combine
commonly acceptable data with mythical and legendary texts, and data
from unverified and unknown sources. Specifically, he uses: Ancient
Greek literature, references to people he allegedly met while doing
. See http://www.protoporia.gr/prin-to-tsoynami-tis-elladas-p-.html.
. See https://www.ianos.gr/to-o-raix-einai-edo-.html#tab-description.
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Figure . Dimosthenis Liakopoulos promoting his books
his military service in the NATO forces, undefined sources on today’s
Brotherhood of Darkness.
Liakopoulos is considered to be the most famous member of the
Epsilon Team. He combines data from various sources, passes them
through the filter of a Christian Orthodox teaching, and concludes
that the Hellenic race has played and will play a significant role in
History. Liakopoulos seems to take advantage of the pride of the
Greek people in its origin and the fact that Greece has maritime
borders with Catholic Italy, the headquarters of Papism, on one side
and on the other with Muslim Turkey, which occupies the capital of
the modern Greek state, Constantinople.
One of his most important publishing works which continued in
the period of crisis is the multi–volume edition (– volumes) of the
work Γιατί και piως ζουν ανάμεσά μας (Why and how they live among
us). One of the basic theories Liakopoulos develops is that of the supre-
macy of the Russian technology which will bring the ‘blonde nation’
of the Russians to world power again, under President Vladimir Putin.
According to this theory, Russian will need five months to dominate
in the upcoming World War III thanks to its hyper–weapons. Ortho-
dox Christianity will spread throughout the world and the Russian
Empire, under the guidance of the Greek nation, will bring peace to
the world.
Another popular theory of Liakopoulos is that of Elohims and
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Nephelims. According to Liakopoulos, past–life regressions to Atlantis
show a struggle between two groups of people: the ones who were
exclusively attached to the satisfaction of their senses and to material
goods, the so–called “Sons of Belial”, and the “Sons of the Law of
One”, who were spiritual beings and were trying to save the world
from annihilation through meditation and teaching. Belial is one of
the kings of the Nephelim, the half–human half–animal creatures
who posed as gods to many ancient civilizations. Belial has a human
body and the head of a wolf and belongs to the race of the Malcheh,
the giant wolf people. The Nephelim were born out of the union of
 fallen Elohims (angel–like shapeshifters) with terrestrial women.
Elohims and Nephelims theory does not seem useful any more,
while it was successful in the past decades. The new economic situa-
tion needs answers and theories concerning the new role of Greece
next to a new super power, such as Russia, outside the E.U and NATO.
But why would such a fantasy make sense? Within the new power
blocs being formed in the world (Russia, China and Brasil), such
ideas seem to many people to answer many questions about what is
happening today.
. Conclusions
For Keely (: ), «[. . . ] a conspiracy theory need not propose
that the conspirators are all powerful, only that they have played
some pivotal role in bringing about the event. They can be seen as
merely setting events in motion». We observe that in Greek conspiracy
theories and urban legends nations are usually involved, which are
powerful in terms of politics and military (USA, Russia, Israel), and
finances (Germany), and pull the strings by involving less powerful
states (Turkey, FYROM, Albania).
Also, in general, conspiracy theories and urban legends do not
have well–known theorists to spread them for fear of becoming a
public laughing stock by those who will not believe them and who
are considered by conspiracists that they usually control the media.
. See http://www.spiritualinsight.gr/en/the-council-of-the-light-and-dark-forces/-
to-simvulio-tu-fotos-ke-i-dinamis-tu-skotus.
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However, we also observe that in the case of Greece, this is not true.
The theorists of conspiracies are well–known people and advocate
their positions publicly and strongly. They are Hellenocentric issues
based on Archeolatry and on a semiotic level we can claim that the
past is recalled as a force of resistance to the emerging insecurity.
These two conspiracy theorists, Velopoulos and Liakopoulos, com-
bine history with contemporary issues. Their ideas hardly follow
official scholarly premises or religious positions. A dominant aspect of
their communication skills, which also explains their success, is their
eloquence, passion, simplicity, and friendliness that support a style of
defense against ‘evil’. This is the best mechanism of communication
with a nation ‘in crisis’ feeling the injustice of sudden and unexplained
poverty. These theories have existed since at least early nineties and
now they are almost mainstream acceptable views. On a social level,
the results of these theories create networks of power in the media
which then goes to the parliament.
It is true that in a country of the European North, as Greece is,
suffering from the economic crisis, the reader of conspiracy theories
and urban legends would expect the demonization of Germany as the
country which, as widely believed, manages informally the European
Union and imposes the rules of financial policy to it, as happens to
all other EU member states facing similar problems. But Archaeolatry
and Hellenocentrism underplay in Greece this reaction to stereotypes
which the media revive and spread, and continue to characterize the
theories and legends that already existed before the crisis. It would
be too hard to flourish a conspiracy theory against Germany with
solid ground in Greece since the German people only came in contact
with the Greek people once, during World War II. I believe that if in
the end a conspiracy theory or an urban legend about Germany in
Greece emerges, then the harm done to the European ideal will be
immense but, hopefully, reversible.
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 : Cipro e le teorie del complotto dopo le imposizioni della
Troika nel 
: Conspiracy theories have many different forms and have been
observed in a wide variety of different countries and cultures. Many
significant political and social events have been shown to co–occur with
conspiracy theories and various studies suggest that people are likely to
endorse and define them for a number of reasons. The article aims to
discuss how and why these speculations seem plausible to some people.
It focuses on conspiracy theories related to the  Cyprus Financial
Crisis.
: Conspiracy Theories; Financial Crisis; Troika Levy; Cyprus .
. Introduction
In contemporary society, people are frequently faced with events that
threaten the social order, such as terrorist attacks, wars, and econo-
mic crises. These events sometimes give rise to conspiracy theories.
Conspiracy theories are an attempt to explain the ultimate causes of
events as secret plots by powerful forces, rather than as overt activities
or accidents (McCauley and Jacques, ). Why people believe in
conspiracy theories? Sunstein and Vermeule () suggested many
different reasons: The first reason is that human beings lack personal
or direct information; they must rely on what other people think. In
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some domains, people suffer from a “crippled epistemology”, in the
sense that they know very few things, and what they know is wrong.
The second reason is that rumours and speculation are inevitable whe-
never a bad event has occurred. They mention that «[m]ost people
are not able to know, on the basis of personal or direct knowledge,
why an airplane crashed, or why a leader was assassinated, or why
a terrorist attack succeeded, or why many people stayed in an area
despite what turned out to be an imminent natural disaster» (ibid,
p. ). The third reason lies in the fact that sometimes a conspiracy
theory is not only accepted by people with low thresholds for its
acceptance but as the informational pressure builds, many people,
with somewhat higher thresholds, begin to accept the theory too,
mentioning that «[. . . ] when many people hold that belief, those with
even higher thresholds may come to accept the theory, leading to
widespread acceptance of falsehoods» (ibid, p. ). The fourth reason
is that sometimes «[. . . ] people profess belief in a conspiracy theory,
or at least suppress their doubts, because they seek to curry favour.
Reputational pressures help account for conspiracy theories, and they
feed conspiracy cascades. In a reputational cascade, people think that
they know what is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonethe-
less go along with the crowd in order to maintain the good opinion of
others» (ibid, p. ) or their reputation. The last reason they refer to,
is that «[i]nformational and reputational cascades can occur without
any particular triggering event. But a distinctive kind of cascade arises
when such an event is highly salient or cognitively “available”» (ibid,
p.). The aforementioned reasons that attempt to explain why and
when conspiracy theories rise provide useful information that can
be used to interpret and clarify a series of such cases. Additionally,
Douglas and Stutton () conducted a study in order to investigate
why people endorse conspiracy theories. Their results suggest that
«[. . . ] people would be more likely to endorse conspiracy theories to
the extent that they project their own willingness to conspire onto the
alleged conspirators» stating also that «[. . . ] people who have more
lax personal morality may endorse conspiracy theories to a greater
extent because they are, on average, more willing to participate in the
conspiracies themselves» (ibid, p.). Another study by Van Prooijen
and Jostmann (, p.) revealed that «[. . . ] the perceived morality
of authorities influences conspiracy beliefs particularly when people
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experience uncertainty’ claiming that ‘they found evidence for this
in the context of both an existing conspiracy theory as well as in the
context of people’s ad hoc conspiracy belief formation following a
fictitious newspaper article» and «[a]s such, their findings represent
a robust phenomenon that generalizes across different conspiracy
theories and suggests that subjective uncertainty and the perceived
morality of authorities jointly influence people’s tendency to believe
or disbelieve in conspiracy theories» (ibid, p.). They also remark
that «[u]ncertainty leads people to be more attentive to the morality
of authorities’ actions, which subsequently influences belief or disbe-
lief in conspiracies» (ibid, p.). Moreover, in their study, Bost and
Prunier (, p.) «[. . . ] tested the prediction that conspiracy beliefs
will strengthen as the apparent motive of the alleged conspirators
strengthens». Their findings suggested that «[. . . ] participants tended
to examine conspiracy claims critically» and that «[w]hen asked to
evaluate fictional conspiracy theories, participants regarded the claims
as relatively implausible, and were sensitive to the quality of the direct
evidence; claims with supporting documentation, such as e–mail or
financial records, received higher likelihood ratings than claims sup-
ported only by hearsay or vague recollections» (ibid, p.). On the
other hand, all participants were influenced similarly by information
about the outcome for the alleged conspirators. Furthermore they
comment that «[t]hough the stories contained no information about
whether the conspirators had intended to gain, or were even aware
in advance that they could gain from the event, participants rated the
conspiracy claims as more likely to be true if the alleged conspirators
had experienced a positive outcome than if they had not» and that
«[t]he fact that post event gains were equally as convincing as direct
evidence in this study suggests that participants over–relied somewhat
on apparent motive as evidence for the theory» (ibid, p.). However,
some researchers propose that the endorsement of specific conspiracy
theories depends to a large extent on individual differences in the
general tendency to adopt such beliefs, that is, a general conspiracy
mentality. This term was originally phrased by Moscovici () who
understood the notion of conspiracy as implying «that members of
a confession, party, or ethnicity [. . . ] are united by an indissoluble
secret bond. The object of such an alliance is to foment upheaval in
society, pervert societal values, aggravate crises, promote defeat, and
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so on». (p. ). As such, a conspiracy mentality then describes the
general propensity to subscribe to theories blaming a conspiracy of
ill–intending individuals or groups for important societal phenomena
or, in more abstract terms, the tendency to subscribe to «general con-
spiracist beliefs» (Swami et al., ). According to Moscovici (),
conspiracy is the work of a minority because the minority is alien and
it is «either composed by foreigners or it is financed by and in league
with foreign powers» (p.). He claims that it is easy to distinguish
«the hand of the stranger» behind the beliefs and actions of a minority.
However, Moscovici () identified a specific way through which
minority may exert influence. For Moscovici, ‘minority influence’ is
the form of social influence that is attributed to exposure to a consi-
stent minority position in a group. Minority influence is generally felt
only after a period of time, and tends to produce private acceptance
of the views expressed by the minority.
However, Imhoff and Bruder () remark that individual diffe-
rences in conspiracy mentality have important consequences as they
predict negative attitudes such as prejudice against powerful societal
groups.
It is obvious that the subject of conspiracy theories is a complex one
and involves social, psychological and political dimensions that seem
to have the power in influencing and promoting specific meanings.
. Conspiracy theories behind the Troika levy in Cyprus during
March 
Much has been said throughout the socio–political history of Cy-
prus in respect of conspiracy theories, especially during the country’s
decolonisation period from Great Britain (–), and since its
state independence in  until today. Throughout the time however,
historical evidences have provided information that diminished the
proliferation of such theories, therefore it seems more appropriate for
this paper to discuss current conspiracy theories, that still remain in
conspiracy level, and in particular the ones that deal with the Troika
levy in . A good overview of what happened in March  is
described by Theocharides () on the blog of Global Center for
Political Finance as follows:
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[. . . ] Cyprus became the epicentre of a financial storm that threatened
markets in Europe and many other regions of the globe. The Eurogroup
(meeting of the Finance Ministers of the Eurozone) helped to initiate the
financial crisis on March th by formulating a plan involving a bail–in of
depositors across all banking institutions (foreign and local) in Cyprus, in
order to save the country’s banking system and in particular the two biggest
banks: Laiki Bank and Bank of Cyprus (BOC, hereafter). The decision called
for a levy (haircut) of .% for all insured deposits (less than C,) and
.% for all uninsured deposits (above C,) in order to raise C.
billion needed for their recapitalization. The agreement also called for an
extra bailout package of C billion for the country’s fiscal needs over
the next several years as well as for recapitalization of other banks and
cooperative institutions. This was the first time that a bail–in approach
was used by the Troika (comprised of the European Central Bank (ECB),
the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
in dealing with the Eurozone’s sovereign debt and banking crisis, and it
rattled financial and currency markets across the globe. A few days later, the
Cypriot parliament decided to vote against this package to help the country,
causing an even bigger stir of markets, fearing of an eventual bankruptcy
of Cyprus. Then, on March th a new and final decision was reached that
closed down Laiki Bank, wiping out all uninsured deposits, transferring
Laiki’s assets and liabilities (insured deposits and funding taken through the
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) of the ECB) to BOC, and applying a
massive haircut on the uninsured deposits of BOC (ended up to be .%)
in order to recapitalize the bank.
This of course has provided, other than distress to the people, a
prosperous field for conspiracy theories to grow. The decision was
announced by the mass media, without any notice (or any other
proactive sign), to investors and depositors on a Saturday morning
when the banking system was closed for a long weekend including
green Monday that followed, causing unsafety, ambiguity, anger and
shock. Theocharides (ibid) has also commented that,
Although most of the blame of what transpired in Cyprus lies on Cypriot
shoulders, at the same time, the way the Troika handled the Cyprus’ econo-
mic problem was by no means effective. This was the first time that a bail–in
with substantial haircuts for depositors was used to solve a European sove-
reign debt and banking crisis, and left a precedent that rattled the trust to
the banking system, not just in Cyprus but also in other Eurozone countries.
Instead of using the European Stability Mechanism to recapitalize banks
directly and thus break the link between a banking crisis and a sovereign
crisis, they decided to shut down one of the banks and enforced the other
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one to recapitalize using their depositors’ money. The banking sector, so
vital for the economy, has lost its credibility and will take a lot of time and
effort to regain it.
In respect of the Troika levy in Cyprus during March , we
can argue that there are mainly five dominant conspiracy theories
expressed in many online forums, social networks, blogs and every-
day discussions. These were around a variety of ‘scenarios’ and in
particular, they could be aligned as follows in random order:
a) “Punishment” of the Republic of Cyprus by the EU in respect
of the rejection of the  Anan plan referendum that was held
among Greek-Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus and Turkish-
Cypriots in the occupied areas of the island (note that in , a
coup was staged in Cyprus by the military junta, then in power
in Greece, for the overthrow of the then President of Cyprus,
Archbishop Makarios. Turkey used this excuse to launch an
invasion in Cyprus in which the Turkish troops eventually
occupied and still do, % of the island’s territory) The 
Anan plan was a United Nations proposal aimed to resolve the
aforementioned problem:
The EU has been frustrated and angry with the Greek Republic of Cyprus
since . The EU was led to believe that both North and South Cyprus
would agree to the terms of the Annan Plan and that the island would be
re–united. Referenda took place in both parts of Cyprus. Voters in North
Cyprus were in favour of reunification by a large majority, but voters in
the South rejected the Annan plan. In the South, the government, church
and most of the media publicly criticised the Annan plan and promoted its
rejection. This was badly received in Brussels. (Hardy )
b) “Punishment” of the Republic of Cyprus by the US as it pre-
vents the negotiation processes of Turkey to become member
of the European Union.
The ongoing and persistent hostility of the Greek Republic of Cyprus
towards Turkey’s application to join the EU has been a severe strain on
relations between the EU and Turkey. The increasing importance of Turkey
as an economic power in the Middle East and its crucial role in a resolution
of the conflict in Syria have led the US to broker better relations between
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Turkey and Israel. The US has been quietly working behind the scenes to
smooth the path for Turkey’s accession to the EU. While the Obama admini-
stration can claim some success in the recent thawing of relations between
Turkey and Israel, the predictable intransigence of the Greek Republic of
Cyprus has been a source of ongoing irritation in both Washington and
Brussels [. . . ]. (ibid.)
c) “Teach” the Republic of Cyprus about “who is the boss” and
remind the importance of respecting hierarchy in seeking mo-
ney when needed. As a member of the European Union, the
Republic of Cyprus should first consult the EU/Troika and not
act autonomously.
The response of the Greek Republic of Cyprus to mounting financial pres-
sures was to seek and secure a .bn euro loan from Russia in . This was
an attempt by the government to circumvent the Troika and its financial
disciplines. (ibid.)
d) “Show” the Republic of Cyprus the economic benefits of a
possible reunification of the island in respect of the natural
gas resources that were located at the southern coast of Cy-
prus. Greek and Turkish Cypriots should benefit from the gas
resources regardless of where they live–free or occupied areas.
Turkey has now positioned itself as a savior for the island of Cyprus and are
likely to benefit from the conspiracy. The Turks have made proposals for the
exploitation of the natural gas resources-Firstly, the island becomes a united
state of Cyprus and there is joint exploration of the resource. Secondly,
Greek and Turkish Cypriots form a joint committee to exploit and market
the resource, or thirdly, there becomes a permanent two state solution for
the Cyprus problem. (ibid.)
e) Other people claimed that all these happened in order for
German Chancellor Angela Merkel to terminate any money
laundering taking place in Cyprus.
According to Dempsey () «[. . . ] in the end, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel to get what she wanted: an end to the endemic system
of money laundering and corruption in Cyprus». Such a decision of
course would inevitably followed by several political consequences,
«even at the cost of further deterioration of relations between her and
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Russian President Vladimir Putin since» (ibid.). Dempsey () also
remarks that,
Russians will almost certainly bear the brunt of the levy. Russian compa-
nies and individuals hold between C billion and C billion, or around
one–third of the total bank deposits in Cyprus, according to reports. For a
country with a GDP of C billion, that said a lot about the island’s depen-
dence on foreign investors, of which Russia is one of the leaders. . . Some
analysts suggested that the EU should have involved Russia in resolving the
Cypriot crisis. In practice, that would have given Russia a seat at discussions
among eurozone countries. But German politicians were decidedly against
the idea. Merkel, who had very cool relations with Putin and was highly
critical of his country’s human rights record and corruption, agreed. Ho-
wever, she also recognized Putin’s reluctance to rescue Cyprus, which has
been a long–term supporter of Russia. For any kind of Russian involvement,
Germany would have insisted on an end to Russian money laundering in
Cyprus. Merkel had received a detailed, confidential report by the German
Federal Intelligence Service stating that an EU rescue plan could benefit
Russian oligarchs, who had deposited C billion in Cypriot banks. Since
the report was leaked, opinion polls showed that a strong majority of Ger-
mans wanted Merkel to take a tough stance against Cyprus. For the public,
this particular euro crisis was inextricably tied to Russian oligarchs, money
laundering, and the lack of transparency in the Cypriot banking system.
. Conclusion
Like all conspiracy theories, unless scientific historic or other forms
of accepted evidences are provided, they remain fictional at the use of
their audiences. People can define, start, recycle and shape conspiracy
theories to provide explanations and answers for various types of
questions and needs. In the case of the Troika levy in Cyprus during
March , the main focus of the theories was developed around
the Cypriot problem of the Turkish invasion in , as well as in
respect of the geopolitical dimensions that this subject takes in terms
of its solution and overall political power. In general, the need of
telling and distributing conspiracy theories in Cyprus, with regard
to the financial crisis in  and the Troika levy, seem to appear
for ‘consoling’ distructive experiences that deal with loss of money,
property and political power.
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Previous examples provide a strong support on how different con-
spiracy theories as a cultural phenomenon are associated with preju-
dice and negative attitudes. So how are we to deal with conspiracy
theories? In a governmental level, Sunstein and Vermeule () gave
us five ways conspiracy theories can be dealt: ) Governments can
ban the conspiracy theories, ) they can tax those who disseminate
the theories, ) the government can engage in counter speech, in an
attempt to discredit the theories, ) they can hire private parties to
engage in counter speech, and ) they can engage in informal dialo-
gues with those disseminating the theories. Sunstein and Vermeule
think that the best way is to combine , , and  through cognitive
infiltration of the conspiracy group.
Another way to deal with conspiracy theories is through the edu-
cational system in all stages. Conspiracy theories arise because people
are not often able to understand and explain unpredicted situations,
something that can be rather superstitious and unreasonable. Stu-
dents and individuals need to develop, during their education years,
critical thinking skills. They would then become more judgmental
with conspiracy theories using historical, scientific, and socio–cultural
evidences, as well as develop skills, abilities, and values critical to
assess everyday life.
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 : Letting the cat out of the bag
: The essay investigates the conspiratorial dimension of Heideg-
ger’s political philosophy and relates it to its notorious adhesion to
Nazism. Heidegger, the essay claims, believed in the existence of a me-
taphysical Jewish conspiracy and reacted to it by concocting his own
conspiracy, a series of sibylline texts whose political content would have
been manifest after the foreseen defeat of Bonn’s government. The essay
also ponders on the reasons for which this dimension of Heidegger’s
thought was not only ignored but also frequently dissimulated by his
post-WWII commentators, including, and perhaps above all, by those
who belonged to leftist ideologies.
: Heidegger, Black Notes, Hermeneutics, Politics, Metaphysics.
. Coming out
Pare che avanti negli anni Heidegger avesse confidato a un assistente
«non ho ancora tirato fuori i gatti dal sacco» («die Katze noch gar
nicht aus dem Sack gelassen»). Il detto si lega a un altro modo di dire
piuttosto diffuso in Germania: «ich kaufe doch nicht die Katze im
Sack», ovvero «non compro certo il gatto chiuso nel sacco» (cioè senza
vederlo), che rimanda ai tempi in cui al mercato si spacciavano gatti
per conigli. Insomma “non compro a scatola chiusa”. L’affermazione
di Heidegger si può intendere così: la situazione non è ancora chiarita,
ci sono ancora sorprese in serbo. E magari: «non ho ancora vuotato il
sacco».
∗ Maurizio Ferraris, Università degli Studi di Torino.

 Maurizio Ferraris
Alla luce dei Quaderni neri pubblicati — con un coming out che
è la circostanza più rivelativa in tutta questa vicenda — per esplicita
disposizione di Heidegger, tutto diventa più chiaro: Heidegger non
aveva ancora vuotato il sacco, il mondo filosofico aveva comprato la
sua filosofia a scatola chiusa. Ci sarebbe da ironizzare, nello stile di
Bernhard nel Nipote di Wittgenstein, quando i parenti austriaci di Witt-
genstein sostengono (nessuno è profeta in patria) che il suo pensiero
è tutto un bluff e che è riuscito a convincere gli inglesi di essere un
grande filosofo, ma non è così semplice.
Il segreto di Heidegger non è il nazismo: da decenni è noto che
l’adesione di Heidegger al movimento fu tutt’altro che un incidente,
“una fesseria” (eine Dummheit), come sosteneva lui nel dopoguerra
e senza molta convinzione (poco mancava che la definisse “una ra-
gazzata”), ma durò almeno sino a Stalingrado, e in realtà anche dopo,
come dimostra la scelta di pubblicare questi quaderni. Questa, a mio
parere, è la vera e grande novità. All’inizio del dibattito successivo
alla pubblicazione dei Quaderni neri si è letto da qualche parte che
sarebbero stati “scoperti”, come una rivelazione incresciosa, ma si
tratta di un errore e più esattamente di una razionalizzazione, nata
dal fatto che appare inconcepibile che Heidegger avesse realmente
predisposto la pubblicazione di questi scritti che mescolano nazismo,
antisemitismo e culto paranoico del segreto.
. Ermetismo
Di qui, a mio avviso, la domanda fondamentale: come è possibile che
un uomo che era già stato processato, e costretto ad abbandonare
l’insegnamento per qualche anno, a causa della sua compromissione
con il nazismo, abbia dato la disposizione di far uscire questi quaderni
di tenebra dopo la pubblicazione della sua opera omnia? Tanto più che
in questi quaderni si trova, per così dire, il cifrario che rende possibile
la decodifica (come vedremo) di molti dei suoi ermetismi? Sembra un
gesto di parresia poco consono al carattere di Heidegger («finché può,
mente», diceva Hannah Arendt) e insieme di autodenuncia, una volon-
taria auto–umiliazione che compromette definitivamente il tentativo
di riabilitarlo e di vedere nel nazismo un elemento estrinseco rispetto
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alla sua filosofia. Dunque, perché? A mio parere per due motivi, uno
storico–politico e l’altro filosofico.
Sul piano politico, Heidegger era persuaso che la Germania di Bonn
non avrebbe avuto una vita più lunga della Germania di Weimar, e
che all’uscita dei quaderni il vento della storia sarebbe già tornato a
soffiare nel verso giusto (per lui). Era del resto anche la convinzione
di Hitler nel suo testamento politico: quando la grande cospirazione
ebraica che aveva decretato la catastrofe del suo progetto fosse stata
finalmente debellata, il mondo avrebbe compreso la sua grandezza.
Il motivo storico–politico è la premessa del motivo filosofico. Hei-
degger è sempre stato ermetico, e deliberatamente, per la delizia dei
suoi interpreti ma anche per un motivo più sostanziale. Scriveva nel
dopoguerra: «Non è dal , dalla pubblicazione di Essere e tempo,
che ho iniziato a osservare il silenzio nel pensiero, ma in Essere e tem-
po, e anche prima, e sempre». E nei quaderni neri spiega che il suo
messaggio non è «mai, e a ragion veduta, comunicato in maniera
immediata», e che Noi restiamo nel fronte invisibile della Germania
spirituale segreta». Era il principio di Hitler in Mein Kampf (letto e po-
stillato da Heidegger): «Tedesco, impara a tacere!». Questa segretezza
rispondeva, nelle intenzioni di Heidegger, a un’altra segretezza, quella
della «guerra spirituale segreta» condotta dall’ebraismo, a cui si deve
rispondere con un’altra guerra mistica e filosofica.
Ora davvero tutto è più chiaro: l’insistenza di Heidegger sul po-
lemos come essenza del mondo, la definizione mistica della verità
come alètheia, cioè come non–nascondimento (quanto dire: viviamo
anzitutto in un mondo di ombre e di inganni, e solo al veggente è
data la verità), l’idea che la storia della metafisica fosse un destino di
decadenza a cui la Germania era chiamata a reagire sono pezzi di
questa strategia. Totalmente immerso nella sindrome del complotto
ebraico, Heidegger risponde con un complotto fatto in casa: scrivere
dei testi misteriosi, poi pubblicarli in gran parte dopo la morte (in vita
Heidegger pubblicò relativamente poco, in gioventù preferiva essere
considerato il re segreto della filosofia tedesca), e infine, quando il
grande corpus ermetico fosse stato alla luce del sole, in una Germania
risollevatasi dalla catastrofe, dare alle stampe la chiave ermeneutica, la
stele di Rosetta che consentisse di decifrare il vero significato di tutto
l’arduo (e a mio avviso futile) meditare sull’Ultimo Dio, l’Evento, l’Ab-
bandono, il Gestell, il Geviert, la Lichtung e l’Essere che non è l’essere
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dell’ente.
Questa interpretazione, lo riconosco, sembra ispirata alle tesi del
“nazismo magico”. Ma, da una parte, è storicamente provato che il
nazismo aveva una componente mistica, che risultava perfettamente
consona allo spirito di Heidegger, così legato alla Germania segreta, al
manierismo spirituale e sensuale di Angelus Silesius, agli oscuri sermo-
ni di Meister Eckhart. D’altra parte, senza postulare questa componente
mistica, risultano incomprensibili affermazioni come quella contenuta
in Che cosa significa pensare?, secondo cui “non abbiamo ancora inco-
minciato a pensare”, quasi che tutta la storia, sino a quel momento,
non fosse stata che una copertura, un equivoco, una macchinazione. E
perché è così grave che «la mancanza di Heimat» possa diventare «un
destino mondiale», come leggiamo nella Lettera sull’umanismo? Perché
significherebbe che hanno vinto i «nomadi semiti».
Visto che il Brief è una lettera indirizzata nel  a Jean Beaufret e
avvia tutto il recupero postbellico di Heidegger in Francia e a sinistra,
il segreto nasconde anche una sorta di sberleffo: Beaufret lo riabilita,
e traduce i suoi testi che ispireranno un grande filosofo ebreo come
Derrida e un grande poeta ebreo come Celan, Frédéric de Towarnicki,
combattente alleato, va a Freiburg nel  insieme ad Alain Resnais
per dargli la solidarietà della cultura nel momento della massima
disgrazia politica, e Heidegger continua ad alludere al complotto
ebraico.
Sembra di leggere un libro di Gide. Però adesso tutto è, non dico
chiaro, ma comprensibile, a cominciare dall’apparentemente assurda
decisione di disporre la pubblicazione di questi quaderni. Essi sareb-
bero usciti in un tempo in cui, forse, il “pensiero calcolante”, che
Heidegger attribuisce essenzialmente all’ebraismo, sarebbe stato sosti-
tuito da un “pensiero meditante”. Prima di quel giorno, la segretezza
sarebbe stata di rigore. E fa uno strano effetto, alla luce di tutto questo,
pensare a Pietro Chiodi, partigiano di Giustizia e libertà, intento a
tradurre Essere e tempo, misurandosi con una prosa che, come abbia-
mo visto, Heidegger definisce come deliberatamente escogitata per
«osservare il silenzio nel pensiero». Davvero uno strano effetto, una
ironia sinistra, che diventa tanto più forte se si considera che, come
leggiamo nei quaderni, Husserl non aveva capito Essere e tempo perché
era ebreo, cioè senza patria, non radicato nella Heimat e non accasato
nella Hutte.
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. Antisemitismo
Si è detto che quello di Heidegger è un “antisemitismo metafisico”.
L’espressione ha qualcosa di curioso. Anzitutto, che l’antisemitismo
sia metafisico non toglie che sia antisemitismo bello e buono (a ognu-
no la sua specialità: Goering aveva un antisemitismo aeronautico,
Goebbels un antisemitismo mediatico, e Heidegger un antisemitismo
metafisico). Come tale, questa affermazione è la caricatura di un’altra
affermazione ben più seria, di Derrida in Dello spirito ().
Qui Derrida osserva che il nazismo non è l’irruzione di qualcosa di
estraneo al mondo dello spirito, e che affonda le sue radici nei punti
più alti della cultura europea:
Il nazismo non è nato nel deserto. Lo si sa bene, ma bisogna sempre ricor-
darlo. E anche se, lontano da ogni deserto, fosse spuntato come un fungo nel
silenzio di una foresta europea, l’avrebbe fatto all’ ombra di grandi alberi,
sotto il riparo del loro silenzio e della loro indifferenza, ma nel medesimo
terreno. Non redigerò il catasto di questi alberi che formano in Europa una
immensa foresta nera, non ne enumererò la specie. Per ragioni essenziali,
la loro presentazione trascende lo spazio di una semplice mappa. Nella loro
fitta tassonomia, porterebbero il nome di religioni, di filosofie, di regimi
politici, di strutture economiche, di istituzioni religiose o accademiche. In
breve, di ciò che si chiama confusamente la cultura o il mondo dello spirito.
(De l’esprit, Galilée , p. )
Fin qui, tutto bene. Ma se appunto passiamo dalla tesi alla sua ca-
ricatura, quella dell’ “antisemitismo metafisico”, le cose cambiano.
Insistere sul fatto che l’antisemitismo ha una radice culturale significa
introdurre una sorta di determinismo: se sei intellettuale, con una
certa formazione, e magari se sei tedesco, non puoi che essere antise-
mita e filonazista. Il che è assurdo: il caso Dreyfus è avvenuto a Parigi,
Auschwitz era in Polonia, e Thomas Mann, che parlava la stessa lingua
di Heidegger, si oppose fermamente al nazismo e fu costretto all’esilio.
Aggiungerei che insistere sull’antisemitismo metafisico comporta un
indugiare nella prolissa e poco interessante produzione di Heidegger
successiva a Essere e tempo e ai testi immediatamente circostanti, come
I problemi fondamentali della fenomenologia o Kant e il problema della
metafisica, che tuttavia non aggiungono niente al libro del  ma
sono particolarmente interessanti per discutere dell’antisemitismo di
Heidegger.
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. Politica
Se sull’antisemitismo — metafisico o meno — di Heidegger non ho
molto da aggiungere, vorrei aprire un capitolo su cui invece non si
è ancora ragionato abbastanza. Nessuno ha mai pensato a fare di
Thomas Mann un eroe della sinistra, mentre il rettore nazista di Fri-
bugo lo è stato, almeno in Francia e in Italia. Come è possibile? Prima
della pubblicazione dei Quaderni neri Gianni Vattimo (“La Stampa”,
//) ha sostenuto che Heidegger era nazista ma non razzista.
Vien quantomeno da chiedersi: ammesso e non concesso che si possa
dare il caso di un nazista non razzista, non è già abbastanza grave esse-
re stati nazisti e continuare a esserlo, come riconosce Vattimo quando
con approvazione osserva che Heidegger non ha voluto essere un
filosofo “democratico” (tra virgolette) e “disciplinatamente atlantico”?
A occhio si direbbe che è grave, molto grave.
Eppure proprio quelle virgolette a “democratico” e a “discipli-
natamente atlantico” suggeriscono il motivo per cui non solo si è
sottovalutato il nazismo di Heidegger ma lo si è letto come un autore
di sinistra. Come si spiega che Heidegger abbia realizzato — come
una sorta di Lili Marleen speculativa, e senza muovere un dito — la
singolare operazione di traghettare nella sinistra postmoderna parole
d’ordine, termini e concetti che appartenevano alla visione del mondo
nazista? Come si spiega che il massimo successo di quella che un
contemporaneo, Lévinas, definiva «la filosofia dell’hitlerismo» abbia
avuto luogo a sinistra e non a destra, e dopo la guerra? L’arcano si
svela abbastanza facilmente.
Da una parte, parlare nel dopoguerra, a destra e in Germania, di
autori nazisti come Heidegger, Jünger, Schmitt (e di un loro riferimen-
to comune, Nietzsche) sembrava implausibile, nel momento in cui
la cultura tedesca era, comprensibilmente, interessata a voltar pagina.
Diversamente andavano le cose in Francia e in Italia, ed è così che si
spiega l’edizione di Nietzsche di Colli e Montinari, così come il rilan-
cio di Heidegger prima in Francia (spesso in funzione anti–sartriana,
a partire dalla Lettera sull’umanismo), poi in Italia. Questo sdogana-
mento (è il caso di dirlo, visto che comporta un passaggio di frontiere,
e poi un ritorno in Germania attraverso la Francia e gli Stati Uniti)
suscitava le ironie di un uomo di spirito come Jünger, che osservava
di aver trovato tutte le sue opere nella biblioteca di Mitterrand, ma
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che del resto c’erano già tutte nella biblioteca di Hitler.
Tuttavia, a mio parere, c’è un secondo motivo più determinante.
Nel dopoguerra, è come se la sinistra avesse avocato a sé il monopolio
del politico. Politica e sinistra erano coestensive, dunque ogni pensato-
re del politico, fosse pure il giurista di Hitler, come Schmitt, diventava
fruibile a sinistra. Il merito principale dell’analisi di Faye in Heidegger.
L’introduzione del nazismo in filosofia (che proprio per questo si diffe-
renzia da precedenti studi sul nazismo di Heidegger) sta nell’illustrare
con chiarezza e profondità è l’intima struttura politica del pensiero
di Heidegger, che lo rendeva particolarmente riciclabile in un’epoca
iper–politica come il Sessantotto. La storia e la decisione sono l’unica
realtà (cosa che era in sintonia con quel funesto antirealista che è
stato Hitler, ma anche con quegli antirealisti più benintenzionati che
proclamavano la necessità della immaginazione al potere), si tratta di
combattere l’oggettività in nome della solidarietà, il freddo intellettua-
lismo in nome del radicamento in una comunità di popolo: «Questo
interrogare, attraverso cui il nostro popolo sopporta il proprio essere
storico, lo patisce nel pericolo, lo conduce sino alla grandezza del suo
compito, questo interrogare è il suo filosofare, la sua filosofia».
Questo movimentismo filosofico appare molto evidente in un se-
minario del ’ omesso dalla “Opera completa” (che dunque, osserva
giustamente Faye, è tale solo di nome) così come in un seminario
su Hegel del medesimo periodo, dove l’intento fondamentale di Hei-
degger è politicizzare in massimo grado l’argomento, per cui, per
illustrare la tesi della identità di razionale e reale, decreta che il Trat-
tato di Versailles non è reale. L’insistenza sulla storicità, intesa come
quel divenire che può giustificare qualunque cosa, è la chiave di volta
del costruttivismo heideggeriano, che si traduce, in sostanza, in un
trionfo della volontà di potenza. Quando i postmoderni hanno soste-
nuto che qualunque tesi e qualunque verità devono essere indicizzate
alla loro epoca lo facevano con intenti emancipativi, ma ripetevano
l’argomento di Heidegger in difesa del Führerprinzip. Desideroso di
trasferirsi a Monaco per stare più vicino a Hitler (come si legge nella
corrispondenza con la Blochman), forse almeno in una occasione
ghost writer del Führer, Heidegger opera una continua trasposizione
del presente nell’eterno, del politico nel metafisico, e viceversa.
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. Metafisica
Per quella che non è certo l’unica ironia della ricezione heideggeriana,
la decostruzione della storia dell’essere in cui si impegna Heidegger
dopo Essere e tempo diventa un modo, per lui e per i suoi seguaci, di con-
tinuare a parlare, ininterrottamente, di metafisica. Il capovolgimento
del platonismo è un modo per parlare di Platone e per rilanciare l’idea
del filosofo–re e dell’illuminato; l’essere che non è l’essere dell’ente
e che non si identifica con il sommo tra gli enti diventa un modo
per parlare dell’Ultimo Dio; proprio come, inversamente, parlare di
polemos significa vestire in panni greci la mobilitazione totale di Jünger.
La complessità, la perversità della strategia è duplice. Da una parte,
superare la metafisica è per l’appunto un modo per renderla onnipre-
sente, come quando Heidegger sostiene che Aristotele è implicato
nel funzionamento del motore diesel. Dall’altra, l’aria eternizzante
che spira sull’Olimpo filosofico viene a coprire riferimenti politici e
contingenti tutt’altro che metafisici.
Così, nutrita, sul palco, da Eraclito e Platone, Aristotele e Cartesio,
Kant e Hegel, e dietro le quinte o nel camerino da Dostoevskij, Jünger,
Spengler e chissà chi altro, la storia dell’essere disegnata da Heidegger
nei seminari su Nietzsche degli anni Trenta e Quaranta ne rilancia
tutta l’ontologia fatalistica e titanica, tranne il riferimento alla scienza.
Anzi, ciò che vien proposto è tutt’altro: un Nietzsche aquila solitaria
in dialogo segreto con altri grandi, un sacrificato come Hölderlin che
attende riscatto dalla nuova contingenza storica. Per il resto, abbiamo
una fusione di Nietzsche e di Jünger, una accentuazione del dinami-
smo: si tratta di superare la metafisica, la quale si caratterizza come
oblio dell’essere, confuso sotto gli enti e con gli enti, per vincere il
nichilismo pensando veramente l’essere.
Heidegger propone la questione dell’essere in termini insieme geo-
politici e teologici. Da una parte, c’è il tema del nichilismo eroico,
dell’accettazione risoluta della fine degli dei. Stretto tra Oriente e Oc-
cidente, fra Stati Uniti e Russia (scriverà Heidegger nella Introduzione
alla metafisica del ), il popolo metafisico per eccellenza si prepara a
un nichilismo eroico — come ricordava Farias, il paragone sarà rilan-
ciato, mutatis mutandis, dal premier iraniano Mahmud Ahmadinej¯ad,
che in gioventù era stato discepolo di Ahmad Fardid (–), che
si proclamava “compagno di strada” di Heidegger. Dall’altra, c’è l’at-
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tesa dell’ultimo Dio, di un nuovo essere che ritorni a guidare con il
decisionismo di un Führer un mondo secolarizzato.
Non è un caso che i seminari su Nietzsche procedano di pari passo
con gli abbozzi per i Beiträge, in cui si parla appunto dell’essere come
evento, e si allude misteriosamente alla figura di un ultimo Dio, di
un Dio a venire destinato a salvare la terra dal nichilismo, e un po’ a
sorpresa (ma confermando i sospetti sull’identità storica dell’ultimo
Dio), nel § , si menziona la mobilitazione totale jüngeriana. In
effetti, in Heidegger il cortocircuito tra l’eterno e il presente è sempre
all’orizzonte. Ad esempio, il tempio greco di cui Heidegger parla in
un altro scritto del , L’origine dell’opera d’arte, era stato, nelle prime
versioni pubbliche della conferenza, lo Zeppelinfeld di Norimberga,
allestito in stile classicheggiante (si ispirava all’altare di Pergamo) per
accogliere il discorso di Hitler, che anche qui Heidegger identifica con
il divino. Il che, chiudendo il cerchio, getta una luce sinistra sulla sua
dichiarazione del  secondo cui «ormai solo un dio ci può salvare».
Il tratto distintivo di questa ontologia dinamica in cui, sotto il se-
gno dell’evento, essere e nulla coincidono, è, per così dire, il passo di
marcia, con un tono che è strettamente d’epoca, tanto è vero che si
ritrova in quell’altra grande dottrina nichilistica che è la Teoria generale
dello spirito come atto puro di Gentile, concepita, nel , sull’onda
dell’entusiasmo per l’ingresso in guerra. Lo stesso entusiasmo che
troviamo, nei corsi heideggeriani sul nichilismo, quando viene cele-
brato il crollo della Francia sotto i colpi delle armate corazzate dei
Generale Guderian: «In questi giorni noi stessi siamo testimoni di
una misteriosa legge della storia, cioè che un giorno un popolo non è
più all’altezza della metafisica scaturita dalla sua stessa storia, e questo
proprio nell’attimo in cui tale metafisica si è mutata nell’incondiziona-
to». E più avanti, con un ragionamento che ricorda Goebbels quando
denuncia il terrorismo dei bombardamenti angloamericani: «Se og-
gi, per esempio, gli Inglesi distruggono le unità della flotta francese
all’ancora nel porto di Orano, da punto di vista della loro potenza
ciò è del tutto “giusto”; infatti significa soltanto: ciò che è utile al
potenziamento della potenza. Con ciò è detto al tempo stesso che
noi non possiamo mai né mai dobbiamo giustificare questo modo
di procedere; ogni potenza, dal punto di vista metafisico, ha la sua
ragione. E soltanto per impotenza passa nel torto».
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. Ermeneutica
Non stupisce che, molto prima che Heidegger vuotasse il sacco, i suoi
interpreti si siano dovuti impegnare in un processo di denazificazione,
che ha avuto tante vie. Anzitutto quella storico–grammaticale, per
cui a leggerlo bene, a capirlo e a metterlo in contesto, si sciogliereb-
bero tutti gli equivoci. Così François Fédier, che negli Scritti politici
di Heidegger postilla la chiusa della allocuzione del  maggio 
in cui Heidegger scrive: «Alla nostra grande guida, Adolf Hitler, un
Sieg Heil tedesco» con parole che sembrano uno scherzo di cattivo
gusto: «Ancora oggi l’espressione “Ski Heil” — senza la minima con-
notazione politica — viene impiegata, tra sciatori, per augurarsi una
buona discesa» (p.  della traduzione italiana, Casale Monferrato,
Piemme ). Questa trasformazione del Sieg Heil nello Ski Heil ha
dell’inquietante, soprattutto se si considera che il Wink, il “gesto” o
“cenno” con cui l’Ultimo Dio, nei Contributi alla filosofia, annuncia la
possibilità di un “altro inizio” e di un superamento del nichilismo è,
con ogni probabilità, il saluto nazista.
Ma c’è anche stata — e continua a esserci, per strano che possa
apparire — una via mistico–allegorica, che traducendo in modo in-
comprensibile il gergo heideggeriano produce una denazificazione
per confusione. Come ad esempio nel caso del brano riportato più
sopra, che è stato reso non trent’anni fa, bensì l’anno scorso, come
segue: «Questo interrogare, nel quale il nostro popolo aderge il suo
geniturale adessere, ossia lo tiene erto per entro la tentazione e fa
sì che esso si erga nell’extraneum della nobiltà del suo incarico, que-
sto interrogare è il suo filosofare, la sua filosofia» (Che cos’è la verità?
edizione italiana a cura di Carlo Götz, Milano, Christian Marinotti Edi-
zioni, ). Con questa ermeneutica anche gli ordini di manovra di
un Sonderkommando sul fronte orientale possono essere trasformati
in poemi simbolisti o in ricette di cucina.
E cosa dire poi del Discorso di rettorato, il cui titolo, di solito tradotto
pianamente e inequivocabilmente con L’autoaffermazione dell’universi-
tà tedesca è stato ritradotto con La quadratura in se stessa dell’Università
tedesca? E che contiene, fra i tanti, un passo dove l’unica cosa (for-
se) comprensibile è la voglia di menare le mani, o, alternativamente,
di tagliare il bilancio? «Solo la lotta mantiene aperto l’antagonismo
e impianta nell’intero corpo dei docenti e degli allievi quell’intona-
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zione fondamentale a partire dalla quale l’autosquadrantesi quadra-
tura in se stessa dell’Università autorizza il risoluto inquadramento
senziente di sé a trasformarsi nella genuina capacità di far quadrare
autonomamente il proprio bilancio».
L’ammirazione fa stravedere, o non vedere, e questo non vale solo
per Heidegger. Per esempio, in Mon cœur mis à nu Baudelaire scrive
«Bella congiura da organizzare per lo sterminio della razza ebraica.
Gli ebrei, bibliotecari e testimoni della redenzione» (Œuvres complètes,
texte établi, presenté et annoté par Claude Pichois,  voll., Gallimard, Paris,
–, vol. I, p. ). Parole spesso a dir poco sottovalutate: Claude
Pichois, il curatore, commenta il passo dichiarando che «qualsiasi anti-
semitismo è da escludersi», mentre Benjamin nel Passagen-Werk, J,
le minimizza classificandole come “gauloiserie”. Non diversamente,
Roberto Calasso, direttore editoriale della Casa Editrice Adelphi ha
sostenuto, a proposito del Nietzsche di Heidegger tradotto dalle sue
edizioni nel : «Nel Nietzsche il giudizio di Heidegger sul nazismo è
trasparente e devastante» («Nietzsche, ultimo scontro», conversazione
con Antonio Gnoli, La Repubblica,  ottobre ).
. Filosofia
Ovviamente a questo punto, e in conclusione, ci si può chiedere: che
cosa ha a che fare tutto questo con la filosofia? Di che cosa ci stiamo
occupando, ad esempio, in questo volume? Dell’antisemitismo di un
tedesco del secolo scorso, o di un grande filosofo? So che molti, forse
la maggior parte di coloro che sono qui, ritengono che Heidegger
non sia un grande filosofo, e che l’antisemitismo, il nazismo, e tutto
sommato l’inconsistenza filosofica che Heidegger rivela quando inco-
mincia a parlare della storia dell’essere, negli anni Trenta, colpisca già
Essere e tempo. Io non sono di questo avviso. Se riconosciamo che non
si fa filosofia con le buone intenzioni, dobbiamo anche riconoscere
che non si fa filosofia con le cattive intenzioni, e che l’opera, alla fine,
è quello che conta. Per quanto oscura, contestabile e in ultima istanza
Kitsch sia la categoria del “grande filosofo”, resta che per esserlo un
libro basta e avanza, e Heidegger quel libro lo ha scritto. O, se può
spiacere (il che è legittimo) dare il titolo di “grande filosofo” a un na-
 Maurizio Ferraris
zista, diciamo che Essere e tempo è un grande libro, e imbarchiamone
l’autore sull’ultimo treno per Norimberga.
Lexia. Rivista di semiotica, 23–24
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. Introduction
In November , the show trial of Rudolf Slánský called worldwide
attention to Prague. It was a high profile trial as a former general se-
cretary had been arrested on charges of so–called «conspiracy against
the state». As the verdict had been decided on beforehand, outside
the courtroom, the trial was not about an adjudication of a (criminal)
case, which means, it was no trial in a juridical sense (Allo : ).
Show trials as the Slánský one were in fact only the tip of the iceberg
of post–war Stalinist terror, because show trials were extremely de-
manding, as well as risky. By no means were they necessary to have
a person executed, which could be (and was) done through purely
administrative processes.
Stalinist show trials were staged for different reasons. They were
performances in order to destroy someone politically and morally by
means of fabricated recriminations. They were about the narrative
and staging: the trials resorted to conspiracy theories, and they did so
in order to explain the world. This is put into effect in a defined place
and time, with the help of a multitude of participants and a centrally
planned dramaturgy.
The Prague trial was by no means a singular event. Similar stagings
took place in other countries of the Soviet sphere of influence. This
article focuses on the Socialist satellites in the Eastern part of Europe
from a historical perspective. It explores — against the background of
historical case studies — two aspects which are related to the circum-
stance that conspiracy theories are meant to be disseminated amongst a
given society: that, first of all, they are staged before a local audience and
then secondly communicated — with the help of written texts, voice
and visualization — to a wider audience outside the courtroom.
. Historical context
During the so–called First Cold War, the late s and the s,
conspiracy theories served to support the state. It was the leading
. Of the more than . victims out of a population of  million, the smallest part
— about  — was sentenced in show trials.
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Communist elites who turned to these interpretive patterns as an
answer to the overall crisis, but also as a solution to specific problems
— to economic, social and political problems. In the Czechoslovak
case, the social acceptance of the leading role of the Communist Party
was gone by the time of the Slánský-trial, whereas in other People’s
Democracies, it had never been achieved in the first place.
However, with Stalin being the victor in the Second Word War, the
local Communist Parties received their legitimisation otherwise. And
with the help of so–called Soviet security advisors, the pseudo–legal
concept of the Great Purges was transferred to Western satellites
— the precondition being an implementation of the Soviet judicial
system. This meant implementing a legislation that was shaped in the
USSR in the s in opposition to the, until then, valid concept of
legal nihilism. The new definition in the words of the Soviet Institute
of Law — following the position of Andrey Vyshinsky — reads:
«The law is the overall sum of the rules of conduct that express the
intentions of the ruling class [. . . ]. Implementation of these rules is
guaranteed by the power monopoly of the state» (Wyschinski :
). Law thus was to become «the instrument of state administration
and the state–driven change of society» (Brink : ).
Furthermore, the international dimension of the Cold War led to
the convenient theory of the «growing intensity of class struggle».
To establish the “enemy” within, local Party leaders collaborated
with the secret police. But who was targeted as an “enemy of the
people”? Communist members of the International Brigades of the
Spanish Civil War, leading members of pre–war — now exiled —
democratic parties, non–communist resistance fighters during the
Nazi occupation experienced in underground work, soldiers having
fought within the ranks of the Western allies, as well as members of
the Catholic Church. In short: people with contacts or even networks
in the West.
. After the war, the Communist Party had won elections without manipulating the
electorate: it gained victory in the  elections (one third of Parliamentary seats); the
February  Communist coup d’état, supported by the USSR, focussed on the theory of
“intensified class struggle”, relying on students, peasants, lower–middle class citizens.
. See below.
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. Showtrials
Looking for a definition of the term ‘show trial’, often referred to
in scholarly journals as well as in the popular press, one is left with
rather unsatisfactory results: no coherent or consistent meaning seems
to be attached to it (Allo : ). On the one hand, a show trial
represents a form of media trial insofar as both share the importance
of the media and the public inside and outside the courtroom. Also,
a show trial can be seen as a political trial in the sense that it deals
with charges of public political interest. However, following the legal
theorist Otto Kirchheimer, we are dealing with a very special form
of political trial, eliminating opponents and adversaries according
to some «prearranged rules», thus providing a «prefabricated and
alternative reality» — an «admixture» of real occurrences and fictitious
happenings (Kirchheimer : , ). Kirchheimer calls it a “Stalin–
type trial” (Kirchheimer : , ). In his classic study on post–war
political trials in Eastern Europe, George Hodos uses the term “show
trial” in an even narrower sense when restricting himself to trials
of leading communists only. The aim, according to Hodos, was «to
personalize an abstract political enemy, to place it in the dock in flesh
and blood [. . . ]» (Hodos : xiii).
To that aim show trials offer an elaborate and refined narrative of
fabricated crime. This can be observed in the hundreds of pages of
the published proceedings. What they offer, and I follow German
historian Dieter Groh in that, is logic, coherence and a «causal nexus
[. . . ] superior to reality» (Groh : ). Let me give you one example
in the notion of Anti-Zionism (read Anti-Semitism) and the relations
with Israel. Initially, Moscow had hoped to make Israel an ally in
the Near East and supported Czechoslovak secret policy of arms
exports. By , following Israel’s orientation towards the United
States, this (secret) policy turned out to have been a mistake. In the
Slánský-trial narrative, however, this mistake of Party policy appears as
a crime — as a crime of anti-Party conspiracy, as a crime committed
according to a plan (Leites and Bernaud : ). Insofar, show
trials are suitable objects of research when communicating conspiracy
. For the fusion of facts and fiction in conspiracy theories, cf. Anton (: ) and
Meteling (: ).
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theories is brought into focus. This holds true for a number of reasons.
I restrict myself here to two major points: first, to their performative
character, second, to show trials as media events.
. Performativity
Show trials can be seen as performative acts. In these cases, conspiracy
theories are presented — mostly in a courtroom, sometimes even
in a theatre. Many contemporaries noticed the theatricality of these
events, and researchers have done so since. If we follow this notion, we
have to take into account the script, the production and the casting of
roles, but also the performance on stage, the individual presentation as
well as the danger of the unforeseen in this live event (Fischer-Lichte:
: , ). Let us go back for a moment to the Great Purge trials of
the s, which at that time divided the contemporaries. An English
reviewer published the following misjudgement of what he called
a “faithful transcription”: «No one [. . . ] could still believe that the
whole proceedings were staged and that some playwright wrote the
 pages in advance for the defendants to act». It is interesting to
see how the same reviewer perceived the state prosecutor’s behaviour,
namely that «in general Vishinsky, instead of putting leading questions
to them [the accused, UC], invited them to tell their own stories».
Andrey Y. Vyshinsky, Stalin’s chief prosecutor and known for his
prominent role in all three Moscow Trials, could rely on the accused
and their preparation in multiple rehearsals to memorize the scrip-
ts. Vyshinsky’s performance presents not only a dialogue with the
defendants or witnesses, as is to be expected of state prosecution, it
. As can be seen in the first East-German show trial, the so–called trial of Herwegen,
Brundert and accomplices, taking place in April  in the then biggest German theatre,
the Saxony-Anhalt Theatre in Dessau in front of an audience of more than  people.
Cf. Prozess Herwegen, Brundert und Komplicen, [online: www.schauprozesse.de, June ,
].
. Dudley Collard in his review on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs:
Review of the Court Proceedings of the Pjatakov-Radek–trial of . In: International
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs –) Vol. , No.  ( July ), pp.
–, at p. f.
. Collard, Review, p. .
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also presents a simulated dialogue with the audience, essentially a
monologue:
[. . . ] a question may arise, which, indeed, some people have actually raised,
namely: How can these people who fought for socialism for so many
years, people who blasphemously called themselves Bolshevik Leninists, be
accused of these monstrous crimes?
Needless to say, he gives an answer to that question. It is the pre-
text for an elaborate narrative, a state–sanctioned narrative of a “great
conspiracy”. The theatrical climax belongs, however, to the defen-
dants and their confessions. But the trial is not about individual guilt
and physical liquidation; it is about the reinterpretation of history in
conspiratorial terms.
This trial sums up the struggle waged against the Soviet state and the
Party [. . . ] This trial [. . . ] has once again revealed the face of real, genuine
Trotskyism — this old enemy of the workers and peasants, this old enemy of
socialism, loyal servant of capitalism [. . . ] this trial has reminded and shown
us all the main stages of the historical path traversed by the Trotskyites and
Trotskyism, which spent more than  years of its existence on preparing
for its final conversion into a storm detachment of fascism [. . . ].
And in the trial of Bucharin in , Vyshinsky states:
In the light of the present trial, these facts, already covered with the dust of
archives, again revive and begin to speak in the loud voice of an impeacher
demanding that the culprits be called to account [. . . ] before the tribunal of
history [. . . ].
History is thus retold. It is retold in a performative act, an act of
exposure, of un–veiling, un–masking. This turned out to be the model
for the post–war satellite–state trials as well. In Prague, chief prosecu-
tor Josef Urválek referred to the significance of this performance:
. Report of Court Proceedings: The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre: heard
before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, Jan. –,
. Moscow: People’s Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., , p. .
. Report of Court Proceedings: The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre, ,
p. , .
. Report of Court Proceedings in the case of the Anti-Soviet „Bloc of Rights and
Trotskyites”. Moscow: People’s Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., , p.  (Italics,
UC).
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Our People’s Democratic court has so far never dealt with a case of criminals
like those who today are in the dock. Day by day the Czechoslovak people
have witnessed a chain of treason without parallel in the country’s history.
It was a dichotomous view of the world that state prosecution and
judges unveiled: a world of darkness and evil, of infamous crimes
to destroy the bright world of working people, the «architects of a
beautiful future». But there was, according to Urválek, a way out:
It surely wasn’t easy, to uncover them. [. . . ] They really reached the peak
of hypocrisy, when they hid their dark past before the Party and the whole
nation and masked their infamous work of diversion [. . . ]. They succeeded
in this masquerade, but in the end their alien inside was uncovered.
The performative act of unveiling is fundamental in the conspirato-
rial narrative. In the case of the show trials, justice and theatre reveal
their dislimitation (Kossmann : ). It was for the audience to
hear and see: a performance with a fatal ending for the defendants,
but with a placable ending for the audience inside and outside the
courtroom. Placable, because answers were given: answers to help
understand the drawbacks in the hope for a new and better life in
Socialism.
In the performative act, the use of language creates reality (Sasse
: ; Kossmann : ). The speech of the prosecutor and the
confessions of the defendants are substitutes for the lack of evidence.
The audience is included in the performative act and plays an active
role. It is a participation that evolves into complicity.
. Proceedings of the Trials of Slansky, et al. in Prague, Czechoslovakia, November
–,  as broadcast by the Czechoslovak Home Service, p.  (Italics, UC).
. Translation from the (longer) German court proceedings: Prozess gegen die Lei-
tung des staatsfeindlichen Verschwörerzentrums mit Rudolf Slánský an der Spitze. Prag:
Justizministerium, , p. .
. Translation from the (longer) German court proceedings: Prozess gegen die Lei-
tung des staatsfeindlichen Verschwörerzentrums mit Rudolf Slánský an der Spitze. Prag:
Justizministerium, , pp. f.
. For “participation” cf. von Saldern : –; for the role of the audience Fischer-
Lichte .
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. Communicating conspiracy theories
Show trials are media events. Their dramaturgy is aimed at scandali-
zing the populace with the help of effective mediation. Therefore, the
visual as well as the oral impact needs to be taken into account. Let us
begin with the latter.
.. Orality
First of all, it should be mentioned that orality is constitutive for
criminal procedure itself. This also holds true for Socialist criminal
procedure. It is interesting to see that in the Soviet Union, Vyshinsky,
the prosecutor, also played an important role as chief lawyer. Now,
Vyshinsky in his law textbooks referred to his prosecution speeches so
that long oral passages were canonized in written form (Wyschinski
). His major body of work on criminal law was still in use after
the war, and much of this written work was translated and stron-
gly influenced the satellites. His oral contributions in the Moscow
Trials thus were taken over in East European law textbooks. As, for
instance, in the case of this revealing passage:
[. . . ]. We have a conspiracy, we have before us a group of people who conspi-
red to bring about a coup d’etat, who organize themselves and for a number
of years carried on a conspiracy which connected the conspirators with
foreign fascist forces. [. . . ] A conspiracy, you say, but where is the program?
Have the people a written program? [. . . ] You say there is an organization,
[. . . ] but [. . . ] where is the material evidence of their conspiratorial activities
— rules, minutes, the seal, and so forth and so on?
I am bold enough to assert, in keeping with the fundamental requiremen-
ts of the science of criminal procedure, that in cases of conspiracy such
demands cannot be put. You cannot demand that cases of conspiracy, of
coup d’etat, be approached from the standpoint: Give us minutes, decisions,
membership cards [. . . ]: You cannot demand that conspirators have their
conspiratorial activities certified by a notary. No sensible man can put the
question in this way [. . . ].
. In German for use in the GDR: Wyschinski : . Also in a Polish version:
Wyszyn´ski .
. Report of Court Proceedings: The case of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre :
.
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Vyshinsky’s understanding of dealing with conspiracy and the que-
stion of evidence presented the guideline for post–war trials in Eastern
Europe.
But there is a second aspect. The significance of orality, of oral
forms and strategies of creating a community can also be observed
in more popular forms of written speech. In fact, popular images, as
presented in the trials, migrated into the press. Let me give you a
few examples of text passages published during the Slánský trial. The
populace, the masses, seem to speak with a single voice. Under the
heading The whole country is infused with the voice of hatred and
contempt for the gang of spies and traitors one could read: «In disgust
we listened to the cold–blooded and cynical confessions of the greatest
criminal, Slánský». Under the title Joyfully we are heading for work,
Ms R. Eminger wrote a letter to the editor. To achieve authenticity, it
seemed to be important to give a name and affiliation.
Every human being pursuing honest work, every worker, craftsman, tech-
nician and clerk today sees clearly why we had a whole clutch of diffi-
culties with material and cadres [. . . ]. R. Eminger, spokesperson for the
Elektroporzelan factory Žaclérˇ
To quote a last passage under the title In deep gratitude:
The state procurator’s speech, which we listened to in the courtroom, was
an indictment by all of the working populace”. [. . . ] Helena Löflerová,
deputy of the National-Socialist Party.
There are plenty more comments like these passages from the
Communist Party’s mouthpiece Rudé Právo. As so–called comments
from the courtroom and letters to the editor they formed an impor-
tant part of the media campaign accompanying the trial. The vocabu-
lary is revealing as it is associated with orality: listening, speaking. The
. German theorist of literature Murašov has done research, on reports from the
courtroom and letters to the editor, as presented in the Soviet press and he found narrative
techniques fostering a collectivity of verbal experience. Murašov : .
. «Celou zemí zní hlas nenávisti a opovržení k bandeˇ špionu˚ a zrádcu˚». Rudé Právo
, /, p. .
. «Jdeme vstrˇíc radostné práci». Rudé Právo , /, p. .
. «Veliká vde˘cˇnost». Rudé Právo , /, p.. The name National-Socialist Party is
misleading, as it is in fact the Czechoslovak Social–democratic Party.
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message is clear: Czechoslovak society is listening, and it is answering
in a single voice. It is this voice from outside that chief prosecutor
Urválek referred to inside the courtroom. Notwithstanding that all
this was prearranged, the audience might have got the impression
that the prosecutor took up the people’s will in his final speech.
The hearts of the working people are filled with deepest indignation and
just anger. [. . . ] The innumerable messages received by the court during
the past few days have displayed the firm resolution of the people to undo
the damage caused by the agents of the imperialist in the shortest possible
time. [. . . ] The ranks of the Communist Party are closer than before.
Creating a feeling of indignation was part of the campaign. Thou-
sands of supportive resolutions were sent to the Communist Party
from various organizations and institutions from all over the country
demanding death sentences. In this respect, the show trial of Rudolf
Slánský is meant to convince the outside world, the Western Capita-
list warmonger world, as well as the People of being a close, united
community.
Orality in communicating conspiracy theories is also closely related
to radio transmission. My third example comes from an East German
show trial: the trial of Silgradt and others, that is of the alleged “ac-
complices” of the so–called „fascist putsch”. In June , four men
were accused of conspiracy and espionage in connection with the
uprising in East Berlin and other places in the GDR in June .
In this case, the radio brought courtroom atmosphere to the work-
places and the homes of the masses. It was, however, not done directly
through live transmissions. The material for distribution throughout
the Republic was cut into a feature. Thus, live recordings taped during
the trial are part of a story presented by a narrator, which in turn is
framed by a second voiceover — a commentator speaking directly to
the audience. This is not the place to give details of the elaborate plot,
broadcast in a two–hour feature, but to illustrate the efficacy of the
broadcast with a short passage.
Allow us at this place, dear audience, to remind you of earlier events. In
front of this court was stood, only a short while ago, someone bearing the
. Proceedings of the Trials of Slansky, et al. in Prague, Czechoslovakia, November
–,  as broadcast by the Czechoslovak Home Service, S. , .
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name of Burianek, and a little later someone called Kaiser. Murder was
their trade. Both had one thing in common: to prepare, with the help of
explosives, incendiary devices, poison and terror a certain day, to prepare
the fortress for the storm. The day was Day X, the fortress the German
Democratic Republic. But neither Burianek nor Kaiser came up with this
idea. Others were behind this, others of whose existence they were aware,
but whom they hadn’t met in person. Others, who, one could almost say,
designed their ideas with scientific accuracy. And that brings us back to Dr.
Silgradt at the Council for Questions of the Runification of Germany.
This is an excerpt from the narrator’s text. Of the names mentioned
one is important: Dr. Silgradt, the main defendant. He worked for
the so–called Forschungsbeirat für Fragen der Wiedervereinigung,
an inter–ministerial council, whose task was to gather expertise for
the Bonn government concerning the future transformation of the
GDR, after the so–called Day X. As such, the Council presented the
ideal cast for the “General Staff ” of the upheaval. However, archival
material shows this was actually not the case. The council did plan for
Day X — a term it used itself –, but when that day came in June ‘,
the Council was taken by surprise, and had to adjust its policy (Roth
: , ). Although the transcript shows only a short excerpt of
the broadcast, it reveals the central elements one would expect from
a narrative of conspiracy: a group of conspirators, the secrecy of those
behind pulling the strings, the evil plan. And, at the end of the feature
also the uncovering of the “conspiracy”:
[Narrator] Thus, they made use of everything that could be mobilized
among the enemies and opponents of progress. The Fifth Column that over
the last  years has tried again and again to break the power of the working
class from within. This Fifth Column, which in trying suffered defeats again
and again, this Fifth Column took action on June th,  und will do so
again in future. They found their judges. They will find their judges. And
they will finally be judged then. ‘Ruin’ is written on their flag.
[Commentator] That was our second summarizing report of the trial of
the agents Silgradt, Mangelsdorf, Füldner and Gassa before the Supreme
Court of the German Democratic Republic. Production Hanna Pustol and
Dieter Mendelsohn.
. GDR Radio Feature: „Bericht vom Prozess gegen die Agenten Silgradt, Mangelsdorf,
Füldner und Gassa”. Source: Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv.
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[Narrator] Things are never as finely spun.
With this last remark, the narrator refers to a popular proverb. At
this point, radio as a medium of secondary orality makes use of pri-
mary oral culture, that is — according to Walter Ong — of a culture
untouched by writing and maintained by formulary expressions, by
repetition, identification and participation (Ong : f; Ong :
). As if to highlight this, the narrator gives away only half of the
proverb «Things are never as finely spun. . . » [«Es ist nichts so fein
gesponnen. . . »], obviously assuming that the audience is able to com-
plete the saying: «[. . . ] they will always see the light of sun» [«[. . . ] es
kommt doch an das Licht der Sonnen»].
The commentator taps into the audience’s knowledge of some-
thing from the realm of primary orality. Once again, community
experiences itself by means of verbally constructed participation. The
phenomenon of conspiracy theory in mind, it is interesting to reflect
on the notion of Walter Ong that primary oral culture “tends to break
down issues into simple polarities in terms of good and evil, ‘good
guys’ and ‘bad guys’” (Ong: : ). Insofar, orality seems to be a
very suitable means of communicating conspiracy theories. There is
reason to argue that it should be taken into account more often than
has been the case.
.. Visuality
The visual aspect of communicating conspiracy theories, I would
argue, is underestimated too. Not only images in the sense of meta-
phors, but also pictures as materialized graphic images, can effectively
transmit the conspiratorial message. This holds true for photography,
film, posters, caricatures and comics — each, however, in its own
specific way. They are visual media, by which the spectator is in a
position to recognize the ‘enemy’. This is, to begin with, achieved
with the help of textual framing (brochures, journals, comics), but
also by sub–text in the sense of implicit knowledge. In case the specta-
tor does not recognize the ‘enemy’ — because he doesn’t look like a
. GDR Radio Feature: «Bericht vom Prozess gegen die Agenten Silgradt, Mangelsdorf,
Füldner und Gassa». Source: Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv.
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Figure . O. Štembera () «Well, this monster got caught in our ship’s propeller»,
Dikobraz, 
traitor — the common knowledge of „the real face hiding behind the
mask” will work. Let us take a closer look at a few examples from the
above–mentioned Czechoslovak and East German trials.
As for the Slánsky trial, two political cartoons shall illustrate the
interrelation of (key) texts and the visual narrative. The pictures we-
re published during the trial in the leading Czechoslovak satirical
magazine Dikobraz (porcupine) (Fig ).
At that time, along with the picture, people could read — in the
hurriedly published proceedings as well as in the press — the words
of chief prosecutor Urválek (Fig. ):
This trial has enabled the Czechoslovak people not only to see the moral
baseness of the accused in its full nakedness, but also to realize the full extent
of the danger that threatened the country [. . . ] It has also become clear that
many obstacles and difficulties which one thought were just accompanying
the development toward Socialism, were, in fact, the outcome of deliberate
disrupting activities of the accused. Like polyps of a thousand arms they
adhered to the body of the republic, to suck in its blood and its power.
. Translation from the German version of the court proceedings: Prozess gegen die
Leitung des staatsfeindlichen Verschwörerzentrums mit Rudolf Slánský an der Spitze. Prag:
Justizministerium, , p. .
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Figure . L. Haas () «The Trial of the leadership of the Anti-State Conspiratorial
Centre has ended; The masks are torn», Dikobraz 
The Slánský trial also made use of a popular image, often referred
to by Vyshinsky: of the masks that are torn off. Slánský himself made
use of the metaphor in his last word:
The enemy within the castle wall is the most dangerous enemy, because
he can open doors. I was an enemy within the Communist Party, within
the Czechoslovak state, within the entire peace camp. [. . . ] I had to put on a
mask, in order to be able to survive as an enemy within the castle wall. I
spoke unlike I thought and I acted.
. Translation from the German version of the court proceedings: Prozess gegen die
Leitung des staatsfeindlichen Verschwörerzentrums mit Rudolf Slánský an der Spitze. Prag:
Justizministerium, , p. .
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The cartoons show how the oral and the visual are interrelated
to bring the message of the now unveiled conspiracy to the public.
In the first case, it is achieved by illustrating the metaphor of the
ship (the Czechoslovak People’s Republic) as the positive model in a
successful confrontation with the monster, all defendants organically
bound together as part of one body, with Slánský the head. The second
cartoon relates to the international, Cold War perspective, as it focuses
on the iron curtain. From behind the wall, imperialist warmongers
(the US capital and military) conspire with the (treacherous) Yugoslav
leader Tito, to jointly pull the strings to make their Czechoslovak
bandogs (the defendants — in the foreground Slánský recognizable
from his eyebrows — as the ‘enemies’ within) ruin the state, but
luckily being unmasked by the trial’s scriptwriters. Here caricature
functions as a means of propaganda from above, paving the way for
the official narrative of a great conspiracy. Caricature is most efficient
in connecting fact and fiction. The art historian Ernst Gombrich
rightly calls it a “weapon” in the cartoonist’s hand:
The cartoonist can mythologize the world of politics by physiognomizing it.
By linking the mythical with the real he creates that fusion, that amalgam,
that seems so convincing to the emotional mind. (Gombrich : )
Let us return once again to East Germany. The Trial of Silgradt
and others was not only broadcasted on radio, but also accompanied
by visual media. In this case, the plot was communicated through
newsreels, but also with the help of cover–illustrations (Fig. ).
This is a brochure published a year after the June uprising, at the
time of the trial. The cover, a photomontage, takes up very effectively
one of the most popular images of conspiratorial thinking: the image
of the mastermind, the one who pulls the strings. If you know about
the plot — and at that time you would know about the plot — the
illustration will have a high affective efficacy. You will know who the
puppets are, as well as who the mastermind is. Of course, the pictorial
narrative is less elaborate than the textual narration. But there are other
qualities, bearing in mind its associative logic: a conspiracy theory
thus visualized is recognizable immediately, it is easy to remember
and stays in the mind for a long time.
Probably less arguable is the phenomenon of visual narrativity
 Ute Caumanns
Figure . «Who pulled the strings? The Putsch of June  and its background».
Cover illustration, Brochure Wer zog die Drähte? Der Juni-Putsch  und seine
Hintergründe, Photomontage,  x  cm,  pp., numerous Illstr., Kongreß-Verlag,
Ausschuß für Deutsche Einheit (Ed.), Berlin (GDR) ()
when it comes to multi–phasic pictures. The following example is
taken from the Soviet satirical magazine “Crocodile” [Krokodil], pro-
duced by the publishing house of the Party’s mouthpiece Pravda, and
at that time very popular (Fig. ).
The comic strip was published before the trial, but it neatly illustra-
tes the narrative that was developed in the GDR — as in the Soviet
Union — right after the June uprising and that was retold in the trial.
The subtitle Our illustrations of the news in American press and radio
makes it a sort of dialogue between East and West on the nature of
the uprising. The pictures highlight the position of the Socialist camp
and they outplay the text (which equals the oral), making a fool of
the characters in the comic strip as well as of Western politicians and
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Figure . Comic strip: Day X — Our illustrations of the news in American press
and radio: ) “The uprising began spontaneously” ) “The whole population of
the German Democratic Republic participated”; ) “Peasants”; ) “Workers”; )
“Intelligencija”; ) “The Bonn government declared its sympathy with the victims
of June th”; source Ju. Fedorov, “Den’ IKC — Naši illjustracii k soobšcˇenijam
amerikanskoj pecˇati i radio”; comic–strip: soviet satire magazine Krokodil, August
, 
media on the whole. Thus, the visual not only communicates the
alleged “truth”, but also fights the enemy by ridiculing him. What is
presented here is the master narrative — the tale of the “fascist putsch”
— that the Trial of Silgradt and others presented in all theatricality.
. Conclusion
To sum up: Show trials can be seen as a forum, where conspiracy theo-
ries are presented to a local audience, as well as to a wider audience
outside the courtroom. To achieve this, the scriptwriters worked out
an elaborate narrative. In cooperation with media experts strategies
and materials were developed to reach the populace:
— by publishing the proceedings — that is in a pseudo–documentary
genre;
— by remastering live performances in radio features;
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— by visualising with the help of cartoons or comics.
The narrative had a basic formula. It presented a group of enemies
working together to undermine and destroy the Socialist camp. The
confessions of the mostly internal, sometimes external, “enemies”
played a central role onstage, in the act of un–masking. The defendants
had to renounce and confess, seeking what was called just punishment
for themselves. Their performance was obviously worth the risk —
after all it was deviation from the script that could produce a critical
moment in the trial.
Show trials did inflict terror on individuals, but the show was not
only a localized one, for the courtroom alone. In this respect, they
had an important didactic function. By presenting a real person —
the defendant — as enemy of the state, an abstract political enemy
was personalized, a story told and history rewritten. The message
was simple enough to be understood by everybody. It was presented
in a performative act, in the act of unveiling the master narrative of
a “great conspiracy”. It created an atmosphere of relief and at the
same time had the chilling effect of intimidation, thus exposing the
dysfunctionality of conspiracist thinking in the long run.
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Storie di complotti e miti a bassa intensità
P O*
 : Low Intensity Conspiracy Myths
: In the system or the galaxy of contemporary myths (which I define
as low intensity myths because of some characteristics that differentiate
them as objects of consumption and personal choice more than collective
rituals), the theme of conspiracy has a multifarious presence. On the one
hand, it is one of the main subjects in urban legends, which often offer
an alternative explanation of official truths; on the other hand, it has been
the key for the success of works such as The Celestine Prophecy or The Da
Vinci Code, with their reconstruction of world history in terms of fiction
that “might have been” true. In these and other forms (including espionage
stories) the representation of conspiracies is a sort of mythical current whose
power is based not so much on the credibility of the stories it tells as on the
fact itself that they are presented as counter–narrations, more consistent
than any reality and disguised in many possible forms.
: Myth; Low Intensity; Urban Legends; Counter-Explanation.
.
Quello che mi interessa discutere qui è il ruolo che i racconti di
cospirazioni hanno nel sistema di quelli che chiamo i “miti a bassa
intensità”.
Definisco così i miti prevalenti nel sistema delle comunicazioni con-
temporaneo, che rispetto a quelli ad alta intensità propri ad esempio
della tradizione classica o anche di molti popoli extra–europei sono
caratterizzati:
— non tanto da comportamenti rituali–celebrativi quanto da attivi-
tà di cosciente o inconsapevole consumo;
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— da una collocazione non in un mondo caratterizzato da radicale
alterità qual è l’universo sacrale, ma in un universo che è il
nostro stesso o gli è strettamente contiguo;
— da una cornice non rigida come quella che il cerimoniale pone
attorno al mito classico, ma porosa e permeabile;
— da una moltiplicazione di storie “nuove e sempre uguali”, per-
ché non si può vedere tante volte lo stesso film ma si può vedere
infinite volte la stessa forma.
In realtà secondo la mia analisi i miti a bassa intensità sono attra-
versati sempre da una tensione perennemente irrisolta tra la spinta da
una parte all’antropocentrismo, all’insediarsi nei luoghi e nei tempi
dell’ordinario, fino a mettere a rischio il senso stesso del mito che
sta nel fare da ponte tra il vissuto e il cosmo, e il riproporsi dall’altra
parte dei temi intrinsecamente mitici della morte e della possibile
immortalità, del mondo astrale insieme vicino e inattingibile, e del
mistero in tutte le sue forme.
I racconti di cospirazione, che collegano la verità del vissuto e
quella sempre incerta ma sempre indispensabile dell’informazione
con il mistero e con un livello diverso di verità (spesso connesso
con universi “ad alta intensità”, carichi di cerimonia e di mistero), si
collocano quindi nell’universo di cui parlo. Però credo non si debba
parlare di “un” modello mitico unitario (come si può parlare di un
modello mitico unitario per i vampiri almeno fino ad Anne Rice, o per
il gangster classico), ma di una pluralità di modelli, che certo spesso
si intrecciano e sovrappongono tra loro ma hanno diversa origine e
sono almeno in parte distinti. È a questo che vorrei dedicare il mio
intervento. In particolare, voglio dimostrare che i temi cospirativi
sono presenti in più punti di quella che chiamo la galassia della bassa
intensità, non stanno in un singolo genere o in un singolo medium; e
vorrei tracciare una sorta di geografia di queste presenze.
.
Ho provato in un libro che sto scrivendo a delineare una mappa di
quella che chiamo la galassia della bassa intensità, non tanto per un
omaggio a McLuhan che pure mi ha insegnato moltissimo, quanto
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perché in generale è proprio della miticità il carattere magmatico
che ne accompagna la genesi e tutta la dinamica («La mitologia è
essenzialmente qualcosa che si muove» scriveva Friedrich Schelling);
questo vale tanto più per quelli che abbiamo chiamato i miti a bassa
intensità, proprio per le caratteristiche che abbiamo prima individuato:
più che di culto istituzionale sono oggetto di fabbricazione industriale;
sono comunque presentati come liberamente scelti per il piacere del
consumo invece che rispettati sulla base di regole rituali; sono diretti,
per riprendere ancora un’espressione di Warshow, a self made men
più che a figli della tradizione.
La galassia della bassa intensità secondo la mia interpretazione è
fatta di racconti che si incarnano in generi, dal poliziesco al non morto
ecc., o derivano da storie–progenitrici che si vengono ripetendo un
po’ rinnovandosi un po’ ripetendosi (dal dott. Jekyll a Don Giovanni);
è fatta di quelle narrazioni ricorrenti che sono state battezzate con
un’espressione entrata nell’uso “leggende metropolitana” e anche del-
le componenti mitiche di tanti racconti giornalistici; è fatta di miti
politici dalla nazione alla rivoluzione, ma anche di quelli che chia-
mo “nuclei mitici” e che attraversano tutta la nostra immaginazione,
dall’amore romantico all’idea del genio che animato da una sorta di
scintilla divina, nuclei che sono un po’ dappertutto nella cultura di
massa, senza essere collocabili in un solo e specifico quadro narrativo.
I temi della cospirazione, del «rovescio della storia contemporanea»,
per usare non casualmente un’espressione di Balzac (che al fondo del
suo immenso affresco sociale vedeva una trama anzi due trame op-
poste, quella maligna dei Tredici e quella “buona” dei Fratelli della
consolazione) possiamo trovarli in diversi punti della nostra galassia.
Proprio questa pluralità di collocazioni, e nella complessità degli scam-
bi tra l’una e l’altra, fa sì che la pretesa di una lettura univoca delle
storie di cospirazione sia semplicistica e conduca a veri e propri errori.
.
Cominciamo dalle leggende urbane: è in questo complesso universo
che viene dato spazio e credibilità alle storie che si presentano come
spiegazioni alternative alle verità generalmente accolte, a cominciare
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da quelle relative a congiure, complotti, supposte menzogne a cui tutti
crederebbero.
La dinamica di circolazione di queste leggende è del tutto affine a
quella delle voci che corrono, o dei rumors per riprendere l’espressio-
ne inglese, tanto che una distinzione netta tra i due fenomeni è spesso
difficile. Tra le caratteristiche che accomunano le leggende urbane
alle voci, oltre naturalmente all’oralità e (com’è appunto caratteristico
dell’oralità) al riadattamento operato man mano dai narratori, vi è il fe-
nomeno che possiamo chiamare dei “due o tre gradi di separazione”,
per cui il racconto trae credibilità in genere non dalla testimonian-
za di chi racconta ma dell’autorità attribuita a una persona terza, da
cui il narratore stesso l’avrebbe sentito direttamente o attraverso un
ulteriore passaggio intermedio.
Per quanto riguarda più in specifico le leggende urbane, per certi
aspetti possiamo dire che in pochi punti della galassia mitica il prin-
cipio che fa incontrare il nuovo con il sempre uguale è portato più
all’estremo. L’azione del narratore di leggende urbane mira anche e
spesso soprattutto a un “effetto”, cerca di creare una suspense seguita
da un colpo di scena.
Nello scambio orale la potenza delle storie di congiura è dovuta
soprattutto alla circolazione orale e socializzata, dove meno possono
essere sottoposte al vaglio della possibile falsificabilità, dove il con-
fronto è maggiormente personalizzato, e l’irrisione all’ingenuità di chi
crede alle verità ufficiali si presenta come difficile da sopportare per chi
rischia di fare, appunto, la figura dell’ingenuo. Le verità ufficiali messe
in questione possono essere le più varie: la storia del falso sbarco sulla
luna come quella secondo cui Otis Redding non era morto in un inci-
dente aereo ma era stato ucciso dalla mafia timoroso di un simbolo
di indipendenza nera, fino agli accordi occulti con le “potenze” più
varie; ma niente impedisce di riprendere in questa chiave storie di
cospirazione ebraica per il dominio del mondo. Le forme possono
essere anch’esse relativamente diversificate: in molti casi sono simili
alla fiaba, brevi racconti chiusi, con una morale più o meno esplicitata
(magari nella conversazione–commento che segue); in altri salgono
verso il mito vero e proprio, sottolineando gli elementi di mistero
ancora irrisolto e il carattere super–umano di alcune componenti
della storia, ad esempio quando la cospirazione coinvolge figure “non
terrestri”; mentre altre volte la leggenda si maschera da voce, da “falsa
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notizia” per riprendere l’espressione di Marc Bloch, appena accaduta.
Nella circolazione del leggendario metropolitano, comunque, que-
sta storia “altra” è tanto più suggestiva solo in quanto si presenti come
nuova, almeno in parte, altrimenti svanisce l’effetto–sorpresa; solo in
quanto tra gli ascoltatori ci sia almeno qualcuno che non la conosce.
E chiede solo quello che Brunvand chiama un half believing che nel
contesto dello scambio orale è sufficiente e anzi se diventasse troppo
ossessiva la volontà di convincere rischierebbe di spezzare il clima
di scambio che accompagna questo tipo di racconti. Poi però come
accade per tutti i miti, alcuni di questi si dissolvono o restano solo
nella conversazione come la storia della baby sitter cannibale, o le bar-
zellette, mentre altri prendono piede e resistono, fino a dotarsi di una
cornice più spessa, fino anche a connettersi con miti più strutturati.
È, si può dire solo in parte scherzando, la vendetta che l’oralità si
prende sulla scrittura. Il racconto orale non è tanto un gioco di società
condiviso quanto piuttosto una sfida lanciata, a una verità dominante
ma ritenuta falsa, da una minoritaria ma che si presenta come la sola
credibile e che mira a rovesciare le credenze condivise. Ma c’è una
differenza importante, e sta nel fatto che le vere e proprie leggende
urbane hanno spesso forma di racconti calati nell’attualità ma di più
lunga durata. Per ricorrere a una formula, potremmo dire che mentre
le voci sono, secondo la definizione sottile ed efficace del sociologo
nippo–americano Tamotsu Shibutami, improvised news, narrazioni
costruite di eventi presentati come di attualità, le leggende urbane
sono improvised myths. Una “verità” che conta proprio sull’effetto–
sorpresa: credevi che le cose andassero in un modo, ora ti racconto
tutta un’altra storia.
.
La cospirazione può assumere un valore e un senso molto diverso
allorquando si fa vero e proprio mito politico, propugnato in for-
ma organizzata e in funzione di legittimazione o (più spesso) di de–
legittimazione. In questi casi si tratta di racconti tendenzialmente
organici, anche se è caratteristico del mito un aspetto di incompiu-
tezza e di ambiguità, come chiariva ancora una volta Schelling; e la
diffusione è tipicamente organizzata. Inoltre in questa veste il racconto
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di cospirazione tende in generale a perdere la vaghezza misteriosa
che generalmente l’accompagna nel racconto orale, e a divenire, al
contrario, ossessivamente coerente, spesso scalare, dal piccolo episo-
dio alla visione del mondo: la coerenza della paranoia naturalmente
ma anche dell’ideologia.
Il mito politico è essenziale alla politica contemporanea, e non cer-
to solo ad alcune correnti ideologiche: è al centro dello stato nazionale
come dei progetti socialisti. Forse il mito più duraturo della storia
moderna è stato appunto una “grande narrazione” politica, quella
della rivoluzione, un racconto volto insieme al passato perché ogni
rivoluzione veste panni antichi, e al futuro anzi al Futuro perché al
centro dell’idea di rivoluzione c’è una frattura nel tempo.
Il racconto di cospirazione è ricorrente come racconto di de–legitti-
mazione del potere o di una parte politica o di un frammento di società
avverso e non certo da una parte sola: non starò qui certo a parlare dei
Protocolli dei Savi di Sion, ma anche la definizione marxiana dello stato
come “comitato d’affari della borghesia” ripetuta come dogma per
più di un secolo implica l’esistenza di un livello occulto della politica,
inevitabile e innegabile ma insieme leggibile solo “sotto” l’ufficialità,
di accordi mai alla luce del sole.
Tanto è spesso casuale per scelta e legato all’effetto–sorpresa e al
gioco della conversazione il racconto orale della cospirazione, tanto
nel mito politico la narrazione si fa invariabilmente “storia”, e chiede
di rileggere alla sua luce decenni o secoli, per minare alla base la legit-
timità di uno stato o per esaltarla contro un presunto nemico occulto.
Per farsi storia ha bisogno di documenti, falsati o re–interpretati, e di
sistemi di insegnamento–apprendimento non casuali. Lo si vede per
fare un esempio relativamente lontano nella battaglia del presidente
messicano Calles per un’educazione che contemplava la lettura della
storia del Messico in termini di potere occulto della Chiesa; a cui corri-
sponde la lettura cattolica della presidenza di Plutarco Elias Calles, che
era in effetti massone, come punto di approdo di una cospirazione
massonica per il potere.
Un esempio estremo e tragico di lettura cospirativa della storia in
quanto mito politico l’abbiamo nei verbali degli interrogatori di Moro
da parte delle Brigate Rosse. Le loro domande, incalzanti e precise in
apparenza quanto fumose nella sostanza, miravano a ottenere risposte
certe: quando, dove, in quali riunioni, erano stati decisi i piani d’azione
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dello Stato, delle multinazionali, delle alleanze militari. Le risposte di
Moro, involute nella forma quanto puntuali nel contenuto, sfumavano,
precisavano, smentivano.
La domanda, cui si risponde, tende a prospettare un’evoluzione della Nato
che tenderebbe a volgersi verso una strategia antiguerriglia. Però, conoscen-
do un poco i tempi e modi di consultazione, pianificazione, attuazione di
eventuali misure militari, si può escludere che un enorme organismo come
la Nato abbia potuto mettere a punto in un tempo così limitato efficaci
organismi a tale scopo e per giunta eccedenti le finalità dell’alleanza che
implica grandi organismi operativi.
In sostanza, ripeteva fino all’esaurimento Moro, non c’è mai stato
un grande complotto, il potere è fatto di un lavorio continuo, di
consultazione, pianificazione, attuazione, aggiustamenti successivi. La
NATO e la DC, il grande capitale e gli interessi degli agrari o dei
commercianti, non hanno mai stabilito una volta per tutte un piano
d’azione, hanno continuato sempre in parte a negoziare, tra loro e
con altri (inclusi il PCI, i sindacati, l’URSS), in parte a usare strumenti,
anche inconfessabili, per farsi i propri affari.
Per le Brigate Rosse, la rappresentazione del potere data da Moro
era, più che inaccettabile, inconcepibile. Il loro mondo era guidato
da un grande centro di decisione unificato, da un piano unitario: lo
chiamassero “piano del capitale” o — con la più famosa delle loro
sigle — SIM, Stato Imperialista delle Multinazionali. Questa idea di
potere e di stato, questo mito politico, era la loro stessa ragion d’esse-
re. Il loro presunto contro–potere, clandestino e responsabile solo di
fronte a se stesso, si giustificava nella loro logica come risposta a un
sistema di potere che immaginavano segreto e privo di regole. Di più,
il grande complotto che imputavano a Moro e alla DC era il rovescio
perfettamente speculare dello Stato che sognavano di costruire, e al
quale improntavano scrupolosamente le loro procedure, fatte di pri-
gioni senza carceri, di interrogatori senza difesa, di condanne a morte
senza appello. Il potere immaginario che attribuivano al governo de-
mocristiano era il loro vero modello, come per il partito nazista (lo ha
capito per prima Hannah Arendt) il sognato potere della Germania sul
mondo altro non era che un’imitazione del potere tutto immaginario
degli ebrei narrato dal più falso di tutti i documenti, i Protocolli dei
savi di Sion.
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.
Ma la polarità tra i due modi d’essere del racconto della cospirazione
che ho descritto fin qui non esaurisce l’insieme. Perché la galassia
mitica contemporanea include anche un terzo aspetto: dei nuclei
narrativi che possiamo definire “trasversali”, e che si manifestano in
una varietà di forme, dalla biografia al romanzo, alla serie televisiva.
Accade ad esempio con le storie di gangster che fanno per così dire
regolarmente la spola tra la realtà urbana e racconti a volte tragici a
volte picareschi, o con quelle dei geni inventori tra biografie più o
meno romanzate, storie tecnologiche, pubblicità.
Parliamo quindi, dopo la cospirazione–leggenda urbana e la cos-
pirazione–mito politico, della cospirazione–romanzo. Se è vera la
frase di Novalis per cui «noi viviamo (nel grande e nel piccolo) in
un gigantesco romanzo», questo non è completo senza una verità
seconda, o anche terza oltre la superficie della narrazione.
Non è casuale il richiamo che ho fatto sopra a Balzac: il tema
della congiura e delle società segrete contribuisce nella Comédie
Humaine a dare quasi un significato ulteriore all’intreccio continuo di
vite che “fa concorrenza allo stato civile”, a definire un terzo livello di
narrazione oltre a quello dei protagonisti delle diverse storie e a quello
che insieme inventa e mette in scena una società. Nelle sue storie
inoltre la società segreta sembra una sorta di proiezione ambivalente
del romanziere, il soggetto nascosto che muove tutte le pedine, come
accade del resto, sia pure in termini differenti, anche nel Meister.
Si potrebbe fare una storia del romanzo e poi del film tra otto e
novecento centrata sul ripresentarsi della cospirazione e delle società
segrete come figure del racconto, dai Tredici all’Incanto del lotto  e
oltre. Un posto va dedicato naturalmente al romanzo di spionaggio,
che è fondato sul segreto come centro del potere moderno, come
arcanum quasi–sacrale dello stato: dove la morte diventa vero e proprio
sacrificio sull’altare di questo potere ma al tempo stesso lo svelamento
del segreto ne può mostrare la povertà. In questo genere l’intensità è
sempre per certi aspetti alta sempre per altri bassa, racconta i rituali
misterici contemporanei ma dal punto di vista di chi penetrandoli ne
diventa parte e in qualche misura sacerdote, ma insieme, svelandoli, ne
dimostra la miseria. Ma un ricordo, in questo cenno al nucleo mitico
delle cospirazioni e delle società segrete come tema del romanzo,
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vorrei dedicarlo all’Uomo che fu Giovedì di Chesterton, che con una
sorta di Lettera rubata delle società segrete smonta il meccanismo
cospirativo, e insieme svela fino in fondo la portata perfino sacrale che
resta nel mito.
.
Negli ultimi vent’anni due episodi indicano il potenziale ricongiun-
gersi del racconto cospirativo in quanto romanzo con il mito politico
e anche in quanto word of mouth, all’interno di quella nebulosa New
Age che ha in parte rimescolato la galassia mitica facendone la base di
una concezione semi–religiosa ma sempre a bassa intensità, nella logi-
ca della religiosità self service intuita già tempo fa da Robert Bellah.
Penso a due testi per certi versi assai diversi per altri molto simili come
La profezia di Celestino e Il codice Da Vinci, che fondano proprio
su una visione paranoica il loro successo, all’incrocio tra una fiction
dichiarata e un’altrettanto esplicita proposta di adesione. A separarli
sono le dinamiche del successo, in un caso legato al passa parola e al
long selling, nell’altro al lancio editoriale nella logica del best seller
classico; la rappresentazione del sociale, che nella Profezia è tardo–
movimentista (il protagonista era “stato preda dell’idealismo sociale
degli anni Sessanta e Settanta e persino degli interessi spirituali degli
anni Ottanta”), nel Codice élitaria per uno snobismo di massa; il fatto
che la Profezia propone una forma di superstizione dichiarata, con
tanto di illuminazioni e di mercato secondario di agende ecc., mentre
il Codice è soprattutto una furba operazione commerciale. Ma a unirli,
facendone l’uno la continuazione per molti aspetti dell’altro, è il fatto
che al centro di entrambi c’è una pretesa, e per molti versi analoga,
controstoria. Ed è la scelta di collocarsi sul terreno della fiction, una
scelta di bassa intensità esplicita. Alle iniziazioni si accede senza nes-
suna fatica che non sia leggere qualche pagina senza doverci neppure
credere. In entrambi i casi, quella che ci viene proposta è una nuova
forma di “religione del libro”: non più il culto di un grande libro
sacro destinato a durare nei secoli, ma il culto poco impegnativo di
un best seller che durerà se va bene una decina d’anni. Una religione
dell’instant book.
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Siamo di fronte a un ricongiungimento dei diversi modelli che
citavo prima? Direi di sì, soprattutto nel caso di Celestino, che dei due
è il vero fenomeno. Trasmissione da bocca a bocca, linea “politica”
esplicita, scelta di definirsi romanzo ma congiunta come dicevo con
forme di superstizione relativamente dichiarata. Questo ricongiungi-
mento è parte di una tendenza diffusa, alla sovrapposizione dei generi
e anche dei modelli mitici. Ma questi, per quanto possano occasional-
mente incontrarsi come in questi casi, devono essere tenuti distinti
per comprenderli sul serio.
.
Un’ultima nota. Coloro che ritengono che la circolazione di storie
di tipo cospirativo sia spiegabile solo in termini di psicopatologia
sociale dovrebbero ricordare che la “grande cospirazione”, in generale,
non esiste ma di complotti ce ne sono ogni giorno; che spesso le
narrazioni di questo tipo colgono frammenti di verità inserendoli in (e
dando credibilità a) narrazioni complessivamente false. In questo caso
l’espressione half believing può acquistare un ulteriore significato, in
parte diverso e complementare a quello tracciato da Brunvand: è un
credere che divide, che spacca, che non può essere generalizzato.
Nessuna storia di cospirazione ha effetto se non c’è una “falsa verità”
da rovesciare, che può e deve godere di un credito diffuso perché il
suo rovesciamento si presenti come una spiegazione significativa e
come una narrazione affascinante. Come un mito.
Lexia. Rivista di semiotica, 23–24
Complotto
ISBN 978-88-548-9931-5
DOI 10.4399/978885489931518
pag. 299–308 (giugno 2016)
Unreal Realities
An Approach to Conspiracy Theories Based
on the Sociology of Knowledge
A A*
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: For a long time, science has regarded conspiracy theories were
regarded as a dubious topic. The few studies that have dealt with this
theme have defined conspiracy as a social problem that must be repres-
sed. The essay proposes an alternative approach, based on the premises
of Sociology of knowledge of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann.
Conspiracy theories are described as a specific form of knowledge that
holds both negative and positive potential. According to this perspective,
the truth of a conspiracy theory is mainly based on processes of social
construction of reality.
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. Conspiracy Theories as a Problem
For a long time, there was a strange discrepancy between the social
importance of conspiracy theories and the more or less not existing
research on them. The main reason for this seems to be the fact
that conspiracy theories are considered to be a dubious topic. Many
scientists seem to be afraid of damaging their reputation by dealing
with this issue. Therefore, conspiracy theories have been neglected by
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science for a long time. The few academics, who nevertheless dared to
engage in conspiracy theories, distanced themselves very clearly from
this research topic. It almost seems that they were afraid of being
denoted as one of those conspiracy theorists which had the reputation
of being paranoid at least since the book The Paranoid Style in American
Politics () by Richard Hofstadter. So, the main perspective on the
topic conspiracy theories was not only to preserve the distance to this
subject, but also to discredit this social phenomenon.
Since the s conspiracy theories became increasingly a subject
of social science, but mainly in the ‘tradition’ of previous work. From
this perspective, conspiracy theories conceptually are considered to
be an illegitimate form of knowledge, because they claim to know
something about conspiracies, which do not exist in reality. From this
point of view, conspiracy theories seem to be problematic in a triple
sense:
— First, it is claimed that conspiracy theories are based on false
knowledge, unproven allegations or invented suspicions.
— Second, it is assumed that the belief in a conspiracy theory
suggests doubts on the mental health of the believer.
— Third, conspiracy theories are problematic because they are a
political threat. From this point of view, conspiracy theories
are the base for irrational, politically extreme attitudes and
therefore, a political menace.
According to this review, conspiracy theories appear as a kind
of social disease that must be treated. So it is not surprising that
the discussed possible causes of conspiracy theories in the majority
of scientific studies are provided in a problematizing, negative or
even pathologizing context. The following list gives an overview of
various approaches discussed to explain the emergence and spread of
conspiracy theories:
— Richard Hofstadter () speaks about a Paranoid Style as a
cause of Conspiracy Theories.
— Karl Popper () calls Conspiracy Theories a Secularization
of religious superstition.
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— Other authors speak about Distrust, fear, feelings of futility
and helplessness, obedience to authority, low self–esteem and
discrimination as reasons for the belief in conspiracy theories
(e.g. Goertzel , Abalakina-Paap et al. ).
— Daniel Pipes () wrote in terms of Conspiracy Theories:
«How the Paranoid Style flourishes and where it comes from».
— Dieter Groh (), a German historian, describes structural ele-
ments of clinical paranoia as an explanatory model for collective
conspiracy theories.
— Some authors discuss pathogenic disorders in early childhood
parent–child relationship as reasons for the belief in conspiracy
theories (e.g. Maaz ).
— And finally, it is often discussed that a “Conspiracy mentality”
is a product of an authoritarian personality or of confusion
and disorientation in phases of crisis (e.g. Pfahl-Traughber ,
Heins ).
All these diagnoses have in common that they are characterized by
the understanding of conspiracy theories as illegitimate and proble-
matic knowledge. The axiomatic assumption that conspiracy theories
are always factually false is usually already expressed in the base defi-
nition of the individual scientific authors, writing about conspiracy
theories. Daniel Pipes, for example, argues that, in essence, a con-
spiracy theory is simply a conspiracy that never happened, that it is
“the nonexistent version of a conspiracy.” That means that conspiracy
theories are completely wrong and imaginary from the outset. Based
on this premise, these theoretical explanations focus primarily on the
reconstruction of inherent structural features of conspiracy theories,
by which the cognitive deficiency of conspiracy theory thinking can
be demonstrated. So, conspiracy theories are principle subject to an
epistemic naivety. From this point of view, conspiracy theories are
mono–causal, outwardly completed and simplified explanations that
reduce complex events to manageable interpretations.
Without a doubt, the problematic aspects of conspiracy theories
should deserve a special consideration in scientific analysis of con-
spiracy thinking. Nevertheless, a fixation on these aspects leads to
a one–sided perspective. David Coady (), a US-American philo-
sopher, verbalized this as follows: «I will argue that although many
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conspiracy theories are flawed, this does not justify such dismissive
attitudes. While it is true that excessive willingness to believe conspira-
cy theory is an intellectual vice, it is also true that excessive reluctance
to believe them is an intellectual vice» ().
Conspiracy theories have not only negative but also positive poten-
tial. It makes it too easy if one examines only the negative potential
of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories contain much more than
this. We will not develop a comprehensive understanding of this phe-
nomenon, if we don’t examine all the aspects that go with it. For this
we need a neutral perspective that does not reject conspiracy theories
a priori as paranoid nonsense.
. A new perspective on conspiracy theories
I want to suggest a new perspective on conspiracy theories (described
in detail in Anton ), based on sociology of knowledge, essentially
formulated by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s in their Book
The Social Construction of Reality (). From this specific view,
the approaches to conspiracy theories I mentioned are analytically
misguided. If we want to analyze a particular form of social knowled-
ge, it does not make any sense to define this knowledge as false or
illegitimate knowledge from the outset. So, it would make no sense to
define Catholicism as nonsense, if we want to analyze and understand
why so many people are Catholics. Behind the mentioned approa-
ches are specific ideas of psychological and political norms that are
always socially determined and therefore cannot be generalized. The
fundamental problem of such essentialist approaches on conspiracy
theories is that they implicitly or explicitly take over common sense
classifications of mass media. However, within the mass media, the
term conspiracy theory is not used in a scientific way. In the public
discourse, the term “Conspiracy theory” is rather used as a rhetorical
device to stigmatize and discredit dissenting opinions.
In other words: The term “conspiracy theory” and the associated
attributions are always a part of the fight for the power to define social
reality. Whether something is considered as a fictional conspiracy
theory or as a real conspiracy depends on processes of social con-
struction of reality. This process of division into true and false does
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not necessarily need any objective facts. This means that conspiracy
theories can be described scientifically only by a relational perspective.
An important feature of conspiracy theories is that they are located
in opposition to accepted constructions of reality. In terms of sociolo-
gy of knowledge, one could say: conspiracy theories are heterodox
realities. This means that their construction of reality is not consensus.
I would like to illustrate this with an example: the conspiracy theo-
ries in terms of /. Their identity as a conspiracy theory obviously
depends on their antagonistic relationship to the “official” and socially
recognized conspiracy narration of the US government and the main-
stream media. This relationship is significant for the current use of the
term in the social and academic field. And truly, the term “conspiracy
theorist” has evolved to the point where it is little more than a label
for people, who believe, or are interested in investigating, any propo-
sition which conflicts with an officially sanctioned or orthodox belief.
Indeed, the expression is sometimes used by such people, even when
their so–called conspiracy theory does not involve a conspiracy at
all. The expressions “conspiracy theory” and ‘conspiracy theorist’ are
the respectable modern equivalents of “heresy” and “heretic”; these
expressions serve to castigate and marginalise anyone who rejects or
even questions orthodox or officially endorsed beliefs.
If scientific authors take the concept and the discrediting and stig-
matizing concept related to conspiracy theories out of the political
arena, they reproduce the degrading social attributions and give them
a scientific character. This is a classic case of an unreflective scientific
reproduction of popular opinion. In opposition to this, an approach
based on sociology of knowledge has to focus on the processes that
divide knowledge in heterodox and orthodox forms. An important
aspect of this perspective is that knowledge is always socially determi-
ned and cannot be reduced to ‘objective facts’ in a positivistic sense.
In relation to conspiracy theories, this means that the main question is
what conditions cause that they are held as true or false by the people
and the media.
In terms of a definition of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ that reflects
considerations from the field of the sociology of knowledge, this
means that the veracity of conspiracy theories cannot be determined
by definition.
To meet this requirement, I propose the following conceptual
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differentiation that can be understood as ideal types in the sense of
Max Weber:
— A heterodox conspiracy theory is a belief system or explanatory
model which describes current or historical events, collective
experiences or the development of a society as a whole as the
result of a conspiracy. The existence of this conspiracy is not
accepted by the majority of the population, the leading media
or other important institutions.
— An orthodox conspiracy theory is a belief system or explanatory
model, which describes current or historical events, collective
experiences or the development of a society as a whole as
the result of a conspiracy. The existence of this conspiracy is
accepted by the majority of the population, the leading media
or other important institutions.
The only thing that distinguishes the two categories is their social
acceptance. Which conspiracy theory in a society at a particular hi-
storical moment is regarded as heterodox and which as orthodox is a
question that can only be answered empirically and not by definition.
Both categories represent extreme points of an analytical continuum
on which empirical cases of conspiracy theories can be positioned.
. Conspiracy theories as special a form of knowledge
The enormous variety of conspiracy theories make it difficult to make
any general statements about them. Using the sociological perspective
that is not primarily concerned with the truth and concrete contents
of conspiracy theories, some matching characteristics can be distilled
that justify the approach to describe conspiracy as a specific form
of knowledge with its own attributes. So we can come to a general
definition of conspiracy theories:
A conspiracy theory is a special (heterodox or orthodox) form of social kno-
wledge, which describes current or historical events, collective experiences
or the development of a society as a whole as the result of a conspiracy. As
socially constructed knowledge conspiracy theories fulfill the function of
generating subjective meaning in respect to human experiences and actions.
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From this perspective, the main social function of conspiracy theo-
ries is to understand events and collective experiences meaningfully
which otherwise could not be integrated into existing world views,
beliefs or, generally speaking, constructions of sense. Thus, there is no
fundamental difference between orthodox and heterodox conspiracy
theories: real conspiracies and fictional conspiracies differ only by
their degree of social acceptance. While the former are considered
to be political reality, the latter will be rejected by the majority of
members of society and the mainstream media. In other words: if
there is a real conspiracy behind a conspiracy theory, it is determined
in the discourse, e.g. in mass media. What is considered as a con-
spiracy theory today may be a real conspiracy tomorrow. What is
considered as a real conspiracy today could turn out as a conspiracy
theory tomorrow.
This theoretical perspective on conspiracy theories also allows basic
assumptions regarding the origin of conspiracy theories: A conspiracy
theory occurs, when an individual or collective experience can better
be embedded in existing world views with the assumption of a con-
spiracy than without. Thus, the background for the rise and spread of
a conspiracy theory can be, for example, political ideology, a specific
world view, a prejudice, but also a fundamental distrust of authority, a
critical or skeptical attitude or simply the common sense.
Therefore, conspiracy theories have not only negative but also
quite positive potential. Provided they have a minimum level of plau-
sibility, they are no more or less wrong than other political theories. It
is absolutely important to point out the dangerous potential of conspi-
racy theories: they can — historical examples are sufficiently available
— be used to justify totalitarian power and domination, oppression
and destruction. They can generate prejudices and misconceptions
about certain events or legitimize politically extreme opinions. But,
they also can serve to detect real actual conspiracies, fraud or abuse of
power and disclose economic manipulations, or political corruption.
They can reveal secret knowledge; carry suppressed or discredited
opinions and disclose previously unknown relationships.
I am speaking, therefore, not only because of theoretical but also
because of sociopolitical reasons against a general allowance of con-
spiracy thinking and the associated pathologizing of the protagonists
of such interpretations. The dominant public and academic thesis of
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a cognitive deficit as an explanation for conspiracy theories is not an
appropriate analytical approach to this complex cultural phenomenon.
Based on the described sociological conceptualization of the pheno-
menon, there seem to be essentially five factors that have influenced
the conspiracy thinking in modern times significantly:
First: The cultural knowledge of the existence of real conspiracies
in politics and business: It belongs to the socially accepted knowledge
assets that political, military or economic conspiracies have always
influenced the course of history. Examples are the successful assas-
sination plot against Julius Caesar in  BC, the failed assassination
attempt on Adolf Hitler on th of July , or the so–called Waterga-
te scandal, which costs US President Nixon his office in . The idea
of real successful conspiracies is a basic component of our cultural
knowledge — and makes a variety of other conspiracies for many
people possible or probable for many people. In other words: since
the conspiracy is a real option for action in our cultural context, events
that are influenced by humans can in principle always be interpreted
as a result of conspiratorial action.
Second: The general mistrust of parts of the population in terms of
integrity and democratic attitude of political, economic and military
power elites: In recent decades, state–supported military or covert
operations were repeatedly revealed (for example the so–called Gladio
affair) that had clearly no democratic legitimacy and that disregarded
the rule of law and ethical guidelines for state action clearly. In addition,
conspiracies within economic structures were known, in which the
corresponding actors acted in a moral dubious or clearly criminal
way.
Third: The wish for plausible explanations for unexpected events in
the social environment: Improbable and unexpected political and eco-
nomic developments or decisions that are difficult to explain in terms
of the interpretations offered by the mainstream media are genera-
ting a demand for alternative explanations. Ultimately, such alternative
explanations even appear to be more equitable than the dominant
reality in traditional public understanding of political, social and eco-
nomic developments. The plausibility of alternative reality description
appears greater, the deficit the explanatory power of the Orthodox
interpretation is. In short: The strength of heterodox interpretations
is caused by the weakness of Orthodox descriptions.
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Fourth: The possibility of a largely uncontrolled circulation of
opposing (heterodox) beliefs and opinions through the network me-
dia: The Internet allows an almost unlimited circulation of opposing
(heterodox) interpretations — the separation between producer and
consumer of media interpretations is repealed. The distribution of
content is global, happens in real time and uses social networks to
generate attention for culturally undesirable or even prohibited con-
tent. An editorial review or control of the content provided on the
Internet is rather limited and usually has no effect. There is virtually
no censorship. For these structural reasons, the internet is the ideal
platform for the dissemination of culturally marginalized informa-
tion, heterodox interpretations and differing descriptions of reality.
This creates the possibility of an open–ended competition between
orthodox and heterodox reality concepts (including conspiracy theo-
ries), which remained largely excluded in the traditional mass media
dominated public.
All together, these factors create conspiratorial interpretation of
current or historical decisions, events and processes. They also decide
on the position on the above outlined continuum between orthodox
and heterodox conspiracy theory of a particular conspiracy theory to
a concrete historical moment. In this context, it is difficult to weigh
the mentioned theoretical determinants. Which factor may play a
dominant role and how the interaction of the different factors is, can
only be answered empirically for individual cases.
In summary, the model presented suggests a critical but open exa-
mination of the contents of conspiracy theories without an overhasty
condemnation. This means that conspiracy theories should not only
be studied in terms of their dangerous potential, but also according to
emancipatory potential. This argument is the more weight, the more
uniform and formed the Orthodox reality of a society is.
In scientific terms, the aim is to present an alternative theoretical
model for understanding the conspiracy thinking in our present socie-
ty from a perspective based on sociology of knowledge and to include
conspiracy theories into the set of recognized objects of scientific
research. That conspiracy in this way, would perhaps not be as scan-
dalous as before, is a Risk that I like to accept. And open Democracies
should, in my opinion, accept that too.
 Andreas Anton
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Political Potentiality of Conspiracy Theories
A V*
 : Le potenzialità politiche delle teorie del complotto
: The web connects like–minded people on a global scale. It wi-
dens communication possibilities for spreading ideas by overcoming
socio–economical restrictions inherent to old media. Thus, Internet is
often understood as a new public sphere, which helps to advance the
ideals of democracy. On the other hand, its role in encouraging specific
niche–communities — often accompanied by the radicalization and po-
larization of identification — cannot be ignored. This means that online
communication allows the development of new kinds of communities,
which differ from previous forms of power (publicly institutionalized).
These communities are located in the gray area between the private
and the public sphere. The article explains the formation of this kind
of community in relation to conspiracy theories. The specifics of com-
munication in these communities are explicated through relying on the
concepts of auto–communication and anti–culture (from cultural semio-
tics) and with reference to Roman Jakobson´s concepts of dominant and
phatic language function.
: Conspiracy Theories; Political Discourse; Phatic Function of
Language; Cultural Semiotics; Auto-Communication.
. Introduction
The aim of this article is to show how the meaning making that is
characteristic of conspiracy theories functions in hypermedia and
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how this process can be explained as political activity. As argued by
Lister and other cyber–theorists of digital forms of information —
storage, access, and manipulation have led to major changes in the
way information is produced, formed, received, and used (Lister et al
, p. ). Compared with old media hypermedia has questioned
the fundamental importance of linear text — creation and facilitated
a way to collective authorship (Friedlander , p. ) and makes
it possible to ignore the classical limitations of genre (Landow ,
p. ). For instance, units of information may be dispersed across
different websites or pages within a particular website. Hypertexts
can combine verbal, visual, acoustic and inter–semiotic elements
(Landow , p. ). Still, as we can see in the case of conspiracy
theories, important communicational nodes or centers of signification
are still formed that organize the meaning making of the online
communicators (Kress , p. ; Landow ).
In this article I treat conspiracy theory as a specific type of commu-
nication process. Ontologically, I presume that the objectivity of social
relations, identities, objects, etc., is constructed within discourse/text
(Laclau, Mouffe ; Lotman ). It means that culture, economy,
power–relations and society can all be analyzed as discourses/texts,
created by the articulation of different elements (objects and practi-
ces) by which social relations and identities as meaningful entities are
formed (Laclau and Mouffe ). This treats the political potential of
conspiracy theories in a broader sense because «The problem of the
political is the problem of the institution of the social, that is, of the
definition and articulation of social relations in a field crisscrossed with
antagonism» (Laclau and Mouffe , p. ). In this article conspiracy
theories are treated as a specific articulation of social relations.
Most studies that deal with explaining the political aspects of con-
spiracy theories approach them as irrational and inadequate practices
of interpretation. The most important pioneer of this approach is Ri-
chard Hofstadter and his book The Paranoid Style in American Politics
. This work was supported by the IUT– and Marie Curie International Research
Staff Exchange Scheme Fellowship within the th European Community Framework
Programme (EU-PREACC project).
. They acknowledge that conspiracy theory is significant cultural practice but they
also stress its inadequacy in the context of mapping actual social relations (Madisson ,
p. . See also Jameson ; , Keeley , Melley , Mason ).
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and Other Essays (). Hofstadter emphasizes that conspiracy theo-
ries are mostly created by political extremists who declare that the
major part of the society is an uninformed populace which does not
have free will and which can easily be manipulated by the political
elite. Hofstadter´s approach divides politics into rational and irrational:
the former manifests a primarily pluralistic ideal of democracy and
the latter characterizes those who jeopardize that ideal and who are
mainly labeled as paranoid extremists with populist political rhetoric
(Hofstadter ). Conspiracy theory is also treated as pathological
rhetoric and an extremist way of thinking by Karl Popper (); Gor-
don S. Wood (), Daniel Pipes () and Michael Barkun ().
These approaches have often been criticized for a having a too skepti-
cal and negative position towards their research objects. They often
accuse the creators of conspiracy theories of being irrational, of a
propensity to create panic and of approaching different manifestations
of conspiracy theories in a too homogeneous manner (Madisson ,
p. ).
This study distances itself from making decisions about the rationa-
lity or adequacy of conspiracy theories. Firstly, the political discourse
(also democratic) as a whole is usually not built on only rational
meaning–making. Political identity is first and foremost a collective
identity which develops in the form of a discursive community.
Second, discussion of the correspondence of conspiracy theories
with reality requires a particular basis for identifying adequacy and
inadequacy. Such an approach would need a different repertoire of
analysis than the one offered by cultural semiotics. The aim of this
article is to find semiotic mechanisms that prevail in the meaning
making of conspiracy theories and not to ask about the overlap with
“reality”. Previously, conspiracy theories have been studied from the
semiotic perspective by Paul Cobley (), and also by Cary William
Spinks, who explicates it by relying on of Peirce’s concept of abductive
logic (). Umberto Eco has explicated conspiracy theories as her-
metic semiosis (). The latest semiotic approaches to conspiracy
theories in academic literature are Mark Fenster´s () and Mari-Liis
Madisson´s (; ).
This article has a mostly theoretical orientation and its main goal
is to offer a framework that explains some characteristics of meaning
making in conspiracy theory that are developed in online media
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and which make this kind of communicative practices political. The
problem is approached by relying on concepts of dominant, auto–
communication and phatic function.
. Conspiracy theory form the point of view of semiotics
Conspiracy theory has been defined as an explanation of an unpleasant
event as being the result of a conspiracy. “Conspiracy theory is a
proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms of
the significant casual agency of a relatively small group of persons —
conspirators — acting in secret” (Keeley , p. ). According to
Svetlana Boym, the dedicated creators of conspiracy theories have a
heightened sense of mission and have been expelled to subcultures
unknown to the general public, much like the conspirers themselves,
but nevertheless attempt to thwart the schemes of the conspirators
(Boym , p. ).
Mari-Liis Madisson has stated that the adaptive system of relations
in conspiracy theory expresses an evil nature of a secret cabal, but
its specific parts; e.g. the articulation of different sub–systems of con-
spirators, temporal and spatial relations of particular events, logical
and causal connections with other events etc., may be comprised
of various structures with different levels of discreteness. Conspira-
cy theories do not normally depict events as the result of unhappy
coincident or tragic accidents. They rather see that dreadful even-
ts are motivated by an ultimate and indisputable cause — morally
corrupted intentions of a covert group of conspirators. Conspiracy
theories not only explain why awful things happen, but usually also
explain how those events happened (the level of explication of course
varies in different interpretations). The acts of the evil cabal are placed
into the so–called actual world: particular events of conspiracy are
equipped with chronotopic relations, conspirators are organized in
sub–systems that have various kinds of expertise and references in
actual (public/private) institutions, and principles of manipulation and
brainwashing techniques are sometimes explained in an extremely
nuanced manner (Madisson ).
From the point of view of cultural semiotics the following crucial
characteristics of conspiracy theory can be outlined. Conspiracy theo-
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ry can be explained as a specific mechanism of meaning making — it
is a semiotic unity whose basic feature is boundedness. Non–semiotic
phenomena or texts of other semiotic systems become actual to a
semiotic unity only if they are translated into the language of this
unity, that is: only when non–semiotic facts are semiotized (Lotman
, p. ). From the perspective of cultural semiotics, the semiotic
sphere can only come into contact with the extra–semiotic sphere
(the radical outside) by the bilingual mechanism of the border which
) sets measures for the intrusion of information, ) filters outside
information, and ) sets off the mechanism of reprocessing outside
information into the inside (Lotman , pp. –). The semiotic
sphere ) enters into the dialogues, ) pushes some sign processes to
the periphery, thus declaring them irrelevant, ) forgets some proces-
ses, which then lose their function within the semiotic system, and )
destroys — the semiotic sphere (culture) and declares some processes
as its antipodes, as anti–cultural phenomena (Ivanov et al, ).
Conspiracy theory draws together different informational spaces
that vary in the sense of informational space and activity. In that
kind of communication semiotic unity will arise on the level of self–
description and will start to contrast itself with other, so–called outer
spheres. If we draw parallels with other online communities then we
can refer to many theorists who outline that hypermedia enables the
connection of people with similar interests from all over the world. A
widespread tendency is to move towards specific international niche–
communities that are often characterized by radical and polarized
identity (see Castells ; Sunstein ). The following sections
explain what kind of characteristics make the meaning–making of
conspiracy theories specifically political.
. Antagonism as a dominant of conspiracy theory
As mentioned above, any formation of social identities necessarily
involves inclusion/exclusion relations and «associated discursive con-
testation, where discourse is understood as a contingent and partial
. This article treats the concept of discourse and the concept of culture as text (on
the point of view of cultural semiotics) principally overlapping.
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fixation of meaning that constitutes and organizes social relations
(including identities, objects, and practices)» (Dahlberg : ). The
communication of conspiracy theorists is characterized by strongly
polarized identity creation and is organized by an important dominant:
the opposition of us and them. That kind of significant opposition has
a concrete function in the process of constitution of semiotic unity
because «the dominant may be defined as the focusing component
of a work of art: it rules, determines, and transforms the remaining
components. It is the dominant which guarantees the integrity of the
structure» ( Jakobson a, p. ). Core structures are usually strictly
organized and, as they are dominant, they also arise in the arena of
self–description. Lotman maintains that self–description usually elicits
dominants and builds a unified model which becomes a code of self–
cognition and self–deciphering of a particular whole (Lotman, p.
).
Of course, the articulation of identity, based on opposition, and
belief in its relevance, varies in different cases, but it is a characteristic
that is typical of all kind of conspiracy theories. The informational
field of conspiracy theories usually shares in common the convic-
tion that the vast majority of contemporary social processes are the
immediate result of a malicious conspiracy. It is assumed that the
world is subordinated to a greedy and morally corrupt (in most of
interpretations it is perceived as implicitly malicious) elite, acting in
secret, whose ultimate goal is to establish its global authoritarian regi-
me. According to Griffin, global cultural homogenization, globalizing
economics and massive migration are seen as signs of the success and
pervasiveness of the conspiracy. Usually conspiracy theorists do not
only limit themselves to just expressing the decadence of the existing
world order, but they also articulate ideas for how to radically reform
the present situation (Griffin , p. ). In academic discourse that
kind of conspiracy theory is usually referred as New World Order
theories (conspiracy theorists also use the term NWO). NWO con-
spiracy theories combine classical plots and antagonists of conspiracy
theories: Freemasons, political elite (global and local), Jews, Catholics,
aliens etc. The accessibility and easy spreadability of hypertextual
sources have diversified that spectrum significantly (Dean , pp.
–; Fenster , pp. –). According to Michael Barkun New
World Order conspiracy theory (NWO) helps to connect elements
Political Potentiality of Conspiracy Theories 
that are seemingly incompatible. It may combine elements of main-
stream politics, pseudo–science, fragments of spirituality etc. NWO
conspiracy theory constitutes a framing narrative that includes almost
all ideas that are present in countercultural fields of knowledge of
fringe politics (Barkun , pp. –). It makes the believers of
conspiracy theory see causal relations between events that have taken
place in different times and spaces and that normally seem completely
separate for an outsider (Madisson, Ventsel ).
The antagonistic nature of meaning–making of conspiracy theorists
may be explained by the framework of culture–anti–culture. ‘Anti–
culture’ can be seen as a type of counter–culture relegated to the
‘inner’ point of view of cultures which, attaching a strict principle
of normativity (correctness) to their systems of expression, regard
deviations in the order of expression as disruptive of the order of mea-
ning, rather than meaningless. From the point of view of own culture
anti–culture is understood as a sign–system which is dangerous to
culture. Lotman and Uspenski explain that in some cases all structures
that are opposed to right culture may be understood as the concerted
system of wrong.
[. . . ] within the conditions of a culture oriented primarily towards expres-
sion and represented as an aggregate of normative texts, the basic opposition
will be “correct–incorrect”, i.e., wrong ([. . . ] this opposition may approxi-
mate, even coincide with, the opposition “true–false”). In the latter case,
culture is opposed not to chaos (entropy) but to a system preceded by a
negative sign. (Lotman, Uspenski , p. )
The polarized elements of anti–culture — culture are both sub-
ject to the symmetrical principle of reduction (Lepik , pp. –,
–). Conspiracy theories articulate heterogeneous elements (cha-
racters, events, conditions) by their connection with Evil structures
(Madisson ). They are all understood as something that needs
to be disclosed or eradicated. So, some agents/social structures are
demonized as Evil, as the antithetic enemy of us. Interpreters that be-
. Many researchers have pointed out that conspiracy theories have a predicta-
ble/redundant principle of organizing information; e.g. it has been stressed that they
allow individuals to map their (tragic) experiences in the light of “ready–made” cultural
frames (Dorsey , p. ), typical plots (Barkun , p. ), universal narrative schema
(Vincent , p. ), frame (Fenster ), or code text (Madisson ).
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lieve in conspiracy theories do not share any kind of common ground
with conspirators. This is illustrated by the opposition that depicts us
and them (enemies): lightness–darkness, nationalism–cosmopolitism,
prosperity of culture — cultural disaster, honesty–corruption etc.
It is crucial to note that this kind of identification practices, do-
minating in online–communication, are not treated as some kind
discursive mediation of pre–determined identity. If that was the case
then absolute evil would always have one fixed reference. On the con-
trary, the embodiment of the function of evil is principally contingent
and it depends on the sociopolitical situation (Madisson ), but
the structure for constructing the enemy is based on the model of
culture — anti–culture. The level of self–description of conspiracy
theorists implies a corrupt society and the decadence of harmonic
society is explained by malicious and systematic acts of conspirators.
The reason for the projection of a harmonic society can be explained
by the (often unaware) perception of the dangers of the revolution of
information and communication technology. Lotman has indicated
that new things, artefacts that originate from outside the tradition,
have increased symbolism. It can be said that the semiotics of things
generates the mythology of things (Lotman , p. ). They are
interpreted as signs of disaster or prosperity. Thus, we have to agree
with Mosco who claims that big changes in culture «paired with the
sublime is the process of demonization, which also encases its object
in a transcendent aura, particularly when it is applied to technology»
(, p. ).
The information overflow, diversity of different kinds of interpre-
tational processes, their qualitative indistinguishability, as well as the
technologically complex nature of hypermedia itself, have often led
to the increasing fragmentation of society. It entails a surplus of in-
formation that cannot be coherently positioned. Collective fear is not
a direct reaction to a particular threat. It is rather the recognition of
signs of potential danger (M. Lotman , p. ). According to Will-
man, «conspiracy theories presuppose a fallen society, whose failure
constitutes itself as a harmonious whole and must be explained; the
conspiratorial narrative resurrects the possibility of society even as
it traces its demise through the agency of hidden forces» (, p.
). From the point of view of the conspiracy theorists fallen society
is caused by decentralized and scattered nature of hypermedia texts
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and also by new forms of surveillance and control that are possible
in online environments. For the conspiracy theorist the antagonistic
figure of conspirator signifies a sharp gap between the ideological
representation of a harmonious society and the actual experience of
society, which cannot be grasped with his/her cognitive frames in
other ways. Agents from outside (conspirators) enable conspiracy
theorists to explain social conflicts and deviations from ideal com-
munal life and are thus needed for creating a meaningfully coherent
world. Political antagonism and politics (articulated discourse about
conspiracy theory) that try to eliminate this conflict mutually presume
each, because every practice of politics is based on exclusion, which
establish new political antagonisms.
Meaning making dominated by the antagonistic division between
us and them (or own and alien) helps to understand the prevailing
logic of conspiracy theorists, but it does not explain the socio–cultural
basis of the kind of relatively static process of signification that of-
ten regenerates itself. The following section introduces the pecu-
liarities of communication, organized by conspiracy theories, and
we can highlight two important dominants: ) the prevalence auto–
communicative meaning making and) the central role of the phatic
language function, which is used for compensating the low proportion
of information in conspiracy theories.
. Auto–communication as mechanism of creating political com-
munion
The online–environment facilitates collective authorship, where topics
are likely to be commented on, specified, supplemented, questioned,
disputed etc. Interactivity is closely connected with the core cha-
racteristics of networked culture, like: participatory culture (Erstad,
Wertsch ), citizen or grassroots journalism (Atton, Hamilton
), and mass self–communication (Castelles ). Despite the fact
that theorists of conspiracy theories tend to stress it in the level of
. In Estonia the cases of ratification meetings of ACTA and Snowden´s affair found
a vast public feedback. Both cases were also with associated with NWO (in some
representations) (see Madisson, Ventsel  and Madisson in present issue).
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self–description, we cannot treat them as a version of the classical
citizen or grassroots media because they are essentially quite unwil-
ling to respect the plurality of different viewpoints (Madisson, Ventsel
). They are not characterized by the desire for dialog or synthesis,
but rather the concentration and fixation of already existing views,
so they tend to navigate in a quite hermetic and homogeneous infor-
mational space. Conspiracy theory rather functions as a trigger for
cultural auto–communication. The following section shows what kind
of semiotic mechanism functions as a basis of auto–communication.
Juri Lotman distinguishes two types of communication: I-I and
I-(s)he. In actual communication situations they appear together in
an intertwined manner, but at the analytical level it is possible to
distinguish the prevalence of one or the other. Auto–communication
may be observed mostly in cases where the addressee/receiver of a
message is a larger community, e.g. a nation, or humanity in general.
Auto–communication is not so primary at the level of the individual
(Lotman , p. ). In the system of “I-I” communication in the case
of conspiracy theorists the carrier of the information remains the
same, but the message itself is reformulated and gains new meaning.
This kind of auto–communicative process can happen because the
new — other– code is added: a message in natural language is introdu-
ced, followed by a supplementary code of purely formal organization.
This supplementary code has a syntagmatic construction and is either
totally without semantic value or tends to be without it. Tension arises
between the original message and the secondary code, and the effect
of this tension is the tendency to interpret the semantic elements of
the text as if they were included in the supplementary syntagmatic
construction and have thereby acquired new, relationary meanings
from this interaction. The communicational system of “I-(s)he” allows
transmission of information at a constant extent (the classical commu-
nication situation where somebody transmits a message to a partner
of dialog). The message itself does not change. What changes is the
number of receivers of this message, but in case of “I-I” communica-
tion there takes place the qualitative transformation of information
that leads to the reformulation of I itself (Lotman , p. ). In that
case the message is being reformulated into different categories. Not
new messages, but new codes come in. The sender and receiver melt
together in the same individual (Lotman , p. ).
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There arises a tension between the message and a new/secondary
code (e.g. economical, juridical etc). Lotman stresses that the secon-
dary code tries to release the elements that were initially significant
from their general linguistic semantics, but it is never done in a com-
plete manner (Lotman , pp. –). In communication between
believers of conspiracy theories built upon an antagonistic polarization
between friend and enemy (conspirators), the “I-I” communicational
type is dominant. A constant process of meaning making takes place
here, but its vocabulary is pre–given in a limited number of stereoty-
pes and it does not allow an exchange of information. The selection
of information, organized by auto–communication, implies that the
system is opened only for connections that are already well–known to
the addressee. New fragments of information are placed in an inner
semiotic sphere of conspiracy theorists and it leads to a cultivation of
already existing associations (Madisson ; Madisson, Ventsel ).
They are, in turn, previously existing connections, but additional value
is added to the fragments of information, by giving them a place in
the world–view of the conspiracy theorist. If we have in mind that
«. . . the essence of a personality may be thought of as an individual set
of socially significant codes» (Lotman , p. ), then the choice of
code and the passage of interpretations of a personality, navigating the
field of conspiracy theories, is guided by auto–communication. Events
are interpreted according to a very limited number of samples. The
signs of international conspiracy are seen behind various local and
global events (Madisson ; Madisson, Ventsel ). The switches
between legal (e.g. juridical frames of information freedom in the
internet), historical (e.g. the expression of worries about criminalizing
Holocaust revisionism/ denial), philosophic–ethical (e.g. questioning
the cultural acceptance of minorities, like homosexuals), political (e.g.
explaining the success of leftwing parties in parliament elections) co-
des will lead to a qualitative deepening of the conviction that there
exists a powerful and global New World Order conspiracy (Madisson
in present Lexia). Thus, we can say that in addition to provoking
antagonistic us–them relations, the meaning creation of conspiracy
theory also has an orientation towards auto–communication.
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. Phatic function of conspiracy theories
As previously indicated, typically the receiver already knows the con-
tent of the conspiracy theory. Of course, particular variants of conspi-
racy theory may add some new aspects (novel factors and unknown
events), but they are usually matched with a pre–existing framework
of interpretation. At the analytical level there is a little difference if
the figure of conspirator is filled with minority groups, people with
other skin color, Jews, Muslims, NATO, or big corporations. They all
refer to an absolute evil that is behind particular antagonisms. Thus,
we can say that the semantic exchange that takes place in that kind
of communication is not very remarkable, but it is compensated by
another important function: the facilitation of a strong communal
bond. It is of note that the phatic language function (by Jakobson) has
an important role in communication that is based on developing or
exchanging conspiracy theories.
According to Jakobson the phatic language function predominates
in, for example, communication that is based on the exchange of
ritual formulas (of politeness) and whose only aim is to continue
communication. The phatic function is directed to contact, «a physical
channel and psychological connection between the addresser and the
addressee, enabling both of them to enter and stay in communication»
( Jakobson , p. ). Although Jakobson differentiates six language
functions, he also notes that usually language serves several functions
simultaneously, so it is more useful to talk about the prevalence of
some functions ( Jakobson , p. ).
Jakobson deals mostly with linguistic examples, but he also em-
phasizes that «this pragmatic approach to language must lead mutatis
mutandis to an analogous study of the other semiotic systems: with
which of these or other functions are they endowed, in what combina-
tions and in what hierarchical order» ( Jakobson b, p. ). Thus we
can treat also visual texts that are exchanged in online communication–
based conspiracy theories as as examples of phatic communication.
Namely, conspiracy theorists tend to exchange audio–visual messages
(e.g. secret signs and symbols, worn out formulas, icons and pictures
in a wider sense, pieces of songs) which do not exhibit informational
value for the other members of the community, but are very impor-
tant in the sense of maintaining the community. This kind of signals,
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phatic posts and other small, micro–symbols indicate the recognition
of one’s interlocutor (presence and validation) as a potential commu-
nicative partner (Radovanovic, Ragnedda , p. ). Andra Siibak
has explored the communication of Estonian extreme rightists on
the web–page rate.ee. Estonian extreme rightists have started to use
various secret codes; e.g. number combinations, acronyms or frag-
ments from meaningful texts (e.g. song lyrics, poems, aphorisms,
etc., but also inside jokes and phrases exchanged in offline context).
Those messages seem meaningless to a wider public, but insiders
who know these codes can exchange their private messages in quite
public channels, e.g. social networking sites, blogs, forums etc. (Siibak
, pp. –). Here, the primary (linguistic) meaning becomes
almost irrelevant. These expressions are rather used for fulfilling the
social function. The social function can be understood as establishing
an atmosphere that fosters private and public interactions between
two communication partners. The phatic communication reflects the
acceptance/non–acceptance of the communication partner or his/her
social status and thus, it provides indexical information for social ca-
tegorization to negotiate the relationship, in particular, their relative
status, roles and affectivity to reinforce social structure (Radovanovic,
Ragnedda , p. ).
Lotman has also stressed that in auto–communication the growth
of sytagmatic connections (inside the message) neutralizes primary
semantic connections and in some cases the message may act as an
asemantic text with complex sytangmatic organization. This kind of
texts has a tendency to become the organizer of random associations
which particular individuals carry in their mind (Lotman, p. ).
Auto–communication fosters processes which change texts into meta–
texts, words and images of inner–speech become indexes (Lepik ,
p. ). The previously described secret signs of conspiracy theorists
may be changed during the communication in time, but new secret
codes and symbols will appear here in a similar phatic communication
function. Thus we cannot say that phatic communication totally lacks
meaning. Phatic communication requires, in many cases, recognition,
intimacy, and sociality, which are the cornerstones of all kinds of
communities. On the other hand, the connection becomes more
meaningful and words become more redundant (Miller , p. ).
Lotman stresses that a system oriented towards auto–communication
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does not feel estranged by stereotypes. It rather has a strong propen-
sity to turn texts into stereotypes and to identify “high”, “good”,
and “real” with “stable” and “everlasting” (Lotman , p. ). Auto–
communication has the potential to generate qualitatively new in-
formation, but it also has the potential to become a deepener of
previously existing connections. In our case, conspiracy theorists re-
cognize the appearance of NWO conspiracies behind different levels
of individual experiences, and that kind of auto–communication ma-
kes the conviction of the existence of conspiracy become more clear
and extensive. Also, the dominance of the phatic function supports
auto–communicative processes in communication based on exchan-
ging conspiracy theories. It explains the seemingly paradoxical situa-
tion where in online communication that offers multiple viewpoints,
people are still encapsulated into hermetic spheres of information
(Madisson, Ventsel ). That kind of tendency is caused by the fact
that online communication is often rather dominated by affirming
and fastening social relations and not so much by exchanging new
information. That kind of situation becomes possible because auto–
communication and the prevalence of phatic communication support
and reproduce each other.
. Conclusion
This study explicated auto–communicative and phatic orientations
of identity creation in conspiracy theories. This kind of co–presence
articulates meaning making within conspiracy theories as a politi-
cal activity. Not all cases of domination of auto–communicative and
phatic function are necessarily political. Radovanovic and Ragnedda
point out that the phatic function is flourishing in social media (e.g.
Facebook) and they stress that usually phatic messages of social media
do not express disagreement or conflict. This tendency is supported
by the presence and wide usage of the like–device. It is important to
note that there is not a similar device for indicating reluctance (Rado-
vanovic, Ragnedda , p. ). On the other hand, the political nature
of phatic communication still depends on the context because it is
easy to imagine an anti-Semitic or racist picture which expresses the
political sympathy of the author.
Political Potentiality of Conspiracy Theories 
Communication, based on the exchange of conspiracy theories,
can be categorized as a political practice if it exhibits all three domi-
nants: ) antagonistic opposition between conspirators and conspiracy
theorist who tries reveal their covert actions; ) meaning–making
that is oriented towards auto–communication, which tends to con-
firm previously existing convictions about the presence of conspiracy,
and ) the domination of phatic communication that supports auto–
communication and facilitates the fastening of communal ties. This
kind of auto–communicative system excites great mental activity in
the form of recognition of different appearances of the same pheno-
menon behind radically dissimilar occurrences. On the other hand,
auto–communicative systems are not dynamic enough to meet the
needs of human society (Lotman , p. ).
The analysis of this kind of quasi–political communities maps the
peculiarities of online communication at a more general level. It could
be asked, what kind of modes of signification prevail in the process of
forming discursive communities; how do the specifics of dominance
influence signification strategies; and how can we distinguish online
and offline communication within the same community? That ap-
proach may also open the way for creating a typology of communica-
tion tendencies. It would explicate the communication and dynamics
between different communities, but also explain the conflicts that are
caused by the specifics of communication.
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“Tell Me What You [Do Not] Eat, and I Shall Tell
You What You Are”
Food, Health and Conspiracy Theories
S S*
La farmacia domestica è in cucina.
Lo stesso piatto può essere un balsamo od un
veleno.
F C, La vera cucina casalinga,

 : “Dimmi cosa [non] mangi e ti dirò chi sei”. Alimentazione,
salute e teorie del complotto
: A well–known aphorism by Brillat–Savarin () states: “Tell me
what you eat, and I shall tell you what you are”. In fact, food represents
a fundamental component of life, encompassing different spheres and
moments. It provides not only the energy the body consumes, but also
the very substance of the body. Moreover, from a subjective point of
view, people often believe or fear, adhering to a sort of magical thinking,
that food acts on their organism or on their identity by analogical conta-
mination, integration, or impregnation (Fischler ). That has become
particularly evident in contemporary foodscapes, mainly according to a
‘negative logic’ that would require rephrasing Brillat–Savarin’s aphorism
as follows: “Tell me what you do not eat, and I shall tell you what you
are”. Lately, food habits forbidding the consumption of specific ingre-
dients (e.g., vegetarianism, veganism, etc.) or even biological molecules
and other nutritional materials (e.g., gluten–free movements, protein–
based diets, etc.) have spread and become increasing visible, further
∗ Simona Stano, Università degli Studi di Torino and International Semiotics Institute,
Kaunas University of Technology.
. “Your kitchen is your pharmacy. A same food can be either a medicine or a poison”
(our translation).

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enhancing the importance of taboos for both the sociocultural order
and the processes of identity building. At the crossroad of physiology
and medicine, on the one hand, and the sociocultural dimension, on the
other hand, food defines people’s identity primarily in negative terms,
through prohibitions and restraints. The essay deals with the recent
spread of gluten–free movements and with the vertiginous increase in
gluten sensitivity rates, which have resulted in the diffusion of conspiracy
theories that explain these phenomena as caused by the globalization of
markets and the misuse of genetic modifications. The analysis of rele-
vant case–studies leads to describe the features and internal mechanisms
of the specific rhetoric underlying such discourses, also relating to more
general observations on conspiracy theories.
: Food; Identity; Conspiracy Theories; Health; Communication.
. Introduction
A well–known aphorism by Jean–Anthelme Brillat–Savarin () sta-
tes: “Tell me what you eat, and I shall tell you what you are”. In fact,
food represents a fundamental component of our life, encompassing
different spheres and moments. It provides not only the energy our
body consumes, but also the very substance of our body (cf. Stano
). Moreover, according to Claude Fischler (), from a subjecti-
ve point of view, people believe or fear that food acts either on their
organism or on their identity by analogical contamination, integration,
or impregnation.
This fact has become particularly evident in contemporary food-
scapes, mainly according to a “negative logic” which would require
rephrasing Brillat–Savarin’s aphorism as follows: “Tell me what you
do not eat, and I shall tell you what you are”. Recent decades have
seen the spread and increasing visibility of food habits forbidding the
consumption of specific ingredients (e.g. vegetarianism and vegani-
sm), or even biological molecules and other nutritional materials (e.g.
gluten–free movements, proteins–based diets, etc.), further enhan-
cing the importance of taboos for both the sociocultural order (see
Douglas ; ) and the processes of identity building. Hanging in
the balance between physiology and medicine, on the one hand, and
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sociocultural dimension, on the other hand, in contemporary socie-
ties food defines men’s identity primarily in negative terms, through
prohibitions and restraints. And it is likely to give rise to various
conspiracy theories, further stressing the connection between food
behaviours and health.
. The “Gluten Conspiracy”: The Five Stars Movement
The recent spread of gluten–free movements and vertiginous increase
in gluten sensitivity rates have resulted in the denunciation of a real
conspiracy theory originating from the globalization of markets and
the misuse of genetic modifications.
On October , , for instance, the Five Stars Movement’s repre-
sentative Loredana Lupo drew the attention of the Italian Parliament
to coeliac disease, asking for new measures intended to promote the
safeguard of all the people who suffer from such a disease, as well as
to increase public awareness on this issue, which — as Lupo states —
“concerns more than , new sick people every year only in Italy”
(our translation).
A real conspiracy theory emerges from the politician’s very first
words: Lupo opens her speech saying “Today, instead of focusing
on coeliac disease as a disease, we should rather conceive it as a
normal consequence of the modern processes of globalization and
hyper–industrialization of the food system” (our translation). In order
to support such an idea, she goes on recalling Brillat–Savarin and
Feuerbach’s mottos: “We are what we eat. In our daily life we do not
pay enough attention to what we eat, and only rarely we understand
that the food that we consume will become part of us and will affect
our chemical, biological, and energetic processes” (our translation).
Hence she distinguishes between “products that are suitable for our
nature and products that are not” (our translation), pointing out that,
while the former bring benefits to our body, the latter generally cause
its “pollution” and “decay”.
. A video of this meeting is available at the link https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=CLNKwJzAQo.
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Gluten, evidently, is of the second type. “But what is gluten?” —
Lupo rhetorically asks — “It is a protein that can be found in some
cereals; a macro–element that for years has been subjected to gene-
tic selections in order to improve its technical features rather than
enhance its qualitative properties” (our translation). Again, the focus
is put on the negative effects of modernity and technology: “People
do not suffer from such a disease since their birth, but only after few
years, because of the bad nutrition they are used to” (our translation).
Precisely these words, together with the complaint concerning the
more than , new cases of coeliac patients each year (only in Italy),
reveal an important fact, namely that the politician is confusing coeliac
disease — which is an autoimmune disorder that, although becoming
manifest from middle infancy onward, occurs exclusively in geneti-
cally predisposed people — with non–coeliac gluten sensitivity (NCGS)
— which, on the contrary, is usually less severe and not genetic, does
not involve autoimmune comorbidities, and is affecting an incredibly
increasing number of people (although no biomarker for diagnosing
it is available) (see in particular Ludvigsson et al. ; Volta et al. ;
Elli et al. ; Fasano et al. ; Schuppan et al. ; Vriezinga et al.
).
. “Gluten Is a Silent Killer”: David Perlmutter’s Grain Brain
A similar theory is presented in David Perlmutter’s best–seller Grain
Brain ().
The cover of the book (Fig. ) reveals the central isotopy characte-
rising it: the link between food — and especially grains, which find
here expression in the figure of the bread — and the human body
— and especially the brain, which plays a crucial role in the author’s
reasoning. Evidently we have here a reference to Brillat–Savarin’s
motto, which is in fact explicitly mentioned in the epigraph opening
Chapter .
. In this respect, it is also very interesting to notice that each chapter is opened by a
quote, generally referring to various fields, from science to literature and cinema.
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Figure . David Perlmutter’s Grain Brain (), cover
The contents reveal a series of semantic marks that recur frequently
in the text, originating other powerful isotopies:
— A Real Change.
Recurrent expressions such as “cornerstone” (p. , , , )
and “new way of life” (p. , , ) are used to “reveal”
a “surprising” and “mesmerizing truth” (p. , , , ),
which will bring readers to a “real change”. Such a change,
evidently, is a positive one (e.g. “Jog your genes to build a better
brain”, p. , ), and opposes the negative effects of grains
(i.e. our “enemies” (p. , , , , ), whose dangerous
power is remarked various times: “how gluten robs you and
your children’s peace in mind” (p. , ), “killer” (p. , , ,
), “silent germ” (p. ), “silently destroying your brain” (p. ),
“silently harming you right now” (p. ), etc.
— Safe Past vs. Dangerous Present.
Since the book’s introduction (p. –), a strong opposition is
established between past and present time:
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If you could ask your grandparents or great–grandparents what
people died from when were growing up, you’d likely hear the
words “old age”. Or you might learn the story of someone who got a
nasty germ and passed away prematurely from tuberculosis, cholera,
or dysentery. What you won’t hear are things like diabetes, cancer,
heart disease, and dementia. [. . . ] Today, those single diseases tend
to be the kind that go on and on in a chronic, degenerating state and
involve multiple complications and symptoms that accumulate over
time (p. ).
No reference is made to the problem of diagnosing such disea-
ses, which are described as direct consequences of modern diets
and habits: “modern grains are silently destroying your brain”
(p. ), acting as “terrorist groups” — we find here a reference to
war and terrorism, which is another recurring element in the
text. Furthermore, Perlmutter tells us that “This isn’t science
fiction; it’s now documented fact” (p. , ). Definitely, he is
the “game–changer” (p. ) who is going to reveal us the “sad
but true” (p. ) story about our daily life.
— Action vs. Fate.
The author directly addresses his readers through a remarked
embrayage: “Let me prove it to you. Then it’s up to you to decide
if you’ll take this all seriously and welcome a brighter, more
disease–free future. We’ve all got a lot to lose if we don’t heed
this message, and to gain if we do” (p.  [our emphasis]). His
message, therefore, is clear: “The fate of your brain is not in
your genes. It’s not inevitable” (p. ); on the contrary, “it’s in
the food you eat”, since “brain dysfunction starts in your daily
bread” (p. ). And his book is going to prove it to us (e.g. “I’m
going to prove it”, p. ; “Let me prove it to you”, p. ).
To this purpose, Perlmutter tries to confer a scientific character
upon his reasoning by making extensive use of schemes and diagrams,
whose sources, however, are not described in details. What is more, he
mixes up histograms, bar graphs, pie charts, scatter plots, drawings,
and even humour cartoons (Fig. ), therefore subverting common
standards for scientific writing.
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Figure . A cartoon used to make fun of conventional medicine
There are also several quotes, including scientific studies that are
presented as new, innovative, original, etc. — that is, that have not
been officially recognised by scientific authorities yet —, and even
literary references.
Figure . Perlmutter’s webpage (http://www.drperlmutter.com)
 Simona Stano
Finally, it is interesting to consider Perlmutter’s webpage (Fig. ),
which is often mentioned in the book: he introduces himself as an
“empowering neurologist”. Such an “empowerment”, which is descri-
bed as a real “mission”, consists “not only [in] provid[ing] information
that relates to specific medical issues, but even more importantly, in-
formation that reveals the keys to maintaining health and preventing
disease”.
Polychromy also suggests the idea of a change, which is further en-
hanced by the verbal expression used to introduce David Perlmutter:
“brain changer”.
. Wheat Belly Total Health: The “Health Crusade” by William
Davis
Another remarkable case is William Davis’ Wheat Belly (), re–edited
as Wheat Belly Total Health ().
On his website (Fig. ), the author is presented as a “Cardiologist”
(that is, a doctor and a scientist, as it is also suggested by the white
coat and the stethoscope that he is wearing in the picture in the
webpage header, as well as by the acronym — “dr.” — preceding
his name), an “Author” (with a direct reference to his books), and
a “Health Crusader” (namely a sort of warrior fighting a holy war).
What is more, his success is remarked by a dedicated section (“Success
Stories”), as well as by his reassuring smile.
Figure . Davis’ webpage (http://www.wheatbellyblog.com)
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Figure . William Davis’ Wheat Belly Total Health (), cover
As regards to Davis’ book Wheat Belly Total Health, the cover (Fig.
) is noteworthy: the iconic code invites readers to make bread “fall”,
while the verbal language (which is characterised by a significant chro-
matic alteration) clarifies what they will achieve by doing so, that is,
“Total Health”. Davis calls his readers to a change, as his dedication
clearly states: “To all the readers who have the boldness, courage, and
conviction to rebel against conventional dietary advice and discover
what real nutrition can do for human health” (p. ).
Both titles and subtitles insist on ideas such as “full recovery” (p.
), “restoration” (p. , , , ,  , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , , , , ), and
“total health” (p. , , ,, , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , ), which is here described
as “the natural state of human life” (p. ). The focus therefore is on
the risks associated with modernity and the so–called “agribusiness”
(p. , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , ,
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, , , , , ), which has further increased the negative
effects of what Davis calls “Frankengrains”: “The seeds of grasses,
known to us more familiarly as ‘grains’ or ‘cereals’, have always been
a problem for us nonruminant creatures. But then busy geneticists
and agribusiness got into the act. That’s when grains went from bad
to worse” (p. ).
His “crusade” is precisely aimed at teaching us how to prevent such
risks and “freed” ourselves from the “dirty work” of conventional
medicine and the mass media, which try to hide them (p. ). This, of
course, implies a drastic change, consisting in the elimination of “all
grains” (with emphasis significantly put on the word “all”). According
to Davis, total health depends on us; and his book is intended to
provide his readers with “empowering strategies” which will bring
them to full recovery, that is, “to regain control” (p. , ) and be
the “king[s]” or “emperor[s]” (p. ) of their life. This will lead them
to evident results:
You see it in smoother skin, a flatter tummy, freedom from leg swelling, as
easy gait, and ease and vigor of motion in all directions. It’s also reflected
internally through deeper sleep, less–turbulent menstrual cycles, freedom
from headaches, and problem–free digestion. In addition to less–disruptive
menstrual cycles, women can enjoy improved fertility and reductions in
perversely high estrogen levels, and they get reacquainted with the concept
of feeling good most or all of the time, rather than just once in a while or
not al all. Male sexual performance improves as men enjoy lower levels of
estrogen, higher levels of testosterone, and reduction of embarrassing large
breasts (p. ).
In order to prove such statements, Davis provides some examples
and “success stories” (which mainly correspond to those appearing on
his website). These are in fact the only sections providing exact data
on weight loss and other aspects related to (individual) improvements,
while only vague information is offered as regards to the general
discussion (e.g. the author generally refer to “many cases”, without
providing precise numeric data). Furthermore, the last part of the
book insists on several “additional steps” that are necessary to achieve
total health, admitting that it is not all about grain elimination.
Finally, as regards to the enunciative level, it should be remarked
that, in this case too, quotations are largely used (also including va-
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riations of titles of novels such as “ shades of grey”, which here
becomes “ shades of grain”), together with recurrent embraya-
ges, which are used to emphasise the reader’s role in the described
“salvation process”.
. Conclusion
These examples suggest the presence of a real “conspiracy theo-
ry” concerning gluten and grains, which is based on some crucial
elements:
— an “evolutionary theory” claiming human beings’ possibili-
ty (and need) to regulate nutrition, by carefully (and totally)
avoiding some foods;
— a sharp contrast between the past, described as idyllic, and
the present, which is instead characterised by the “devil of
agribusiness”;
— a peculiar relationship between Nature — that is, our body —
and Culture — which takes on two different connotations: on
the one hand, (i) a negative culture, corresponding to agribu-
siness and the lies of conventional medicine and science; on
the other hand, (ii) a positive culture, consisting in the specific
competence of “enlightened” and unconventional doctors, and
enabling “natural (and total) health”.
As regards to the enunciative level, these elements find expression
in a large use of metaphors, hyperboles, and quotations, as well as in
the attempt to establish a scientifically validated discourse — which,
nonetheless, generally lacks consolidated data and reliable sources.
Great importance is also commonly attributed to personal experience,
which is used as an evidence of success, while scientifically recognised
data tend to be scarce.
.. Debunking the “Gluten Conspiracy”
Several scholars have tried to make such mechanisms evident. Let us
consider, for example, Against the Grain: Should You Go Gluten Free?
 Simona Stano
by Michael Specter (), a journalist mainly dealing with medicine,
biotechnology, and agricultural resources. In this article, Specter first
of all points out the difference between coeliac disease and gluten
sensibility:
For people with celiac disease—about one per cent of the population—the
briefest exposure to gluten can trigger an immune reaction powerful enou-
gh to severely damage the brushlike surfaces of the small intestine. People
with celiac have to be alert around food at all times, learning to spot hid-
den hazards in common products, such as hydrolyzed vegetable protein
and malt vinegar. Eating in restaurants requires particular vigilance. Even
reusing water in which wheat pasta has been cooked can be dangerous.
Until about a decade ago, the other ninety–nine per cent of Americans
rarely seemed to give gluten much thought. But, led by people like William
Davis, a cardiologist whose book “Wheat Belly” created an empire founded
on the conviction that gluten is a poison, the protein has become a culinary
villain. [. . . ] David Perlmutter, a neurologist and the author of another of the
gluten–free movement’s foundational texts, “Grain Brain: The Surprising
Truth About Wheat, Carbs, and Sugar—Your Brain’s Silent Killers,” goes
further still. Gluten sensitivity, he writes, “represents one of the greatest
and most under–recognized health threats to humanity.”
Nearly twenty million people contend that they regularly experience
distress after eating products that contain gluten, and a third of American
adults say that they are trying to eliminate it from their diets. [. . . ] The
syndrome has even acquired a name: non–celiac gluten sensitivity.
Such a distinction, as we remarked above, was not very clear in Lu-
po’s speech, and it seems somehow concealed in Perlmutter and Davis’
books, which recognise it, but try to reduce its importance, blaming
those who disregard gluten sensitivity (i.e. conventional medicine and
dietetics).
Another interesting point in Specter’s article is the attention attri-
buted to FODMAPs:
But there is more to wheat than gluten. Wheat also contains a combination
of complex carbohydrates, [. . . ] called FODMAPs, an acronym for a series
of words that few people will ever remember: fermentable oligosaccharides,
disaccharides, monosaccharaides, and polyols. Not all carbohydrates are
considered FODMAPs, but many types of foods contain them, including
other foods [. . . ]. Most people have no trouble digesting FODMAPs, but
these carbohydrates are osmotic, which means that they pull water into the
intestinal tract. That can cause abdominal pain, bloating, and diarrhea (ibid.).
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Recalling relevant research in the field, the journalist therefore con-
cludes: “FODMAPs seem more likely than gluten to cause widespread
intestinal distress, since bacteria regularly ferment carbohydrates but
ferment protein less frequently”. However — he denounces — they
“are not as trendy as gluten and not as easy to understand” (ibid.).
Also Alan Levinovitz, in his book The Gluten Lie: and Other Myths
About What You Eat (), aims at unveiling the conspiracy theories
concerning coeliac disease and other “myths” about food. Since the
very first pages of his book, he clearly states that he is not a doctor, but
a scholar in religious studies and contemporary culture who wants to
decipher the functioning mechanisms of such processes.
Opposing science to myth and real scientists to gurus, Levinovitz
argues that “The problem is that running a few studies doesn’t ‘prove’
or ‘conclusively show’ anything. Good nutrition science depends
on the long, slow accumulation of data over many, many studies,
something scientists themselves know very well” (p. ).
This is why he defines Perlmutter and Davis “false prophets”, also
highlighting that none of them is a leader in his field, and much lesser
an expert in nutrition science (Davis is a cardiologist, Perlmutter a
neurologist). His conclusion, therefore, is that “fiction, not food, is the
real demon” (p. ). And he calls for a change: “Everyday foods don’t
have life–giving or death–dealing properties. Grocery stores aren’t
pharmacies. Your kitchen isn’t stocked with silent killers, and the
charlatans that make a living on false promises and uncertain science
need to be revealed for what they really are” (p. ).
In order to do so, he traces a brief history of coeliac disease, intro-
ducing elements that are totally absent in the previously analysed texts,
and pointing out that shocking measures — such as the so–called “ba-
nana diet” — were adopted to cure such a disease mainly because of
commercial interests and false prophecies. Finally, the author suggests
that the efficacy of such processes can be explained in terms of “magic
thinking”, even though he does not enter much deeper into this issue.
.. Magic Thinking, Science, and (Meta-)Conspiracy Theories
Among the major scholars who have dealt with magic thinking, Ja-
mes George Frazer, in The Golden Bough () sets out his theory of
“magic”, conceived as the first step of a complex process, and descri-
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bed as “a spurious system of natural law as well as a fallacious guide
of conduct; it is a false science as well as an abortive art” (III, § ).
According to Frazer, such a system is based on “sympathy” between
things, which can follow a law of similarity (such as in the case of
voodoo, where we have homeopathic magic) or rather that of contact
(for which objects have an influence on one another even after being
separated). Magic thinking plays an important social role, since it is
based on the establishment of laws, taboos, and rules of belonging
and exclusion. Without getting down to the details of Frazer’s theory,
which has also been strongly criticized by different scholars (such as
Wittgenstein), it is sufficient for the purposes of this paper to note that
magic thinking is described by this scholar as a real cognitive operation,
which is complementary to other forms of knowledge such as science
and religion.
In Magic, Science and Religion (), Bronislaw Malinowski recalls
Frazer’s studies to present magic as a “pseudo–science” ([], p. ).
He also describes better its role in knowledge, by making reference
to the myth: according to Malinowski, the myth represents the basis
of social organization and of knowledge itself, since it expresses, en-
hances and codifies people’s beliefs. In other words, myths come into
play when no pragmatic or rational logics can be used to describe the
world and facts surrounding us.
Claude Lévi–Strauss () further develops this theory, not only by
revealing interesting observations about how we should consider and
analyse myths (whose occasional unclearness is only apparent), but
also by introducing a concept that plays a crucial role in the particular
type of myths (or conspiracy theories) with which we have dealt so
far: the so–called “effectiveness of symbols”.
The cure would consist [. . . ] in making explicit a situation originally existing
on the emotional level and in rendering acceptable to the mind pains which
the body refuses to tolerate. That the mythology of the shaman does not
correspond to an objective reality does not matter. The sick woman believes
in the myth and belongs to a society which believes in it. [. . . ] The sick
woman accepts [the] mythical beings or, more accurately, she has never
questioned their existence. What she does not accept are the incoherent
and arbitrary pains, which are an alien element in her system but which
the shaman, calling upon myth, will re–integrate within a whole where
everything is meaningful.
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Once the sick woman understands, however, she does more than resign
herself; she gets well. But no such thing happens to our sick when the
causes of their diseases have been explained to them in terms of secretions,
germs, or viruses. We shall perhaps be accused of paradox if we answer that
the reason lies in the fact that microbes exist and monsters do not. And yet,
the relationship between germ and disease is external to the mind of the
patient, for it is a cause–and–effect relationship; whereas the relationship
between monster and disease is internal to his mind, whether conscious
or unconscious. [. . . ] The shaman provides the sick woman with a langua-
ge, by means of which unexpressed, and otherwise inexpressible, psychic
states can be immediately expressed. And it is the transition to this verbal
expression—at the same time making it possible to undergo in an ordered
and intelligible form a real experience that would otherwise be chaotic and
inexpressible—which induces the release of the physiological process, that
is, the reorganization, in a favorable direction, of the process to which the
sick woman is subjected ([] pp. –).
Instead of opposing magic and science, therefore, it would be
better to conceive them as two parallel modes of acquiring knowledge,
requiring the same kind of mental operations, which — according
to Lévi-Strauss () — “differ not so much in kind as in different
types of phenomena to which they are applied” ([], p. ). Up
against the impossibility of conventional science to provide holistic
and comprehensive explanations, myths and symbols come into play.
In other words, whether we call it a placebo or rather a nocebo effect —
since in the previously analysed cases abstinence from specific foods
is said to have positive and healthy effects —, such processes have
important outcomes not only on people’s mind, but also on their body.
This fact seems to be mainly disregarded both by coeliac crusaders
— who force Brillat–Savarin’s aphorism into deterministic views and
reject conventional science a priori — and their debunkers — who
instead seem to completely deny the role of mythical and symbolic
operations in health–related processes. This, in turn, originates a pe-
culiar phenomenon: while unveiling the conspiracy theory according
to which coeliac disease is an effect of globalization and modernity,
its debunkers argue that the current emphasis on such a disease is a
“lie” manipulating people for commercial purposes. Hence the first
conspiracy theory (“CT”) becomes the fulcrum and at the same time
the justification of a second conspiracy theory (“CT”), in a sort of
“meta–conspiracy” that, in its turn, is likely to open the way to new
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conspiracy theories, in a process of unlimited semiosis that risks de-
generating in an endless series of references to other theories, thus
further fomenting the eternal fight between the “scientific” and the
“mythical” paradigm.
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 : Avvenimenti nazionali sconvolgenti e narrative del com-
plotto nella letteratura italiana contemporanea.
: In the history of a nation, upsetting events sometimes threaten
its identity. Often, conspiracy theories work as counter–narratives con-
trasting the reassuring official accounts of such shocking happenings.
Fictional literature is one of the main channels for the diffusion of con-
spiracy theories. Starting from such premises, the essay focuses on a
corpus of Italian novels written in the last sixty years. They refer to four
of the most upsetting moments of Italian national history (Risorgimento,
the fall of Fascism, the “lead years”, and the passage from the first to the
second Republic). The analysis concentrates on novels by Umberto Eco,
Andrea Camilleri, Leonardo Sciascia, Rino Cammilleri, Carlo Alianel-
lo, and Luciano Bianciardi. It singles out different types of conspiracy
narratives in contemporary Italian literature, each one characterized by
peculiar recurrent motifs and characters. The essay, therefore, sets the
premises for a semiotic study of conspiracy as literary genre.
: Conspiracy; Italian Literature; National Identity; Semiotics;
Narrative.
. Conspiracy narratives
In the history of a nation there are upsetting events that threaten the
sense of national identity itself. Generally, institutions and citizens
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tend to organize these facts in reassuring narratives working as a
form of self–protection. It is nevertheless possible to hypothesize that
such difficult moments generate not only reassuring accounts but also,
as a sort of byproduct, a big number of the peculiar narratives called
“conspiracy theories”. Literature is one of the main channels of their
diffusion. In this paper, I will therefore address some representations
of conspiracy in contemporary Italian literature.
Although stories of conspiracies and of mysterious secret societies
exist since the antiquity, scholars tend to consider conspiracy theories
as a typically modern phenomenon, or they underline that today
they are assuming a new importance, mainly by offering a kind of
“quasi–religious” alternative to the declining grand narratives:
[. . . ] the idea of conspiracy offers an odd sort of comfort in an uncertain
age: it makes sense of the inexplicable, accounting for complex events in
a clear, if frightening, way. [. . . ] by offering a highly adaptable vision of
causality, conspiracy theory acts as a “master narrative,” a grand scheme
capable of explaining numerous complex events [. . . ]. Most conspiracy
theories are virtually impossible to confirm — yet this built–in impediment
to certainty is precisely why they have flourished in an age supposedly
marked by the disappearance of grand explanatory schemes and master
narratives. Because they are so difficult to confirm, they require a form
of quasi–religious conviction, a sense that the conspiracy in question is
an entity with almost supernatural powers. In fact, the term “conspiracy”
rarely signifies a small, secret plot any more. Instead, it frequently refers to
the workings of a large organization, technology, or system — a powerful
and obscure entity so dispersed that it is the antithesis of the traditional
conspiracy. “Conspiracy,” in other words, has come to signify a broad array
of social controls. (Melley , p. )
[. . . ] the “conspiracy theory of society” [. . . ], which is more primitive
than most forms of theism, is akin to Homer’s theory of society. Homer
conceived the power of the gods in such a way that whatever happened on
the plain before Troy was only a reflection of the various conspiracies on
. See Anderson () and his theory of the “reassurance of fratricide” and Renan
().
. Taguieff (), for example, underlines the connection between the moments of
deep historical change, such as the French Revolution, and the flourishing of a plurality of
conspiracy theories. On the conspiracy theory as a narrative see Martinelli herein; Fenster
(), chap. .
. Pagán (); Roisman (); Eco ().
. See Knight (), pp. –; Fenster (); Ceserani ().
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Olympus. The conspiracy theory of society is just a version of this theism,
of a belief in gods whose whims and wills rule everything. It comes from
abandoning God and then asking: ´Who is in place?´ His place is then filled
by various powerful men and groups — sinister pressure groups, who are
to be blamed for having planned the great depression and all the evils from
which we suffer. (Popper , p. )
Given such premises, the present study focuses on a corpus of
novels published in Italy in the last  years. It will neither consider
the science–fiction conspiracy , which seems a less explored branch,
possibly derived from American cultural influence, nor will it consider
ancient plots. It will instead focus on a sample of novels presenting
an account of some of the most upsetting events in Italian national
history: ) the Risorgimento (the national unification period, s-
s); ) the end of Fascism; ) the “Anni di piombo” (“lead years”,
terrorism in the s); ) the passage from the first to the second
Republic (s).
Novels treating such key historical events using conspiracy narra-
tives are analyzed in order to point out some recurring motifs and
characters, and to introduce a reflection on the possibility of a study
of conspiracy as a genre in Italian literature.
. Umberto Eco: Il cimitero di Praga and Numero Zero
The Prague Cemetery () and Numero Zero () involve all the above–
quoted key moments. Eco () concerns, even if not exclusively, the
Risorgimento, while Eco () is set in the s and treats the fall of
Fascism and the “lead years.”
Eco’s thought on conspiracy theories is well known: the only dange-
rous conspiracies are those that emerge publicly. A conspiracy whose
effects are unknown is a failed conspiracy, or it is a fake, maybe in-
vented by a dictator to mislead public opinion. As it has often been
observed, Eco wrote some of his novels deliberately playing with sym-
bols, motifs and stereotypes of “authentic” conspiracy literature. In
. E.g. the novel for kids Luciani ().
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Eco’s intention, writing novels that represent the distorted mentality
leading to conspiracy theories should be a way to exorcise them.
In Eco () we can find a declaration of conspiracy poetics. The
protagonist is an old spy recalling his life. Grown up by a grandfather
persuaded of the existence of a Jewish conspiracy for the conquest
of the world, passionate reader of feuilletons full of tricks, the young
Simonini is impressed by Dumas’s novel Giuseppe Balsamo. This
reading makes him aware of the underlying structure, or “Universal
Form” (p. ), of all conspiracies:
Let us imagine conspirators who come from every part of the world and
represent the tentacles of their sect spread throughout every country. Let
us assemble them in a forest clearing, a cave, a castle, a cemetery or a
crypt, provided it is reasonably dark. Let us get one of them to pronounce
a discourse that clearly sets out the plan, and the intention to conquer the
world. . . I have known many people who feared the conspiracy of some
hidden enemy — for my grandfather it was the Jews, for the Jesuits it was
the Masons, for my Garibaldian father it was the Jesuits, for the kings of
half Europe it was the Carbonari, for my Mazzinian companions it was
the king backed by the clergy [. . . ] and so forth. Who knows how many
other people in this world still think they are being threatened by some
conspiracy? Here’s a form to be filled out at will, by each person with his
own conspiracy. (Eco , pp. –)
This intuition leads Simonini to produce the fake known as the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. He is a sordid, paranoiac and cruel
character, partially based on the stereotype of the grande vecchio, the
big old man, the master plotting in the shadows. However, contrarily
to the recurring figure of the old master, well represented e.g. in
Cammilleri (, see below), Simonini is not able to fully control the
consequences of his actions. He is not aware of the huge impact that
his Protocols will have in the th century.
Both Eco’s novels are characterized by dark and dull settings, and
in Eco () a character called Romano Braggadocio embodies, in
an almost caricature style, the paranoiac who sees conspiracies every-
where. The narrator Colonna, a failed writer, ex- editor and translator,
describes Braggadocio highlighting “filthy” (p. ) aspects of his physio-
. On Eco’s position and on the big debate it produced see Riotta and Eco ();
Magris and Eco (); Tosatti (); Mattioli (); Taguieff and Paoli ().
. Riotta and Eco (); Taguieff (); Kelman ().
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gnomy. Braggadocio has adopted a radical philosophy of suspicion,
due to the certitude of living surrounded by a constant deceit (e.g.
«The newspapers lie, the historians lie, the TV today lies [. . . ] I don’t
trust anything anymore. We live in the lie and, if you know that they
lie, you must live in the suspicion. I suspect, I always suspect»). As a
consequence, the goal of his life is to find out the truth and to bring it
to light (pp. , ).
Not only is Braggadocio paranoiac, but he also seems to be affec-
ted by the illness Eco spoke about in different occasions by quoting
Borges’s character of Funes el Memorioso. Funes was a man that
remembered everything, and he was “a perfect idiot”, because he
was not able to select and hierarchically organize the information
he received. Indeed, Braggadocio is persuaded that everything is
connected (pp. , ), and that the smallest detail can have a crucial
meaning. This is a characteristic trait of the conspiracy mentality.
Starting from the presupposition that the “common vulgate” (p.
) is too simple to be true, Braggadocio builds his own account of
the Italian postwar history. His interpretation is based on two main
factors. The first one is an abnormal logic, typical of that «interpretive
disorder that revolves around questions of control and manipulation»
(Melley , p. ) called paranoia. The second factor is necrophilia.
Braggadocio is irresistibly attracted not only by sinister places, but
also by all sort of human remains. In Braggadocio’s vision, all the
history of Italy after World War II depends on the motif of Musso-
lini’s death. Mussolini does not represent the hidden mind guiding
history; he is rather the object of the history, especially as a dead body.
As Simonini’s obsession with the Jews comes from his grandfather,
. For example: «Gli occhi di Braggadocio brillavano, sembravano illuminare la teoria
dei teschi che ci attorniavano, le sue mani tremavano, le labbra si coprivano di saliva
biancastra, mi aveva afferrato per le spalle [. . . ]» (Eco , p. ).
. My translation, no English version available yet. «I giornali mentono, gli storici
mentono, la televisione oggi mente. [. . . N]on mi fido piú di niente [. . . ] Viviamo nella
menzogna e, se sai che ti mentono, devi vivere nel sospetto. Io sospetto, sospetto sempre»
(Eco , pp. –).
. See e.g. Eco (b). We can see this tendency of Braggadocio in the episode
concerning the cars’ advertisements, which he cannot help learning by hearth. The
numerous and detailed data concerning the cars haunt him and ultimately make him
think that the whole car industry is a conspiracy against him (p. ).
. See on this regard Knight (), chap. .
 Jenny Ponzo
Braggadocio’s mania seems to come from his family history, from his
father’s involvement with fascism.
According to Braggadocio, after the fall of fascism, Mussolini, with
the Vatican’s help, secretly flies to Argentina, where he lives for 
years. A lookalike is killed in his place and his body is publicly exposed.
Mussolini’s return is the nucleus of a golpe against the government
acted in  and involving numerous secret societies. The golpe fails
because of the old Mussolini’s death during the long travel back to
Italy. From that moment on, deprived of their central symbol, the
secret societies change their strategy and begin a series of terroristic
actions: «[. . . ] the shadow of Mussolini, deemed dead, dominates all
the Italian events from  [. . . ], and his actual death provokes the
most terrible historical period of this country, involving stay–behind,
CIA, NATO, Gladio, the P, the mafia, the services, the high military
headquarters, ministers [. . . ] presidents [. . . ], and of course most part
of the extreme left terroristic organisations [. . . ]» After having traced
this story, Braggadocio enthusiastically states that he is the only one
who has been able to understand the truth (p. ). Maybe his name,
evoking a boaster, alludes precisely to this presumption.
Braggadocio thinks that some secret societies are still active. Indeed,
after revealing his theories to Colonna, he is mysteriously murdered.
Colonna, infected by Braggadocio’s disease, starts seeing conspiracies
everywhere and feeling persecuted. He recovers thanks to his friend
Maia and to a BBC program showing partial truths concerning the
dangerous secret that he knows. The partial and trivialized revelation
of the secret both neutralizes and better conceals it. Colonna reduces
therefore his paranoia to a «calm distrust of the world» and he
decides to come back to his insignificant but safe old life of translator.
In the end, Colonna and Maia pessimistically reflect on the reason
why conspiracy theories find scarce resonance in Italy. Italians have
lived too many historical upsetting events, such as invasions, massa-
cres, raids. Being used to stories of “daggers and poisons”, they are
. «[. . . ] l’ombra di Mussolini, dato per morto, domina tutti gli eventi italiani dal
 [. . . ], e la sua morte reale scatena il periodo piú terribile della storia di questo paese,
coinvolgendo stay–behind, CIA, NATO, Gladio, la P, la mafia, i servizi, gli alti comandi
militari, ministri [. . . ] e presidenti [. . . ], e naturalmente buona parte delle organizzazioni
terroristiche di estrema sinistra [. . . ]» (Eco , p. ).
. «Calma sfiducia nel mondo che mi circonda» (Eco , p. ).
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immune to all shocking revelations and always ready to suspect that
they are false. They just worry about how to evade taxes and do not
care about what the rulers do, because they give their corruption for
granted (p. ). The growing indifference is a symptom of moral
decay. According to Colonna, in a near future all the worst actions
will be performed publicly and ashamedly (p. ), “en plain air” and
without “baroque chiaroscuro, counter–reform stuff ”.
Due to both his novels deliberately playing with conspiracy motifs
and his theoretical declarations, Eco is the Italian author more directly
related to conspiracy theories. But the conspiracy theme can be found
in many other contemporary works, which present a set of recurring
traits, as the following short review will show.
. Cammilleri: the grande vecchio
Immortale odium () is a thriller set in the years following the
Risorgimento and containing all the classic ingredients of conspiracy,
such as secret societies, mysterious symbols and dull scenarios. Two
Catholic priests inquire into the murder of a group of masons invol-
ved in the profanation of Pope Pius IX’s corpse. The killers are the
members of a secret society aiming at causing a new world war in
order to reaffirm the power of the Church, whose terrestrial kingdom
has been conquered by the newborn Italian State.
A clear opposition is traced between the Church, which represents
the good, true religion, and the Revolution, which tries to destroy
the Church to install the full sovereignty of man over himself. The
new liberal ruling class is represented as an esoteric sect publicly
proclaiming the virtue of reason but secretly practicing all sorts of
spiritualist rituals and witchcraft. This elite is organized as an “Anti-
Church,” as the “Church of the Progress and of the Reason” (pp.
–).
Several chapters of the novel are devoted to a mysterious character,
an old man with a decrepit and demoniac appearance, who explains
the history of the Risorgimento to a silent interlocutor. Just near the
end the reader learns that the old man is called Nubius, and that,
since he is close to death, he has summoned a priest, not to obtain the
absolution, but to tell him that the Church is going to be overthrown.
 Jenny Ponzo
According to Nubius, the whole Risorgimento is determined by
a hidden revolutionary mind, which is the author of a plurality of
conspiracies and is able to orientate history thanks to a foresight
capacity that no one else owns. Nubius reports murders and crimes
with pleasure and no regrets. After revealing how the Bourbons, the
Savoy, Garibaldi and all the agents of the Risorgimento have been
manipulated, he says that the national State is just a step in the long
history of revolution. Concealed behind false ideologies spread by
propaganda, revolution uses utopias to induce naïf idealists to act in
favor of its hidden aims. But it has no defined goal, being instead
an end in itself. The end or revolution is revolution itself, i.e. the
instauration of a religion of man instead of the religion of God (pp.
–).
Masonry is just one of the provisional tools used by revolution,
destined to be soon overcome. Nubius also speaks of the esoteric
propensities of many revolutionaries, including Garibaldi (who accep-
ted the direction of a spiritualist society and wrote a letter to praise
the Antichrist, pp. –). He considers the “occultist stuff ” as a
contingent and risible accident, while he is the everlasting enemy
of the thrones and of the Church: «None has ever known who was
hidden behind that name. But he was the gray eminence behind every
conspiracy, the puppet master above every plot. [. . . ] For many he was
just a myth [. . . ], a way to confuse the [old Italian kingdoms’] polices
inducing them to think that [. . . ] they could just cut the branches but
never arrive at the tree. But he actually existed».
In the last chapter Nubius is represented as the embodiment of
an idea. A growing contrast is traced between his more and more
weak and miserable body, and his spirit, immortal and endowed with
a tremendous energy:
His voice was now shriller [. . . ], now deep and cavernous. Of course it
came from him, but in certain moments it seemed like it was not his own
[. . . ], as if someone else was using him as a mask [. . . ]. In such moments,
even his head, his hands, his shoulders seemed to be moved by invisible
. «Nessuno ha mai saputo chi si celasse dietro a quel nome. Ma era l’eminenza
grigia dietro a ogni complotto, il burattinaio sopra ogni congiura. [. . . ] Per molti era solo
un mito [. . . ], un modo per confondere le polizie inducendole a pensare che con i loro
arresti tagliavano solo rami senza mai poter risalire all’albero. Invece, esisteva eccome»
(Cammilleri , pp. –).
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strings. He spoke, and there you saw a poor, asthmatic [. . . ] old man, the
shrunken spectre of the adult man he used to be. He spoke, and there he
assumed the appearance of a demonic, powerful, evil sculpture.
Due to his immortal spirit, Nubius can forecast the future. He has
planned and started a process that cannot be stopped or changed. In a
moment of transfiguration, in a sort of epiphany, Nubius reveals his
identity. He is the personification of Revolution and Anarchy:
I am not the momentary upsetting of the public order, [. . . ] nor the con-
spiracy plotting in the dark, nor the substitution of a dynasty with another
[. . . ]. I am not Luther [. . . ], nor Robespierre, nor Babeuf, nor Mazzini, nor
Kossuth. These people are my sons but they are not me. These things are
my works but they are not me. These men and these things are transitory
facts, but I am a permanent state. I am the refusal of every social and reli-
gious order not established by man and of which he is not both the king and
the god. I am [. . . ] the philosophy of rebellion, the politics of rebellion, the
religion of rebellion. I am Prometheus unchained; in a word, I am Anarchy,
because I am God overthrown and substituted by man. This is why I am
called Revolution [. . . ]. And my registry or battle names are not important,
because I am eternal and I existed before and will exist after this body’s
death. [. . . ] But by now the path is traced and it will be impossible not to
follow it. By now every effort can just slow down the avalanche, not stop
it. It will go straight toward its ultimate end, which is all and nothing. A
cosmic laughter.
. «[. . . ] la sua voce si faceva a volte più stridula e gracchiante, altre profonda e ca-
vernosa. Proveniva da lui, certo, ma in determinati momenti si aveva l’impressione che
non fosse sua [. . . ], come se un altro lo usasse da maschera [. . . ]. Anche la sua testa, le sue
mani, le sue spalle sembravano in quegli istanti come tirati da fili invisibili. Parlava, ed ecco
un povero vecchio asmatico [. . . ], spettro rinsecchito dell’uomo adulto che doveva essere
stato una volta. Parlava, ed eccolo assumere l’aspetto di una scultura demoniaca, possente,
malefica» (Cammilleri , p. ).
. «Io non sono il momentaneo sconvolgimento dell’ordine pubblico [. . . ], né la
congiura che cospira nell’ombra, né la sostituzione di una dinastia con un’altra [. . . ] Non
sono Lutero [. . . ], né Robespierre, né Babéuf, né Mazzini, né Kossuth. Costoro sono miei
figli ma non sono me. Queste cose sono opere mie ma non sono me. Questi uomini e
queste cose sono fatti transitori ma io sono uno stato permanente. Io sono il rifiuto di
ogni ordine religioso e sociale non stabilito dall’uomo e del quale egli non è re e dio
tutt’insieme. Io sono [. . . ] la filosofia della ribellione, la politica della ribellione, la religione
della ribellione. Io sono Prometeo scatenato; in una parola, io sono l’anarchia, perché io
sono Dio spodestato e sostituito dall’uomo. Ecco il motivo per cui mi chiamo Rivoluzione
[. . . ]. E il mio nome anagrafico o quello di battaglia non hanno importanza. Neanche chi
adesso ti parla ha importanza, perché io sono eterno e c’ero prima e ci sarò dopo che
questo corpo sarà morto. [. . . ] Ma ormai la via è tracciata e non si potrà non seguirla.
 Jenny Ponzo
Nubius is moved by his hatred, which confers much more power
and invulnerability than love and allows one to act alone (p. ). The
regime forecast by Nubius is “cryptocracy” (p. ), the most radical
and absolute despotism: «A unified humanity, without barriers and
frontiers, without religious trammels» (pp. –), led by secret
rulers:
Some clowns will be placed on the stage to act as presidents, ministers, heads
of the government, and they will be more than happy to lend their faces
and their wooden heads in change of a fistful of privileges and some crusts
thrown to their vanity. But none will ever know who really rules. [. . . N]ot
because the true power will be hidden, but because, on the contrary, it will
be under everyone’s eyes. And, as all the evident things, it will not be seen.
[. . . ] This leadership will never be overthrown because one would not know
whom to shoot.
The conclusion of the book leaves the reader with a doubt, leading
him or her to wonder if Nubius’s prophecy is totally absurd or not.
Like Eco (), Cammilleri () is based on the motif of the big old
men manipulating history in the shadows. However, while Simonini
is represented just as an old man suffering from various psycholo-
gical disturbs, Nubius appears as a sort of supernatural power, as a
miserable body possessed by an evil immortal spirit.
. Hydra organizations
In Italian literature, the motif of the complex plot organized by a
hidden head is present not only in the novels explicitly related to the
conspiracy theories, such as Eco () and Cammilleri (), but
also in the novels concerning mafia. Such texts are characterized by
Ormai ogni sforzo potrà solo rallentare la valanga, non fermarla. Essa andrà verso il suo
fine ultimo, che è tutto ed è niente. Una risata cosmica» (Cammilleri , pp. –).
. «Alcuni pagliacci li si metterà in primo piano a fare i presidenti, i ministri, i capi di
governo, e saranno più che contenti di prestare le loro facce e mettere a disposizione le
loro teste di legno in cambio di un pugno di privilegi e qualche crosta gettata in pasto alla
loro vanità. Ma chi comandi davvero non si saprà mai. [. . . N]on perché il vero potere sarà
occulto ma perché, al contrario, sarà sotto gli occhi di tutti. E, come tutte le cose evidenti,
non si vedrà. [. . . ] Questo comando non sarà mai [. . . ] abbattuto perché non si saprebbe a
chi sparare» (Cammilleri , pp. –).
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a different kind of anxiety, which is not based on sinister, macabre
and esoteric elements, but rather on realism. Indeed, they represent
facts that are disturbingly similar to those reported by newspapers
and history books.
An example is provided by I pugnalatori (Sciascia). The mem-
bers of the so–called “sect of the stabbers” kill contemporarily thirteen
people in different places in Palermo. They are low–class men hired
by a secret head, the powerful prince of Sant’Elia, who is so haunted
by the desire of having even more power that he organizes terroristic
actions aimed at undermining the government. While the poorest
stabbers are executed, the prince remains untouchable, and he keeps
his status and privileges. Although it is set during the Risorgimento,
the text is full of references to the “lead years.”
In numerous mafia novels (e.g. Sciascia ; Camilleri ) we
can find conspiracies whose head is discovered, but it proves to be
undefeatable. Even if the truth is found out, the frightening conclusion
is that there is a sinister agent that cannot be stopped and keeps free
to act his plots and crimes. There is no protection against him. This
sense of vulnerability, of impossibility to protect oneself against evil,
the presence of evil in everyday life, together with the realism and the
similarity with actual situations and events, provide such novels with
their peculiarly uncanny, disquieting side.
. The desecration of conspiracy
Nevertheless, in many other cases the motif of conspiracy does not
present such dramatic traits. Especially in the literature concerning the
Risorgimento, the conspiracy tendency appears as a sort of national
vice, typical of sly characters who are depicted with contempt, but
often in caricature tones. We can think e.g. of Calogero Sedàra in Il
Gattopardo, who made proselytes for the future Italian regime: «[. . . ]
up and down the whole district he went like a bat; by trap, horse,
mule, foot, in rain or sun; and whenever he passed secret groups
were formed, to prepare the way for those that were to come. He’s a
scourge of God, Excellency, a scourge of God» (Tomasi di Lampedusa
, p. ).
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Another example is provided by the characters of Coronato and
Forgogna in Alianello (), two notables ruling a southern town
during the Risorgimento. Coronato and Forogna are described in
caricature tones both in their appearance (the one tall and thin, the
other short and fat) and their behavior (e.g. they hurry up changing
the statues and portraits of the kings in their home at every change of
regime). They are corrupted, involved with the mafia, and they plot
with every party that seems to be prevailing at the moment, sometimes
even with two parties at the same time. They are always moved
by their individual material interests. Even if they raise contempt,
these village conspirators are very different from the omnipotent and
maleficent big old man. On the contrary, their very same pettiness
can sometimes inspire a hilarious irony.
We can therefore say that, in Italian literature, the conspiracy is
often de–sacrated, in the sense that it is deprived of its «misterium
tremendum et fascinans» (Otto ). This happens by means of the
ironical representation and the caricature reduction of the plots and
of their agents, or by exasperating the paranoia and the distort logic
that inform the conspiracy theories . A third desecration strategy is
the ironic highlighting of the conspiracies’ collateral effects and by-
products. This last strategy reduces conspiracies to a human and very
fallible dimension. Andrea Camilleri provides us with a masterpiece
of the account of the conspiracies’ collateral effects in his Il birraio
[brewer] di Preston.
. Camilleri, the brewer and Karl Popper
According to Popper (, p. ), «[. . . ] a conspiracy never [. . . ] turns
out in the way that is intended» In social life, we hardly «[. . . ] produce
precisely the effect that we wish to produce, and we usually get things
that we do not want into the bargain. Of course, we act with certain
aims in mind; but apart from these aims (which we may or may not
really achieve) there are always certain unwanted consequences of
our actions; and usually these unwanted consequences cannot be
eliminated» Popper’s position could thus be defined as a theory of
. As Eco himself explains about his novels, see Eco and Magris () and above.
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the byproducts of conspiracy. Camilleri’s Il birraio di Preston seems a
perfect literary representation of such a theory.
Set in Sicily shortly after the Risorgimento, the novel is based on
three conspiracies (C) with tragicomic collateral effects. The episodes
are narrated in an apparently casual order, but we can identify the th-
ree conspiracies as the pivots of the action. The “foreigner” Florentine
prefect of Montelusa, Bortuzzi, states that the theater of the nearby
Vigata must be inaugurated with the opera Il birraio di Preston. The
inhabitants of Vigata are hostile to this order because of an old rivalry
with Montelusa. Bortuzzi asks therefore the mafioso Ferraguto to
employ every stratagem to ensure the success of the representation
(C). The members of the society “Circolo cittadino di Vigata” decide
in their turn to conspire against the representation (C):
“And we’re supposed to inaugurate our new Vigàta theatre with an opera
by this mediocrity just because our distinguished prefect is besotted with
him?” [. . . ]
At this point Canon Bonmartino got up from his chair, ran over to the
windows, and drew the curtains to make the room dark, while Headmaster
Cozzo lit a lamp. The men then gathered in a semicircle around the light.
And Dr. Gammacurta, in a baritone voice, intoned: “Suoni la tromba e
intrepido”.
The first to join him, as if written into the score, was the commendatore.
One by one, all the others followed. Standing round, hands linked as in a
chain, looking one another in the eye, they instinctively lowered the volume
of their song.
They were conspirators. They had become so at that very moment, in
the name of Vincenzo Bellini.
The Brewer of Preston, the opera by Luigi Ricci imposed on them by
the prefect of Montelusa, would never play. (Camilleri , pp. –)
The agitator Traquandi is sent to Vigata by the Mazzinian party,
. «E noi dovremmo inaugurare il nostro teatro di Vigàta con un’opera di questa
mezza calzetta solo perché il signor prefetto amminchiò? [. . . ] A questo punto il canonico
Bonmartino si susì dalla seggia, corse alle finestre, tirò le tende a fare scuro, mentre il
preside Cozzo addrumava un lume. Attorno a quella luce si ritrovarono tutti a semicerchio.
E il medico Gammacurta attaccò con voce da baritono: “Suoni la tromba e intrepido. . . ”.
Primo gli si unì, come da partitura, il commendatore. Poi, uno a uno, tutti gli altri. In
piedi, taliandosi occhi negli occhi e stringendosi a catena le mani, abbassarono d’istinto il
volume del canto. Erano congiurati, lo erano diventati in quel preciso momento nel nome
di Bellini. Il birraio di Preston, opera lirica di Luigi Ricci, imposta dal prefetto di Montelusa,
non sarebbe passata» Camilleri (), pp. –.
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with the complicity of members of the parliament. His task is to
exacerbate the tension created by C and C in order to provoke a
national scandal aiming at undermining the government (C). C is a
byproduct of C and . The night of the representation, the spectators
boycott the show by mocking the opera. The prefect prohibits them
from leaving the theater before the end of the show, but people are
suddenly panic–stricken and they attack the prefect’s guards. Some
hours later, when everything is over, Traquandi sets fire to the theater.
Each conspiracy fails but causes a big number of unplanned and
unwanted effects. Bortuzzi and Ferraguto apparently meet their goal,
because the representation takes place. However, the soirée ends up in
a disaster that ruins Bortuzzi’s career and provokes Ferraguto’s death
(discredited and weakened, he is killed by a more powerful mafioso).
The Vigatesi cannot impede the representation, and they just obtain
the destruction of their new theater. Many people are hurt and three
people die. The police heads secretly kill Traquandi, because they fear
to be accused of not having stopped the terrorist in time, and thus they
unwittingly thwart the national scandal planned by the Mazzinians.
The three conspiracies also generate a series of collateral conse-
quences connecting in bizarre causal chains events and characters
that have apparently nothing to do with each other. For example, a
young widow living in the house next to the theater dies because
of the smoke provoked by the fire during the first night of love she
was having after many years of loneliness; the engineer Hoffer is
happy to have the opportunity to try the machine he has invented to
extinguish the fire and, since he leaves home, his son Gerd can spend
an unusual night; the stevedore Turiddru, who lives in a squalid room
with his numerous family, saves his mother from fire, but he loses
the house he dreamt to move in with his wife and sons. The honest
doctor Gammacurta disobeys the order to stay in the theater until the
end of the show. He exists by the backdoor, but a guard thinks he is
a burglar and shoots him: the honest man is paradoxically killed as
a criminal. These are just a few instances showing that this novel is
not far from Popper’s principle: social action often takes unexpected
directions, in spite of human efforts to control the events. This is also
made evident by the fact that the key event, the battle in the theater, is
not directly caused by the different conspirators, but rather by a chain
of fortuitous events:
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a) A guard falls asleep and, by pressing his musket, he involuntarily
shoots.
b) When she hears this noise, the soprano, very nervous because
of the spectators’ mockeries, awfully cracks.
c) The musicians, scared by these strong noises, suddenly throw
away their instruments and run away. The fall of the instru-
ments, amplified by the theater’s acoustics, seems the rumble
of an earthquake.
d) The spectators are panic–stricken by the supposed earthquake
but, when they try to run away from the theater, they find the
exits blocked by the guards. A big brawl starts.
The narration of such clumsy conspiracies and of their inevitably
distorted direction is ironical and funny, but with a touch of pity for
their innocent victims and for the fragility of human life, ultimately
governed by a haphazard fate. Camilleri’s narrator shares with Co-
lonna and with Bianciardi’s narrator the “vice of quotation” (“il vizio
della citazione”, Eco , p. ). This aesthetic propensity for intertex-
tuality can be related to the taste for the allusion, for the abundance of
semi–hidden clues, and to the axiom “everything is connected” that
are typical traits of the conspiracy mentality.
. Bianciardi and the paranoid style
Les visions conspirationnistes sont indissociables d’une rhétorique de la
dénonciation dont le premier caractère observable est un «style paranoïde»,
comme si l’obsession du complot allait de pair avec un délire d’interpréta-
tion, susceptible d’être lui–même le symptôme d’une structure psychique
paranoïaque. Le paranoïaque élimine l’incertitude, systématise la méfiance
et généralise le soupçon [. . . ]. (Taguieff (), p. )
Bianciardi’s novel Aprire il fuoco (, st ed. ) is a good exam-
ple of the “paranoid style” characterizing the conspiracy theories as a
general semiotic style but also, more specifically, as a literary genre.
The protagonist and narrator lives in exile after having participated in
revolutionary actions and having been taken to trial five times by a
corrupted judiciary system. Even if he mentions the names of some
of his personal antagonists, his main enemy is a whole system, made
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of powers without a face, of banks and tribunals that oppress the indi-
vidual depriving him of his rights and of his goods. As Eco’s Colonna,
the narrator is a failed editor and a translator. He lives in a hybrid time
melting the Risorgimento with the s: for example, Milan is still
under the domination of Austria as in the s, but the protagonist
watches TV and he translates Henry Miller’s novels. He has obsessive
persecution feelings. For instance, he only leaves home disguised as a
hunter, a seller or a teacher, because he fears to be recognized by the
ubiquitous “oppressor’s spies” (p. ).
From time to time, the narrator has to leave the quiet village of his
exile to hand in the translated books in Milan. Such occasions exacer-
bate his paranoia. The city is an “enemy land” where «many people
suffer and sweat under the oppressor». Milan is metaphorically defi-
ned as an orchard, where the protagonist waits for his martyrdom as
Jesus in the Gethsemane: during the train journey to Milan one can
recognize «the signal of the orchard, when you have to get ready [. . . ]
and proceed toward the door [. . . ] But always try not to be seen and,
if anything, meditate upon this orchard signaled many times by the
writings on the wall, or on the top of the smoky city’s shining neo–
towers. Ask yourself, brother, which orchard we are talking about,
and [. . . ] you will finally understand that it’s the Gethsemane, where
the son of man sweated blood». The protagonist sweats blood as
well. He explains that the scientists call “hematidrosis” this phenome-
non caused by violent emotions or fears, and that they connect it to
hysteria, a disease that he fiercely denies to suffer from, because it is
typically feminine.
The narrator presents the mentality of the radical suspect that we
found in Eco’s characters, especially in Braggadocio. Like Simonini,
he is obsessed with the disguise and he is a double, or split, character:
Bianciardi’s narrator lives between past and present, Simonini has a
double personality (Simonini and Dalla Piccola). Eco (, ) and
. «Basta un colpo d’occhio per capire che siamo in territorio nemico, dove patisce e
suda tanta gente sotto l’oppressore» (Bianciardi , p. ).
. «[. . . ] il segnale dell’orto, quando devi prepararti [. . . ] e avviarti nel corridoio verso
la porta. [. . . ] Ma tu cerca sempre di non farti vedere e medita semmai su questo orto più
volte segnalato dalle scritte sui muri, o in cima alle neotorri lustranti della città affumata.
Chiediti, fratello, di quale orto si stia qui parlando, e [. . . ] lo capirai, finalmente, che è l’orto
del Getsemani, dove il figlio dell’uomo sudò sangue» (Bianciardi , p. ).
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Bianciardi () follow an aesthetics of paranoia, characterized by
a hallucinated style, an absurd logic, unusual connections between
events and bizarre associations of ideas. The stream of consciousness
(Bianciardi) and the diary (Eco ) are literary forms that well suit
such an “interpretive disease”.
This aesthetics of paranoia seems typical of male characters whose
forefathers can be found in Western literature at least from the th
century. In her book, which focuses on German literature, Johnson
writes:
Men of melancholy or enthusiastic temperament, as represented in late
eighteenth- and nineteenth–century literature and psychology, were prone
to feel themselves at the mercy of other, uncanny men with “special powers”
akin to those to which Freud refers in his essay on “The Uncanny:” we think
of others as uncanny not only when we think of their intentions as evil,
but when we believe that they have special powers. These powers, however,
are nothing supernatural and in fact only exist in the mind of the melan-
choly man, who lives in a liminal uncanny lack–of–home. [. . . ] the male
protagonists of the novels [William Lovell by Tieck and Der Geisterseher
by Schiller], all of whom exhibit “hysterical” symptoms, are convinced that
they are victims of conspiracies. To be sure, they are handicapped by nature;
they suffer from an excess of sentiment [. . . ]. But their psychological and
social doom is sealed by their perceived victimization at the hands of others
— lovers, friends, brothers, fathers, and secret societies. ( Johnson (), p.
)
According to Johnson, this paranoia is characteristic of a “male hy-
steria” recurring around . Indeed, despite his denial, Bianciardi’s
protagonist seems to show all the symptoms of this disease. If we
consider the corpus analyzed herein, we can observe that all, or most
of, the characters connected to conspiracy, both theorists and agents,
are men. Italian contemporary literature seems therefore to show a
mainly masculine conspiracy paranoia, which is probably the legacy
of an older literary tradition.
. Towards a semiotic study of conspiracy as a literary genre
As Eco demonstrates, it is possible to theorize a “Universal Form” of
conspiracy, i.e. a basic narrative structure functioning as the revelation
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of obscure plots led by powerful enemies hidden in sinister settings.
Such a structure underlies many textual forms circulating in our cul-
ture, as multimedia discourse (Internet, TV, newspapers), pamphlets
and, of course, novels. There are many studies — mainly, but not on-
ly, American — focusing on the recurring traits of the novels based
on conspiracy. Such researches induce us to hypothesize that it is
possible to tackle the narrative of conspiracy as a specific literary genre.
Nevertheless, the study of the small corpus of novels presented
herein shows a various and nuanced landscape. In contemporary
Italian literature, the narration of conspiracy crosses different literary
genres, thus assuming different traits and tones, from the tragicomic
tale (Camilleri, Alianello) to the socio–historical denounce (Sciascia),
to the classic conspiracy theory with uncanny characters and settings
(Eco and Cammilleri).
In order to get to a more precise typology of the conspiracy genre
in Italy, a systematic study of an extended corpus of novels is needed.
Semiotics can offer useful analytic tools to such a research. The main
traits of both literary and non–literary conspiracy theories have all
been central subjects in semiotics:
a) Agency. The problem of agency is central to the conspiracy
theory, which typically focuses on issues of power and is full of
mysterious agents opposed to a subject trying to understand
their secret plots.
b) Binary oppositions. A conspiracy theory implies the revelation
of a secret plot. Secrecy is a fundamental element. The contra-
st between being and appearance is the first of a series of key
oppositions that characterize conspiracy mentality: lie/truth,
good/evil, light/darkness, individual/society.
c) Passions. The passion ground of conspiracy is constituted, on
the one hand, by the fears of an individual that theorizes the
conspiracy and, on the other hand, by the desires and passions
. See e.g. Levine (); Hantke (); Wisnicky (); Micali ().
. Coady (); Melley (), pp. –; Byfort (), chap. . For an overview of
the semiotic theories on agency, see Leone ().
. Coady (). The study of binary oppositions is one of the main traits of structu-
ralism, and it can be afforded for instance with the “semiotic square” (see e.g. Greimas
).
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(often hatred and/or avidity of richness or power) attributed to
the conspiracy agents. The dominating passion in conspiracy
narratives is anxiety, amplified by sinister and uncanny settings
and characters. Nevertheless, such stereotyped passions are
sometimes reversed by an irony that is made possible by the
reference to a well codified genre.
d) Manipulation and interpretation. Manipulation is highlighted
in every conspiracy theory. The mentality of radical suspect
derives from the persuasion of being manipulated and it is
linked to paranoia, which, as we have seen, can be defined as
an interpretive disease, as an abnormal semiosis.
e) Counter–narrative. A conspiracy theory is defined in opposition
to an official narrative. It implies the opposition of a “self ” to a
hostile and menacing social order. Conspiracy theories can
therefore be studied as a system of clashing ideologies.
Each of these components can be the object of a semiotic analy-
sis aimed at a literary typology of conspiracy. On the thematic level,
when compared for example to American culture, Italian literature
seems less concerned with the sub–genre of the big Ufo–alien con-
spiracy. It is instead more attracted to an imagery rich of secret sects,
which have been actually abundant in Italian history and have raised a
persisting curiosity on their aims and actions. There are Catholic and
revolutionary conspiracies, supernatural personifications of Evil and
painfully realistic accounts. However, a typically Italian irony is often
ready to downplay the big conspiracy, reducing it to the messy plot
of sly but clumsy “arruffoncelli” (“wheeler–dealers,” Alianello , p.
).
In view of more extended analyses, we can therefore state that, in
Italy, conspiracy narratives have peaks corresponding to key traumatic
historical events that shake the nation. Such narratives have two main
functions. On the one hand, they work as counter–narratives that,
. Wisnicki (), chap. . On the semiotics of passions see Greimas and Fontanille
(); Del Marco and Pezzini ().
. Coady ().
. On interpretation see e.g. Eco (, , ).
. Coady (). For an overview of the semiotic study of ideology and for a more
detailed analysis of the novels treated herein, see Ponzo ().
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albeit frightening, provide an alternative explanation to the scarcely
persuasive official or institutional version. However, on the other hand,
the ironic reduction of conspiracy exorcizes paranoia and irrational
fear. What we have called the “desecration” of conspiracy seems to
prevent Italians from a serious adhesion to narratives and beliefs that
in other cultures take sometimes the form of an alternative religiosity.
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Il misterioso Holden
Ipotesi semiotica per un complotto
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Voleva che i lettori approcciassero le sue ope-
re in maniera totalmente vergine, totalmente
libera. E questo era un intento nobile. Am-
mirevole. Ma era anche, all’improvviso me
ne resi conto, impossibile. Per J.D. Salinger,
quantomeno. Nessuno, nessuno poteva ap-
procciare i suoi libri senza averne un’idea pre-
concetta. Senza avere un’idea preconcetta di
lui.
J R, Un anno con Salinger
 : The Mysterious Holden: A Semiotic Conspiracy Theory
: The essay analyses through semiotics the circulation of conspi-
racy theories related to the fandom of J.D. Salinger’s novel The Catcher
in the Rye. Such conspiracy theories link some of the contents of the
novel and certain traits of the biography of its author to the manifesta-
tion of violent behaviors among Salinger’s fans and readers. The essay
explains the genesis of such conspiracy theories as depending on the
vicious circle between misinterpretation of the novel by some readers
and misinterpretation of their behaviors by some social commentators.
: J.D. Salinger; The Catcher in the Rye; Conspiracy; American
Paranoia; Aberrant Interpretation.
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. Introduzione
Nel marzo  esce I giovani, raccolta di racconti di un Salinger alle
prime armi, ancora inedita in Italia. Un’operazione editoriale parte
di un piano dettagliato portato avanti dalla fondazione cui Salinger ha
affidato il compito, dopo la sua morte, di monitorare le pubblicazioni
degli inediti e di presiedere all’edizione delle proprie opere. Ma an-
che una novità di notevole portata mediatica: da decenni non veniva
pubblicato alcun lavoro dell’autore del Giovane Holden, intorno al
quale gravitava — alimentata negli anni e sedimentata nell’immagina-
rio comune — la leggenda dello scrittore recluso, una narrazione fatta
di segreti e misteri legati alla sua vita, ai suoi libri e alla sua storia. Una
storia che, secondo Berselli (: online) «è in fondo la storia di una
sparizione perfetta. Un libro, al massimo due, un’opera irripetibile e
generazionale come Il giovane Holden (The Catcher in the Rye). E
poi leggende, incontri segreti, rincorse, misteri». Serino (: online)
parla di “un autore diventato di culto, letto ogni anno da centinaia di
migliaia di lettori in tutto il mondo, che per questo libro ha sacrificato
tutta l’esistenza con una vita a (s)comparsa. Ormai nel mito la sua
riservatezza”. La pagina celebre di letteratura rappresentata da Hol-
den e l’insolita biografia del suo autore permettono una riflessione
sul pensiero complottista. Il romanzo, per l’intreccio di vicende cui
è inestricabilmente legato, costituisce un unicum intorno al quale
hanno preso vita fenomeni semiotici di vario tipo. A caratterizzarlo
è innanzitutto il titolo, nella versione originale The Catcher in the Rye,
un gioco di parole incentrato sulla canzone di Robert Burns, Comin’
Through the Rye, di cui Holden, il protagonista del romanzo, storpia
il secondo verso. La traduzione letterale in una lingua — e in una
cultura — differente da quella originale non riuscirebbe a rendere
le sfumature semantiche adombrate da questo riferimento letterario
modificato, ecco perché nelle versioni tradotte The Catcher in the Rye
. Il controllo di Salinger sulle proprie opere si contraddistingue nel mondo editoriale
per capillarità, severità ed estrosità: l’autore stesso, e dopo la sua scomparsa la fondazione
da lui appositamente creata, monitorava ogni passaggio della pubblicazione, insistendo
affinché nessun contratto prevedesse, per esempio, la cessione di diritti cinematografici
né la possibilità di porre figure in copertina, motivi per cui in ogni parte del mondo le
opere di Salinger hanno tutte una copertina bianca. Sulla mania di controllo di Salinger cfr.
Hamilton, , p. .
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ha subito spesso rifacimenti notevoli, diventando l’italiano Il giovane
Holden o, per esempio, il francese L’Attrape-Coeurs. Si tratta dell’uni-
co romanzo mai pubblicato da Salinger, la sua storia editoriale porta
con sé misteri e leggende legati ai contenuti, alle scelte dell’autore e
alla sua biografia.
A riaccendere interesse su questa narrazione, rafforzando un im-
maginario, nel  Einaudi promuoveva la nuova traduzione del
romanzo e negli Stati Uniti era da poco uscito Salinger, un docu-
mentario realizzato da Shane Salerno () costruito dopo anni di
ricerche allo scopo di scoprire perché Salinger avesse smesso di pub-
blicare, perché fosse scomparso e cosa avesse scritto negli ultimi 
anni. La rappresentazione dipinge lo scrittore come un recluso che
dal  si è ritirato in una casa nel New Hampshire continuando in
realtà a comunicare e interagire con i fans. È questo atteggiamento
a far sì che lo stesso Salinger, con la propria decisione di vita, abbia
creato e offerto al pubblico il mito di se stesso, rafforzandolo con
un’ossessione per la privacy cresciuta parallelamente alla morbosa
curiosità del mondo esterno e dei media. Il documentario di Salerno
evidenzia il meccanismo di rafforzamento, nel racconto intorno a
Salinger, di alcune isotopie tematiche che ruotano intorno al segreto
e al mistero da svelare. Un filone tematico che si ritrova nelle teorie
del complotto, fervide e numerose in quegli stessi Stati Uniti culla del
culto salingeriano.
L’intento di questo lavoro non sarà dunque quello di effettuare
un’analisi semiotica de Il giovane Holden, quanto di concentrare l’at-
tenzione sui meccanismi di senso che hanno fatto di questo romanzo
e del suo autore i protagonisti di una teoria del complotto capace di
agire oltre i confini del testo. Sebbene la storia di Holden presenti
diversi agganci a tipiche situazioni complottiste (la pazzia, la paranoia,
la diversità, la grande contrapposizione tra verità e falsità), ciò che
nel corso dei decenni ha fatto di questo romanzo un simbolo, un
mito e, in virtù di questi caratteri, anche un’arma, è principalmente la
rappresentazione che ne è stata data, intrecciata a malfunzionamenti
semiotici con ricadute tragiche sulla realtà.
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. Ipotesi di complotto
Il film Conspiracy Theory () presenta un interessante rimando al
Giovane Holden che innerva l’intera struttura narrativa e che sot-
tolinea il suo legame con i temi del complotto. La storia è quella di
Jerry, tassista newyorkese ossessionato dai complotti di cui conosce
perfettamente tutte le teorie, dalla presenza di droga nelle tubature
della città, agli elicotteri della CIA dotati di silenziatore. Proprio la CIA,
protagonista di svariate storie di complotto, svolge un ruolo di primo
piano, avendo selezionato in passato alcuni soggetti da trasformare in
automi umani allo scopo di uccidere senza ricordare nulla. Jerry era
tra questi soggetti, ha infatti problemi psichiatrici, paranoie e ossessio-
ni forti: vorrebbe denunciare i suoi persecutori e per questo si rivolge
a una funzionaria del ministero della giustizia, Alice, che finisce per
essere coinvolta insieme a lui in una sorta di inseguimento–complotto.
Tre momenti, in particolare, fanno esplicito riferimento a Holden. Nel
primo Alice e un presunto agente FBI trovano il libro tra gli effetti
personali di Jerry. Nel secondo Alice, entrata a casa di Jerry, scopre una
collezione di copie del libro che tuttavia il proprietario non ha mai
letto. Infine Jerry, durante l’ennesimo inseguimento, viene ingannato
dal libro stesso: la traccia del suo acquisto fa scattare l’allarme alla
CIA, che lo trova e lo cattura. Come afferma Zaccurri (, p. ), lo
sceneggiatore Brian Helgeland «assegna al Giovane Holden un ruolo
centrale nella trama di Ipotesi di complotto. Il libro di Salinger è infatti
l’oggetto che Jerry porta sempre addosso, come un amuleto».
Il film contribuisce e isolare alcune suggestioni che rimarcano il
legame del libro di Salinger con il complotto. Innanzitutto allonta-
na dalla mera letteratura e dà modo di considerare il “fenomeno
Salinger” (Hamilton, , p. ) da un punto di vista mediatico. La
rappresentazione che ha coinvolto i discorsi sul libro e su Salinger è
significativa dell’elevazione a culto di Holden e del continuo crescere
della leggenda su Salinger, autore schivo. Ma il film fornisce anche
lo spunto per osservare quanto Il Giovane Holden sia radicato nella
cultura americana: lo si legge a scuola ed è quasi scontato che faccia
parte del patrimonio letterario di ciascun americano. Americana è
anche la paranoia di Jerry (non a caso il nome dello stesso Salinger). È
una visione del mondo che rintraccia complotti, fa emergere misteri,
collega fatti apparentemente distanti e sembra caratterizzare gli Stati
Il misterioso Holden 
Uniti (cfr. Barkun). Il quarto suggerimento che il film offre riguar-
da uno scavalcamento dei confini del testo, causato da un regime di
adesione intima da parte di personaggi disturbati che pensano il testo
destinante di azioni concrete. Non è dunque un caso se il Jerry del film
dedicato al complotto ricalca Holden nell’aspetto — indossa sempre
un cappellino –, nel rifiuto della società americana, nella promozione
di un pensiero libero e creativo contro l’omologazione.
. The Catcher in The Rye
Unico romanzo mai pubblicato da Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye
esce  luglio  dopo una lunga e travagliata lavorazione. Esor-
dio di straordinario successo, riceve subito recensioni positive, viene
riconosciuto come libro più innovativo dell’anno e già nell’ottobre
successivo all’uscita risulta al quarto posto nella classifica dei best sel-
lers. Viene inoltre selezionato come libro del mese ed è ristampato
diverse volte. Il successo prosegue: il romanzo inizia a essere preso in
considerazione dal mondo accademico e in pochi anni è già dichiarato
libro di culto. Nel  è annoverato tra i  libri più venduti dalla fine
dell’Ottocento e ancora oggi vende duecentomila copie annuali in tut-
to il mondo. Dal  non ha mai smesso di attirare lettori, diventando
un classico della letteratura americana, parte integrante della cultura
del dopoguerra (cfr. Hamilton , Salerno ).
Se, secondo la definizione di Italo Calvino «I classici sono libri che
esercitano un’influenza particolare sia quando s’impongono come
indimenticabili, sia quando si nascondono nelle pieghe della memo-
ria mimetizzandosi da inconscio collettivo o individuale», Il giovane
Holden è annoverabile tra la categoria. È tra i libri consigliati nell’età
scolare e risulta una sorta di manifesto dell’adolescenza, età che per la
prima volta viene circoscritta e definita. Testo fondamentale per intere
generazioni che si identificano nel personaggio, Holden è l’antesigna-
no del Selvaggio Marlon Brando, anticipa l’era della controcultura,
dei beatniks, è un adolescente in guerra contro una società da cui si
sente alienato. È un senso di alienazione che viene universalizzato e
accolto dal pubblico di massa, che elegge Holden come personaggio
capace di esprimere un’età contraddittoria e problematica.
 Alessandra Chiappori
Le contraddizioni plasmano il discorso del libro e allo stesso modo
il discorso intorno al libro e al suo autore: Salinger faceva parte di
quell’upper–middle class che contesta criticandone attraverso Holden
i valori e lo stile di vita. Come Holden guardava con sdegno la su-
perficialità e l’ipocrisia della società, ma era viva in lui l’ambizione di
scrivere qualcosa che non fosse semplice letteratura di massa. Finisce
però con il contraddirsi, scrivendo un libro culto adorato dalle folle,
e il cui protagonista mente più volte («sono il bugiardo più pazzesco
che abbiate mai incontrato. Una cosa mostruosa» Salinger, , p. ),
ma conferma di detestare l’ipocrisia.
Una breve analisi del romanzo evidenzia le caratteristiche che più
ne confermano la potenza simbolica, e che giustificano l’interpretazio-
ne aberrante alla base dell’ipotesi di teoria complottista che riguarda
The Catcher in the Rye. Sul piano della manifestazione lineare, ciò
che colpisce è il linguaggio nuovo, diverso, intessuto di parlato e di
termini gergali e volgari, al contempo celebrato dalla critica e censura-
to. I temi principali ruotano intorno all’ipocrisia, alle contraddizioni
dell’adolescenza e all’alienazione. Holden è un bugiardo cronico, ma
si scaglia contro l’ipocrisia della società, una contrapposizione che ne
fa un disadattato, patologicamente affetto da una depressione che lo
porterà nella clinica in cui si trova in apertura e chiusura di romanzo.
Dal tema dell’ipocrisia discendono diverse isotopie, che innervano il
romanzo e ne fanno una storia molto forte e potente, la contrapposi-
zione tra individuo e società, la verità e la falsità fanno inoltre parte
della struttura tipica del complotto. Anche il regime enunciazionale
crea un particolare effetto di senso: Holden parla in prima persona
rivolgendosi a un lettore al quale dice esplicitamente di non voler
dire tutto. È lui a conformare il proprio destinatario e a manipolare
il discorso, evitando coscientemente di dire alcune cose: «Se davvero
volete sentirne parlare, la prima cosa che vorrete sapere sarà dove
sono nato, e che schifo di infanzia ho avuto, e cosa facevano e non
facevano i miei genitori prima che nascessi, e altre stronzate alla David
Copperfield, ma a me non va di entrare nei dettagli, se proprio volete
la verità. [. . . ] Vi racconterò giusto la roba da matti che mi è capitata
. Presente e forte, nonché parzialmente collegato al tema dell’ipocrisia, è anche il
tema dell’infanzia, la cui figura principale è la sorella Phoebe, simbolo dell’innocenza che
Holden sa essersi persa nel mondo adulto.
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sotto Natale, prima di ritrovarmi così a pezzi che poi sono dovuto
venire qui a stare un po’ tranquillo».
Holden è protagonista di una storia di cui è l’eroe perdente. L’i-
deologia che connota il percorso del soggetto da lui rappresentato sul
piano figurativo, contrapposta all’assiologia dominante della società,
non riuscirà a imporsi, e lo soggiogherà. È destinato a perdere, am-
malarsi e a fallire sia a scuola, da cui scappa, sia nel suo progetto di
passare qualche giorno a New York non scoperto dai suoi, e ancora
in ogni micro azione che intraprende nel breve periodo in cui la sto-
ria si svolge. Al livello semionarrativo profondo si ritrovano le forti
opposizioni binarie che caratterizzano non solo Holden ma molte
storie di complotto. In particolare, come si è visto dalla rapida analisi
del livello discorsivo ed enunciativo, la contrapposizione principale è
quella riprodotta dal quadrato della veridizione, e al cuore delle teorie
del complotto, quella tra essere e apparire, tra verità e falsità.
Oltre al testo ci sono poi la biografia dell’autore e la narrazione me-
diatica che la accompagna. Le due storie sembrano condividere molte
delle isotopie tematiche, dal disturbo psichico all’alienazione, caratte-
ristiche di Holden e di Salinger al contempo, tanto da alimentare, in
un aberrante passaggio tra testo ed extra testo, la rappresentazione del
testo come entità maledetta. Lo stesso Salerno (), così come già
molti biografi e giornalisti, assume infatti l’identificazione tra autore
e personaggio come chiave di lettura del complotto generato intorno
a Holden.
. Un romanzo cult
Zaccuri (, p. ) definisce Il Giovane Holden un “cult book per
eccellenza”, mentre Shields e Salerno (, p. XI) notano che l’opera
di Salinger «ha un peso culturale e una capacità di penetrazione che
nella letteratura moderna sono rimasti quasi ineguagliati». Nel giro di
pochi anni Holden diventa il libro che tutti devono aver letto, il libro
più venduto e il più censurato a causa della carica ribelle ed eversiva
che il suo protagonista difende. Il romanzo viene interpretato come an-
tiamericano, non solo per il linguaggio offensivo ma per l’immoralità
e la perversione. È un libro che dà voce al disagio, e per questo motivo
Salinger diventa il portavoce dei giovani, il loro guru. Secondo Shields
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e Salerno (, p. ) «Holden divenne la parola d’ordine di un club
segreto e sovversivo, e la società sembrò dividersi tra chi conosceva
il romanzo di Salinger e chi no». Proponendo un modello culturale
alternativo alla società americana, il romanzo accresce la propria forza
simbolica fino a diventare un mito nel senso barthesiano (Barthes,
): viene connotato con valori aggiunti, che nel caso di Holden han-
no a che fare con i giovani, la ribellione, l’opposizione contro la falsità
dilagante della società di massa occidentale (cfr. Hamilton, , pp.
–). A figurativizzare la ribellione concorre per esempio, dentro
al libro, il rifiuto di Holden per il cinema, odio condiviso dall’autore
ed espresso con divieto imposto alla riproduzione cinematografica di
qualsiasi sua opera (cfr. Salerno ), dice Holden in apertura «Se c’è
una cosa che odio è il cinema, non me lo dovete nemmeno nominare»
(Salinger, , p. ). I contenuti fortemente simbolici e la parallela
narrazione sulla vita dell’autore creano intorno al romanzo una sorta
di leggenda (Hamilton, , p. ): «non molto tempo dopo il suo
esordio, J.D. Salinger diventerà un simbolo della sacralità della lettera-
tura onorata nel silenzio e, insieme, un narratore amato e celebrato
da intere generazioni di lettori» conferma l’introduzione italiana a I
Giovani (Salinger, ).
Come per ì i fenomeni di culto, anche nel caso Holden possono es-
sere identificate alcune caratteristiche del meccanismo di senso mitico,
a loro volta causa di letture aberranti. Holden presenta innanzitutto
un seguito di lettori appassionati. Non si limita a essere un best seller,
ma riesce ad avere un impatto sulla vita dei lettori, un’influenza più o
meno forte sui singoli ma allo stesso tempo sulla società, la cultura
e sulla rappresentazione che un’intera generazione dà di sé. La forza
simbolica del culto — in questo caso del libro — può anche sfociare
in un sentimento di fascino perverso e degenerato incanalato in una
sorta di ossessione da menti disturbate. Come il culto religioso, anche
il culto del romanzo si collega alla sfera religiosa, secondo modelli
narrativi e valoriali condivisi con il sistema delle teorie del complotto.
La forza simbolica di Holden si fa contenitore di un sentimento di
rifiuto e ribellione molto più grande del libro stesso, che diventa il
testo di riferimento per una sorta di nuova religione.
In merito all’aspetto religioso del fenomeno di culto, secondo Ugo
Volli (, p. ) «attraverso il culto, il fedele acquista una qualche
intimità col divino, impara a conoscere le sue storie e il suo carat-
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tere — anche se separazione e trascendenza continuano a essere la
principale definizione di ogni forma di divino [. . . ] il culto avvicina
ai suoi profeti, a chi ne ha avuto rivelazione». Salinger, voce ispira-
trice dietro le pagine del libro, è noto per la propria fuga dalla scena
pubblica. Per decenni resta distante dal mondo dei riflettori mentre
moltissimi lettori e giornalisti, guidati da diverse ragioni, esplorano
il New Hampshire per cercarlo, riconoscendo in lui, in modo distor-
to, la divinità dietro al culto del Giovane Holden. Nel culto religioso
rientra inoltre la lettura di testi, un’attività che consente alla comunità
raccolta intorno alla divinità di organizzare i propri valori, in questo
caso rappresentati nella storia di Holden. «Per essere sistematico, il
culto si esplica in una serie regolata di pratiche, per l’appunto i riti,
che sono da pensare come le modalità di comportamento in cui il
culto si esplica. Il culto è sempre espresso da un fare, non è mai sem-
plicemente una condizione cognitiva o affettiva» (Volli, , p. ).
Qquando il culto si accompagna a una credenza forte, l’adesione ai
valori della storia–religione si trasforma in azioni, di cui il libro e il
suo autore–divinità sono destinanti. Infine, il culto nell’era moderna
diventa culto della merce, feticismo. In questo caso l’oggetto è un libro
dalla forte carica simbolica, intorno al quale si costruisce una sorta di
comunità con i propri riti e pratiche, utili a mettere in scena i valori
espressi dal testo e condivisi da chi si oppone alla società americana.
Queste osservazioni evidenziano un legame tra il culto e il mo-
derno cult, definizione alla quale risponde Holden. Se infatti il culto è
sacro, il cult ha una dimensione profana, che eleva a culto divino prati-
che e testi della cultura di massa: «il culto richiama il sacro e mette in
gioco un altro mondo: le sue credenze e riti. Il cult richiama il profano
e mette in gioco questo mondo, trascendendolo ma riferendosi alle
sue aspettative, pratiche e ai suoi testi. Il culto dipende dai dogmi e
dalle credenze, mentre il cult nasce dai gusti e dalle sensibilità» (Berza-
no, , p. ). Al centro di entrambe le forme di ritualità restano
valori e forti relazioni simboliche, che si accompagnano a una forte
carica emotiva, collante della comunità che si rispecchia nella creden-
za. (Berzano , p. ) si riferisce a questa comunità come a un
fandom: «una collettività che si riconosce in un insieme di conoscenze,
atteggiamenti, identificazioni, pratiche riferite a un personaggio, film,
uno stile di vita. Sia la comunità istituzionale che il fandom contri-
buiscono a creare il cult. Il fandom riproduce e mantiene il cult, così
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come il rito riproduce e mantiene il mito. Il fandom, quindi, eleva a
cult individui, pratiche e testi della cultura profana. Ma è attraverso il
cult che l’universo dei fans acquisisce un’identità collettiva» (Berzano
, p. ). Il fandom si riconosce nell’insieme di valori e pratiche
riferite all’oggetto di massa — il libro — e mantiene, riproducendolo,
il cult, così come una ritualità riproduce una mitologia. Ma soprat-
tutto presuppone (cfr. Scaglioni, ) una prossimità, un’adesione
entusiastica e un’interpretazione del testo. Se il testo è il destinante di
ogni azione del fandom, quest’ultimo può però degenerare (nel senso
etimologico del deviare dall’origine) la propria interpretazione, dando
luogo ad atti efferati e guidati dalla fascinazione di un fittizio rapporto
intimo con l’autore o la star coinvolta. In questa semiosi impazzita e
lettura aberrante giocano un ruolo decisivo disordini di personalità
e malattie psichiche che si inseriscono come amplificatori devianti
di una dimensione affettiva del testo centrale per la sua fruizione e
interpretazione.
Dal libro al suo autore, dal fandom a reali fatti di cronaca: Il giovane
Holden porta con sé la nomea di “libro maledetto”, ad alimentare
il complotto per il quale negli anni Ottanta è ritornato diverse volte
sulla scena pubblica come manuale per killer. La carica eversiva e il
forte valore simbolico espresso dal testo e interpretato da un fandom
molto coeso si è fatta licenza di uccidere. Sono quattro i casi che le
cronache annoverano e a cui i media hanno dato risalto, costruendo
una storia parallela ma legata a Holden e Salinger, fatta di paranoia
e di elementi tipici delle teorie complottiste. Il primo a sparare in
nome del Giovane Holden è un supplente, ossessionato dal libro,
che colpisce uno studente con cui aveva avuto un alterco, tiene in
ostaggio la classe e infine si uccide. Nel dicembre  avviene il
fatto più eclatante: Mark David Chapman spara a John Lennon e lo
uccide, Holden sarà la sua difesa in tribunale. Non si ferma qui la scia
degli omicidi compiuti contro personalità di spicco da menti malate,
tutte caratterizzate dall’età, compresa tra i  e i  anni, e dal tenere
in una mano la pistola e nell’altra il libro di Salinger. John Hincley
sparerà a Reagan e al suo addetto stampa, dichiarando che il suo gesto
è spiegato tra le pagine di Holden, e infine Robert Bardo ucciderà
l’attrice Rebecca Shaeffer con lo stesso mandante.
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. La leggenda di Salinger
«Non raccontate mai niente a nessuno» sono le parole con cui Holden
conclude il romanzo (Salinger, , p. ), parole che sembrano, an-
cora una volta, poter uscire dalle pagine del libro e investire la biografia
dell’autore, innescando quel cortocircuito al contempo mediatico e
alimentato dal fandom per cui il senso del libro viene deviato e applica-
to alla vita reale. La rappresentazione che Salerno () fa di Salinger,
la più recente e documentata attualmente disponibile, vede l’autore
rispettare il consiglio di Holden. Avvolto nel silenzio, nel segreto e
nel mistero circa la propria attività per più di quarant’anni, Salinger
appare come un recluso ossessionato dalla possibilità che qualcuno
possa spiarlo o disturbarlo. Conferma questa visione Hamilton (,
p. ) che scrive di Salinger «era, in tutti i sensi, invisibile, come morto,
e tuttavia conservava, agli occhi di molte persone, una vera e propria
forza mitica. Era famoso per non voler essere famoso. Dichiarava di
aborrire qualsiasi tipo di indagine pubblica ed era diventata per lui una
pratica abituale quella di diffondere solo qualche falso indizio». Ma,
Shields e Salerno (, p. XII) lo evidenziano «lungi dall’essere un
recluso, intrattenne anzi un costante dialogo con il mondo, in modo
da rinforzare la percezione della sua reclusione».
Questa osservazione ritiene l’isolamento di Salinger parte di un piò
ampio e consapevole progetto di comunicazione volto a perpetuare
il mito di se stesso, una narrazione che condivide alcuni aspetti con
le storie di complotto e il diffuso discorso sulla paranoia presente in
tutta la cultura — non solo letteraria — americana. Così come nei
complotti, nel ragionamento di Salerno sulla cosciente manipolazione
avviata da Salinger con il proprio stile di vita mancano fonti dirette ed
è forte il modello narrativo legato al mistero. Se il ritiro nell’anonimato
è in realtà qualcosa di organizzato, è facile pensare che sia finalizzato al
mantenimento di una leggenda progettata a tavolino: dagli anni Sessan-
ta molti giornalisti e fan, convinti della natura pubblicitaria delle scelte
dell’autore, danno vita a una serie di appostamenti rocamboleschi in
cerca dello scoop. Quella del reclusive author è un’etichetta inventata
dai giornalisti stessi che, con le esperienze di caccia alla notizia, di svela-
mento del mistero e del segreto, costruiscono a loro volta un’ulteriore
rappresentazione giustificatrice del mito di partenza. Nella quarta di
copertina del corposo volume di Salerno, che affianca il documen-
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tario, si paragona la ricostruzione della vita dell’autore a un “thriller
letterario”, segno di adeguamento alla retorica del mistero per cui la
biografia di Salinger sarebbe pervasa di segreti, falsità e complotti attra-
verso i quali la tensione del pubblico sarebbe tenuta in vita dal costante
fascino dell’enigma da svelare. Non è una novità il fatto che biografie
votate alla privacy lontano dai riflettori abbiano nutrito l’immaginario
delle storie, in letteratura e non solo: Greta Garbo, con il suo ritiro,
sconvolse il pubblico, e allo stesso modo Thomas Pynchon, noto au-
tore americano, vive nel segreto alimentando intorno a sé ricerche,
dibattiti e un costante clima di irrisolto, il medesimo che ruota intorno
al misterioso nom de plume della scrittrice Elena Ferrante. La storia
di Salinger è inoltre stata rielaborata per dar vita alla storia di un altro
scrittore isolato, il protagonista di Scoprendo Forrester, figura che già
nel nome omaggia l’autore del Giovane Holden e di cui, nel film, si
mettono a nudo i segreti e il passato. Salerno evidenzia, poi, il ruolo
svolto dai disturbi psichici, quelli di Salinger, successivi all’esperienza
drammatica sul fronte di guerra, ma anche quelli di Holden, come
ricordato prima sofferente di depressione e ricoverato in una clinica.
Una caratteristica che accomuna, ancora, Holden e il suo autore, a soli-
dificare una semiosi aberrante che si inserisce a sua volta nel discorso
sulla paranoia e l’ossessione americana per il complotto.
Sulla sovra copertina di Franny e Zoey, uscito nel , viene ripor-
tata una frase dal racconto che sembra rispecchiare le idee di Salinger:
«è mia destabilizzante opinione che l’anonimato–oscurità di uno scrit-
tore sia la seconda più preziosa proprietà che gli venga data in prestito
durante i suoi anni di attività». Ritiratosi a Cornish nel , dal 
Salinger non pubblica più nulla, permettendo alla tensione tra la sua
vita privata e quella pubblica di scrittore di un libro di successo, di
crescere a dismisura. Salinger «non si suicida — secondo Hamilton
(, p. ) — ma fa la cosa che più ci va vicina: scompare, smette di
vivere nel mondo, si rende semipostumo. Puoi parlare di lui, ma non
puoi parlare con lui». È un atteggiamento che, secondo la retorica del
mistero e della paranoia che si è visto essere già ampiamente condivi-
sa dal libro e dal suo autore, appare come la volontà di nascondimento
di qualcosa che deve restare segreto. E i manoscritti di Salinger mai
pubblicati, di cui è stata confermata l’esistenza, alimentano nell’opi-
nione pubblica la tensione e la curiosità per la rivelazione di questo
segreto, tenuto nascosto per decenni.
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Se, come affermano Shields e Salerno (, p. XI), «J.D. Salinger
trascorse dieci anni a scrivere Il giovane Holden e il resto della sua vita
a rimpiangere di averlo fatto», è pur vero che, non pubblicando altro,
Salinger è diventato autore di un testo universale. Da qui l’ulteriore for-
za mitica che è andata caricando il potere simbolico del romanzo, un
unicum che, visti i molteplici legami tra contenuto e vita dell’autore,
sembra parlare al pubblico, coinvolgendolo intensamente dal punto
di vista emotivo. Il successo della leggenda dell’autore schivo e isolato
si alimenta parallelamente al libro e al suo successo. Ammantarsi di
mistero nella società dello spettacolo è la via più semplice per attirare
l’opinione pubblica: il silenzio di Salinger non ha fatto che alimentare
il suo mito, mentre l’isolamento ha garantito la funzione contraria.
Dopo la pubblicazione di Holden, il complesso meccanismo se-
miotico attivato da una parte dal testo stesso, dall’altra dal fandom e
dalle sue devianze criminali e, infine, dalla vita dello stesso autore, ha
dato vita a un’epica dal sapore complottista, sempre in bilico tra una
rappresentazione mitica, falsa, e una reale dei fatti, dunque veritiera.
Un ambiente simbolico — una semiosfera — fertile per le teorie sul
complotto.
. Bad boys, bad readers!
La storia di Holden non sarebbe forse quella odierna se a caricare di
ulteriore forza simbolica un libro già potente, con una comunità di
lettori assiologicamente orientata e un autore dalla biografia curiosa-
mente ricalcata sui valori del libro, non fossero intervenuti gli episodi
criminali menzionati sopra. Lettori dalla personalità psicolabile e colpe-
voli, a monte dei delitti, di una lettura e interpretazione aberrante del
testo, questi personaggi si sono identificati nell’alienazione raccontata
da Holden decidendo di non attenersi, nella loro immedesimazio-
ne, alla narrazione, in cui il soggetto accetta passivamente ciò che
lo circonda senza agire ma venendo sopraffatto dalla realtà, e hanno
sparato. In virtù di atti efferati come questi, Holden entra di diritto tra
. La formula è tratta da Whitfield, , p. , dove l’autore si sofferma sul successo
di Holden tra il pubblico adolescenziale e tra i fanatici che, sulla scorta del fascino esercitato
dal libro ne hanno fatto un’arma, ricollegandosi quindi agli episodi criminali che hanno
visto protagonista il libro.
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i protagonisti di un mondo letterario intessuto di ossessioni e paranoie
che caratterizza la letteratura americana. Non a caso Zacurri (, pp.
–) dedica un intero capitolo del suo volume sulla paranoia nelle
narrazioni di massa americane alla “sindrome Holden” ritenendo che
si tratti di «un libro che può diventare pericoloso se non viene letto con
il dovuto distacco, se la porta stregata della letteratura rimane aperta
troppo a lungo e il lettore finisce dentro il romanzo. Non era successo
così anche a Don Chisciotte e a madame Bovary?» (Zacurri,, pp.
–). Il fenomeno legato all’interpretazione aberrante di Holden
dimostra come talvolta «la letteratura [possa diventare] la porta d’in-
gresso in un regno maledetto» (Zacurri,, p. ), e come i confini
del testo possano perdere nitidezza e aprire a interpretazioni fallaci
facendo leva «su una sorta di preconoscenza dei testi i quali, a causa
del contesto del tutto inusuale in cui vengono collocati, assumono un
significato nuovo e niente affatto rassicurante. L’idea di letteratura che
ne deriva corrisponde, nel migliore dei casi, a un sapere collocato in
una sfera lontana dalla normalità dell’esistenza» (Zacurri, , p. ).
I criminali hanno perso il senso del romanzo: da storia, artefatto
di una cultura del secondo Novecento, Holden è stato reinterpreta-
to fuori contesto e coinvolto in un percorso di senso aberrante. La
notorietà di alcuni coinvolti — Lennon, Reagan — e il ripetersi del
fatto ha dato via alla nuova isotopia, quella del romanzo dal sinistro
potere, mandante di omicidi. Miscelata con i temi del romanzo, con
il mito e il culto ad esso legati, con la storia dell’autore, questa nuova
storia sul e del Giovane Holden ha finito per avvalorare ulteriormente
una rappresentazione a toni complottisti in cui il romanzo è messo
al bando perché veicolo di temi legati alla ribellione, di controversie
e dell’imprevedibile azione di personaggi psicotici e disadattati. Se il
mito alimenta il mito, anche questi fatti di cronaca non sono semio-
ticamente esauriti nel loro svolgersi, ma hanno attivato una nuova
spinta simbolica. Aumentando il mistero e la carica di enigmatico
fascino intorno al romanzo, aumentano anche le vendite del libro
e quel sistema così massificato e ipocrita aborrito da Holden, da Sa-
linger, dagli assassini, non fa che riprodursi in un sistema a circuito
chiuso, come del resto si conferma quello della macchina aberrante
a toni complottisti, basato sulla fallace idea di continuità tra fiction e
realtà. Murakami, traduttore di The Catcher in the Rye in giapponese,
sancisce la presenza di due sistemi di senso in conflitto e costante
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frizione dietro al romanzo e al suo successo, il libro per lui «ha una
qualche connessione con la tenebra nella mente delle persone, e que-
sto è veramente importante. È un grande libro ma, allo stesso tempo,
Salinger era inchiodato in quel sistema a circuito chiuso. Salinger è
in un sistema aperto in quanto scrittore, ma penso che il suo libro sia
ambivalente tra un sistema e l’altro. Credo che questa sia una delle
ragioni della sua forza» (in Mondadori, , p. ).
Una forza che è costruita nel testo grazie a una carica patemica
particolarmente intensa e al regime enunciazionale che vede Holden
rivolgersi direttamente a un tu, identificabile non troppo difficilmente
come il suo lettore. Un espediente con il quale avvicinare da un lato il
lettore–interlocutore al personaggio e, dall’altro, esibire una manifesta
coscienza della finzione letteraria. Come Holden è autore dichiarato
delle proprie sensazioni e pensieri, così vicini a quelli del lettore medio,
così Salinger si dimostra compartecipe a quel mondo. Illuminante
l’affermazione di Joanna Rakoff nel suo libro che, seppure romanzato,
ricalca fatti autentici su Salinger:
Quando si legge un racconto di Salinger la sensazione non è tanto quella di
leggere un racconto, quanto di avere Salinger in persona che ti sussurra le
sue storie all’orecchio. Il mondo che crea è al tempo stesso palpabilmente
reale e spaventosamente intensificato, come se girasse per il mondo con
le terminazioni nervose scoperte. Leggere Salinger significa compiere un
gesto di tale intimità che, a volte, subentra del disagio. (Rakoff, , p. )
Holden stesso — ancora una volta il rimando è dall’extratestuale
al testo –affermava l’esigenza di un rapporto con i libri non limitato
al testo, nella falsa idea di una corrispondenza tra autore modello e
autore reale, tra fiction e realtà: «Mi fanno impazzire i libri che quando
hai finito di leggerli vorresti che l’autore fosse il tuo migliore amico,
per telefonargli ogni volta che ti va» (Salinger, , p. ).
. Manipolare, ingannare, raccontare
Attraverso la letteratura possono circolare in società discorsi nei quali
vengono affermati o contraddetti valori. Sono discorsi custoditi in
testi narrativi, emotivamente coinvolgenti o meno, dotati spesso di un
valore aggiunto dal punto di vista espressivo. Ma, in quanto narrazioni,
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sono responsabili allo stesso modo della circolazione di falsità all’in-
terno di ogni manifestazione culturale. I testi letterari selezionano,
raccontano, stringono con il lettore un implicito patto di finzione in
cui agisce una sospensione dell’incredulità: inevitabilmente, dunque,
mentono. Il complotto si basa sul medesimo meccanismo semioti-
co elementare: ricostruire un ordine basato su una struttura e una
logica narrativa. Fabbricando l’illusione di un mistero su Salinger e
il suo libro culto secondo i meccanismi della retorica del complotto,
sono stati i media a creare e far circolare la teoria del libro maledetto,
connettendola a un’agentività che, a dispetto della fiction, è diventata
reale.
Il libro è stato così personalizzato e dotato di intenzionalità come il
soggetto — un destinante in questo caso — di una storia che ricalca
molte delle caratteristiche delle cospirazioni per cui poteri sotterranei
agiscono in nome di individui singoli nella società. Ogni teoria del
complotto è spesso incentrata sulla presenza di un’agentività, solita-
mente un potere autoritario o un personaggio nascosto, fautore di
un progetto delittuoso: Salinger, la sua vita e il suo libro–mito, sem-
brano incarnare questa figura. La trama criminale colpisce persone
o istituzioni secondo un disegno occulto, ed è ciò che nella storia di
Holden sembra poter fare il libro stesso, in nome del quale vengono
uccise star o minacciati presidenti. Inoltre, un altro aspetto ricorrente
in ogni storia di complotto è la presenza di assiologie binarie che,
con riferimento al quadrato della veridizione, contrappongo il regime
del segreto al pubblico, la falsità e la verità, l’individuo e la società.
Sono opposizioni presenti nel testo, nella storia relativa alla biografia
dell’autore, e nelle motivazioni che hanno spinto i criminali ad agire.
La tensione tra i due poli opposti si esprime con un’angoscia e una
paranoia che affliggono il protagonista, individuo solo davanti alla
società.
L’estetica della paranoia, condivisa dal lettore medio e unita a uno
stile interpretativo aberrante perché basato su un percorso di costru-
zione del senso privo di fondamenta, garantisce la rappresentazione
dei fatti che riguardano Holden in forma di complotto. Lo stesso stile
interpretativo, unito a reali problemi psichici, dà invece vita a gesti
folli nella realtà. Ad agevolare il processo di creazione della retorica
complottista concorre la base simbolica presente intorno al roman-
zo: Holden fa ormai parte della mitologia letteraria per una serie di
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motivi interni ed esterni al testo. Ma anche l’inconscio collettivo, si è
visto, partecipa di questo processo semiotico, presentando la paranoia
come estetica diffusa soprattutto nel modo di interpretare i fatti. Gli
Stati Uniti sono certo un contesto favorito e socialmente predisposto
a un tale atteggiamento (cfr. Panella, Grammanetieri), si pensi ai casi
presidenziali Watergate e Kennedy, nei quali i media hanno avuto un
ruolo preminente nello svelare i segreti. Nell’immaginario collettivo
americano è diffusa una tendenza alla paranoia e al sospetto costante
che ciò che appare non sia ciò che è, tale cultura popolare agisce
sulla connotazione del mito e del complotto, favorendo un circuito
che alimenta reciprocamente immaginario e prodotti di fiction. La
singolare vita di Salinger e la quasi totale assenza di fonti, prove e testi
dell’autore, hanno inoltre favorito la ricerca di indizi e segni utili ad
alimentare la teoria del complotto. In questa direzione hanno agito
i giornalisti, in cerca di verità alternative rispetto alle apparenze: il
fascino del segreto e lo svelamento hanno dato vita a una retorica
molto efficace.
La costruzione complottista sarebbe dunque un problema emi-
nentemente semiotico, fatto di narrazioni e interpretazioni, “non
raccontate mai niente a nessuno” consiglia Holden nella chiusura
di un libro la cui interpretazione crea un cortocircuito di senso e
assume vita propria come uso deviato nella realtà. Se la letteratura
ha il fondamentale scopo di fornire istruzioni e informazioni sulla
realtà attraverso inferenze e ipotesi, in un fruttuoso passaggio dalla
fiction alla realtà, nel caso di Holden la base mitica è così forte da
invertire il processo, riverberando un mito sociale sulla storia, riletta
e re–interpretata alla luce della nuova credenza. Una credenza che, se-
condo la tipologia di Bertrand (), si potrebbe classificare come un
credere accolto, un regime di adesione al testo così forte da fondere il
lettore ad esso, una sospensione della finzionalità che annulla i confini
tra il testo e la realtà costruendo un mondo possibile in tutto e per
tutto uguale al reale. Il lettore viene inghiottito dal romanzo, fino a
non distinguere più cosa sia fiction e cosa no.
Il testo può al contempo diventare destinante di azioni non incluse
entro i suoi confini, e alimentare, con questa interpretazione sbagliata,
una rappresentazione complottista a base mitologica ben lontana dal
significato primo. Quale resta, dunque, il ruolo della letteratura e del-
l’immaginario all’interno del grande e polimorfo habitat dei discorsi
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sociali e delle rappresentazioni mediatiche? Il caso di Holden dimostra
quanto la letteratura possa essere influenzata dalle altre rappresenta-
zioni, evidenziando la potenza simbolica di un linguaggio non più
letterario ma prevalentemente mitico. Ne deriva una forma di “auti-
smo mediatico” tale per cui, attraverso i testi letterari e mediatici, ogni
utente aderirebbe a un regime discorsivo sulla base di una coincidenza
di ideologie, senza più considerare gli elementi paratestuali, finendo
quindi per essere fagocitato e ingannato dal testo.
Della potenza degli effetti di senso testuali e degli inganni della
comunicazione e delle false interpretazioni sembrava pienamente
cosciente Salinger in Seymour. Un’introduzione, del  uno dei pochi
racconti pubblicati dopo Holden. Buddy Glass si esibisce qui in un
monologo in cui si rivolge esplicitamente al lettore, giocando ancora
con l’enunciazione tanto da indurre la critica a identificarlo con la
voce di Salinger. Si tratta, semioticamente, di un esercizio di metanar-
rativa teso a esplicitare i meccanismi letterari. Buddy mette il lettore
a confronto con il potere della narrativa e dell’enunciazione: come
Salinger, anche lui manipola, inganna, racconta attraverso le parole
e il linguaggio, strumenti di trasformazione della realtà. Ecco allora
emergere il senso della dedica posta in apertura al volume: «se esiste
ancora al mondo un lettore non professionista — o qualcuno che
legge e basta — chiedo a lui o a lei, con indicibile affetto e gratitudine,
di dividere questa dedica in quattro con mia moglie e i miei figli».
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: Conspiracy theories permeate through every level of the Web.
The semiotic features of this medium lead to mistrust, misunderstan-
ding, and aberrant interpretations entailing a mythological approach
to meaning. The essay investigates the relations between conspiracy
theories and the semiotic features of a peculiar area of the Web: its
peripheries. In particular, the essay focuses on the so–called “A-culture”,
hosted in the boards of sites such as chan and chan. In order to study
the semiotic dynamics that promote the rise of conspiracy theories, the
essay singles out a particularly challenging case study: the violent Web
dispute about video games and feminism, known as #GamerGate.
: Web and Internet; Conspiracy Theories; Play; #GamerGate.
. Introduction
Michael Barkun in A Culture of Conspiracy () outlines three
principles of conspiracy theories: ) nothing happens by accident;
) nothing is at it seems; and ) everything is connected. The first
principle is strictly connected with what says Mattew Dentith ( ):
a conspiracy theory is the attempt to explain a significative event with
a significant cause — which, as Dario Martinelli reminded us, is one
∗ Mattia Thibault, Università degli Studi di Torino.
. In the Meetings on Meaning –, dedicated to Semiotics of Conspiracy
Theories.
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of the basic needs to whom humanity answer with the creation of
myths. Conspiracy theories, therefore, are products of a desperate
need of meaning facing the inability to easily interpret reality.
The second principle — on deception — is also firmly connected to
semiotic activities: if nothing is what it seems, it means that everything
is a symbol, or a clue, of something else. We can see the roots of this
concept from the etymology of the word “conspiracy” itself, which
means to “blow together” or to “whisper together”, implying, on the
one hand, secrecy and on the other hand, conventionality among the
conspirators.
Finally, the third principle, relates to an other word, often used to
describe conspiracy theories: plot. This etymon, also used in many
other languages to indicate conspiracies (“complot” Spanish, “Koplott”
German) literally means to be “bent”, or “bent together” and therefo-
re bound together. The word “plot” is also connected with the textile
area, indicating “fabric”, or “cloth”, and to the textual area (from the
latin “textus”, that means “fabric”, again) referring to the disposition
of events in a narration. Similarly, the Italian word “trama” indicates,
at the same time, a machination, the intricacy of a piece of cloth, and
a story. Conspiracy theories, hence, seem to be inextricably related to
weaving — as much as narration is.
In addition, there is one last word, semantically connected to the-
se, “web”, which nowadays is used to metonymically indicate one
of the most important infrastructure of our time: the World Wide
Web, the enormous hypertext that contains much of the information
exchanged on the Internet.
Arguably it may be no accident, therefore, if the Web is one of the
most productive cradles of conspiracy theories, being the very meta-
phor that we use to understand it, deeply connected with the genesis
of conspiracies. Additionally, the Web also features characteristics that
match perfectly with Barkun’s other two principles, consisting in a
hypertext at the same time puzzling and soaked of secrecy.
In this paper we will approach the relationships between conspiracy
theories and the semiotics features of a very peculiar area of the Web:
its peripheries. In particular we will focus on the so–called A-culture
(Auerbach ) hosted in some boards of sites such as chan and
. As in Nelson (): a multi–pronged digital text which parts are connected by links.
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chan. In order to investigate the semiotic issues that promote the
rise of conspiracy theories, will dedicate a paragraph to a particularly
challenging case study: the violent Web dispute about video games
and feminism, known as #GamerGate.
. The Peripheries of the Web
In this chapter we will approach the Web with the tools and theories
of semiotics of culture, which are, in my opinion, particularly indicated
to map such a complex and ever changing reality such as the one
that the Internet hosts. I have already proposed such approach on
the pages of this very journal (Thibault, forthcoming), therefore this
paragraph will be dedicated to a brief recap of its main assumptions,
in order to be able to continue with our investigation.
.. The Semiosphere of the Web
The word “periphery” that I used to indicate a precise and characteri-
stic area of the Web, is obviously borrowed from Juri Lotman’s theory
of the semiosphere — i.e. the smaller working semiotic mechanisms,
the minimum unit of semiosis (Lotman ) that surrounds every
single culture. The semiosphere, hence the semiotic space of a culture,
appears to both enclose the Web and be overtaken by it. On the one
hand, the texts forming the Web are undoubtedly part of the cultu-
re, but, on the other hand, however they are not limited to a single
culture.
The Web, therefore, has to be considered as a transversal set of
texts, delimited by the overlapping of the immense hypertext of the
Web and the semiosphere. The presence of the Web in a single culture,
hence, is determined by the intersections between its semiosphere
and the hypertext, and therefore bill be a two–dimensional section
of a sphere. This section, however, follows the general organization
and structure of the whole semiosphere, and presents all the featu-
res and dynamics described by Lotman in his works: the hierarchy
. Let’s think at social networks such as Vkontacte or renren, which are internal to
the Web but external to the semiosphere of western culture
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between a rigid, but influential center and a free and dynamic peri-
phery, the continuous movement of textualities from the latter to the
first, the existence of an external border working as a porous space of
translation and so on.
Regarding the Web, the periphery — described by Lotman as
the most innovative, dynamic, and fertile area of culture, but also
limited to a minority of individuals — hosts what we can generally call
“subcultures”, including fandoms, religious sects, political extremists
and, subcultures connected to the concepts of geekiness and nerdism.
Their websites and texts are generally unknown to the majority of
the public, and their ideologies are more often than not opposed, or
at least alternatives, to those that we can find at the center.
.. The Internet
The situation that we have described, with the Web present in every
area of culture, represents only our current situation. When the In-
ternet was a novelty, known only to a small circle of experts, it was
a peripheral phenomenon — as happens to all cultural innovations
limited, at the beginning, to a set of individuals and/or to the younger
generations.
When the Web was born a small community of users arose, strictly
connected with geek and nerd subcultures, formed by individuals
that, for passion or for profession, happened to surf in the all new
World Wide Web. This community shared a system of values and of
ideologies (notably including a radical separation between reality and
virtual world) and a strong feeling of belonging to the medium.
With time, however, the Web underwent to a process that made of
it of central importance in the semiosphere, maybe the most impor-
tant medium of all. From the peripheries, the Web has been deformed
towards the center of the semiosphere (see Lotman ). Millions
of new users started surfing and the Web itself changed greatly. Not
much of the original Web is still existing today.
The Web subculture, nevertheless, survived and it is still situated in
the periphery of the semiosphere, mostly gathered around forums and
imageboards such as gaia online or the infamous chan. The latter
. Even if fairly unkonwn to the public, gaia online, forum dedicated to manga and
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is an imageboard founded in , whose users interact in complete
anonymity sharing and commenting images, generally employing a
wide range of highly formalized practices of textual production and
sharing. Most of the Internet memes (Marino ) were invented
there and, even if not much famous, it has a large influence, in the Web
and even outside it — the infamous collective of hackivists known as
Anonymous was born on chan’s random borad /b/.
This part of the peripheries of the Web and its pragmatics is ge-
nerally referred to by its users with the synecdoche “the Interent”.
In this chapter, we too, hence, will use (improperly) the expression
“the Internet” to refer to the same area as opposed to “the Web”
representing the whole World Wide Web.
.. A-Culture
Auerbach () renames “A–Culture” the subculture hosted on the
Internet and tries to outline the features of this community and its
users. He argues that the members of A-culture, are often individual
suffering of a social stigma — as the aforementioned geek and nerds,
but also Japanese otaku — that find in the Web a new home in a
sort of parallel reality, where their stigma and separation from reality
becomes something to be proud of. This pride, according to Auerbach,
becomes the typical form of elitism that can be found in the Internet
(see also Thibault forthcoming).
The “elite of the elite”, the most prominent examples of members
of the A-culture are the Anons, the anonymous users of some boards
of chan and chan — notoriously /b/, /v/ and /baphomet/.
A-Culture has the features of what Lotman defines a culture orien-
ted towards the expression (i.e. a culture that believes that what is
outside of it is wrong) and in particular, Anons strongly oppose the
websites of the center of the semiosphere because such sites promote
the Web as a prosthesis of real life. The identity of their users is strictly
connected to their offline identities (e.g. the selfie, a way to “translate”
oneself into the Web) which represents all the Internet hates: sharing
anime is believed to be the most prolific forum in history, with the highest number of post,
among which one that counts more than a million pages of comments. In this case the
hybridization between different subcultures is self evident
 Mattia Thibault
real data, not protecting one’s identity, and mixing the real to the
virtual.
.. The Web between play and reality
Peripheral Web is based on the fundamental distinction between Web
and every day reality. The economy of unreality described by Auer-
bach is the core of the Internet: suspicion it’s its natural consequence,
and offense a way to protect it.
The Internet claims and protects the Web’s unreality refusing
any contagion with reality and antagonizing users and websites that
promote such confusion. However, even if the Internet is structured
as an alternative space to reality, with different values and ideologies,
this distinction doesn’t make it ontologically any less real than other
parts of the Web. What we are facing, thus, is a different semiotic
domain, and in particular a playful one.
The playful character of the Internet is intrinsic both to the texts it
produces (e.g internet memes) and to its pragmatics (every interaction
between users is oriented to jokes, irony, or complicity).
However, this feature of the Internet and of its texts is rarely com-
municated, but its taken for granted, making for an external viewer
extremely difficult to correctly interpret it. The metacommunication
of the playful intentions — for Bateson () essential to any play —
is entrusted to the context: for an internet user everything on the Web
is a joke and should not be taken seriously. This also explains why
the Internet is often seen from outsiders as a place of the Web full of
harassers, misogynists, homophobes and porn maniacs oriented to
violence, hate speeches and sadistic practices.
If we consider the Internet as inherently playful, then, we can claim
that two different semiotic domains — the playful and the real — are
competing to be hegemonic over the Web. The results of this quarrel,
as we will see, can lead to significant misunderstanings.
. Which is, of course, a rethorical and narrative construction as well as the playful
one.
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. The rules of the Internet: a constitution
.. Welcome to the Internet
The Internet’s conscience of the separation between online and offline
(which is absent in websites like Google or Amazon) is one of the
things that makes the peripheries of the Web semiotically interesting,
as it entails the awareness of the uniqueness of online communication.
Tracing a sharp boundary between online and offline allows the users
of the Internet to discern and describe more thoroughly the features
that characterize it. These descriptions assume, of course, the form
of the texts that are massively produced in these areas of the Web:
Internet memes.
A particularly interesting meme is the so–called list of the “Rules
of the Internet”. This list, born in  in the random board /b/ of
chan, is both prescriptive and descriptive an mainly sarcastic and
ironic. However, this meme sketch an interesting portrait of the
Internet and of the Web in general. In this paragraph, therefore, we
will focus on some of them, and in particular to those pertaining to
anonymity and to the economy of suspicion — in other words: those
related to conspiracies.
.. The rules
The first two rules of the Internet: «Rule . Do not talk about /b/»
and «Rule . Do not talk about /b/» are clearly a parody of the “rules
of the Fight Club” from the homonym film by David Fincher ( ).
Their connection with conspiracy theories is self evident: on the one
hand they reveal a taste for fiction about conspiracies, on the other
hand they are also symptomatic of a certain measure of xenophobia:
these rules state that the community must be concealed from the
outsiders who are perceived as potential dangers.
The next rules are «Rule . We are Anonymous» and «Rule . Ano-
nymous is legion». They are also born as a joke: as most people on
chan posted as “Anonymous” soon someone started to pretend that
Anonymous was a single person, even if manifold (hence the diabo-
lical claim of Anonymous being legion). These rules underline the
importance of anonymity, which was common in the primordial Web,
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but nowadays fought off by all the Web’s big companies. Anonymi-
ty is, again, a typical trait of conspirators or, at least, to their more
“romantic” images. The fact that the group of hackivists called “Ano-
nymous” (born on chan and whose name was a direct reference to
the Rule ) uses as symbol the mask of Guy Fawkes — well known
British conspirator and whose mask is used also by the eponymous
character of V for Vendetta ( James McTeigue, ) — is another proof
of the Anons’ love for conspiracy narratives.
Partially connected with the idea of conserving anonymity on the
Internet is also the «Rule . There are no girls on the Internet» that
can be interpreted as reinforcement of Rule : anonymity has no
gender, no one should ever reveal it’s own sex inchan (Manivannan
). On the other hand, however, this rule can be also interpreted in
another (non exclusive) way, as stating that anyone claiming of being
a girl on the internet is probably not — as well as everyone claiming
to be a child is in reality an FBI agent, as another popular meme says.
This concept dates back to the original Web, when the female users
were very few, and many men exploited the complete obscurity of
the empiric author to pretend to be females. Again, we are facing a
culture of suspicion, in which nothing is what it seems, and the rule
is to doubt in every occasion. On the same line is «Rule . Pics or
Didn’t Happen» that requires to provide proof for every claim made
on the Internet, that will otherwise considered false.
Masks and unmasking appear therefore to be central to the Inter-
net ideology, probably because deeply rooted in the medium itself.
The empirical author being irremediably out of reach, the semiotic
competence of the Web is (or has been) mainly the ability of interpre-
ting correctly its hidden intentions and objectives. The Web makes it
really easy for everyone to create their own mask, and thus, celebra-
ting unmasking, “the rules of the Internet” are celebrating the ability
to understand and use correctly the medium.
. Roles and communities of the Internet
In order to be able to investigate the dynamics of Internet conspira-
cies, a last order of premises is needed, regarding their actors (in a
Greimasian sense). In the next few paragraphs I will briefly approach
Trolls, Hackers, Anons 
Figure . Trollface, meme used to explicit one’s playful intention after trolling
some of the most important groups of users of the peripheries of the
Web and try to sketch a sort of “semio–ethnography” of the Internet.
These groups are often delineated by the pragmatics of their Web
interactions, more that by any other feature. In other words, these
groups are designated by thematic roles defining their communicative
characteristics.
.. Trolls
“To troll” means to advocate in an aggressive and often illogical way
an unpopular opinion, in order to start an argument with other users.
The troll doesn’t try to convince its interlocutor and will not change
opinion: its sole goal is creating and maintaining conflict, and the more
the argument becomes heathen, the better for the troll. Nowadays,
the term “trolling” is used for any form of aggressive deception and
hoax on the Web, if the goal is the troll’s fun. This led some scholar
to dramatically define trolls as “the sadists of the Internet” (Buckels,
Paulhus e Trapnell ) and, more in general, to the idea that trolls
are disturbed individuals.
From a semiotic perspective, a troll is someone who exploits the
impossibility to reach the empiric author of a message typical of the
Web, to hide his identity and his intentio, behind a very well defined
(even caricatured) model author in order to delude the receiver of
the message. The playful nature of this practice is evident, as it deals
with illusion (from the Latin ludere, “to play”) and fun. This form of
play isn’t new, of course, it is what is generally called a “joke” (from
the Latin iocus, meaning “fun”, “jest”), but, if for many jokes the
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point is exactly the revelation of its playful nature (let’s think of candid
cameras), trolls do never reveal their true intentions.
Even if most trolls are part of A-culture, they generally operate on
very central websites: primarily the Youtube comment section, followed
by Twitter, Facebook and Tumblr. There are attempts of trolling also
in the boards of chan, but they have a lot less success: after all there
are two rules of the Internet that explain clearly how to deal with trolls:
«Rule . All your carefully picked arguments can easily be ignored» and
«Rule . Do not argue with a troll — it means that they win».
Even if the rule “Don’t feed the troll” is universal, many of the users
of the central areas of the Web do not have the competences to identify
and avoid trolls, and therefore fall into their traps. This competence,
is the competence is a semiotic domain (and, in particular, in a playful
semiotic domain) and it is a fundamental trait required of any user of the
Internet. The ability to understand if someone is trolling you, and hence
to ignore every provocation, avoiding to become a “lulcow”, reflect the
understanding of the playful nature of the Internet.
What we are facing, therefore, is the result of the war between two
different conceptions of the Web, one as prosthesis of the real world,
and another as virtual playground, free from every social norm. Trolls
don’t communicate their playful intentions, because on the Internet
«Nothing has to be taken seriously» (Rule). The Web, according to
them, is meant as a place to play into, and those who don’t understand
it and make the mistake of taking things seriously deserve to become
lulcows, and to be “milked” for fun.
The Internet however, is peripheral, and the number of users
that know the “true nature” of the Web is exiguous. Knowing this
“secret” becomes for them being part of a sort of conspiracy, where
only an elected few know what is really happening, while the others’
judgment is clouded. That’s why chan and Anonymous often employ
trolling for their raids against people or organizations (as the famous
raid against Scientology). In this way the troll become the agent of a
conspiracy and uses the weapons of irony and sarcasm to fight those
who fail to understand that the Web is only one big joke.
. See also the Italian online joke “Gattini per Salvini”, a quite successful raid consisting
in posting images of cats, the “true rulers of the internet”, on the internet accounts of
extreme right politician Matteo Salvini.
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.. Hackers
The hacker is thematic role much loved by the Internet and a quite
common trope in many works of fiction, mainly focusing on him
as a young genius (see War Games, John Badham, ) or a mystic
figure (especially in The Matrix, Laurence and Andrew Wachowski
). Real life hackers are individuals capable of exercising an unusual
control on the medium and to break its rules, generally in order to
acquire information. They do not simply use the medium to com-
municate, but they can communicate with the medium, and hence
manipulate it.
Really skilled hackers, however, are rather few, and the importance
of this thematic role is more a mythological one that a social one. This
role fascinates the Internet, not only with fiction, but also thanks to
famous real like hackers and activists like Julian Assange, the founder
of Wikileaks. The prestige of this role among the users of the Internet
is probably due to its two major characteristics: the first one is the
outstanding computer science competences he possesses; the second
one is its ability to unmask, to manage the revelations. The latter
is strictly connected with the economy of suspicion that permeates
the Internet, from this perspective a hacker is mainly a debunker,
someone capable of see under the surface and to reveal conspiracies
by unmasking the actions of the conspirators and finding the proofs.
One of the easiest — and therefore more common — actions
linked to hacking is doxing, which is the act of discover the real
identity of a Web user and share online is data: personal address, family
composition, e–mail, contact and, sometimes, even passwords. Doxing
has a clear intimidating nature, displaying the force and ability of the
hacker and leaving the victim exposed and defenseless. However,
most of the times these information are used only to make fun of the
victim, who will receive online–ordered pizzas at home in the middle
of the night or will be unwillingly subscribed to many spam mailing
lists. In other words: doxing is used to bring trolling outside the Web
into the real world.
It could seem an oxymoron that people valuing very much anony-
mity are so willing to unmask others and reveal their identities online.
I think that there are three, non exclusive possible interpretations that
may allow us to understand better what is doxing:
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— doxing is a test of someone’s hacking abilities, ant thus is part
of the qualification of the subject;
— doxing can be interpreted as a performance that excludes from
the Web individuals that do not protect well enough their iden-
tities. At the same time it denounces the risk of sharing data on
the Web, and claims the latter for those embracing anonymity;
— doxing may be seen as an invasion of the real world by the play-
ful space of the Web. It brings trolling in real life, overturning
the balance of power between real and virtual, and affirming
the superiority of the latter.
.. Gamers
This is a quite vast thematic role, semantically derived by the action
of playing video games. According to recent studies playing video
games is mostly an adult occupation, and women play almost as
much as men. The prototypical image of the “gamer”, however, is
completely different, and has its roots in an early stage of gaming
and in an assimilation between the stereotypes of gamers and nerds.
From this perspective gamers are often described as white teens with
no social life who are generally porn–obsessed obese virgins. These
stereotypes are still astonishingly alive and played an important part
in the #GamerGate quarrel.
On the other hand, not every video game player consider himself
or herself a gamer — term that, in fact, is not well defined. In many
websites and boards populated by gamers, as the board /v/ of chan,
there have been many discussions of what is to be a “gamer”. Many,
for example, have criticized studies reporting that more adult women
play video games than teenage boy (source: Entertainment software
association), claiming that playing Candy Crush Saga as a pastime
doesn’t make someone a gamer. If some of the criticisms to these
quantitative analysis may have a point, they are also the sign of the
strong xenophobia that permeates the gamers’ subculture. For many
years very strong prejudices against gamers were quite common, and
video games were thought to hurt the brain or to induce violence,
even if recent studies claim the exact opposite (Ferguson  and
. http://phys.org/news/--women-men-video-games.html.
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Przybylski ). This social stigma, thus, has probably boosted the
cohesion of the group and reinforced the suspicion and hostility
towards anyone outside the group.
The similarities between the subculture surrounding the Internet
and the gamer’s subculture may seem many. However, these two
groups only partially overlaps, and many similarities are mainly due
to the fact of their being communities situated in the periphery of the
semiosphere. Gamers are not a primarily online community, but, at
the contrary, considers themselves to be gamers also in everyday life.
.. Sockpuppets
Sockpuppets are deceiving enunciative devices typical of the Web.
The term is used to indicate accounts reporting false information and
hiding the identity of the user behind them. Sockpuppets are fake
virtual prosthesis, marionettes, and may be used for many reasons:
to troll avoiding recognition, to overcome a ban, to pretend to be
of another sex or race, or to undermine an position in an argument
by claiming to support it and making meaningless points. The same
individual can use different sockpuppets at the same time, manipu-
lating the perception of its individuality and presenting himself like
multitude — a sometimes very useful meaning effect.
From a semiotic standpoint a sockpuppet is a particularly articu-
lated and explicit model author that the empiric author employ to
influence, through techniques on émbrayage, his model readers.
As for conspiracies, the mere existence of the possibility of creating
a sockpuppet encourage suspect and mistrust on the Web, hence the
actions taken by the most central Websites against all fake accounts.
.. Social Justice Warriors and Feminazis
On the Internet the expression “Social Justice Warrior” indicates Web
users that hypocritically exploit the promotion of social justice as
a way to ask for attention and to improve their offline image. The
website Encyclopedia Dramatica, a Wikipedia parody describing the
Internet, in the page dedicated to Social Justice claims:
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The main purpose of SOCIAL JUSTICE is not to enact actual change or
forward progress. If it were, no one would give a fuck. In fact the primary
reason for its existence is to allow white people to impress other white
people with how accepting and totally sensitive they are. Due to being over
privileged teenagers with too much time on their Internet hands, they have
never actually experienced OPPRESSION. So, they merely wing it. Utilizing
their caresonas to yell at others about how they are ruining other peoples
lives with harmful blog posts.
This is a form of identity crafting that is strongly antagonized by
the Internet. Needless to say that accusing someone of being a Social
Justice Warrior is a very easy way to delegitimize his or her position
and arguments, without actually engaging with them. However, again,
the basic idea that on the Internet nothing has to be taken seriously,
and that the Web is not the place in which to fight effectively for social
justice may bring most of its users to believe that anyone defending
liberal ideas on the Web is loosing its time.
One of the main issues of #GamerGate, as we will see, is feminism
which, especially in its online forms, on the Internet is often coarsely
associated with Social Justice Warriors. Because of the general igno-
rance on the topic (one of the common argument is: «if it is about
equality, why isn’t it called equalism?»), of some hard–to–believe hoa-
xes (as the false news of a feminist aborting her male child to avoid to
“give birth to a monster” or the fake feminist movement to abolish
“father day” orchestrated by chan) and of some undeniable exagge-
ration (like the journalist shaming scientist Matt Taylor for his shirt
in an interview about the successful mission of space probe Rosetta)
the Internet is often not a feminist–friendly place, when not openly
misogynistic on the topic.
Things, however, are more complex than it might appear. Emma
Watson, for example, who is considered being the “crush of the In-
ternet”, is a outspoken feminist, and her speech at United Nations (in
September , as Goodwill Ambassador for UN Women) was ge-
nerally appreciated also from many users of the Internet. In addition,
some feminist, as Christina Hoff Sommers, have taken the side of the
. https://encyclopediadramatica.se/Social_justice.
. Original blog post: http://injusticestories.com/i-aborted-my-baby-because-it-was-a-boy/.
. http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/endfathersday.
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gamers in #GamerGate, and are quite popular among them.
Hence, following (unintentionally) another kind of rule of the Web,
the Godwin Law, the term “Feminazi” was born, in order to distin-
guish the Social Justice Warrior feminists and the “men haters” from
the “true feminists” who advocate equality. The oversimplification
and general confusion is blatant, but it is symptomatic: when a com-
munity based on communicative practices have to face a political idea
the latter can appeal to some of its users and be disliked by others. In
order to keep the community united, the idea is either articulated in
one positive and one “nazi” side easy to deal with, or translated to a
mere fact of communication pragmatics.
. The #Gamergate: a case study
The #GamerGate controversy is an heterogeneous and extremely
complex internet flamewar that started in august  and to the day,
it hasn’t completely ended. What I will do in this paragraph is to try
to outline the development and the features of this controversy and
to investigate how they were affected by the patterns typical of conspi-
racy theories and by the semiotic and communicative characteristics
of Web communication in general, and the Internet’s in particular.
The controversy has been extremely animated — death threats have
been received in both sides — and has taken place mostly on Twitter,
where between August and November the hashtag #GamerGate
alone has been used  million time: almost  times a day. Also
the Wikipedia page of the controversy has become for some time a
battlefield resulting on mass bans. The comment sections of many
blogs and websites that have dedicated entries and articles to the
subject has also become quite often hosting spaces of the discussions,
again with many bans and, sometimes, explicit regimes of censorship.
. «As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving
Nazis or Hitler approaches ».
. The reconstruction will be based on the narrations about them build by the two sides
(Kotaku, Gamasutra ecc on the one hand, Knowyourmeme and Enciclopedya Dramatica on
the other) and on my personal, and hopefully more objective, observation of the phenome-
non. I monitored the hastags #GamerGate, #Stopgamergate  and #notyourshield from
September  to February , when the controversy reached its peak.
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.. Genealogy of flame war
What was the principal subject of all these discussions? It would appear
that the main topic was the nature itself of the factions, in particular
of the #GamerGate movement. On the one hand, people hostile to
GamerGaters accuse them of being a misogynist hate group attacking
women in the video game industry in order to intimidate them and
preserve the straight, white, male hegemony in the world of digital
playfulness. The people that identify under the banner of the #Ga-
merGate, on the other hand, refuse these accusations, claiming to be
a diverse movement (the hashtag #notyurshield has been created and
supposedly used by women, minorities and homosexual that identify
with GamerGaters — although the reality of these claims has been
put into question by critics claiming that these accounts are, in fact,
sockpuppets) fighting against corruption and dishonesty in the media.
It is clear that the narrations of the two sides of the quarrel are
extremely different. In order to try to shed some light on the birth
of such narratives, we will here try to reconstruct, very briefly, the
events that made explode the quarrel.
In August the th , Eron Gjony publishes a blog entry about Zoe
Quinn, award–winning game developer with whom he was in a romantic
relationship until that moment. In his blog Gjony claimed that Quinn had
many affairs while still being with him, some of which with video game
journalists — one of them being part of the jury that assigned the award
to Quinn. To support his claims he published a series of screenshots
which he claimed showed messages between him and Quinn.
The day after, Internet Aristocrat, a quite influential youtuber, re-
leased a video about the “Quinnspiracy theory”. In this video Internet
Aristocrat accuses Quinn to be «using sex to influence journalists and
for portraying herself as a victim to receive donations and support».
The reaction of this video and to Gjony blog entry where twofold.
On the one hand many people started to question how her personal
relationships affected her career, and if judges and video game jour-
nalists could still be considered trustworthy. In the subsequent days
Quinn was victim of many ferocious and violent attacks, insults and
even death–threats on the Web (mainly on twitter, but also on Tum-
. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SbILqkODY.
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Figure . “Gamers are dead” blog title collection
blr). On the other hand, many people have been supportive with her,
and accused Gjony of being misogynistic and of having written his
accusations with the sole intentions to punish Zoe Quinn for having
left him. In these days the hashtag #GamerGate was firstly created.
Few days later, the th — also following a wave of criticisms, mixed
again with insults and threats received by feminist youtuber Anita
Sarkeesian in response of a series of videos focusing on misogyny
in video games — all the most important new websites and blogs
dedicated to digital games (The Financial Post, Ars Technica, The
Daily Beast, The Stranger, Beta Beat, Gamasutra, Polygon and Kotaku)
dedicated articles and entries to the end of the identity of the “gamer”,
accusing them to be a spoiled hate group of misogynists and online
harassers, and stating that game developers shouldn’t consider them
their target audience, anymore (Fig. ).
The synchronicity of the response has been immediately interpreted
as the proof of a conspiracy (“everything is connected”) and the disco-
very of a mailing list, called “gamejournopros” in which the authors
of these articles were discussing how to respond to the vicious attacks
against Zoe Quinn has been seen by many GamerGaters as a confirma-
tion of their suspicions. chan’s board /v/, dedicated to video games
become the basis for a counter conspiracy, in which GamerGaters coor-
dinated attacks, actions and trolling operations. At least at the beginning,
however, the majority of the posts on /v/ invited to avoid threats and
insults, and focused on how dismantle the conspiracy they believed was
held against them. One of their first actions has been to write to the
companies that were advertised in the websites that had claimed the
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“gamers” dead, menacing to boycott them if they continued to support
the websites that, they claimed, were attacking their very consumers.
This strategy proved itself successful, in a certain measure, entailing the
cancellation of several contracts, among which those held by Intel.
Insults and threats however, continued, and soon where answered
with other insults and other threats: rapidly the quarrel become a
proper flame war, fought with screenshots, doxings, accuses of being
sockpuppets or trolls and banning requests.
Most of the blogs dedicated to video games joined the cause of the
“anti–gg”, while their opponents gained the endorsement of different
personalities, as British tech journalist Milo Yiannopoulos and feminist
writer Christina Hoff Sommers. Since then the attention to the quarrel
started to slowly decline, but the flame war still hasn’t seen an end.
.. Doxing, lies and paranoia
The quarrel per se it is not very interesting, at least from a semiotic
perspective. There are, however, two aspects of this quarrel, that in
my opinion are worth further investigation. The first one is a cultural
one: the two sides of the dispute seem to be absolutely unable to
understand each–other systems of values and ideologies, and their
semiospheres seem to be too different to allow any dialog. On the one
hand many of the GamerGaters’ claims show a complete ignorance
not only about feminism, about its history and ideas, but also about
journalism, seeing as a conspiracy the fact that journalists might com-
municate and discuss their ideas between them, and even pursuing
agendas different from pleasing their customers. On the other hand,
the anti–gg are blatantly unable to understand the workings of the
Web. Redditor Spawnpointgard, on Reddit provided a lucid analysis
of this cultural gap from the Internet’s point of view:
Like any problem, SJWs attempt to solve the troll issue by “raising awareness”.
To people who don’t understand the Internet (like every major news outlet),
. Which probably tells us something about the state of digital capitalism and of the
economic system of immediate feedback and online ratings.
. https://www.reddit.com/r/KotakuInAction/comments/syq/a_history_of_
chan_culture_and_how_it_relates_to/.
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SJWs look like courageous individuals finally taking a stand against online
harassment. To us, they look like morons trying to feed the trolls to death.
If you’re the target of online harassment, don’t promote it. Don’t even
respond to it. Don’t be anyone’s lulcow.
The second semiotically interesting aspect of this quarrel, is the
importance that the characteristics of the medium play in the creation
of opposite narratives which often reflects a conspirative way of thin-
king. We have already claimed that the fact that the empirical author
of any online message is unreachable and hidden lead to question
his nature, his identity and his agenda. In the narrative of the Web,
this is mirrored by the impossibility to connect actors and actants, to
identify with certainty who did what. A few days after the publication
of the Quinnspiracy video, for instance, Zoe Quinn claimed to be
the victim of an hacker attack and a doxing: a post on her Tumblr
revealed her telephone numbers and was signed “/V/”. Eventually,
blogger The spectacular spider–girl, stated that, in her opinion, the
doxing was staged and accused Quinn to be behind it. The spectacular
spider–girl claimed that, seen Tumblr security features, which would
disconnect multiple users on to the same account, it should had been
impossible for Quinn to denounce the hack from her own hacked
account. Additionally she stated that nobody from /v/ would never
write the board’s own name with an unacceptable capital letter, sugge-
sting that Quinn herself staged her own doxing to gain more support.
The virtual impossibility to proof or disproof this new conspiracy
theory makes its acceptance inevitably a matter of faith, and only
reinforces the existence of two different, incompatible narratives.
Interestingly enough, when to months later the personal data of
game designer Brianna Wu were released publicly on /v/, the reaction
of the Anons to the doxing where of two kinds: firm condemn of any
doxing and ironical skepticism — many Anons responding something
like: «Brianna, please, we don’t care about your data. Stop pretending
to be a victim».
. http://thespectacularspider-girl.tumblr.com/post//zoe-quinn-fake-
doxxhack.
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. The ineffable nature of the Web
Without denying that online harassment is a problem — and a big
one, what we are facing is a tremendous amount of texts, mostly
contradictory, supporting two (if not more) different narrations with
claims that cannot be verified by any means.
We don’t really have any real data in our hands. Numbers can
easily be faked and are, thus, insignificant: if identifying a single
sockpuppet is, sometimes, easy, when one have to deal with hundreds
of them it may become impossible. We also can’t unequivocally in-
terpret the intentio auctoris behind any of these texts, nor discern
between honest authors and trolls supporting the same cause. In some
cases, someone may use sockpuppets to cause more naive users to
follow, honestly, their example.
Even if it is possible, sometimes, to reconstruct the goals and iden-
tity of the author of a text on the Web, being sure is generally a very
difficult task, often requiring good computer skills. Most of the times,
therefore, the user’s approach to the interpretation of online texts is
necessarily uncritical and based only on trust. If the latter is misplaced,
then, being prey of hoaxes may be extremely simple.
Finally, the coexistence of different semiotics domains on the Web,
poses an additional obstacle to straightforward online communication.
The same messages can be radically different in different context or
with different intentions, and the corpus of any online conversation,
frequently, composed by hundreds or thousandths of texts, especially
in social media, can be extremely heterogeneous and hard impossible
to interpret.
All this semiotic issues increase suspicion, mistrust and misunder-
standing on the Web, often resulting in the spur of conspiracy theories,
which in this chaotic set of uninterpretable texts offer a simple way
out from this interpretative impasse.
For this reason it is fundamental that Web users — and most of
all Web scholars — approaching similar topics, especially when the
Internet is involved, are fully aware of the twofold nature of the
. There are evidences showing that Anons often started their cam-
paigns mobilizing thousandths of fake Twitter accounts, see, for example:
http://arstechnica.com/gaming///new-chat-logs-show-how-chan-users-
pushed-gamergate-into-the-national-spotlight/.
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medium. A single semiotic competence is not enough to be able to
interpret and study the Web: a conflict permeates it and opposes two
different online forms of life (Fontanille ), one associating online
practices with real life, and the other with freedom and playfulness.
Any attempt at approaching the Internet without recognizing this
two–faced semiotic nature (the existence of two different frames of
context) will be irremediably flawed.
It is indispensable, then, to remember that the Web is, unavoidably,
a virtual place and not an extension of society. It might be used as
one and it can be a mirror of society, but it doesn’t necessarily do so.
Failing to see the difference between reality and the Web, eventually
brings to aberrant decoding and hence it easily entails mythological
explanations and, thus, conspiracy theories.
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History as We Know It
Conspiracy and Historical Narrative through
Deus Ex: Human Revolution
V I C*
 : La storia così come la conosciamo: complotto e narrativa
storica in Deus Ex: Human Revolution.
: History is often believed to have been shaped by conspiracies.
Through the semiotic analysis of the videogame Deus Ex: Human Revolu-
tion, the essay seeks to shed new light upon the link between conspiracy
narratives and historical representation. The focus lies on three points:
historical ontologies involved by conspiracy theories and history as a
discipline; similarities and differences in the cognitive processes of histo-
rical and conspiratorial understanding; relations between social groups
and the development of historical representations subject to conspiratory
logic.
: Conspiracy; Deus ex; History; Narrative; Temporalities.
. Introduction
History has always been a privileged environment for conspiracy
theories (Knight ), whether conspiracies are believed to stem from
significant historical events, whether historical events are considered
to be as a result of different conspiracies, able to shape history as we
know it. It is possible to conduct some preliminary remarks on the
relationship between history and conspiracy theories, focusing on the
last three words of the title of this essay (we/know/it).
Starting with that last word, it is worth pointing out that history
will not be discussed through an ontological perspective in this essay,
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but instead in light of a semiotic approach. As noted by Greimas ()
and Lozano (), the term “history” is endowed with a double
meaning: it can be seen as the sum of all events (a reified meaning),
and consequently their narration and/or description; or it can be
defined as the discipline that deals with that reconstruction, thanks
to its textual products. As for some disciplines there is an overlap
between the field of discipline and discipline itself.
Turning to the next word, “know”, we can consider the processes
through which the past (and its development) is known. Here, a second
duplicity stands. On the one hand is the cognitive process of historical
disciplinary discourse and its criteria, which results in the form of speech
used for this reconstruction (historical essay etc). On the other hand
is the cultural representation of history that every human community
creates, with its own characteristics; resulting in the development of
historical narratives and the integration of this in the memory and
culture of societies. According to Lotman and Uspensky (), this
process belongs to the fundamental autodescription of cultures.
Finally, the last word, “we”. This can be said to be connected to the
previous points: the collective subjectivity involved in this cognitive
process, and therefore the relationship between the historical imagi-
nary and the community involved, the way in which the selection and
memory of events depends on the characteristics of different societies.
Last but not least, the members of history as a discipline with their
organizations, connections between them and their criteria, tools and
theories used by historical discourse in a specific environment.
This essay will now focus on these three points (historical ontologies;
process of understanding; relationship with the subjectivity involved)
starting from the analysis of a videogame: Deus Ex Human Revolution
(DE:HR), which can be considered a paradigmatic text that can be used
to reflect on the relationship between history and conspiracy.
. The world of Deus Ex
.. The saga
Third title of the homonym series of W-RPG (Deus Ex), DE:HR is a
prequel to the story told in the progenitor. The narrative begins in
History as We Know It 
, in a cyberpunk world in which the protagonist ( JC Denton) is
one of the first bio–engineered soldiers from UNATCO; instructed
to eradicate the threat of terrorism and to prevent the spread of the
virus Death Grey, which has infected most of the world’s population.
Following the traditions of conspiracy clichés, it is discovered that the
virus is actually produced by the authors of the vaccine, a secret cell of
the Illuminati (Majestic ) that plan to use both for world domination.
In the following game (set a few years after the first) the world
has fallen into a new Dark Age, known as “The Collapse”, in which
para–religious organizations (the WTO, the Order, the Templars, Apo-
stlecorp) have achieved transnational power at the expense of States.
The States have been reduced to city–states, due to the destruction of
the global communication network. Several organizations are plotting
in the shadows to use the protagonist, a clone of JC Denton, in order
to carry out their plans for world domination.
Within the history of the series, it was decided that the third instal-
ment would be a prequel, set  years before Deus Ex. This choice
freed the narrative from the problems of interacting with multiple
endings of predecessors, but resulted in the difficult task of imagining
a setting that was both consistent with the saga of the world but fea-
turing its own “historical” personality; a plot integrated in the fictive
continuous but at the same time a turning point in the series.The
developers decided to return to the previous state of evolution of the
universe of DE, cybernetics, linked to mechanical prosthesis (augmen-
tations) which, during the first episode, were about to be supplanted
by the new (and less invasive) nanomachines.The most interesting
choice was to tie this “historical period” to a precise chronological
reference, that of a Renaissance (quasi–baroque, actually) style that
is as much an aesthetic horizon as a cultural one. It is the way the
world DE reads and interprets itself. In the early years of cybernetic
implants, the world is living a second Human Revolution that the
creators of the game have called Cyber Renaissance.
. As stated by Christian Nutt for Gamasutra, available at
http://www.gamasutra.com/view/feature//a_cyberrenaissance_in_art_.php
[last accessed //].
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. Cyber renaissance
Game developers coined the concept of Cyber Renaissance to portray
both the historical period and the game’s aesthetics. According to
the Art Director, J.J. Belletéte, the choice was the outcome of the
comprehension of the Renaissance as the moment when people begin
to study the human machine and view the body as a central gear of a
complex system.
Figure .
. By viewing both the teaser trailer and full trailer, available at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=mjhkpTWIBuA, and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
hoRwOuxOfw&list=FLvmqka_PKAiaxwvq-lTg&index= it is possible to observe
the results of this choice, and make some preliminary remarks.
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The trailer features clear quote from the Anatomy Lesson of Dr.
Nicolaes Tulp () and also the De Humanis Corporis Fabrica Li-
brorum Epitome of Andrea Vesalius (). In the teaser we see a
swift sequence of alternating pictures from the Anatomical Studies of
Da Vinci, the Icarus of Draper and, finally, the sign H + symbol of
Transhumanism.
For the architecture, clothing and design, it is clear that it was com-
plex work to adapt the cyberpunk aesthetic to a Renaissance–esque
and Baroque–like one. The designers have used gold and black shades
(showing a strong affinity with the Blade Runner movie), geometric
shapes and linear perspective, along with a more flamboyant and
“impact” spin devoted to Baroque elements, combining all of this with
contemporary influences in the dress design of video games.
This design, however, is not all–encompassing. There are many ele-
ments of continuity with cyberpunk and contemporary dress/archi-
Figure .
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tecture design. These, we can assume, were intended to reconnect
the environment to a more foreseeable future and to the cyberpunk
universe. We can thus see places, clothing and architecture that are in
opposition to the Renaissance style mentioned above. For example,
underground and metallic traits recall a present of industrial decay,
bonded to characters opposed to this cyber Renaissance rhetoric (e.g.
Purity First, Humanity front).
The world of DE:HR is considered a historical moment in which
the figure of the man, as in the Renaissance, is at the centre of the uni-
verse and has the ability to determine its own destiny (Homo Faber
Suae Fortunae). This is particularly evident in the trailers, through the
presence of an ideology of planning, non–limited agentivity (as in trai-
ler: “who we are is but a stepping stone to what we can become” “they
cannot stop us, they cannot stop the Future”). The pro–enhancement
rhetoric of David Sarif, the tycoon of Sarif Industries, is linked to the
certainty of granting a better future for all mankind, a future that
will eradicate inequalities and biological differences, letting man to be
Figure .
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truly master of his own development. Yet the very pictures, through
interaction of different temporalities, seem to contradict or overth-
row these statements by presenting at the same time the conspirator
theme.
. First considerations
.. The clash of temporalities (it).
a) From what has been observed, it can be seen as the fictitious
setting make clash and interact different temporalities: Inter-
pretation of the present in the light of the Renaissance (Cyber
Renaissance), as already mentioned;
b) Mythical quotations and reinterpretations: The trailer plays wi-
th the myth of Icarus, partly confirming it and partly overruling
it. The DE series features strong links with biblical or mytholo-
gical elements. For example, the initials of the protagonist of
the first DE are JC; his brother is Paul; the new hero is Adam;
the adjuvants and opponent AIs are Daedalus and Icarus, who
later merge together in Helios.
Figure .
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c) Priority with respect to the timeline of the saga: The cybernetic
manipulations are the premise of nanotechnology and eugenics;
HR also features many internal cross–references and quotations
(Adam is the genetic parent of JC and other characters are
involved in the entire time period).Continuous reference to
events of “our” present and the inclusion of ethical and political
issues contemporary to the publication of game (August ).
Among the main topics of public debate were the Occupy Wall
Street protests and the growing concern for stem cell research
and cell manipulation (GMOs, cloning etc).
So far, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions with
reference to the three previous points mentioned. Uspenski () sho-
wed how every society develops a general temporal ontology within
its cultural autodescriptive model, especially through the fundamen-
tal typological opposition between a linear–oriented time (typical of
historical discourse) and a cosmological time, circular and linked to
mythological discourse.
The same author recalls that linear time and cosmological time
may coincide, leading us to assume that society cannot just build
a single temporal representation, but needs to create a network of
different temporalities. Sometimes these may be super–structured
by a dominant code, sometimes they may not be integrated and may
even be in contradiction. Through the example of Lotman’s medie-
val Russian Chronicles, interpreted by Lozano (), the difference
between news and ancient history is clear:
While for contemporary consciousness history, understood as the sum of
real events, is reflected in a set of various texts, each of which has only a
certain aspect of reality, for medieval Russian chronicle was instead the text,
the written equivalent of life as a whole [. . . ] The record was isomorphic
to reality: the annual registration of the facts allowed to build a final text
without limit, which grew steadily along the time axis (ie the earth). In
contrast, modelings based on the principle of cause and effect forced to
mark the end of the text: it is the passage from the chronicle the history and
fiction. (Lozano : ; translation mine)
First, modern history would require the existence of more than
one text that was able to describe the development of time in its
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entirety. Secondly, history would replace a text with no term limit
with a principle of conclusion (the narration) based on the principles
of cause and effect.
In DE:HR, a multiplicity of temporality is not immediately connec-
ted to a single representation of history. Following Foucault () and
Didi-Huberman (), eterochronic and anachronistic reasoning it
is at work here. This presents the problem of the representation of
history through the multiplication, overthrow and clash of representa-
tions based on different syntagmatic logics: linear, circular, oscillatory,
euphoric, dysphoric, and tensive.
.. Conspiracy, history and detectives (know).
The reference to conspiracy can be seen early on in the trailer, but in
the whole game it develops on three levels:A triggering conspiracy, in
which an attack by mysterious soldiers at the lab where Adam is head
of security takes place. This results in the death of a Sarif scientist and
his transformation into a cyborg without him knowing, in order to
avoid death. The player knows the effect of this conspiracy but not the
instigators nor the goals.Conspiracy charges, affirmed by Purity First.
These terrorists believe that Sarif Industries (and the protagonist) is
plotting to control people through augmentations. The developers
have produced promotional videos for viral marketing, inspired by
contemporary conspiracy theorists. The systemic conspiracy, which
is the last plot twist. This indicates the arrival of a systemic conspi-
racy, with a multiplication of hidden plots by different factions, each
pursuing their own schemes to promote themselves (Sarif Industries,
Humanitarian Front, Illuminati) and to hinder others.
Following the dynamics of movie conspiracy theory, as described
by Martinelli, the protagonist of DE becomes a detective in search
of traces of the machinations, whose viewpoint coincides almost
completely with that of the player. The narration of the conspiracies
becomes possible only through the interaction between the process of
inquiry and the homologation of viewpoints between main character
. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=akaosURto.
. «Temi e processi narrativi nella rappresentazione del complotto», Incontri sul senso
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kqBsuRIM.
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and reader. In this sense, the narrative of conspiracy is able to unveil
its (hi)story.
Both Eco () and Lozano () observed that the circumstantial
paradigm is not limited to detective stories, but it is closely implied in
the cognitive work of historians:
These two procedures [historical analysis and detective investigation, A/N]
are very similar, because the detective tries to reconstruct the development
of an exceptional series of past events up to find their author, who does
everything to be backseat, while the scientist tries to speculate on the causes
of other events, or that have occurred exceptionally or more and regularly
occur. (Eco, : p. , translation mine)
Lozano, on the other hand, discusses the similarity of historical
work and that of the detective through the concept of the circumstan-
tial paradigm as developed by Ginzburg (). This starts from the
example of three “historians” as Giovanni Morelli, Sherlock Holmes
and Freud, who share the need to observe and reflect starting from
the most unexpected and unconventional trails, from testimonial
“wastes”, less prone to ideological or voluntary falsification.
Strangely enough, everything seems to link historical analysis to
typical features of conspiracy thinking (Barkun, ). The use of see-
mingly insignificant particulars, outside the frames of common sense,
as well as the hypothesis of mystification of “official” traces or sources,
are all features ascribed to the (il)logical conspiracy reconstructions.
If the logical framework of conspiracy seems to be close to many of
the procedures typically used by the circumstantial paradigm, this is
due to the fact that both feature at their core the trust in the existence
of “something”, whose tracks are followed and interpreted. It can be
said that something has happened, and this involves a purpose and
sense of mission in the detective.
Confidence in the event is the first element allowing us to shape
a picture from statistically infrequent, generally marginal and frag-
mentary elements. The concept of event is the beginning of these
methods of interpretations, as we have seen in the citation of Eco. The
use of the event as a basis for historical reasoning is highlighted by De
Certeau ():
What then is the event, but what we must suppose in order to make possible
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an organization of documents? It is the means by which we pass from disor-
der to order. It does not explain at all: it allows the explanation. Authorizes
to put an intelligibility. It is the tool — but often the too easy explanation —
for understanding. “Something must have happened” there, and because
of that it is possible to build a sequence, or switch from one to another
regularly. With this procedure, once presumed the “disquieting familiarity”
in the empty box called “event”, a “cause” of history” can be thought. (De
Certeau , p. translation mine)
However, Lozano () stated that the contemporary historical
discipline started to question the problematic nature of the event,
assuming opposing positions regarding its importance, its relation
to the interpretation, the possibility of a non–evenemential history,
and the central link between the events with narration. This was
mentioned previously as a central element of “modern” historical
discourse.
.. History is ordinary people (we)
Let’s go back to the relationship between historical reconstruction and
cultural identity, whose connection is hereby illustrated by Uspenski
():
So a meaning is assigned to the events: the text of the events is read by the
social community. [. . . ] It organizes the information itself, resulting in the
selection of significant facts and establishing the links between them: what
is not described in this language can be considered as if not acknowledged
at all by social receiver, it is out of its field of view. (Uspensky, , p. ,
translation mine)
In the world of DE, through the presence of a hegemonic historical
narration, there is no place for a unique narration shared and accepted
by the whole society as the only possible interpretation of events. The
sense of the mission of the protagonist / player is what allows him
(and only him) to differently explain the contemporary horizons. In
addition, the presence of more or less explicit conspiracies makes the
text of contemporary events less clear and less easy to decipher.
In this sense, the main factions and social groups read the world
differently depending on which historical rhetoric they are supporting.
They assume continuous conspiracies by the other factions, which
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destroy confidence in information received. Lotman () argues how,
in conflictual times, the semiotic degree of a cultural system increases
because conflictual (explosive) events can be read through different
interpretations / translations. This bestows opposite meanings to the
same events. As a result, the community is fragmented and social
stratification is intensified.
In addition, people’s inability to explain and interpret events means
that the act of selecting and constructing events is delegated to the
intermediary role of global broadcasters. The world–casted news of
Picus TV embodies the globalized broker of facts and interpretations.
Local revolts that take hold in Detroit, and urban and underground
chatter which can be heard during missions, acts only at a local level
and via hearsay.
As a result, social fragmentation is linked to the absence of preli-
minary trust conditions; supported by the possibility of negotiating
and selecting contemporary events. This opens the way to the logic
of the conspiracies and systemic doubt (or its opposite, the belief in
any coherent narrative).
. Developments and final
.. Story, narrative, plot
Towards the end of the game, another plot twist reveals the third level
of conspiracy. Behind the attack at Sarif lies an Illuminati plan for total
control of augmentations, obtained through a mixture of systematic
manipulation of media, the spread of anti–augmentations rhetoric,
control of the market and paramilitary action intended to eliminate
rivals. Hugh Darrow, inventor of the augmentations technology, is
now afraid of the consequences of his invention (seeing himself as a
modern Daedalus). He pretends to ally with them to devise his own
plot. This triggers a global crisis at a meeting in Antarctica, where the
central figures in the augmentations debate are in discussions. The
player, once he reaches the platform, can confront the stance of the
various factions and, once solved the crisis, can decide to broadcast a
message worldwide. He can choose what truth to reveal to the world
to explain the crisis; thus being part of a conspiracy himself.
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As in storytelling, the privileged viewpoint is granted to the player
and is bound to a logic of narrative relevance as well as to the con-
clusion of the story. The narrative, be it a movie or a text, concludes
the process of infinite interpretation, which Fenster (), recalling
Peirce’s Infinite semiosis, ascribes to conspiracy theories’ logic.
This process of closing a textual narrative program, characterized
as a continuous process of desire (search for truth), is not, however,
typical only of conspiracy theories, but also common to the historical
discipline in particular. Even assuming the uniqueness of the event,
there is never a moment in which the disciplinary discourse runs
out or is completed, just as there is not a systemic conspiracy theory
explaining the whole movement of all conspiracies in history. The
narrative form is typical of both processes, so it aims to close and only
temporarily satisfies this endless process of interpretation.
In this way, in the game’s endings the ideology underlying the
action of the player is turned into a final message (chosen from four)
through a montage of images and video footage. The voice of Adam
is in the background, explaining the reasons behind his actions and
explaining his final choice about the truth to be revealed. This will
be the “truth” according to whatever faction the player decided to
support: Darrow’s, Sarif ’s, Taggart’s, or his own.
Videos and images are thus used to frame and strengthen the rheto-
rical discourse of the protagonist. Each final video carries a unique and
all–encompassing interpretation of human history, including source
fragments in a speech as evidence for the truth / reality of the speech
itself.
Following this reasoning, we can assert that the game features ano-
ther level of conspiracy than those initially identified, which may be
labelled the conspiracy of historical discourse. Each of the characters /
factions on the one hand supports the Cyber Renaissance rhetoric, in
order to appeal to some values to be pursued in the present (whether
technology, human morality, equality etc). At the same time, however,
every faction secretly destroys this rhetoric from within; surpassing it
in a “future” point of view. During the final (optional) conversations
with the characters, each one confesses his position. Darrow rereads
. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vHvTIlXj (last accessed
//).
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the dialectic of enlightenment and proposes a return to the ethical
value of myths; Sarif argues for a darwinian view of progress as oppo-
sed to a pan-Renaissance humanism, Taggart supports the concept of
enlightened despotism against humanist egalitarianism.
Each of these positions “exceeds” chronologically the myth of Cy-
ber Renaissance and destroys the metaphorical reasoning on which the
reality of DE lied. Cyber Renaissance is a self–description of DE:HR
history, which is both symbolically appropriate and socially necessa-
ry, but basically ideological, in the full sense of false consciousness.
Reinterpreted through these conversations, the rhetoric of the game
endings seems less shiny, more pragmatic and located. At the same
time, it is a dehistoricized perspective, in which history becomes a
supporting argument to appeal to moral, ethical and pragmatic values
that are hypostatized into an abstract age, in an end of history time.
.. The conspiracy of historical discourse
The game endings allow two final reflections on the relationship
between historical representation and conspiracy theories. First of all,
the process of closing of history is linked to that described by Walter
Benjamin (), comparable to the phases of translating explosions in
Lotman’s theory the rereading of past history according to the needs
of the present:
The semiotically highlighted events lead then to picture history, to align
the earlier events in a time series. Thus is the historical experience shaped,
which is not identified with the real knowledge deposited (accumulated)
gradually over time [. . . ] but it is in the relationships of cause and effect
identified in terms of synchronicity (existing at a given moment) [. . . ] Later
other incidents may occur, to suggest a new interpretation of historical
experience or its reinterpretation. (Uspensky, , p., translation mine)
Hence the second point, related to the adequacy of the symbolic
discourse of conspiracy theories, reported by Fenster () in his
reading of Jameson. The relationship between the individual and
history in the narrative of conspiracy theories is an attempt to shape
a unique and all–encompassing scenery for relations of power of the
twentieth century. An example of both is offered by Aaronovitch
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(), describing the reactions to Spike Lee documentary, When the
Levees Broke, about the devastation left by Hurricane Katrina:
That so many black residents believe that the levees were purposely blown
up is a result of their historical experience and their continuing sense that
their safety and well–being will be sacrificed. In other words, the possible
untruth of the allegations was making less important than the bigger truths
revealed by them. (Aaronovitch, , p.)
The plot of historical discourse is thus the paradox by which history
can never tell its meaning. Rather, it can only be read and interpreted
in textual form to legitimize, contradict or convey messages that are
being built by societies through a logic of symbolic adequacy. This is
useful to create their own identity and not to investigate an unknown
otherness, as pursued by historical discipline.
. History as We Know It: Conclusions
.. Society, history, conspiracy (we)
In the game endings, the source material is thus used as the support
for a speech neutralizing history itself, using it and dissolving it into
achronic ethics. The construction of a symbolic adequacy on the hi-
storical horizon is more important than preservation of the otherness
of history. In the case of DE:HR, this is due to an end of the world
speech. We could say that the end of history corresponds to history’s
ends. To express meaning, it has to conclude or close its narration
and act as a tool for the birth of a non–historical discourse originating
from society.
From the point of view of conspiracy theories, the end of history
is often a central element of the conspiracy rhetoric. Barkun ()
considers conspiracy theory as a form of improvisational milleniarism.
Fenster () argues that it is a popular eschatology. These systems
of belief read the history, imagining its end, to constitute a fictional
community, present or future, establishing at the same time a sense of
mission originating from the sharing of beliefs and correct behaviour.
They reflect the cultural picture that the community creates to assume
 Vincenzo Idone Cassone
a legible and clear orientation of the historical process. That is, a path
that leads to the end of history as we know it.
Indeed, Barkun () cites as secularized forms of millenarianism
some ideologies of history as positivism, Marxism or Nazism. Secular
visions of a perfect future, fuelled by the belief in a transcendent force
different from religious, each promising the future to some especially
worthy group.
From the point of view of the construction of community identity,
a certain kind of historical narrative and recent systemic conspiracy
theories share this tendency to expunge history from history itself,
as a means of strengthening or creating communities. According to
Knight (), this would explain why the US is the country where,
for the last forty years, the conspiracy theories have caught on more;
due to the typical sense of mission embodied by the american dream.
Based on the premise that the lack of a shared historical representa-
tion would sharpen the fragmentary perception of social identity, we
are now observing how conspiracies and narratives are brought toge-
ther by the chance to strengthen a sense of community by getting rid
of the complexity of historical narration, by postulating its conclusion
and partially contradicting the logic of the historical discipline.
.. The logic of the discourses (know)
The picture becomes more complex by looking once again at cogniti-
ve processes. Conspiracy theories, according Fenster (), use this
popular eschatology to:
Provide an accessible and comprehensible, all–encompassing narrative fra-
me or metanarrative that can explain the past, the present, and the future for
a mass audience [. . . ] Popular eschatology thus serves as a form of historio-
graphy, articulating and circulating a method of historical interpretation, a
general theory of historical agency, and an underlying conceptual structure
that makes human history intelligible. This historiography is distinct, yet
however, from the theory and method of research practised by professional
historians; rather, much of contemporary eschatology serves as a form of
popular historiography that seeks to Shops provide an overarching theory
of history in an accessible format in order to call readers to action in the
practice of interpreting history. (Fenster,  p.–)
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On the contrary, history as a discipline in the twentieth century
has turned towards a problematic view of historicity. It is more and
more considered as a specific and limited discipline; based on the
relationship between scientific discourse and narrative competence,
centred on the problems of the event, abandoning positivistic theo-
ries in favour of statistical, economical, symbolical and sociological
explanations.
From this point of view, conspiracy thinking is unable to distin-
guish (hi)stories told in texts from the historicity of texts. It end up
considering the event as a given, naturalizing it; superimposing value
systems and criteria of selection of past societies with that of current
ones. In this way, marking the departure from historical discourse as
a discipline, and instead coming closer the historical narration as an
un–mediated reading and memory of cultures.
.. History as such? (it). Conclusions
What remains of the ontology of history in this link between conspira-
cy theories, community self–description, the multiplicity of historical
representations and disciplinary discourse? There seems to be some
link between the ontology of postmodern history (what has been cal-
led end of history, or the end of the great narratives), the emergence
of conspiracy theories, and millenarianism and fideistic processes.
The concept of postmodernism has among its main points the end
of grand narratives (Lyotard, ). This is often linked to the end
of history as advocated by Francis Fukuyama (), which seemed
to support the idea of an historic moment in which societies are
no longer able to reconstruct unique narratives, and cannot lay the
foundations for a representation the historical process.
Maybe the emergence of conspiracy theories lets us tackle the issue
from another point of view. If the end of history corresponds to histo-
ry’s ends (that is, there comes a time when the purpose of history is to
conclude to meet the community symbolic adequacy), we can say that
the end of history does not match the end of (hi)stories, or hegemonic
narratives. Which does, however, suffer a double transformation:
— History as a discipline is dominated by history as a communita-
rian narrative. Its procedures are increasingly being parasitized
 Vincenzo Idone Cassone
by the logic of the narrative and the movie narration in a short
circuit that, I add, is needed for the closure of history itself.
— The historical community narrative flattens itself on the pat-
terns of astoricity or contemporary thinking. It seems plausible
that models belonging to mythical discourse, as described by
Uspenski () on the one hand, and contemporary systems of
values on the other, are progressively determining the meaning
of history.
This success of specific traits of myths and narrations, together
with the search for a unique frame meeting symbolic adequacy, are
the key elements of the success of conspiracy theories as a form of
dehistoricized story–telling, and at the same time as its suppression
and overtaking.
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Tricks, Conspiracies, and Corruption in the American TV Series Set
at the White House: Homeland and Scandal
F T*
Sospettare, sospettare sempre, solo così trovi
la verità.
Non è cosi che ci dice di fare la scienza?
U E, Numero Zero
 : Tutta colpa del Presidente. Intrighi, complotti, corruzioni
nelle serie TV americane ambientate alla Casa Bianca: Homeland e
Scandal
: The essay analyzes through semiotics some TV series about
USA politics (i.e. Scandal and Homeland), trying to describe the cultural
models emerging from these texts and the collective imaginary they
create/refer to. The essay also seeks to detect the rhetorical devices used
to describe conspiracies.
: Conspiracy; Secrecy; Cultural Models; Narratives; TV Series.
. Talking about “conspiracy”
In the next few pages I would like to discuss the rhetorical use of
a complex concept such as “conspiracy” in the construction of the
plot of some American TV series, in order to understand the inner
narrative principles of the concept itself.
∗ Federica Turco, Università degli Studi di Torino.
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Therefore, I’ll start with a short excursus on the definition of the
term “conspiracy” and on the meaning of this concept according to
literature; then I’ll highlight the main features of two series, Home-
land and Scandal, both set at the White House; finally, I’ll try to lay
down some recurring elements emerging from them.
Dictionaries show many different definitions of the term “conspi-
racy”, most of which describe the phenomenon as a secret agreement
between two or more persons with the purpose of modifying, subver-
ting, radically changing a regime, a State, a political profile, sometimes
employing violent and coercive means. Some definitions also refer
to the possibility to commit a crime or accomplish legal purposes
through illegal actions.
In these definitions we can notice a first series of elements for a
semiotic overview on the concept of conspiracy: the presence of a
group of people; the secrecy; the changing of the system as the main
purpose of the action; the connection with the political environment;
the issue of legality/illegality; the imprecise plot and so on.
We can find the same ingredients in the scientific literature concer-
ning conspiracy, too.
In his book A culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contempo-
rary America, Micheal Barkun claims that
despite the frequency with which conspiracy beliefs have been discussed
at the end of the second millennium, the term conspiracy itself has often
been left undefined, as thought its meanings were self–evident. This has
mostly originated the negative feature of the word. [. . . ] The essence of
conspiracy beliefs lies in the attempts to delineate and explain evil and, the
author specifies, a conspiracy belief is the belief that an organization made up
of individuals or groups was or is acting covertly to achieve some malevolent
end. But this have positive effects too: a conspiracist worldview implies a
universe governed by design rather than by randomness. (Barkun, , p. )
Then, Barkun continues with a list of three basic principles of any
conspiracy:
— nothing happens by accident: as we said, conspiracy implies a
world based on intentionality, in which accident and coinciden-
. See, for example, the Oxford Dictionary, the Macmillan Dictionary and, in Italian,
the Devoto-Oli.
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ce have been removed. Anything that happens occurs because
it has been willed. A fantasy world, far more coherent then the
real one can be generated, in the most extreme scenario;
— nothing is as it seems: conspirators want to deceive, in order to
disguise their identities or their activities;
— everything is connected: since conspirators’ world has no room
of accident, patterns are believed to be found everywhere.
Somehow, this conspiratory vision is both frightening and reas-
suring: it is frightening because it magnifies the power of evil, but,
at the same time, it is reassuring because it promises a world that is
meaningful, rather than arbitrary.
Obviously, in Barkun’s theory, conspiracy and secrecy seem indis-
solubly linked: conspiracy involves two different forms of secrecy: one
concerns the group itself (a group may be secret or known), the other
concerns their activities (secret or known). The combination of these
positions originates  different possibilities:
— secret groups acting secretly, such as the Illuminati organization
or the famous anti–semitic forgery named the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion;
— the second type lies outside conspiracy theories proper, for it
concerns groups that, while concealing their existence, none-
theless act openly, such as the philanthropic ones.
— then we have known groups with secret activities. These orga-
nizations usually exist at two different levels: the one is relatively
open, while the other is hidden to the larger public. The fir-
st level usually masks the second (e.g., the Masons, and all
Intelligence Agencies, such as the CIA or KGB);
— the last type combines known groups with known activities:
e.g., free associations, parties, groups of interest, and so on.
We have to add that, according to Barkun himself, the belief in
conspiracy theories is an act of faith, and does not correspond to a
concrete evaluation of proofs or evidences. And this is the reason why
conspirators can go beyond the paradox to be among the few ones
who can see a reality that nobody else can perceive.
 Federica Turco
Figure . Secrecy versus Openness (Barkum, , p. ).
A certain number of Authors theorises a strong and systemic con-
nection between conspiracy theories and paranoia, meant not just
as a clinic personality disorder, but as a kind of social and political
attitude widely prevailing nowadays. In a book published in , for
example, the American historian Richard Hofstadter claims that this
link is originated by the common way to construct their inner narra-
tive system, their plot. As a matter of fact, just like a conspirator, the
political paranoid believes that each hostile circumstance is directed
not against himself or herself personally, but against a whole nation,
culture, way of life, and that the consequences of such circumstance
would affect not him/herself only, but millions of people (Hofstadter,
). Exaggeration and distortion become, thus, the norm and this
apocalyptic vision of life spreads everywhere.
In this context, it is important to come back to the notion of “ene-
my”, as developed by Umberto Eco in his dedicated, illuminating essay
(Eco, ). According to the semiotician, the presence of an enemy
in an individual’s life is necessary to define his/her own personality,
and to assess the value system in which he/she moves (in the very
moment in which I have to face my enemy, I can show and confirm
my own values). This is the reason why people create enemies even
. The use of this term is taken from the famous Eco’s vision of mass cultural system:
the apocalyptic intellectual rejects mass culture as “anti–culture” and, generally, refuses
to see any positive benefit from such innovations as cinema, television, fiction, and so on.
In the same way, the paranoid, thanks to his/her intellectual capacity to imagine a reality
others do not see, considers the “normal mass vision” (that is confident in people) as a
distorted one, with no positive effects.
. On this topic, see also Melley () and Carter ().
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though they do not have a real one and these made–up enemies are
always pinpointed within groups of people we do consider di fferent
from us: enemies are the ones who are “other than us” and who
behave differently from us.
With this imperfect and short excursus on “conspiracy” in our
mind, we can now move on to the analysis of the TV series that I have
scrutinized for this paper. The first one is Scandal.
. Scandal: an enemy within
Scandal is an American political thriller television series starring Kerry
Washington. Created by the screenwriter and director Shonda Rhimes,
it debuted on the American broadcaster ABC on April th, . The
show takes place in Washington D.C. and focuses on Olivia Pope’s cri-
sis management firm, Olivia Pope & Associates, and on White House
staff affairs.
The main character, Olivia Pope, has been a very trustworthy
collaborator of the USA President and the purpose of her present
firm is to help in hiding any type of action, problem, or scandal of the
American upper–class and protecting the public image of the nation’s
elite. As we can read in the official page of the series, on the ABC
website,
Olivia Pope is a fixer. The best in D.C. A title earned first by getting an
underdog candidate elected President. What makes Olivia Pope the best is
that she doesn’t fix problems. She fixes clients. She fixes people. They come
to her at their lowest moment. On the worst day of their lives. Covered
in blood, on the verge of conviction. . . when rock bottom is in sight and
there’s nowhere left to turn they come to Olivia Pope for salvation.
Sometimes, this “fixing role” just implies the necessity to tell credi-
ble stories in order to conceal unmentionable secrets, but some other
. It is known that the topic of “otherness” is fundamental in different branches
of knowledge. We can remember here the work of Paul Ricoeur (, ) and, in a
semiotic perspective, the positions and the theories developed by Juri Lotman and, in
general, the semiotics of culture (Lotman and Uspenskij, ). The fear of the “Other” is
the base of quite large phenomena as racisms, sex and gender discriminations, nationalisms,
anti–semitism, and so on.
. http://abc.go.com/shows/scandal/cast/olivia-pope (last access: ..).
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times it involves the necessity to hide corpse or kill enemies. All of
this is fair in politics, when the ultimate end in the preservation of a
whole system, the USA Government, that is considered as a higher
and unalienable entity.
Around Olivia we find the staff of Pope & Associates: some of them
are lawyers, who are also called “the gladiators”, who seem to have
some dark experience in their past to be hidden, too.
All the first season of the series develops around the personal story
of these characters. Episode after episode, case after case, we discover
the reason of Olivia’s departure from the White House (a sexual and
sentimental, never ending affair between her and the President) and
we discover details about her collaborators, as well.
Even if we have to overlook, by necessity, most of the details, there
are few things we can already say about this series.
First, the whole first season of Scandal develops around a precise
thematic area: secrecy. Episode after episode our concern about what
we are seeing increase and our doubts about the reliability of the
given information grow. We may name it “the unseen and the untold”
issue: throughout all the episodes, we have the constant feeling that
there is something missing or that we cannot see. We are made
conscious that there is a kind of Big Brother, an omniscient deus
ex machina, manipulating the puppet strings, and this concealing is
somehow represented as a theme of the plot itself, and, consequently,
as a value.
A second key point of these episodes is the presence of a “team”: a
group of people that works together, with a common objective (the
maintenance of the structured power system) that is clear for all the
members of the group. As we said, in our story this team is named
“the gladiators”:
Harrison: I’m not a baby lawyer. I’m a gladiator in a suit. Because that’s
what you are when you work for Olivia. You’re a gladiator in a suit. Do
you want to be a gladiator in a suit? You gotta say it. Queen: I want to be a
gladiator in a suit (Season , Ep. ).
Are we Gladiators, or Are we bitches? (Season , Ep. ).
You’re a gladiator. Gladiators don’t run. They fight. They slay dragons.
The wipe off the blood. They stitch up their wounds, and they live to fight
another day. You don’t get to run (Season , Ep. ).
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I didn’t even get a chance to be her gladiator because no one bothered to
let me know that she was missing, that she was in trouble, that she needed
me. All the times. All the times that she saves me. All the times. I would
save her, David. I would go over a cliff for her (Season , Ep. ).
Well, you know, once a gladiator, always a gladiator, right? (Season , Ep. ).
The fact that Olivia’s team is named “the gladiators” (Olivia calls
them so, but also each member of the group identifies him/herself
with this term, proving his/her own complete acceptance of the role)
reminds, obviously, a semantic sphere concerning the fight, the strain,
the struggle, but also the inevitability: you cannot choose to be a
gladiator or not and, furthermore, if you are a gladiator, you cannot
choose when to fight. It is someone in charge who decide about your
life. In other words, The Sender is external to the Subject: it is the
social–political–civil system, the society itself that needs gladiators
(or their actions and their way to arrange things) for its own survival.
This seems to be the chief message of the series.
The third feature is the strict connection with the political envi-
ronment. Olivia doesn’t help ordinary people, she has links just with
people from the American establishment.
For example, in the first season, we meet: a Russian Ambassador; a
famous metresse whose clients come from the political environment;
a White House apprentice accused to be the President’s lover; a South
American dictator, and so on.
Finally, the single stories of all these people suggest another im-
portant issue of the series, that is the boundary of legality. Olivia acts
beyond and above law, she helps innocents and criminals, the gladia-
tors act out of the social rules because they have “higher purposes”:
purposes that ordinary people cannot understand or cannot even see
nor conceive. It is the classical staging of the «end that justifies the
means». And this end is never personal, or subjective; it is collective,
it is social. It is the necessity to reorganize (or to maintain) the social
system itself.
As we can see, these features correspond to the elements I have
listed as the key concepts for a semiotic overview of conspiracy: the
group, the secrecy, the radical change, the political environment, the
illegality, the imprecise plot. It is not difficult to recognize all these
elements in the description of Scandal I’ve tried to give.
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What is missing in the series is the conspiracy itself, or, better, the
evidence of the presence of a conspiracy. But soon Scandal reveals
this aspect too. During the second season, we are finally informed
about all those untold and unseen that we perceived during the first
one. There are two conspiracies under and above the actions of each
character of the story:
— the first one concerns the irregular election of the President of
the United States (election that Olivia contributed to rig when
she was the press agent of Fitzerald Grant);
— the second one concerns the existence of a secret intelligence
agency named B, that, apparently, is under the command of
the US President, but that, in fact, acts with an illegal, unlimited
liberty.
These two narrative lines push the series on during all the subse-
quent seasons and, in my opinion, they set up the entire elementary
structure of meaning of the series. Let’s go deeper through them, a
little bit more.
The first point is connected with the issue of power: how can a
single man lead a state or the entire world? How can he legitimate this
power, that is, at the same time, a political one (the authority or juri-
sdiction to act for personal or collective purposes) and a philosophical
one (the ability to influence attitudes and behaviours of humans)?
Max Weber () distinguishes three ideal types of political leader-
ship (referred to three types of domination, legitimisation or authori-
ty):
— the charismatic domination (familiar and religious); i.e., the
power of God;
— the traditional domination (patriarchal, patrimonial, feudal); i.e.,
the power of Napoleon;
— the legal domination (modern law and state, bureaucracy); i.e.,
the power of Constitution.
In his view, every historical relation between the rulers and the
ruled contained such elements and they can be analysed on the basis
of this tripartite distinction.
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So, the question is: what group should a President who has been
elected with a trick belong to?
Concerning the second point, the events connected with B not
only are linked to the issue of the legality of political power, but they
are linked to the one of identity: who is who?
In his lessons on the philosophy of communication (), Ugo
Volli talks about the concept of identity and asserts that it refers both
to the way an individual considers and establishes him/herself as a
part of social groups and to the set of rules, habits, and traditions
he/she uses to relate to along with others. In this sense, identity is
something that has a kind of memory: it remains across time, it has a
past, a present, and a future.
In Scandal, we have a certain number of characters who seem to be
something but that are, in reality, something else: Olivia’s father is not
an ordinary curator of antiquities at the Smithsonian (this is the way
he introduces himself ), but the person in charge of B; Jake Ballard is
not an anonymous marine, but a spy for both President Grant and for
B; Huck is not just one of the faithful and loyal gladiators but he has
been a torturer for B; and so on, in a never ending list of confusion
and exchange that lie at the basis of the narrative construction of the
conspiracy in the fiction.
We can conclude this short analysis by saying that Scandal sets up
its value structure around the juxtaposition between two main values:
being and seeming. If you take a look at the left part of semiotic veri-
dictory square, you can find the secrecy: it is here, on the tension line
between being and not–seeming that the narrative inner mechanism
of this series is constructed: nothing is as it seems, nothing happens
by accident, everything is connected (Barkun, ).
. Homeland: an enemy outside
The second series I would like to discuss in this short text is Home-
land, that is usually defined as a political thriller and that has been
broadcasted in America since .
The subject of this fiction is not original, but it is inspired by the
Israeli series Hatufim (Prisoners of war, in the English version).
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Figure . The semiotic veridictory square
The series stars Claire Danes as Carrie Mathison, a Central Intel-
ligence Agency officer with bipolar disorder, and Damian Lewis as
Nicholas Brody, a United States Marine Corps Scout Sniper. Mathison
had come to believe that Brody, who was held captive by al-Qaeda, as
a prisoner of war, has been brainwashed by the enemy and posed as a
threat for the United States.
This is the main nucleus of the story: Carrie is alone. She is the
only one to see this truth that others cannot even imagine. And she
can see it because of her insanity. The film establishes a clear link
between the ability to imagine absurd and inconceivable worlds and
madness. The hero is alone against who is plotting to the detriment of
the American political and military establishment; the hero cannot be
comprised by normal people, since normal people have not got the
capacity to imagine, to foresee the consequences of their own actions,
to pretend, to disguise their selves, to catch opportunities etc. They
have no metis, as Ugo Volli would suggest ().
This fiction tackles the connection between conspiracy theories
and paranoia that we have been discussing above (Hofstadter, )
and, in my opinion, the core meaning of the narration lies right in this
connection (the presence of a declared, even if secret, mental disease
of the main character of the plot), as it explains, justifies, and describes
the conspiracy and its role in society.
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This case is opposed diametrically to the previous one: there, in
Scandal, we have seen how conspiracy may emerge from the insi-
de of the establishment and the American political system; here, in
Homeland, the conspiracy is, if anything, external. This latter type is
the enemy described by Eco: someone who is di fferent from us and
who threats the system from another place (in particular, in this case,
the violent and unknown enemy is al-Qaeda or Islamic terrorism in
general).
In , Jesse Walker published an interesting book entitled The
United States of Paranoia. A Conspiracy Theory. Walker talks about
five primary myths that underlie America’s conspiracy folklore. He
clarifies that the use of the word “myths” has not to be connected to a
fictional characterization of the stories, but to their repetitiveness, and
recurrence. Somehow, this is Lévi-Strauss’ (, ) idea of myth,
according to which the working principle of myths in not in their
content, but in the relations they set up.
Therefore, these five myths are:
— The Enemy Outside, who plots outside the community’s gates;
— The Enemy Within, comprising villainous neighbours who
can’t easily be distinguished from friends;
— The Enemy Above, hiding at the top of the social pyramid;
— The Enemy Below, lurking at the bottom;
— The Benevolent Conspiracy, which isn’t an enemy at all: a secret
force working behind the scenes to improve people’s lives.
According to this typology, in Scandal we have the enemy above
and within, in Homeland we have the enemy outside.
One may say that Nicolas Brody is not an outsider; he is an Ameri-
can marine, with and American family and American friends.
Actually, the truth is that Brody was a marine. But the imprison-
ment he underwent changed him deeply, and the fiction repeatedly
insists on this point: he converted to Islam and totally believes to be
different from Americans (many scenes of the series try to give a
point at this, via figurative and isotopic strategies). He has an intimate
and familiar relationship with the al-Qaeda commander and he is
convinced that his role in American history is to revenge the death of
al-Quaeda commander’s son (killed by an American drone).
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It is hard to write about these kind of themes in these days without
using a rhetorical approach to terrorism, religion, and the supposed
diversity between humans, but it is necessary to analyze in depth the
narrative construction of the series to understand the inner values it
tries to set–up and spread.
According to myself, the key word that we may use to describe this
text is: “revenge”.
As I’ve already underlined in previous works (Turco, , ),
revenge is an interesting category, because it is a kind of behaviour that
goes beyond temporal limits. It originates from something in the past,
goes on in the present, and prepares itself for the future realization. In
our fiction, the revenge acts as a kind of balance for passions; during
the organization of his revenge plan, Brody can find serenity and the
belief he is about to realise his own narrative program: the Subject,
deprived of his own Object, plans his conjunction with a new Object
that is a substitute of the previous one. And this new Object is revenge
itself.
In Homeland, revenge is the value used to establish the tension
between “me” and the “other” (cf. Fig. ), and to explain the central
matter of the plot, which is “otherness” itself (another key point of
conspiracy’s essence). This “otherness” is constructed, most of all,
by means of the religious system of beliefs: on the one hand (which,
in fiction’s logic, would be the right one, namely the laic, fair, and
equal), we have the Americans and the US system; on the other one,
we have terrorists, who act in the name of a God with corrupted and
conspiratory purposes.
Somehow, in this fiction, revenge is a category that becomes an
ideology, which we may describe, in semiotic terms, as the syntagma-
tic arrangement of values and their actualization in a quest. Subjects
desire values, which become the object of the quest. Their selections
and setting up as goals define an ideology. Once the quest is accom-
plished, we no longer talk about ideology: the notion of ideology
contains a permanent quest that is reflected in the actantial structure
of its own narration.
. Paris has been attacked by ISIS terrorists few days ago (on th November, )
and, while I’m writing, in Bruxelles, a massive police action has been launched in order to
identify the bombers after several days of lockdown at the highest level of alert in France,
Belgium, and all Europe.
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Figure . The semiotic square of “Otherness”
The tension between “me” and the “other” in our fiction is built on
the assumption that religion is an ideology: the stories and the actions
people do “in the name of Faith” are a continuous representation of
moral values as goals to be achieved. Even revenge and violence, as a
means to achieve the revenge, become Objects to be desired by the
Subjects of narrations.
As Massimo Leone underlines (), the expression “religious vio-
lence” can assume different meanings, depending on the contents of
the terms that compose the syntagm, and depending on the relation-
ships between these contents. We can define as “religious” that kind
of violence the Subjects performe “in the name of ” a transcendent
system of beliefs; but the religious dimension of a violent action is also
inextricably interconnected with other cultural and social dimensions,
like politics, language, social and economic class etc.
According to Leone, a religious tradition allows violent actions
when it is used as a depository of elements meant to build and
differentiate individual or group identity from the external social
reality.
In Homeland, Brody is right the depository of this diversity, because
he has been an American (and he has shared American values and
behaviours) and now he is an Islamic terrorist (and he shares with al-
Qaeda new values and behaviours). The friction point lies in the fact
that while terrorism is described as a religious organization, the US
are, instead, shown as liberal, laic, and superpartes. The only possible
point of contact between these two perspectives is Carrie Mathison,
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who is assumed to be liberal, laic and honest, as Americans, but who
shares madness with the terrorists and this become the strategic key
for her interpretation and prevision of their violent actions.
. Some conclusions
The analysis I presented here may suggest some ideas about the
rhetorical construction of the representation of conspiracy in TV
series. I think there are at least  useful issues to address:
— The use of the rhetorical device of mise en abîme. These sto-
ries are always constructed like Chinese boxes, whose joining
and overlapping and mixing contribute to the creation of the
meaning of narrative programs. A program is just the part of
another program that is part of another program that is part
of another, and so on. Again, everything is connected (Barkun,
).
At a meta–textual level, this organization stages a kind of criti-
que to the television language itself and of its capacity to reach
reality foundations, because TV language refers to another lan-
guage, that refers to another language, that refers to another,
and so on.
— We want to believe. Conspiracy is a word we are willing to
believe to. It is a problem of textual cooperation (and of per-
tinence, somehow). Differently from other fiction, where we
can perceive as fantasy facts that are presented as true, here we
do the more radical experience to perceive as plausible facts
that are described as invention of the imagination. And this is
possible because conspiracy theories are much more stronger
that we can think. They’re not a minority belief, but they are
innate in our common interpretation of society.
— As a consequence, I think it is correct to interpret these fictions
as a part of a wider contemporary cultural model. We assume
that cultural models are recurrent discourse configurations
that are capable to give coherence to entire sign encyclopaedias.
Upon cultural models we do create our own vision of the world
«It’s all the President’s Fault» 
and society. And this is the reason why cultural models expand
and broaden and become part of collective imaginary, indeed.
— I think that the narrative coherence of these fictions is given
by the use of hyperbole. They give us so many details that we
cannot verify them one by one (I mean, we cannot separate
them from the context, in order to evaluate their reliability or
truthfulness) and, in the end, we believe to the whole as if it
were really connected.
Finally, we can say that in these stories the hermeneutics of suspect
seems to be the only way to comprehend what is happening. In a
world that is described as divided into two permanent and unmoving
parts, the good and the bad ones, everyone tries to demonstrate to be
good, forgetting that in our society everyone is bad, more or less.
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Il contagio cospirativo sui social media
Ebola e la narrazione delle teorie del complotto
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: The Conspiratorial Contagion in the Social Media: Ebola and the
Narration of the Conspiracy Theories
: The essay focuses on the development of conspiracy narratives,
with special attention to the evolution of mythologies in social networks.
Stories of plots concerning health issues, and specifically of narratives
about the Ebola virus, have carved out a significant space in the scenario
of digital media. In , in the regions of north–western Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and Nigeria, thousands succumbed to the virus; according to
the “Centers for Disease Control and Prevention”, it caused the most
serious outbreak of hemorrhagic fever in history. As in the case of
previous epidemics (AIDS, SARS, and so on), the massive spread of
Ebola too was accounted for by numerous conspiracy theories. The
essay analyzes processes and narratives that lie behind them, focusing
on Facebook pages and Twitter accounts that boosted the diffusion of
such mythologies.
: Conspiracy Theories; Ebola Virus; Sanitary Plots; Social Net-
works Conspiracies; Viral Narrations.
. Uno sguardo sulla teoria del complotto
La nascita delle teorie cospirative è strettamente legata a rilevanti av-
venimenti storici (de Haven-Smith, ) che condizionano e spesso
modificano politica, rapporti economici e sociali propri delle nazioni
dove hanno avuto luogo. Il termine stesso, Teorie Cospirative o in
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inglese, Conspiracy Theories, secondo De Haven-Smith (), è stato
utilizzato per la prima volta proprio in relazione a uno dei più gravi av-
venimenti nella storia degli USA, ovvero l’assassinio del presidente J.F.
Kennedy nel . Il termine racchiudeva in sé tutte quei “rumors” e
le versioni alternative in opposizione alla conclusione stilata dalla Com-
missione Warren, incaricata delle indagini sull’omicidio. Com’è noto
Lee Henry Oswald fu individuato come unico responsabile. Il termine
tuttavia ha assunto nel tempo una connotazione negativa (Quaglia,
): il riferimento a queste teorie, infatti, ai giorni nostri parole
come “complottismo” e “cospirazionista” sono strettamente connesse
a quelle spiegazioni alternative e allo scetticismo nei confronti di una
versione ufficiale su un determinato fatto, teorie prive di fondamento
e non del tutto verificabili con strumenti oggettivi. Nello studio delle
caratteristiche che accomunano la narrazione delle teorie cospirative,
è possibile individuare un filo conduttore che secondo il sociologo
Michael Barkun risiede nella «convinzione che un’organizzazione fat-
ta di individui o gruppi agisca di nascosto per raggiungere un fine
malevolo» (Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary
America, , p.). Agire segretamente, specie in gruppo, per nuocere
o raggiungere un fine a scapito di qualcun altro è quindi il fulcro della
pratica cospirativa. Prendendo come punto di riferimento le defini-
zioni precedenti e il testo di Barkun, possiamo quindi tracciare un
profilo delle caratteristiche che accomuna la dinamica di evoluzione
delle teorie del complotto.
— La versione ufficiale non è mai trasparente. Niente è come sem-
bra. Le informazioni fornite dai media tradizionali e dalle fonti
istituzionali non ci dicono tutta la verità (sospetto nell’autorità)
— Un gruppo potente, influente, come un’organizzazione statale
o parastatale, trama all’insaputa di un gruppo tendenzialmente
più debole, depistando e distruggendo qualunque indizio o fatto
che possa ricondurre all’azione cospirativa e ai suoi responsabili
(occultamento e segretezza)
— Le narrazioni o versioni alternative che ne derivano, spesso
contorte e molto articolate, contrastano la verità ufficiale, dando
vita a vere e proprie mitologie in opposizione alle masse che
credono invece nella verità ufficiale.
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Le pratiche narrative, quindi, sono alla base delle mitologie co-
spirative. Basti pensare alle numerose produzioni cinematografiche,
televisive, letterarie (Arnold, ), nate proprio dalla suggestione
di argomenti caldi, misteri storici irrisolti, scenari futuri apocalitti-
ci. Uno dei temi che maggiormente caratterizza le narrazioni sulla
cospirazione è certamente la paura. Runcini (), ne La paura e l’im-
maginario sociale nella letteratura, afferma infatti che la paura è uno tra
i meccanismi più incisivi sui quali verte la produzione letteraria. Se
considerassimo la narrazione complottista un genere letterario, questa
affermazione le sarebbe congeniale. La paura come chiave, isotopia
dei più importanti meccanismi cospirativi.
Il mondo contemporaneo è costellato di avvenimenti drammatici,
e mai come in questi ultimi anni lo spettro del terrorismo (special-
mente dall’ settembre in poi) condiziona in modo considerevole il
palinsesto dei telegiornali, le pagine social, la letteratura e il cinema
(Rondini ), acuendo la sensazione di paura e di insicurezza causata
dagli attacchi terroristici, si pensi all’eccidio nella redazione di Charlie
Hebdo e alla strage di Parigi del  novembre . Intorno ad alcuni di
questi drammatici avvenimenti, si sono evolute nuove teorie cospirati-
ve e con esse si sono le isotopie correlate alla paura, come ad esempio,
l’insicurezza, il contagio (terrorismo con armi batteriologiche). Oc-
cultamento, segretezza, sospetto, paura, dubbio, paranoia (Hofstadter,
) sono alcune delle isotopie che ricorrono nella narrazione di una
teoria cospirativa. Ma come può una narrazione di questo tipo essere
realmente efficace e suscitare interesse, instillare il dubbio dell’utente
nei confronti “nella versione ufficiale”?
Paura e dubbio da soli non bastano. È opportuno mettere in atto
una vera e propria strategia comunicativa che attiri e interessi real-
mente. La manipolazione e la persuasione sono due delle componenti
fondamentali di questo processo narrativo (Sibona ) che si snoda
attraverso l’instaurarsi di un rapporto di fiducia tra il lettore–utente e
il teorico che “spiega” il complotto. L’occultamento di alcune informa-
zioni all’interno di un testo al fine di suscitare interesse, ma al tempo
stesso la promessa di rivelare dettagli che gli organi di comunicazione
convenzionali “non sveleranno mai” (basti consultare il titolo della
pagina Facebook di nocensura.com “Cose che nessuno ti dirà“) si
. https://www.facebook.com/nocensura/?fref=ts
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rivela come strategia vincente: la voluta impersonalità e ricercata og-
gettività dell’enunciatore nell’affrontare gli interrogativi proposti a un
attante, cioè al ricevente (Sibona, ) riguardo argomenti di ordine
scientifico o presunto tale, come ad esempio le teorie cospirative sorte
attorno al caso Ebola, le quali verranno illustrate in seguito.
Questo meccanismo potrebbe inscriversi in quello che Greimas
() definisce “fare persuasivo” ovvero “la convocazione da parte
dell’enunciante di ogni sorta di modalità miranti a far accettare, da
parte dell’enuciatario, il contratto enunciativo proposto” rendendo
quindi incisiva ed efficace la comunicazione. Nel caso delle teorie co-
spirative, un’ulteriore spinta verso la stipulazione di un patto di fiducia
tra lettore e teorico esperto delle cospirazioni, arriva attraverso quello
che il linguista e filologo Chadwick individua come “desiderio di far
parte di una cerchia ristretta alla quale ogni segreto è svelato”. Essere
quindi i protagonisti e i depositari dei segreti che si celano dietro una
verità precostituita e assimilata dalla massa in contrapposizione a chi
aderisce alla versione alternativa, scomoda per i gruppi che detengono
il potere e tessono le trame degli avvenimenti che condizionano la
nostra società.
. Ebola e la diffusione dei social–complotti
Secondo il Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, la mortalità a
causa delle febbri emorragiche ha raggiunto tra agosto e novembre
 numeri tragicamente elevati rispetto alle precedenti epidemie,
superando i confini geografici del continente africano e arrivando
anche in Europa e America. In una reazione a catena innescata dalla
condivisione sistematica delle notizie su Ebola attraverso i social media
oltre che i tradizionali sistemi di informazione, hanno preso piede
e prosperato numerose teorie del complotto. Sulla rete diversi siti e
pagine social sono passati dall’annunciare il massiccio incremento di
contagi a notizie inquietanti basate su numerosi ipotesi cospirative,
la maggior parte delle quali basate sulla creazione in laboratorio del
. http://espresso.repubblica.it/opinioni/la-bustina-di-minerva////news/
il-complotto-sui-complotti-..
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virus da parte di alcuni scienziati americani.
I social media rappresentano infatti l’ultima frontiera per il propa-
garsi di nuove teorie cospirative e l’immediatezza con le quali vengono
condivise e trasmesse, attraverso un processo che si potrebbe definire
di “mormorio” digitale. Le isotopie ricorrenti e condivisibili in questo
caso sono lo spettro del contagio, la morte, l’invisibilità del nemico.
Da un punto di vista comunicativo il virus diventa un simbolo molto
potente (Rondini ): è invisibile, estremamente aggressivo, letale.
Il timore di essere contagiati spinge sempre più utenti ad aderire a
mitologie cospirative che possano soddisfare il loro interrogativi. Il far
parte della cerchia ristretta di chi si informa “realmente”, depositaria
di verità osteggiate e affossate dai gruppi di potere, è in netto contrasto
con tutti coloro che invece assumono come attendibili le narrazioni
ufficiali, alle quali fanno riferimento in virtù di prove oggettive e veri-
ficabili (create a tavolino da quelle stesse organizzazioni che cospirano
contro la società).
L’analisi di queste teorie è stata eseguita partendo la consultazione
di numerose pagine Facebook, Twitter e notizie dei principali quoti-
diani italiani. Secondo l’agenzia italiana WatkinsMedia, che si occupa
dello studio delle tendenze che circolano sui social media, i tweet
contenenti la parola “ebola”condivisi tra il gennaio  e ottobre dello
stesso anno sono stati .. L’utilizzo del termine su twitter però,
ha avuto un forte incremento a partire da aprile, per un totale di oltre
 indirizzi digitali dedicati all’epidemia di febbre emorragica . Tra
questi appunto ci sono anche i tweet cospirativi.
Le pagine Facebook italiane analizzate e riportanti le teorie sulla
cospirazione sono diverse decine, ma tutte rimandano in genere a siti
dedicati al mondo nelle narrazioni cospirative. Tra questi troviamo:
— http://informatitalia.blogspot.it;
— http://www.lantidiplomatico.it;
— http://www.nocensura.com;
— http://www.disinformazione.it;
. http://informatitalia.blogspot.it///il-piu-importante-quotidiano-liberiano.
html.
. http://www.watkinsmedia.com/watkinsmedia/, http://www.lastampa.it//
//tecnologia/ebola-lallarme-epidemia-nei-tweet-italiani-uFg JVjiEMkgtJNhyI/
pagina.html.
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— http://www.informarexresistere.fr.
Le pagine Facebook create per questi siti, riprendono quasi tutte
uniformemente la stessa notizia, diffusa dal quotidiano liberiano Daily
Observer il  settembre . L’articolo, intitolato “Ebola, AIDS Ma-
nufactured By Western Pharmaceuticals, US DoD?” riporta la firma
del dottor Cyril Broderick, professore di patologia vegetale di origini
liberiane e docente all’università del Delaware. Secondo costui e il
virus Ebola sarebbe in realtà un organismo geneticamente modificato
e creato nei laboratori del dipartimento della Difesa negli Usa. Questa
affermazione — come si legge nell’articolo — troverebbe conferma
e trarrebbe ispirazione da un testo pubblicato nel  da Leonard
Horowitz intitolato Emerging Viruses: AIDS and Ebola — Nature, Acci-
dent or Intentional. Il testo rimanda inoltre a un’altra delle più gravi
emergenze sanitarie della storia contemporanea ovvero la diffusio-
ne dell’Aids, attorno alla quale sono state concepite altrettante teorie
cospirative. Entrambi i virus secondo il testo, sarebbero stati creati
negli Usa durante la Guerra Fredda come armi batteriologiche per
poi verificarne l’efficacia in Africa. Il  sarebbe la data alla quale far
risalire il primo ingresso di Ebola in Zaire, per mezzo di alcuni agenti
della CIA.
Nell’analisi dell’articolo è importante evidenziare alcuni aspetti che
ci forniscono delle tracce sulla tecnica narrativa. Il primo elemento
riguarda l’autore dell’articolo: il fatto che questo sia un uomo di scien-
za, professore universitario, erudito appunto, potrebbe infondere una
certa sicurezza in chi legge, rispondendo al patto di fiducia tra autore
e lettore: “Fidati io so”.
Un altro aspetto tipico della narrazione cospirativa risiede nel ri-
mando a precedenti narrazioni concatenate: il tema della malattia
infettiva creata a tavolino che, con la teoria cospirativa nata dopo il
caso Aids, ha generato nuove teorie figlie, tra le quali appunto quella
incentrata su Ebola. Il riconoscimento dell’organizzazione segreta che
programma e quindi crea a tavolino un piano di sterminio serven-
dosi delle lobbies farmaceutiche, altra grande categoria inserita in
numerose teorie della cospirazione sanitaria. Un ulteriore elemento
. http://www.liberianobserver.com/security/ebola-aids-manufactured-western-
pharmaceuticals-us-dod.
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Figure .
narrativo che incide nella credibilità della teoria risiede nella compo-
nente iconica dell’articolo, corredato da un’immagine scientifica (Fig.
).
L’immagine, che riporta la riproduzione del virione responsabile
del virus Ebola, è molto articolata e propone il dettaglio delle varie
componenti corredate da una serie di termini provenienti dalla nomen-
clatura scientifica specifica. Questa scelta narrativa non è certamente
casuale e l’immagine dona maggior valore al testo, potenziandone la
carica semantica e rimandando a contenuti specifici che inducono a
credere in chi legge che il testo, essendo così dettagliato, non possa
che risultare credibile. Insieme a questo articolo altre immagini simili
sono facilmente reperibili nei siti sopracitati e il contenuto dell’articolo
è quasi sempre riportato integralmente. La narrazione che, come ab-
biamo appurato, risulta efficace, attira sulle pagine Facebook dedicate
. Immagine tratta dall’articolo al seguente link http://www.liberianobserver.com/
security/ebola-aids-manufactured-western-pharmaceuticals-us-dod.
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numerosi utenti (basti consultare il numero di like per pagina). Le
stesse pagine sono incisive e di facile individuazione in quanto sono
costruite a partire dall’impatto visivo (un esempio su tutti la pagina
Facebook di “Nocensura.com”) (Fig. ).
Il sottotitolo della pagine rimanda poi al discorso dell’esclusività e
della segretezza (Cose che nessuno ti dirà). L’immagine raffigurante
un uomo con bocca, occhi e orecchie occultati da mani sconosciute,
sembra voler suggerire la volontà di ostacolare appunto una libera vi-
sione critica sui fatti del mondo, che invece verrà svelata dai contenuti
della pagina.
La diffusione delle teorie del complotto in rete ha però incontrato
un nuovo livello comunicativo. Queste narrazioni sono diventate esse
stesse notizie, scavalcando quindi il fatto scatenante, l’epidemia. Ciò a
riprova del fatto che la diffusione delle teorie cospirative attraverso i
media digitali è avvenuta a una velocità molto elevata, influenzando il
processo di notiziabilità. Basti pensare all’articolo pubblicato dal Cor-
riere della Sera l’ ottobre  «Ebola e le teorie del complotto: dagli
zombie al demone bianco. Con il diffondersi del virus aumentano, in
rete e non solo, anche le teorie della cospirazione che riguardano la
febbre emorragica».
La narrazione nella narrazione, in questo caso, prova che la portata
della “viralità”, della diffusione di queste pratiche è imponente, in
grado di influenzare la comunicazione a più livelli.
Le narrazioni cospirative nate in seguito all’esplosione dell’epi-
demia, come abbiamo visto, hanno trovato terreno fertilissimo e
prospettato nel mondo dei social media. Perché questo canale sembra
essere così funzionale alla diffusione di notizie alternative, al “con-
tagio”cospirativo? Ciò induce a pensare quindi che nell’aderire a un
discorso di tipo cospirativo, l’utente manifesti un atteggiamento quasi
fideistico in relazione alle notizie “rivelate”, considerate assolutamen-
te attendibili sulla diffusione volontaria e pianificata da parte di un
. https://www.facebook.com/nocensura/ piace a .. persone,
https://www.facebook.com/informareXresistere/?fref=ts, piace a . per-
sone, https://www.facebook.com/Informatitalia/ piace a . persone,
https://www.facebook.com/LAntidiplomatico-/?fref=ts piace a
. persone. Ultima visita della pagine  dicembre .
. http://www.corriere.it/esteri/_ottobre_/ebola-zombie-cebcd--e-
-bc.shtml.
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Figure .
gruppo di potere di un virus letale. L’ adesione a trame intricate e
connesse secondo le quali niente è stato generato da coincidenze, po-
trebbe trovare una giustificazione nelle parole di Karl Popper ()
che ne La società aperta e i suoi nemici p. , parla infatti
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di come la teoria cospiratoria della società nasca nella convinzione che la
spiegazione di un fenomeno sociale consista nella scoperta degli uomini
o dei gruppi che sono interessati al verificarsi di tale fenomeno (talvolta si
tratta di un interesse nascosto che deve essere prima rivelato) e che hanno
progettato e congiurato per promuoverlo. Questa concezione deriva, natu-
ralmente, dall’erronea teoria che, qualunque cosa avvenga nella società —
come la guerra, la disoccupazione, la povertà, le carestie, che la gente di
solito detesta — è il risultato di diretti interventi di alcuni individui e gruppi
potenti.
Il “mormorio” digitale, ovvero tutta la serie di miti sulle possibili
verità che non ci è dato conoscere si diffondono esponenzialmente in
rete molto più velocemente grazie a una semplice pratica, la condivi-
sione “consapevole” del contenuto, caratteristica descritta da Jenkins
() in Spreadable Media. La diffusione delle teorie cospirative at-
traverso Facebook e Twitter avviene infatti dopo una scelta operata
da parte del lettore. La possibilità di discutere con altri utenti, e non
soltanto assumere le teorie cospirative “passivamente”, spinge l’utente
a un approccio molto più attivo e contribuisce alla narrazione diffon-
dendola attraverso più piattaforme, fruibili da altri utenti facenti parte
della “cerchia ristretta di chi si informa realmente”. Si potrebbe quindi
parlare di un “coinvolgimento transmediale” degli utenti che si fanno
essi stessi portatori e creatori di nuove narrazioni.
Il processo cospirativo che ha circondato le notizie su Ebola nei me-
si di maggiore intensità di questo fenomeno, è quindi legato alle scelte
degli utenti e al valore che questi attribuiscono alla narrazione. Le
competenze, le esperienze di ciascuno, vengono messe alla prova da-
vanti ai link che propongono una verità altra che catalizza l’attenzione,
idealizza un nemico comune, lo costruisce secondo parametri precisi,
e, molto spesso, è un nemico interno (Eco, ), ovvero facente parte
della nostra stessa società (nel caso delle teorie cospirative su Ebola il
nemico è appunto rappresentato dagli Stati Uniti). La promessa, però
di far parte di una cerchia esclusiva che a sua volta mette in atto una
sorta di cospirazione contro i governi, le multinazionali e altri gruppi
di potere, rende l’utente parte attiva della seconda cospirazione: si
pone esso stesso dei dubbi, fa delle congetture, le condivide con altri
membri della cerchia, (rappresentata dalle pagine Facebook complotti-
ste, blog, siti web dedicati) manipolando e rimaneggiando le teorie
preesistenti. Si innesca così un processo di semiosi illimitata, un effetto
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domino che dà origine a nuove mitologie che a loro volta daranno il
via a nuovi dubbi che altri utenti decideranno di condividere oppure
contestare, il tutto con un semplice clic del mouse.
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Da quando Vladimir I. Vernadskij, nel , divulgò il concetto di
“biosfera”, già coniato dal geologo austriaco Eduard Suess alla fine
dell’Ottocento, le scienze umane — specie a seguito del fortunato
neologismo lotmaniano, “semiosfera” — sono state inondate di “sfe-
re” relative agli elementi più svariati. Oramai, qualunque oggetto del
discorso può ricevere il suffisso “-sfera” e indicare una dimensione
dell’esistente socioculturale in cui tale oggetto si articola e, nelle sue
varietà e tipi, circonda il soggetto analitico. Nonostante il termine sia
stato ampiamente abusato, usi giustificati di questa pratica neologistica
non mancano di affiorare di quando in quando, ed è certamente il
caso della “corposfera” che dà il titolo al bel libro di José Enrique
Finol, ultima fatica del semiologo venezuelano. Figura tra le più rino-
mate della semiotica internazionale, ricercatore di spicco in America
Latina, Finol è notissimo per studi che combinano semiotica e disci-
pline antropologiche attorno a temi che riguardano l’attualità della
comunicazione, in special modo nel continente americano. Dotato
di un retroterra interdisciplinare, di una curiosità multiculturale, e di
uno stile caratteristicamente sobrio, preciso, e al contempo seducente,
Finol, attualmente a capo di una nuova struttura di ricerca in Ecuador,
si propone in questo volume di sviluppare una variegata “antropose-
miotica” delle cartografie del corpo, vale a dire di tutti quei dispositivi
di scrittura, codifica e decodifica che circondano il corpo nel suo vive-
re quotidiano. Missione impossibile, si dirà, se non che Finol l’affronta
∗ Massimo Leone, Università di Torino.
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con consueta arguzia, dividendo il suo incedere in otto capitoli che
progressivamente perimetrano e penetrano il soggetto di studio. Nel
primo, intitolato “I saperi sul corpo”, l’autore dipana una conoscenza
enciclopedica e approfondita delle “scienze umane del corpo” per
dimostrare che esse lasciano uno spazio vuoto e insondato proprio per
quel che riguarda il vissuto di senso e significazione degli stati e delle
azioni corporali; la proposta è quella di “vedere il fenomeno corporale
come parte di una storia, di una cultura, e di una società, però anche
come il risultato di una serie complessa di operazioni di significazione
che lo contraddistinguono come messaggio, come spettacolo, come
senso” (p. ). L’articolazione del metodo volto a cartografare la se-
mantica del corpo inizia nel capitolo successivo, dedicato, appunto, al
concetto di “corposfera”. Finol propone di studiarla come intreccio di
quattro dimensioni: ) il corpo–linguaggio, ovvero un sistema di segni;
) il corpo–oggetto, ovvero i discorsi su di esso; ) il corpo–spazio, cioè
in quanto scenario di altri segni; e ) il corpo–riferimento, vale a dire
oggetti modellati dal corpo, la mera esistenza dei quali lo “racconta”. Il
libro non si limita a una prospettiva astratta ma, in una serie di paragra-
fi agili e avvincenti, fornisce una moltitudine di esempi attraverso una
segmentazione in chiave “comunicativa” del corpo, nella quale il volto,
lo sguardo, i capelli, il torso, i genitali, etc. si trasformano da semplici
parti corporali in microtesti da analizzare semioticamente in relazione
a un preciso ambiente comunicativo, dall’uso del trasero nella pubblici-
tà alle nuove fogge comunicative della peluria umana. L’idea di fondo
che il capitolo segue è che l’analisi del “corpo in sé” sia fondamentale
per approdare a quella di un’analisi del “corpo per gli altri corpi”, e
che l’un aspetto non sia, in realtà, che il rovescio della medaglia del-
l’altro. È quanto si prefigge di appurare il terzo capitolo, consacrato a
“Immaginari, frontiere e limiti delle semiotiche del corpo”. Fedele al
suggerimento di Lotman, qui Finol intraprende di delineare i tratti e
le dinamiche della “corposfera” proprio investigandone le zone di con-
fine, le tensioni e gli sfrangiamenti, come quando si concentra sulle
“mitologie del corpo sano” o su quelle, sempre più attuali, che attorno
al corpo costruiscono nuove promesse di una longevità indefinita. Il
capitolo dunque articola ulteriormente il concetto di “corposfera”,
intesa come “congiunto di linguaggi che si originano, attualizzano e
realizzano grazie al corpo” (p. ), proponendo una tipologia dei suoi
confini: ) morfologico, ad esempio il limite fra le articolazioni ossee,
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pertinentizzato da molte lingue naturali; ) orografico, in cui confini
pià sfumati si disegnano e agiscono semioticamente al di sotto e al di
là dei limiti morfologici, come quando il lembo di pelle fra bocca e
naso diviene perno e superficie di una particolare espressione facciale;
e ) geografico, nel senso del rapporto fra interiorità ed esteriorità, ove
l’autore distingue fra azioni corporee “transitive”, le quali si affacciano
come comunicative sullo schermo del corpo, e azioni “intransitive”,
che invece sono vissute solo nella propriocezione. Uno dei contributi
più interessanti del capitolo è però quello di osservare come questi
limiti siano continuamente negoziati, e spostati in modo a volte anche
radicale dai nuovi fenomeni di cultura e comunicazione. Ne deriva la
conclusione che “queste frontiere semiotiche che abbiamo preso in
rassegna non sono muri, ma sono, al contrario, demarcazioni mobili,
sottoposte al fiume interminabile delle forze dei nuovi segni, dei nuo-
vi miti e riti che si dibattono nell’arena del sociale e che costituiscono
la cultura [. . . ]” (p. ).
Per meglio comprendere queste dinamiche semiotiche di continuo
riposizionamento dei confini corporali, Finol dedica l’intero quarto
capitolo alle “Modalità del corpo: spazio e movimento, ritualità ed
erotismo”, costituito da una carrellata di esempi illuminanti, ciascuno
provvisto di uno sguardo semiotico innovatore su un aspetto della
semiotica corporea; nella sezione dedicata a “Corpo macchina e cor-
po digitale”, per esempio, Finol propone un’efficace articolazione di
questo complesso campo semantico, distinguendo fra “robot”, “cy-
borg”, “clone” e “avatar” a seconda delle operazioni semiotiche cui
sottopongono il corpo — cioè “replica”, “mescolamento”, “identità”,
“sostituzione” — ma anche a seconda delle diverse forme di “sacraliz-
zazione” che tale gradualità implica, dalla sacralità assoluta del corpo
alla sostituibilità totale dell’avatar. Il quinto capitolo, “Corpo, estetica,
ed edonismo” affronta sia il tema spinoso della semiotica del dolore
(cui Umberto Eco ha dedicato i suoi ultimi sforzi di studioso, purtrop-
po incompiuti, ma che segnalano l’estrema rilevanza del tema), sia il
suo contrario edonistico, il corpo trionfante dell’ego–surfing, della cac-
cia spasmodica alla propria immagine nel web. Concludono il volume
tre capitoli nei quali Finol torna su alcuni suoi “cavalli di battaglia”,
vale a dire argomenti sui quali si è spesa buona parte della sua carriera
di studioso, semiologo, e antropologo: la struttura del gesto corporale
nelle cerimonie pubbliche; la ritualità dei concorsi di bellezza, sui
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quali Finol ha pubblicato pagine memorabili; i testi funerari. Ognuno
di questi capitoli conferisce però un respiro teorico maggiore agli
studi precedenti di Finol sugli stessi argomenti, in quanto li inserisce
all’interno di una “semiotica della corposfera” che abbraccia ormai
tutti gli aspetti della significazione corporale, sistematizzati all’interno
di un libro che, sia pur dotato di uno stile agevolissimo, non mancherà
di diventare un punto di riferimento per gli studi sul corpo.
Pubblicato nella elegante veste tipografica della serie “Studi cultu-
rali e teorie della mediazione”, per i tipi delle “Edizioni CIESPAL” (il
centro di ricerche equatoriano sulla comunicazione, uno dei migliori
in tutta l’America Latina, in cui Finol è attualmente ricercatore di pun-
ta), La corposfera è un libro che deve essere presente nella biblioteca di
ogni semiologo interessato al funzionamento comunicativo del corpo
e soprattutto ai nuovi fenomeni di senso che riguardano questo ele-
mento centrale delle nostre vite. Scritto con brio e rigore, il volume si
distingue specialmente per quello sguardo multiplo che José Enrique
Finol, esploratore delle culture indigene d’America, delle enciclopedie
europee, e del loro prodotto meticcio nel variegato campo di segni
dell’America Latina, sa poggiare su tutti gli oggetti delle sue ricerche,
rivelandone tratti salienti e a un tempo inaspettati.
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Sémir Badir, ricercatore presso il Centro Nazionale delle Ricerche
Belga, è uno dei più noti semiologi in lingua francese, universalmente
apprezzato per la raffinatezza e precisione dei suoi scritti e dei suoi
interventi. Specialista di linguistica e semiologia strutturale, con Épi-
stémologie sémiotique — La théorie du langage de Louis Hjelmslev dà alle
stampe un libro ambizioso, che riassume il risultato di ricerche de-
cennali sul linguista, semiologo, e glossematico danese, costituisce
un’interpretazione a tutto tondo della sua complessa teoria del lin-
guaggio, e insieme propone una visione personale della semiotica,
imperniata sull’esclusività della sua epistemologia.
Il volume, pubblicato dalla prestigiosa casa editrice parigina Hono-
ré Champion, è diviso in sette capitoli, preceduti da un’introduzione,
seguiti da una conclusione aperta che l’autore intitola “senza conclu-
sione”, nonché da un utile apparato che comprende un inedito in
inglese di Louis T. Hjelmslev e la sua traduzione in francese, “Procé-
dure glossématique”; una ricca bibliografia; due utili indici, dei nomi
e delle nozioni.
Sin dall’introduzione, Badir precisa il suo ambizioso progetto, che non
è meramente quello di fornire una nuova interpretazione degli scritti
hjelmsleviani, o una loro originale sistematizzazione, ma di estrarne
una teoria per così dire “totale” che restituisca alla semiotica il suo
statuto di epistemologia interdisciplinare (o persino “sovradisciplinare”).
Secondo l’autore, infatti, “ciò che sfugge [. . . ] ai semiotici è l’origine
∗ Massimo Leone, Università di Torino.
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di questo potere di attualizzazione dei concetti hjelmsleviani. Questo
potere non deriva soltanto dalla loro propria forza immaginativa, per
quanto la si eserciti. Esso deriva dal fatto che il pensiero di Hjelmslev
contiene una teoria” (pp. –, trad. nostra). In contrasto con le posizioni
“contro il metodo” alla Feyerabend, Badir ammette, sì, che vi è un
carattere idealizzante nell’opera di Hjelmslev — carattere che fa della
sua epistemologia un’utopia — ma sostiene anche che ciò che distingue
questa utopia linguistica da una semplice ideologia aprioristica è proprio
il fatto di presentarsi come un cantiere aperto di problemi da risolvere.
Nei capitoli successivi, il volume si propone d’identificare alcune di
queste questioni, e di dar loro una risposta, sia pure in via ipotetica.
Dopo alcune pagine dedicate all’apparato filologico del libro —
assai precise e utilissime, visto lo stato caotico nel quale versa la filo-
logia degli scritti di Hjelmslev — il primo capitolo si dipana attorno
a un difficile esercizio di sdoppiamento: da un lato, l’autore si chiede
quale sia l’angolo concettualmente più appropriato per abbordare la
teoria dello studioso danese. Dall’altro lato, è nella stessa teoria di
Hjelmslev che Badir cerca una risposta, identificando giustamente
questa teoria principalmente come una teoria dell’interpretazione. Il
suggerimento proposto dal ricercatore belga è di spostare l’attenzione
dai dati dell’interpretazione, solitamente invocati per proclamare la
pertinenza di tale o talaltro aspetto della teoria hjelmsleviana, alle sue
condizioni. Aggiungendo un ulteriore livello di complessità, tuttavia,
Badir sceglie di condurre la discussione sulla centralità delle condi-
zioni nei processi interpretativi utilizzando come caso di studio la
nozione di connotazione e le sue applicazioni. Il cerchio si chiude
in maniera virtuosa: per interpretare correttamente Hjelmslev, Badir
ricorre alla teoria hjelmsleviana dell’interpretazione, e tuttavia que-
sto riferimento gli permette di ritornare meta–linguisticamente sulla
teoria stessa, esplicitando le condizioni in base alle quali un concet-
to hjelmsleviano di portata più generale, quello di “connotazione”,
debba essere interpretato. Ne deriva una schematizzazione delle con-
dizioni d’interpretazione del concetto di connotazione in Hjelmslev
secondo più livelli: ) Interpretazione secondo il senso comune; )
interpretazione testuale intrinseca; ) interpretazione intrinseca non
strettamente testuale; ) interpretazione estrinseca. A fianco e al di là
di questi livelli, Badir ne propone un quinto, che in realtà approfon-
disce quello dell’interpretazione intrinseca, suggerendo che il testo
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principale nel quale Hjelmslev definisce il concetto di connotazione —
uno dei più sfuggenti e, dunque, abusati dell’intera semiotica —, vale
a dire i Prolegomeni, fornisce esso stesso l’indicazione di una sua lettura
ideale nel segno della formalizzazione; a queste condizioni intrinseche
d’interpretazione “formale” del testo hjelmsleviano, Badir si adatta
dunque definendo la connotazione come basata sulla “possibilità co-
stante, per l’analista, di produrre un testo che renda conto di ciò che
egli vuole attribuire al connotatore, di modo che il testo ne risulti una
parafrasi adeguata” (p. ). Quest’analisi del concetto di connotazione,
però, non è in Badir fine a sé stessa, ma è invece la leva d’Archimede
che gli consente di proporre un passaggio dall’interpretazione della
teoria di Hjelmslev come teoria del linguaggio a un’interpretazione in
cui tale teoria si apre invece alla possibilità di diventare il fondamento
di un’analisi universale della conoscenza, ovvero un’epistemiologia.
È proprio nel cogliere il funzionamento della connotazione e del
metalinguaggio, infatti, che la teoria linguistica di Hjelmslev diventa
una teoria semiologica, tale passaggio filologicamente compiendosi,
secondo Badir, nella transizione dai Prolegomeni, celebrata opera del
linguista danese, all’opera rimasta inedita in vita dell’autore Sprogteori.
Résumé (“sintesi di teoria del linguaggio”).
Se il primo capitolo del volume è dedicato ai “Dati”, o piuttosto ai
“Fondamenti” dell’interpretazione hjelmsleviana, il secondo è intito-
lato “Teoria” e si prefigge di rispondere a tre domande: ) Che cos’è
una teoria del linguaggio?; ) Quale concezione di teoria è addotta da
Hjelmslev?; ) Quale funzione si può attribuire a dei prolegomeni? Il
percorso di risposta intrapreso da Badir in realtà non fa altro che dare
fondamento all’ipotesi epistemologica elaborata nel capitolo preceden-
te. Infatti, se i Prolegomeni vi si trovano interpretati come un tentativo
di costituire un’interfaccia teorica fra la teoria del linguaggio, e in
particolare la linguistica, e la teoria della conoscenza, o epistemologia
generale, il Résumé vi è allora concepito come testo che condensa un
passaggio teorico successivo, in cui la teoria glossematica si dà per
fondata, e può allora divenire la base per la costruzione, o almeno per
la proposizione, di una componente universale in grado di fondare
la costituzione delle scienze. In termini più semplici, Badir cerca di
dimostrare in che modo la linguistica di Hjelmslev si fa semiotica,
senza perdere il suo carattere cogente, ma invece radicando la propria
dignità epistemologica nella teoria del linguaggio.
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Nel terzo capitolo, “Semiotica”, Badir persuade il lettore, con pe-
rizia a un tempo filologica e teorica, che questo passaggio si può
compiere in quanto, per Hjelmslev, l’oggetto della teoria non è sempli-
cemente la lingua ma la semiotica, di cui la prima non è che specifica-
zione. Al contrario di Saussure, infatti, Hjelmslev sceglie di utilizzare
il termine danese “semiologi” come designazione dell’oggetto della
teoria, più che come designazione della teoria stessa. Il capitolo ospita
dunque un’approfondita analisi dei diagrammi hjelmsleviani, la quale
è intesa proprio a dimostrare come un meta–linguaggio alternativo a
quello verbale s’installi nella teoria di Hjelmslev e consenta, di fatto,
la definizione dell’oggetto “semiotica” in contrapposizione a quello
delineato dalla nozione di “mutazione”. La semiotica risulta dunque
essere (definizione  del Résumé) “una gerarchia in cui ognuna delle
componenti ammette un’analisi ulteriore in classi definite per mutua
relazione, in tal modo che ciascuna di queste classi ammetta un’analisi
in derivati definiti per reciproca mutuazione”. Badir interpreta il posi-
zionamento epistemologico reciproco di “mutuazione” e “semiotica”
in Hjelmslev sostenendo che, se la mutazione è in definitiva caratteriz-
zata da una proporzione (a è per b ciò che a è per b, e viceversa), una
semiotica è “un oggetto di cui l’analisi conduce allo stabilirsi di una
proporzione”. Ma questa definizione non fa che designare in astratto
le classi che compongono l’oggetto “semiotica”, vale a dire i piani
del linguaggio. Allo stesso tempo, attraverso la sottile distinzione fra
“interpretazione continua” e “interpretazione ulteriore”, questa defini-
zione consente di articolare la vulgata della ricezione hjelmsleviana
(quella che s’insegna ormai in tutti i corsi di semiotica strutturale,
secondo cui l’oggetto semiotico si disporrebbe sui due piani dell’e-
spressione e del contenuto), sottolineando che “una semiotica è una
gerarchia i cui piani sono in relazione reciproca in funzione delle
proporzioni nelle quali entrano i loro derivati” (p. , trad. nostra).
Ma a tale definizione Badir aggancia anche la necessità di ancorare
lo stabilirsi di due assi, per cui alla fondazione di una gerarchia pro-
porzionale deve collegarsi una divisione previa che l’articoli in due
complessi d’analisi: quello del sistema e quello del processo.
Il quarto capitolo (“Testo”), anch’esso illuminante, ripercorre l’e-
mergenza del testo come oggetto–quadro dell’analisi semiotica hjelm-
sleviana. Le difficoltà che ineriscono a questa scelta sono, in primo
luogo, l’indistinzione fra tale oggetto e i mezzi della sua conoscenza; in
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secondo luogo, l’indistinzione fra l’oggetto e i suoi costituenti. Ma, al
di là di ogni definizione banalizzante, Badir conclude che, in Hjelmslev,
il testo non è mai considerato come un oggetto particolare. Ciò che si
coglie in esso è, invece, “un oggetto generale, vale a dire un oggetto che
assomiglia [. . . ] a degli oggetti particolari e che, assomigliando loro, li
costituisce in un certo modo per la conoscenza” (p. ). D’altra parte,
Badir ci tiene a sottolineare che, in Hjelsmlev, questa accezione “episte-
mologica” di testo comunica con quella corrente, rigettando tuttavia
ogni approccio “prototipico” così come ogni “naturalizzazione” dei
testi. È invece attraverso la dialettica fra formalità e sostanze del testo
che Badir propone di specificare l’operatività del testo epistemologico.
Dopo una fulminea sintesi del percorso condotto nei capitoli pre-
cedenti, il quinto, “Metasemiotiche” si pone il problema, centrale
in semiotica, di “stabilire la procedura di un’analisi semiotica, facen-
do astrazione di ogni particolarità collegata al testo, in modo che la
procedura corrisponda a una deduzione, di valore universale” (pp.
–, trad. nostra). Appoggiandosi allo schema di lettura del Résu-
mé proposto nell’introduzione di Francis Whitfield alla traduzione
inglese dell’opera, Badir riflette sulla tipologia delle operazioni meta–
semiotiche, sottolineandone non tanto la scientificità, quanto appunto
il carattere “-meta”, ossia il fatto che l’oggetto d’analisi ne divenga di
fatto il contenuto semiotico. Che l’oggetto possa divenire tale, dunque,
dipende dalla sua struttura interna, e dal fatto che essa risponda alle
sette condizioni individuate da Hjelmslev, alcune delle quali sancisco-
no la pertinenza dell’oggetto (gerarchia, relazione e mutazione), altre
la specificano (denotazione I, scienza, denotazione II), mentre altre
ancora ne evidenziano la manifestazione e il senso. Ma l’analisi meta–
semiotica di un passo delle Strutture della sintassi di Noam Chomsky
consente a Badir di dimostrare che, “dal punto di vista dell’analisi
metasemiotica, un testo di linguista è un testo come gli altri” (p. ,
trad. nostra).
Tale disarmante conclusione è in relazione a un “impensato” della
teoria semiotica, che Badir affronta nel suo sesto capitolo, “Espres-
sione”, appunto. L’autore si cimenta con quello che è, per certi versi,
lo “scandalo” della teoria formale del linguaggio e del senso, ossia
l’incidentalità della manifestazione espressiva; Hjelmslev infatti non
si stanca di ripetere che la designazione reciproca di espressione e
contenuto è puramente formale, come se la prima non avesse essenza
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alcuna a distinguerla dal secondo. È sul carattere controintuitivo del-
l’asimmetria di questa interdipendenza che s’interroga Badir, il quale
riprende il famoso esempio e caso di studi del “linguaggio semaforico”
per evidenziare che le qualità precipue del piano dell’espressione in
un certo senso emergono in relazione alle stesse operazioni che si
effettuano per articolarlo, per distinguere, ad esempio, fra una manife-
stazione espressiva pura e semplice e una vera e propria realizzazione.
Tuttavia, sebbene sul piano analitico si dia l’impossibilità di accedere a
un contenuto senza partire dallo studio della sua espressione, Badir si
pronuncia a favore delle virtù semiotiche del mantenimento di un’i-
dea formale di simmetria fra i piani del linguaggio, in quanto consente
di aprire la strada, ad esempio, all’analisi di linguaggi che siano “multi–
piano”, e che, dunque, non prevedano semplicemente una dipendenza
fra piano dell’espressione e piano del contenuto. Il capitolo si chiude
con la rianalisi di due casi di studio hjelmsleviani, quella del carillon
del Big Ben e quella della tastiera del telefono (numeri –), ma an-
che con un accenno al fatto che si possa sviluppare un’esplorazione
simmetrica delle specificità del piano del contenuto rispetto a quelle
del piano dell’espressione nell’ambito fenomenologico.
Chiudono il volume un capitolo accessorio, il settimo, che tenta
una valutazione in chiave hjelmsleviana dell’epilinguistica di Antoi-
ne Culioli, e una “non–conclusione”, in cui l’autore rifiuta sia una
storicizzazione che un’attualizzazione del pensiero hjelmsleviano e,
al contrario, ne sottolinea il tono utopico, il carattere lussuoso di
elucubrazione deduttiva.
Il finale del libro è poetico; in esso risiede, forse, tutto il senso della
sua operazione: sottolineare la dignità dell’astrazione, al di là delle sue
ricadute pratiche, al di là delle sue cadute teoriche, significa affermare
un principio che è innanzitutto etico, quello di un’indipendenza del
pensiero che, in fin dei conti, è l’anima che scrive e fa girare le pagine
migliori della storia, non solo della linguistica e della semiotica ma,
forse, dell’umanità intera.
Épistémologie sémiotique rispecchia ed esalta questo principio nel
suo essere un libro difficile, denso, per pochi, astratto ma non astru-
so: vi si coglie, in tutte le sue raffinate circonvoluzioni, quell’idea
di purezza della conoscenza che, per quanto utopica, rimane forse
il lascito migliore della linguistica strutturale, della glossematica di
Hjelmslev, della semiotica di Greimas. Si tratterà forse di una purezza
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inadeguata al mondo? Essa rimane nondimeno sublimemente musi-
cale, gradevolissima all’ascolto per chi ha l’orecchio aduso a tali note
intemporali. Va riconosciuto a Sémir Badir di averne saputo distillare
di squisitamente rarefatte nel suo importante volume.
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conceives Hip Hop as toolbox of cultural technics, useful for recon-
structing identity, community and society. A part of her publications
on rap’s effects on identity, socialization and social empowerment
(Rap: More than Words, ; Identitätsbildungsstrategien in der
Vorstadt- und Hip-Hop-Kultur, ; Rap–republics: Transglobale Ge-
meinschaften und alternative Formen der Wissensvermittlung, ;
Autobiographie und Authentizität: Selbst(er)erzählung und Wirkli-
chkeitsentwürfe in Songtexten französischer Rapperinnen, ; A
Third Space for Dissent: Raps Peripherial Semiosphere, its Making
and Effects, . Her last research project took place in Tunisia in
February  (Rap in Tunesien: Revolution oder Evolution?, ).
Evangelos Kourdis (Ph.D.) is Associate Professor of Translation Se-
miotics in the Department of French Language & Literature, Aristo-
tle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. His scientific interests focus
upon Sociosemiotics, Sociolinguistics, Language Ideology and Cultu-
ral Communication. He is the national representative of Greece in the
International Association for Semiotic Studies, the vice president of
the Hellenic Semiotic Society, a founder member of the Hellenic So-
ciety for Translation Studies and of the AUTH SemioLab, a member
of the Semiotics and Visual Communication Lab of the Cyprus Univer-
sity of Technology, and the Review Editor of Punctum-International
Journal of Semiotics.
Saman Sebastian Hamdi Profilo biografico–scientifico.
Massimo Leone is Professor of Semiotics and Cultural Semiotics at
the Department of Philosophy, University of Turin, Italy. He graduated
in Communication Studies from the University of Siena, and holds a
DEA in History and Semiotics of Texts and Documents from Paris
VII, an MPhil in Word and Image Studies from Trinity College Du-
blin, a PhD in Religious Studies from the Sorbonne, and a PhD in Art
History from the University of Fribourg (CH). He was visiting scho-
lar at the CNRS in Paris, at the CSIC in Madrid, Fulbright Research
Visiting Professor at the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, En-
deavour Research Award Visiting Professor at the School of English,
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Performance, and Communication Studies at Monash University, Mel-
bourne, Faculty Research Grant Visiting Professor at the University of
Toronto, “Mairie de Paris” Visiting Professor at the Sorbonne, DAAD
Visiting Professor at the University of Potsdam, Visiting Professor at
the École Normale Supérieure of Lyon (Collegium de Lyon), Visiting
Professor at the Center for Advanced Studies at the University of
Munich, Visiting Professor at the University of Kyoto, and Visiting
Professor at the Institute of Advanced Study, Durham University. His
work focuses on the role of religion in modern and contemporary
cultures. Massimo Leone has single–authored seven books, Religious
Conversion and Identity — The Semiotic Analysis of Texts (London and
New York: Routledge, ;  pp.); Saints and Signs — A Semiotic
Reading of Conversion in Early Modern Catholicism (Berlin and New York:
Walter de Gruyter, ;  pp.), Sémiotique de l’âme,  vols (Berlin et
al.: Presses Académiques Francophones, ), Annunciazioni: percorsi
di semiotica della religione,  vols (Rome: Aracne, ,  pp.), Spiri-
tualità digitale: il senso religioso nell’era della smaterializzazione (Udine:
Mimesis, ), Sémiotique du fundamentalisme : messages, rhétorique,
force persuasive (Paris: l’Harmattan, ; translated into Arabic in ),
and Signatim: Profili di semiotica della cultura (Rome: Aracne, , 
pp.), edited thirty collective volumes, and published more than four
hundred articles in semiotics and religious studies. He has lectured in
Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America. He is the chief
editor of Lexia, the Semiotic Journal of the Center for Interdisciplinary
Research on Communication, University of Torino, Italy, and editor
of the book series “I Saggi di Lexia” (Rome: Aracne) and “Semiotics
of Religion” (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter). He directs the
MA Program in Communication Studies at the University of Turin,
Italy.
Mari–Liis Madisson (b. ) is a junior research fellow of Media
and Communication Studies at the Institute of Social Studies, Tartu
University, Estonia. She defended her PhD thesis “The Semiotic Con-
struction of Identities in Hypermedia Environments: The Analysis
of Online Communication of the Estonian Extreme Right” in  at
the University of Tartu, Department of Semiotics. Her main research
focuses are: cultural semiotics, political semiotics, identity studies and
media studies. She has published widely and internationally on such
Note biografiche degli autori / Authors’ Bionotes 
themes in the major journals for semiotics.
Marta Milia (Cagliari, ), dal  Dottoranda in Semiotica e Media
presso l’Università degli Studi di Torino. Vincitrice di borsa di studio
INPS con il progetto di ricerca “L’informazione in rete e la narrazione
politica sui social media: per una Semiotica della Comunicazione .”.
Le sue ricerche vertono sulle nuove strategie comunicative messe
in atto sui social media, in particolare i processi comunicativi che
regolano le dinamiche di diffusione di testi attraverso Twitter e lo
sviluppo della narrazione politica italiana attraverso i principali social
networks. Tra le sue pubblicazioni nel : “Quando l’ironia morde.
Gli attacchi social da Suarez a Renzi. I bersagli e la tecnologia che
distorce” per Carte Semiotiche e “Il gioco assedia la città. Critical City
Upload e il pervasive game” per “I Saggi di Lexia”. Ha collaborato
come redattrice con la testata giornalistica Casteddu Online e con
l’Emittente televisiva Primocanale.
Peppino Ortoleva is professor of Media History and Theory at the
University of Torino. Among is most recent publications, Il secolo dei
media, Milano, , Dal sesso al gioco, Torino, , Miti a bassa
intensità, forthcoming.
Alessandro Perissinotto (Torino ) si è laureato presso l’Universi-
tà di Torino con una tesi in semiotica sulla figuratività nella fiaba. È
professore associato di Sociologia dei Processi Culturali presso il Di-
partimento di Filosofia dell’Università di Torino. È anche romanziere
ed editorialista per i quotidiani La Stampa e Il Mattino.
Jenny Ponzo is currently a member of the Center for Advanced
Studies and a research fellow at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University
Munich (Germany), where she works at her third monograph, Reli-
gious Narratives in Italian Literature after the Second Vatican Council:
A Semiotic Analysis (, De Gruyter, under contract), and she tea-
ches master’s courses in Semiotics of Religion. Her research interests
include aesthetic and narrative theories, interdisciplinary methods for
the study of identity, subjectivity, values and interpretative styles, Ita-
lian and comparative literature, cultural and religious studies. In ,
she was awarded a Ph.D. in Italian Literature (University of Lausanne,
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Switzerland) and a Ph.D. in Semiotics (University of Turin, Italy, inter-
national joint supervision). Her doctoral research was awarded grants
from the Swiss “Fondation pour des bourses d’études italo–suisses”
and “Fondation Zerilli-Marimò”, as well as the “Prix Dante” by the So-
cietà Dante Alighieri. Her dissertation, which was published in  as
a monograph in two tomes (La narrativa di argomento risorgimentale
–, Aracne) presents a semiotic study of the representation of
national identity in a corpus of sixty Italian novels whose plots concern
the national unification period (Risorgimento). She is moreover the
author of a monograph on the controversy between Charismatics and
Conservative Evangelicals about the practice of glossolalia (Lingue
angeliche e discorsi fondamentalisti: alla ricerca di uno stile interpre-
tativo, , Aracne) and of a number of articles on issues such as civil
religion, fundamentalism and semiotics of literature.
Daniele Salerno is research fellow at University of Bologna and mem-
ber of the Centre for the Interdisciplinary Study of Cultural Memory
and Traumas (TraMe). He obtained his PhD in Semiotics with a dis-
sertation on terrorism and security discourse (published in Italy by Li-
breria Universitaria). He has recently published on “Social Semiotics”,
“Versus”, “The Italianist”.
Simona Stano is Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of
Turin and Senior Researcher at the International Semiotics Institu-
te, Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania. She holds a PhD in
Sciences of Language and Communication from the University of
Turin (UNITO, Italy) and a PhD in Communication Sciences from the
University of Lugano (USI, Switzerland). During her doctoral studies,
she worked as Visiting Research Scholar at the Dept. of Anthropology
of the University of Toronto (UofT, Canada), also obtaining a Research
Fellowship from the Dept. of Religious Studies. From October  to
January  she worked as “Visiting Researcher” at the Universitat
de Barcelona (UB, Spagna) and the Observatorio de la Alimentación
(ODELA, Spagna). She deals mainly with semiotics of culture, food
semiotics, and visual, urban and communication studies, and has
published several articles, chapters of books and edited volumes (in-
cluding special issues of top semiotic journals such as Semiotica and
Lexia) on these topics. Her recently–published monograph is entitled
Note biografiche degli autori / Authors’ Bionotes 
Eating the Other. Translations of the Culinary Code (). She has
presented many papers at national and international conferences, also
organising and co–directing several scientific events and research pro-
jects. In  Dr. Stano was awarded the title of “Expert in Philosophy
and Theory of Languages” from the University of Turin. In recent
years she has collaborated as adjunct professor, lecturer, examiner
and supervisor of undergraduate and graduate students with several
universities in Italy and abroad (e.g. University of Turin, University
of Palermo, eCampus University, Kaunas University of Technology,
Università della Svizzera Italiana, etc.). Moreover, she has delivered
semiotic and cultural analysis for international agencies and private
organisations.
Mattia Thibault è Dottorando di Ricerca presso l’Università di To-
rino e partecipa a SEMKNOW il primo programma dottorale di se-
miotica pan–europeo. Ha svolto diversi periodi di ricerca all’estero:
un semestre presso la Tartu University (Estonia) come Fellow del-
la Archimedes Foundation, un mese presso il The Strong Museum
of Play (Rochester, NY, USA) come The Strong Research Fellow e
un semestre presso la Helsinki University (Finlandia) grazie ad una
CIMO Fellowship. Ha all’attivo diverse collaborazioni nel ruolo esa-
minatore e relatore/tutor di studenti e laureandi presso l’Università
di Torino. Inoltre da gennaio  collabora come co–redattore per la
rivista internazionale di semiotica Lexia (SCOPUS). Le sue ricerche si
concentrano nel campo della ludicità: dalla semiotica del giocattolo a
quella dei videogiochi, dalla ludicizzazione della cultura alle playful
practices delle periferie del Web. Su questi argomenti ha presentato,
organizzato e diretto interventi, conferenze ed attività in ambito nazio-
nale e internazionale. È membro fondatore del collettivo Fast Forward
— Future Lab Torino che in collaborazione con il MuFant ha orga-
nizzato diverse attività di design fiction e divulgazione scientifica. Tra
le sue ultime pubblicazioni: Do not talk about anonymous, censura,
autocensura e anonimato nelle periferie del Web, in stampa su Lexia,
Gioco e Spazialità digitale: Percorsi ludici tra avenues digitali e realtà
alternata pubblicato su E/C nel  e LEGOs: when videogames are
a bridge between toys and cinema pubblicato nello stesso anno su
GAME journal.
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Federica Turco succesfully completed a PhD in Semiotics at Univer-
sity of Torino. After her degree in Science of Communication, with a
graduation thesis about the relationship between media events, urban
image and semiotics of space, she has conducted a doctoral research
concerning the representation of women in Italian serial TV fiction
and putting forward her own model for a gender–oriented analysis
of audio–visual products. She has collaborated, as a researcher, wi-
th several Research Centres of the University of Torino and with
local cultural associations, where she has conducted researches on:
social communication campaigns, communication strategies of local
governments, equal and gender studies, mega event communications,
media and public opinion. Currently she is responsible in charge for
communication at CIRSDe, The Research Centre for Women’s and
Gender Studies of the University of Turin, and she teaches in courses
of Semiotics, Semiotics of Gender and Sociosemiotics at University
of Turin and at the European Institute of Design of Turin. Among
her last publications: “La vittima e il carnefice. Ovvero degli scontri di
“genere”, dei ruoli tematici e del sistema di sguardi nel cinema italiano
contemporaneo”, in Ferraro G. and Santangelo A. (eds) Uno sguardo
più attento. I dispositivi di senso dei testi cinematografici, I Saggi di
Lexia, Roma, Aracne, ; “Soggetti di confine: ruoli, europeità e
visual culture”, E|C, Palermo, n. –/; “Corpi in movimento.
Rivendicazioni femminili”, in Turri M.G. (ed) Femen, la nuova rivolu-
zione femminista, Milano-Udine, Mimesis, ; “Dalla performance
all’azione. The artist is present: Marina Abramovic´”, in Lexia Nuova
Serie, n° –/; “Aborto. Dal corpo delle donne alla legge e ritor-
no”, in Caffo L. and Taddio L. (eds) Radicalmente Liberi, Mimesis,
Milano, .
Andreas Ventsel (b. ) is a senior researcher of Semiotics at the
Department of Semiotics, Tartu University, Estonia. He defended
his PhD thesis “Towards Semiotic Theory of hegemony” in  at
the University of Tartu, Department of Semiotics. His main research
interests are: political semiotics, semiotics of hegemony, biopolitics
and semiotics of online communication. He has published widely and
internationally on such themes in the major journals for semiotics.
Ugo Volli, nato a Trieste nel , laureato in Filosofia a Milano nel
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, è professore ordinario di Semiotica del testo presso la Facoltà di
Lettere e Filosofia dell’Università di Torino, dove insegna pure Socio-
semiotica. Fino all’anno accademico – ha insegnato Filosofia
del linguaggio all’Università di Bologna. È presidente del Corso di
laurea specialistico in Comunicazione multimediale e di massa dell’U-
niversità di Torino, dove dirige anche il Centro Interdipartimentale
di studi sulla comunicazione e partecipa al collegio dei docenti del
Dottorato in Comunicazione. Fa parte anche del collegio dei docenti
del dottorato ISU di semiotica presso l’Università di Bologna. È mem-
bro della commissione comunicazione dell’Università di Bologna e di
quella della CRUI. Ha tenuto corsi e conferenze in numerose istituzio-
ni e università italiane e straniere fra cui l’ISTA (International School
of Theatre Anthropology), di cui è membro del comitato scientifico,
la New York University e la Brown University di Providence — R.I.
(USA), in ciascuna delle quali stato visiting professor per un semestre.
Inoltre ha svolto varia attività didattica alla Columbia University, Haute
Ecole en Sciences Sociales (Paris), Brooklyn College, Universidad Na-
cional di Lima, Universidad Nacional di Bogotà, Università di Genéve,
Bonn, Madrid, Montpellier, Augsburg, Vienna, Zagabria, Helsinki,
Sofia, Kassel oltre a numerosi atenei italiani. È professore a contratto
di Semiotica, presso il Corso di laurea in Scienze della Comunicazione
dell’Università Vita Salute di Milano.
Evripides Zantides is Associate Professor of Graphic Communica-
tion and Head at the Department of Multimedia and Graphic Arts
at Cyprus University of Technology. His professional activities in-
clude the presentation of research papers at a number of journals
and international conferences on semiotics, graphic design education,
typography and visual communication, and his participation, with
distinguished work, in refereed Art and Design biennials and other
international exhibitions. He is involved as a reviewer in scientific jour-
nals, in educational, conference and exhibition evaluation committees
and he is the delegate for Cyprus in the Association Typographique
Internationale (ATypI), as well as in the International Association for
Semiotic Studies (IASS-AIS). In addition, he is a member of the Helle-
nic Semiotic Society (HSS)), the International Association for Visual
Semiotics (AISV), and founder member of the Cyprus Semiotics Asso-
ciation (CSA) and the Graphic and Illustrators Association of Cyprus
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(GIC). His research interests are based on semiotics in the process of
fine or applied audio/visualization of verbal language, using image,
text/typography and sound. He is the founder and director of the
Semiotics and Visual Communication Lab of the Cyprus University
of Technology (www.svclab.com).
Jiang Zhang, Ph.D. and Professor of Literary Studies. He is currently
Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
and Editor–in-Chief of Social Sciences in China Press (SSCP), Social
Sciences in China, Chinese Literary Criticism, Social Sciences in China Re-
view and Chinese Social Sciences Today. He is also Chairman of Chinese
Society for Literary Criticism (CSLC) and the expert of the Review
Committee of The National Social Sciences Fund of China (NSSFC).
He has long been engaged in research on literary theory and criticism.
Many of his articles were published in Social Sciences in China (both
Chinese and English edition), Oktyabr (Russian literary magazine),
Comparative Literature Studies (US), Literature & Art Studies, Literary
Review, Philosophical Researches among prestigious academic journals,
and in People’s Daily and Guangming Daily among the best–known
newspapers in China. Some articles are re–printed in The Xinhua Di-
gest, Chinese Social Sciences Digest, Reprinted Data of Renmin University
of China and other periodicals. In recent years, his concept “Imposed
Interpretation” has aroused intensive and extensive discussions and
received enthusiastic responses in academia both domestic and abroad.
Some of his representative works are: Imposed Interpretation: Querying
Contemporary Literary Criticism, Identification of issues Concerning Con-
temporary Western Literary Criticism: With Concurrent Reflections on the
Reconstruction of Chinese Literary Criticism, On Theory–centric Literary
Theory: A Discussion Starting from the So–called Literary Theory without
Literature, Discussion on the Periodization of the History of Western Litera-
ry Criticism (series), Can the Author Die or Not, The Presence or Absence of
‘Intention’, etc.
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« Lexia », the international, peer–reviewed journal of CIRCe, the Cen-
ter for Interdisciplinary Research on Communication of the University
of Torino, Italy, invites contributions to be published in issue n.  of
the new series.
« Lexia », la rivista internazionale peer–reviewed di CIRCe, il Centro
Interdipartimentale di Ricerche sulla Comunicazione dell’Università
di Torino, sollecita contributi da pubblicare nel n.  della nuova serie.
« Lexia », le journal international peer–reviewed de CIRCe, le Centre
Interdépartemental de Recherche sur la Communication de l’Univer-
sité de Torino, Italie, lance un appel à soumissions d’articles à publier
dans le n.  de la nouvelle série.
« Lexia », la revista internacional peer–reviewed de CIRCe, el Centro
Interdepartamental de Búsqueda sobre la Comunicación de la Univer-
sidad de Torino, Italia, invita artículos a publicar en el n.  de la nueva
serie.
L’argomento del prossimo numero è “Semiotica dell’aspettualità”.
Le sujet du prochain numéro est « Sémiotique de l’aspectualité ».
El tópico del próximo número es el siguiente: “Semiótica de la
aspectualidad”.
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Topic / Tema / Sujet / Tópico
The topic of the forthcoming issue is “Semiotics of Aspectuality”
The traditional object of semiotics, the sign, stems from a selection.
The signifying side of the sign never simply reproduces the signified
one but singles out an aspect of it. “Aspect” (from the Latin “aspicere”,
“to look at”) etymologically designates what appears, what presents
itself to the eyes, as well as the way in which this presentation takes
place. In English, “aspect” enters the language in the late th century
as an astrological term, indicating the relative position of the planets
as they appear from earth (i.e., how they ‘look at’ one another).
Generally speaking, the aspect in semiotics is everything that pu-
shes reality to turn into signification “in some respect”. The word
“respect”, famously chosen by Peirce in his canonical definition of the
sign, may be regarded as a cognitive variant of the word “aspect”. If
“aspect” is a particular way of looking at things, “respect” is a particu-
lar way of thinking of things. The respect is the inward counterpart
of the aspect. The aspect is the outward counterpart of the respect.
However, both refer to the same process: meaning derives from se-
lection, and looking is the model and utmost metaphor of it. Peirce’s
distinction between “dynamic object” and “immediate object” could
not make sense without involving some form of aspect or respect.
Indeed, most interpreters of Peirce describe the immediate object not
as some additional object distinct from the dynamic one but merely
as some “informationally incomplete facsimile of the dynamic object
generated at some interim stage in a chain of signs” (Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy). The fact that this “facsimile” is incomplete is the
consequence of the fact that some cognitive and cultural forces shape
the sign into the result of a series of aspects and respects, highlighting
certain qualities of the dynamic object while playing down or simply
ignoring some other qualities.
If “aspect” (and, more precisely in Peirce, “respect”) is a general
feature of any semiotic dynamic, “aspectuality” is both an object and
an area of investigation that has traditionally focused on one particular
domain of it (“an aspect of the aspect”, one might say): time. Of all
the categories of dynamic objects that undergo their transformation
into immediate objects through selection of an aspect, time is the one
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that most attracted the attention of scholars. Early reflection on verbal
language encouraged linguists to maintain that words do not limit
themselves to represent the time of reality, distinguishing between
what occurs before and what occurs after, but also to represent this
time from a particular point of view, as though projecting a ‘verbal
eye’ into the linguistic depiction of reality. Already the Indian linguist
Yaska (ca. th century BCE) dealt with this feature of verbal language,
distinguishing actions that are processes (bha¯va), from those where
the action is considered as a completed whole (mu¯rta). The obser-
vation that many verbal languages contain mechanisms that enable
speakers to represent the time of an action according to different
aspects of it has led to the development of a specific area of linguistic
study, that of “grammatical aspect”, which considers the aspect as a
grammatical category that expresses how an action, event, or state,
denoted by a verb, extends over time. Traditionally, scholars distin-
guish among different aspects depending on how they represent the
lasting of a process (durative or punctual), its completion (perfective
or imperfective), the stage of it (inchoative, intermediate, terminative),
its potential iteration (singular, iterative, cyclical), etc. Although most
reflection on the grammatical aspect concerns verbs, scholars have
long realized that the qualities of the time of reality can be verbally
rendered also through other semantic means, including adverbs or
specific lexical choices.
Since the beginning, the study of aspectuality was carried on for
both theoretical and practical means. On the one hand, it is abstracted-
ly interesting to find out how each language (underlain by a specific
linguistic ideology) provides speakers with a series of options as re-
gards the representation of the temporal qualities of reality. On the
other hand, it was soon evident to scholars that choice among these
options often results in a rhetorical effect: verbally casting light on a
process so as to highlight its initial, terminal, complete, incomplete,
etc. character is often a means to lead the receiver and interpreter to
specific pragmatic conclusions. To give an example, contemporary
online journalism often adopts an aspectuality of emotions that is
diametrically different from that of classical ‘paper journalism’; social
networks are full of expressions such as “you’ll be outraged when
you’ll realize what the politician X said”, inviting the reader to click
on the often enticing image attached to the message. Such and similar
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expressions vehicle and simultaneously provoke a receptive dynamics
in which prejudiced emotional reaction to the facts precedes the co-
gnitive awareness of them (readers are led to be outraged before
knowing what they are outraged about, somehow relying on the “ou-
trage deposit” that sits in society and that is automatically activated
through fiduciary adhesion to the journalist’s proposed interpretive
framework).
The centrality of aspects and respects in the definition itself of the
sign, both in Peirce’s and Saussure’s tradition, the accumulation of
insights on verbal aspects in the history of grammar, and the study
of aspectuality in structural linguistics have given rise, in contem-
porary semiotics, to a specific interest for aspectual dynamics. This
interest has manifested itself on two different but intertwined levels.
On a more specific level, semiotics, and especially the Greimassian
school, has focused on the narrative implications of aspectuality. In
the Greimassian model, substantially in keeping with the previous
and parallel linguistic literature, aspectuality is an over–determination
of “temporalization”, that is, the construction, through enunciation,
of the temporal framework in which the action of narration is situated
and imaginarily takes place. Indeed, while in most Indo-European
languages temporalization consists in the narrative projection of a
present, a past, or a future, aspectualization specifies such projection
by focusing on a specific aspect of it. To give an example, in Italian
as well as in other Romance languages, sport journalists characteri-
stically relate soccer actions (which have already occurred in the past,
and are therefore complete) by using not perfective verbal forms (“al
trentesimo minuto del primo tempo, il giocatore ha passato il pallone”,
“at the thirtieth minute of the first half, the player passed the ball”), but
bizarrely adopting imperfective verbal forms (“al trentesimo minuto
del primo tempo, il giocatore passava il pallone”; ““at the thirtieth mi-
nute of the first half, the player was passing the ball”). The pragmatic
effect of this aspectual distortion consists in transmitting to receivers
the feeling that the soccer action, albeit by definition complete, is still
going on under their eyes as if in slow motion, empowering, hence,
the evocative ability of the journalist’s discourse.
It is precisely in order to account for these rhetorical effects that
Greimassian semiotics developed a systematic study of narrative aspec-
tualization. At the same time, in keeping with Saussure’s ambition
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to conceive semiology as a generalization of linguistics, Greimassian
semioticians have also explored the second level of investigation on
aspectuality, by considering whether the analytical framework ela-
borated so as to explain temporal aspectuality could be generalized
in order explicate also non–temporal forms of aspectuality, such as
‘spatial aspectuality’, for instance. In the Greimassian school, such
generalization of the study of temporal aspectuality took place mainly
through the introduction of the so called “observer actant”. As is
well known, the Greimassian school conceives meaning as essentially
stemming from cultural oppositions that find their expression in narra-
tive forms. Relying on previous intuitions by Propp, Lévi-Strauss, and
others, Greimas analyzed narratives as structures characteristically
composed by a certain number of narrative roles or “actants” (subject,
object, sender, receiver, adjuvant, and opponent). Thus, meaning in
society circulates through stories in which the correspondent value,
embodied in an object, is pursued by a subject encouraged by a sender
and sanctioned by a receiver, helped by an adjuvant and contrasted by
an opponent (often at the service of the parallel but inverse narrative
program of an anti–subject). Subsequent followers of the Greimassian
school, however, and in particular Jacques Fontanille, realized that,
so as to fully account for this narrative structure, a further actant
should be introduced in it, a sort of ‘abstract eye’ that observes the
action of the story by focusing on a particular aspect of it. Changing
the perspective of this “observer actant”, the rhetorical meaning of a
narrative can be substantially altered.
In an epoch in which both global and local representations of time
and space seem to undergo a dramatic shifting, Lexia, the international
journal for semiotics published by CIRCE, the Center for Interdisci-
plinary Research on Communication at the University of Turin, Italy,
calls for papers inquiring on the semiotics of aspectuality. Papers dea-
ling with either (or both) of the two levels mentioned above are
welcome: on the one hand, articles may inquire into the specific se-
miotics of temporal aspectuality, focusing on the way in which the
various kinds of present or past discourse represent and rhetorically
shape the receiver’s interpretation of action in time. On the other
hand, articles may seek to extend the semiotic framework for the
study of temporal aspectuality into different and broader domains,
concerning the aspectuality of space or that of non–verbal languages.
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A non–exhaustive list of potential themes include:
a) the history of reflection on aspectuality in linguistics and/or
semiotics;
b) relations, similarities, and differences between the linguistic
and the semiotic analysis of aspectuality;
c) the notions of “respect” and “dynamic/immediate object” in
C.S.S. Peirce;
d) the analytical framework of temporal and non–temporal aspec-
tuality in the Greimassian school of semiotics;
e) the notion of “observer actant”;
f ) the rhetoric of aspectuality in old and/or new media;
g) aspectuality in non–verbal discourses (music, visual communi-
cation, gestural languages, etc.)
h) aspectual ideologies in cultural semiotics: articles on the pre-
valence of such or such ‘aspectual regime’ in specific societies
and cultures;
i) specific aspectual ‘figures’: beginnings; conclusions; reiterations;
completions; incompleteness; durations; instantaneity; etc.
j) specific moral or religious connotations of aspectual representa-
tions (genesis, apocalypse, rebirth, eternal return, catastrophe,
etc.).
L’argomento del prossimo numero è “Semiotica dell’aspettualità”
L’oggetto tradizionale della semiotica, il segno, deriva da una selezio-
ne. Il lato significante del segno non riproduce mai semplicemente
quello significato, ma piuttosto ne individua un aspetto. “Aspetto” (dal
latino “aspicere”, “guardare”) etimologicamente designa ciò che appa-
re, ciò che si presenta agli occhi, così come il modo attraverso il quale
siffatta presentazione avviene. In inglese “aspect” entra nella lingu
verso la fine del XIV secolo come termine astrologico, che indica la po-
sizione relativa dei pianeti per come appaiono dalla terra (ossia: come
si “guardano” a vicenda). In termini generali, l’aspetto in semiotica
è qualsiasi cosa spinga la realtà a convertirsi in significazione “sotto
qualche rispetto”. La parola “rispetto”, notoriamente scelta da Peirce
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nella sua definizione canonica di segno, può essere considerata come
una variante cognitiva della parola “aspetto”. Se “aspetto” è un parti-
colare modo di guardare alle cose, “rispetto” è un particolare modo
di pensarvi. Il rispetto è la controparte interna dell’aspetto. L’aspetto
è la controparte esterna del rispetto. Tuttavia entrambe si riferisco-
no allo stesso processo: il significato deriva da una selezione, e l’atto
del guardare ne è modello e più precipua metafora. La distinzione
peirciana fra “oggetto dinamico” e “oggetto immediato” non avrebbe
senso senza considerare qualche forma di aspetto o di rispetto. Inve-
ro, la maggiorparte degli interpreti di Peirce usa descrivere l’oggetto
immediato non come una sorta di oggetto addizionale distinto da
quello dinamico ma come “facsimile informazionalmente incompleto
dell’oggetto dinamico generato in qualche stadio provvisorio in una
catena di segni” (Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Il fatto che tale
“facsimile” sia incompleto è conseguenza del fatto che alcune forze
cognitive e culturali hanno modellato il segno come risultato di una
serie di aspetti e rispetti, mettendo in luce determinate qualità dell’og-
getto dinamico e minimizzandone, o semplicemente ignorandone,
delle altre.
Se “aspetto” (e, più precisamente in Peirce, “rispetto”) è una carat-
teristica generale di ogni dinamica semiotica, “aspettualità” ne è nel
contempo un oggetto e un’area di investigazione tradizionalmente
focalizzata in un particolare dominio (si potrebbe dire: “un aspetto
dell’aspetto”): il tempo. Di tutte le categorie di oggetti dinamici che
subiscono la loro trasformazione in oggetti immediati attraverso la
selezione di un aspetto, il tempo è quella che ha maggiormente su-
scitato l’attenzione degli studiosi. Le prime riflessioni sul linguaggio
verbale hanno incoraggiato i linguisti a ritenere che le parole non si
limitino a rappresentare il tempo della realtà, distinguendo fra ciò che
avviene prima e ciò che avviene dopo, ma che pure rappresentino tale
tempo da un particolare punto di vista, come a proiettare un “occhio
verbale” nella raffigurazione linguistica della realtà. Già il linguista
indiano Yaska (ca. VII secolo a.C.) ebbe a trattare questa caratteristica
del linguaggio verbale, distinguendo azioni che sono processi (bha¯va)
da quelle dove l’azione viene considerata come un tutto (mu¯rta).
L’osservazione per la quale alcuni linguaggi verbali contengono
meccanismi che consentono ai parlanti di rappresentare il tempo di
un’azione secondo differenti aspetti ha condotto allo sviluppo di una
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specifica area dello studio linguistico, quella dell’aspetto grammatica-
le, che considera l’aspetto come categoria grammaticale esprimente
il modo nel quale un’azione, evento, o stato, denotati da un verbo,
si estendano nel tempo. Tradizionalmente, gli studiosi distinguono
differenti aspetti in base a come questi rappresentano la durata di
un processo (durativi o puntuali), il suo compimento (perfettivi o
imperfettivi), il suo stadio di completamento (incoativi, intermedi,
terminativi), le sue potenziali iterazioni (singolari, iterativi, ciclici),
etc. Sebbene buona parte delle riflessioni sull’aspetto grammaticale
siano relative ai verbi, gli studiosi hanno da tempo compreso come le
qualità del tempo della realtà possano essere rese verbalmente anche
attraverso altri mezzi semantici, come gli avverbi o specifiche scelte
lessicali.
Sin dai suoi albori, lo studio dell’aspettualità è stato condotto nel
contempo su binari teoretici e pratici. Da un lato, è interessante in ter-
mini astratti comprendere come ogni linguaggio (che sottintende una
specifica ideologia linguistica) fornisca ai parlanti una serie di opzioni
per rappresentare le qualità temporali della realtà. Dall’altro, è stato
presto evidente agli studiosi che la scelta di una delle opzioni suddette
spesso si traduce in un effetto retorico: gettare luce verbalmente su
un processo in modo da evidenziarne il carattere iniziale, terminale,
completo, incompleto, ecc. costituisce spesso un mezzo per portare il
ricevente e l’interprete verso specifiche conclusioni pragmatiche. Per
fare un esempio: il giornalismo online contemporaneo spesso adotta
un’aspettualità emotiva diametralmente opposta a quella del classico
“giornalismo su carta”; i social network straripano di espressioni come
“sarai indignato quando realizzerai cosa il politico X ha affermato”,
le quali invitano il lettore a cliccare sull’immagine, spesso allettante,
allegata al messaggio. Queste e simili espressioni veicolano e simulta-
neamente provocano una dinamica ricettiva per la quale una reazione
emotiva pregiudiziale ai fatti precede la consapevolezza cognitiva di
questi (i lettori sono condotti all’indignazione prima di conoscere
che cosa li indignerà, in qualche modo attingendo da un “deposito
d’indignazione” sociale che viene attivato automaticamente attraverso
l’adesione fiduciaria al quadro interpretativo proposto dal giornalista).
La centralità degli aspetti e dei rispetti nella definizione stessa di
segno, e nelle tradizioni perciana e saussuriana, l’accumulo di appro-
fondimenti sugli aspetti verbali nella storia della grammatica, e lo
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studio dell’aspettualità nella linguistica strutturale hanno dato origine,
nella semiotica contemporanea, a uno specifico interesse verso le di-
namiche aspettuali. Tale interesse si è manifestato su due livelli diversi
ma intersecati. Su un più specifico livello la semiotica, e specialmen-
te la scuola greimasiana, si è focalizzata sulle implicazioni narrative
dell’aspettualità. Nel modello greimasiano, sostanzialmente in linea
con la letteratura linguistica precedente e parallela, l’aspettualità è una
sovra–determinazione della “temporalizzazione”, ovverosia la costru-
zione, attraverso l’enunciazione, di un quadro temporale nel quale
l’azione della narrazione è situata e immaginariamente accade. Infatti,
mentre in buona parte delle lingue indoeuropee la temporalizzazione
consiste nella proiezione narrativa di un presente, un passato, o un
futuro, l’aspettualizzazione specifica tale proiezione focalizzandosi su
uno specifico aspetto di questa. Ad esempio: in italiano, così come
in altre lingue romanze, i giornalisti sportivi caratteristicamente rac-
contanto le azioni calcistiche (che sono già successe in passato, ergo
sono complete) non usando forme verbali perfettive (“al trentesimo
minuto del primo tempo, il giocatore ha passato il pallone”), bensì
bizzarramente adottando forme verbali imperfettive (“al trentesimo
minuto del primo tempo, il giocatore passava il pallone”). L’effetto
pragmatico di tale distorsione aspettuale consiste nel trasmettere ai
riceventi la sensazione che l’azione calcistica, pur dato il suo comple-
tamento, si stia ancora svolgendo sotto i loro occhi come in una sorta
di slow motion, catalizzando quindi l’abilità evocativa del discorso
giornalistico.
È precisamente al fine di tenere conto di tali effetti retorici che
la semiotica greimasiana ha sviluppato uno studio sistematico delle
aspettualizzazioni narrative. Allo stesso tempo, in linea con l’ambi-
zione saussuriana di concepire la semiologia come generalizzazione
della linguistica, i semiotici greimasiani hanno anche esplorato il se-
condo livello d’investigazione dell’aspettualità, valutando la possibilità
di estendere il framework analitico elaborato per spiegare l’aspettua-
lità temporale anche verso forme aspettuali non–temporali, come
ad esempio l’aspettualità spaziale. Nella scuola greimasiana tale ge-
neralizzazione dello studio della temporalità aspettuale è avvenuta
principalmente in forza dell’introduzione del cosiddetto “attante os-
servatore”. Come noto, la scuola greimasiana concepisce il significato
come essenzialmente derivante da opposizioni culturali che trova-
 Call for papers: Aspettualità / Aspectuality
no la loro espressione in forme narrative. Basandosi sulle intuizioni
precedenti di Propp, Lévi-Strauss, e altri, Greimas analizzò le narra-
zioni come strutture caratteristicamente composte da un determinato
numero di ruoli narrativi o “attanti” (soggetto, oggetto, destinante,
ricevente, aiutante e opponente). Il senso, dunque, circola nella società
attraverso storie nelle quali il valore corrispondente, incorporato in
un oggetto, è perseguito da un soggetto spronato da un destinante e
sanzionato da un destinatario, aiutato da un aiutante e contrastato da
un opponente (spesso al servizio del parallelo, ma inverso, program-
ma narrativo di un anti–soggetto). Tuttavia, i discepoli di Greimas, e
in particolare Jacques Fontanille, hanno poi compreso che, per tenere
conto appieno di tale struttura narrative, era necessario introdurre un
ulteriore attante, una sorta di “occhio astratto” che osserva l’azione
della storia focalizzandosi su un particolare aspetto. Cambiando la
prospettiva di questo “attante osservatore”, il significato retorico di
una narrazione può essere sostanzialmente alterato.
In un’epoca in cui le rappresentazioni sia globali che locali del
tempo e dello spazio sembrano subire uno slittamento drammatico,
« Lexia », la rivista internazionale di semiotica pubblicata da CIRCE,
il Centro Interdipartimentale di Ricerca sulla Comunicazione dell’U-
niversità di Torino, emana un call for papers sul tema della semiotica
dell’aspettualità. Sono graditi articoli concernenti uno o entrambi i
livelli menzionati in precedenza: da un lato, gli articoli possono in-
dagare la semiotica specifica dell’aspettualità temporale, mettendo a
fuoco il modo attraverso cui vari tipi di discorsi, presenti e passati,
rappresentano e modellano retoricamente l’interpretazione del lettore
circa l’azione nel tempo. Dall’altro lato, gli articoli possono proporre
un’estensione del framework semiotico per lo studio dell’aspettualità
temporale verso domini differenti e più ampi, relativi all’aspettualità
dello spazio o a quella dei linguaggi non verbali.
Alcuni (ma non gli unici) potenziali temi di ricerca sono:
a) la storia della riflessione sull’aspettualità in linguistica e/o se-
miotica;
b) le relazioni, le similarità e le differenze fra l’analisi dell’aspettua-
lità dal punto di vista linguistico e semiotico;
c) la nozione di “rispetto” e di “oggetto dinamico/immediato” in
C.S.S. Peirce;
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d) il framework analitico dell’aspettualità temporale e non–temporale
nella scuola semiotica greimasiana;
e) la nozione di “attante osservatore”;
f ) la retorica dell’aspettualità nei media vecchi e/o nuovi;
g) l’aspettualità nei discorsi non–verbali (musica, comunicazione
visiva, linguaggi gestuali, etc.);
h) le ideologie aspettuali nella semiotica della cultura: articoli sulla
prevalenza di questo o quel “regime aspettuale” in specifiche
società e culture;
i) specifiche “figure” aspettuali: inizi; conclusioni; reiterazioni;
completamenti; incompletezze; durate; istantaneità; ecc.;
j) connotazioni morali o religiose specifiche delle rappresenta-
zioni aspettuali (genesi, apocalisse, rinascita, eterno ritorno,
catastrofe, etc.).
Le sujet du prochain numéro est « Sémiotique de l’aspectualité »
L’objet traditionnel de la sémiotique, le signe, dérive d’une sélection.
Le côté signifiant du signe ne fait pas que reproduire le côté signifié,
mais il circonscrit un aspect de celui–ci. « Aspect » (du latin « aspice-
re », « regarder ») désigne étymologiquement ce qui émerge, ce qui se
donne à voir (aux yeux), la manière avec laquelle cette représentation
s’offre. En anglais, « aspect » apparaît à la fin du e siècle comme un
terme astrologique, pour indiquer la position des planètes par rapport
à la Terre (c’est-à-dire comment elles se « regardent » mutuellement).
De manière générale, « aspect » en sémiotique désigne tous les élé-
ments qui rendent la réalité signifiable « dans quelque rapport ou à
quelque titre », selon la célèbre définition du signe par Peirce : « A sign
is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect
or capacity ». Le mot anglais respect choisi par Pierce dans sa définition
canonique du signe peut être considéré comme une variante cognitive
du mot « aspect ». Si « aspect » signifie une manière particulière de
voir les choses, respect est une manière spécifique de penser les choses.
Le respect est la contrepartie intérieure de l’aspect, et l’aspect est la
partie extérieure visible du respect. Néanmoins, les deux concepts
se réfèrent au même processus : la signification dérive d’une sélec-
tion, et le regard est son modèle et sa plus grande métaphore. La
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distinction établie par Pierce entre les « objets dynamiques » et les
« objets immédiats » ne peut pas opérer sans tenir compte de certaines
formes d’aspect ou de respect. En effet, bien des interprètes de Pierce
décrivent les objets immédiats non pas comme des objets additionnels
distincts des objets dynamiques, mais plutôt comme des « facsimilés
informatifs mais incomplets inspirés par les objets dynamiques à un
stade intermédiaire de la chaîne des signes » (“informationally incom-
plete facsimile of the dynamic object generated at some interim stage
in a chain of signs” [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]). Le caractère
incomplet de ce « facsimilé » est la conséquence du fait que des forces
cognitives et culturelles ont élaboré le signe en une série d’aspects et
de respects, en relevant certaines qualités dynamiques de l’objet, mais
en en occultant ou en en ignorant d’autres.
Si l’« aspect » (et plus précisément, selon la terminologie de Pierce,
le respect) est une caractéristique générale de toute dynamique sémio-
tique, l’aspectualité est à la fois un objet et une aire de recherche qui
s’est traditionnellement focalisée sur un aspect de l’objet lui–même
(un aspect de l’aspect pourrait–on dire) : le temps. Parmi toutes les
catégories d’objets dynamiques qui évoluent en objets immédiats à
cause de la sélection d’un aspect, le temps est celui qui a le plus retenu
l’attention des chercheurs. Les premières recherches sur le langage
verbal ont encouragé les linguistes à établir que les mots ne se limitent
pas à définir le temps de la réalité, en distinguant entre ce qui précède
et ce qui suit, mais qu’ils représentent également le temps d’un point
de vue particulier, comme si un « œil verbal » était projeté dans la
description linguistique de la réalité. Déjà le linguiste indien Yaska
(˜ e siècle avant J.-C.) s’est positionné sur ces problématiques du
langage, en distinguant les actions qui sont des processus ( bha¯va), de
celles où l’action est considérée dans son ensemble (mu¯rta). Le constat
que nombre de langages verbaux développent des mécanismes qui
permettent aux locuteurs de représenter la temporalité d’une action
suivant différents aspects de celle–ci a conduit au développement d’u-
ne aire spécifique des études de la linguistique, celle dite des « aspects
grammaticaux ». Cette sous–discipline de la linguistique considère l’a-
spect comme une catégorie grammaticale qui exprime comment une
action, un événement ou un état donné par le verbe, se répercute sur
le temps de l’action. Traditionnellement les chercheurs distinguent
entre différents aspects dans leur manière de représenter la durée
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d’un processus (continu ou ponctuel), son achèvement (perfectif ou
imperfectif ), son aspect (inchoative, intermédiaire, terminatif ) et son
itération potentielle (singulative, itérative, répétitive), etc. Bien que la
plupart des développements sur les aspects grammaticaux concernent
des verbes, les chercheurs se sont aperçus depuis longtemps que les
caractéristiques de la temporalité du réel peuvent être rendues par le
biais d’autres moyens sémantiques, en incluant des adverbes ou des
choix lexicaux spécifiques.
Depuis ses débuts, l’étude de l’aspectualité a été développée pour
des raisons théoriques et pratiques. D’une part, il est très intéressant
d’un point de vue théorique de découvrir comment chaque langage
(soutenu par une certaine idéologie linguistique) fournit aux locuteurs
une série d’options en ce qui regarde les possibilités de représentation
des caractéristiques de la réalité. D’autre part, il est devenu très tôt
évident pour les chercheurs que le choix parmi ces options résulte
souvent d’un effet de rhétorique : attirer verbalement l’attention sur
les effets d’un processus en mettant l’accent sur son début, sa fin, sa
complétude ou son inachèvement, etc. est souvent une manière de
conduire le destinataire et interprète à un certain type de conclusions
pragmatiques. Par exemple, le journalisme en ligne contemporain
adopte souvent une aspectualité des émotions qui diffère diamétrale-
ment de celle du journalisme classique ; dans les réseaux sociaux, on
trouve souvent des expressions comme « vous serez indigné quand
vous saurez ce que le politicien X a dit », qui invitent le lecteur à
cliquer sur l’image souvent attrayante jointe au message. De telles
expressions véhiculent et en même temps provoquent des dynami-
ques de réception dans lesquelles une réaction émotionnelle basée
sur des préjugées précède la connaissance (les lecteurs sont conduits
à être indignés avant de savoir pourquoi, car d’une certaine manière
ils puisent au « dépôt d’indignation » qui réside au sein de la société et
qui est automatiquement activé par le biais de l’adhésion fiduciaire au
cadre interprétatif proposé par le journaliste).
La centralité des aspects et des respects dans la définition même
du signe dans les traditions de Peirce et de Saussure, le progrès de la
connaissance sur les aspects verbaux dans l’histoire de la grammaire,
et l’étude de l’aspectualité par la linguistique structuraliste ont en-
gendré l’intérêt spécifique que la sémiotique structurelle porte aux
dynamiques aspectuelles. Un tel intérêt se manifeste à deux niveaux
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différents mais entremêlés. Au niveau plus spécifique, la sémiotique,
et spécialement l’école greimassienne, s’est concentrée sur les im-
plications narratives de l’aspectualité. Dans le modèle de Greimas,
substantiellement en ligne avec la littérature linguistique précédente
et contemporaine, l’aspectualité est une sur–détermination de la « tem-
poralisation », c’est-à-dire la construction par l’énonciation du cadre
temporel dans lequel l’action de la narration est située et dans lequel
on imagine qu’elle ait lieu. En effet, tandis que dans la plupart des lan-
gages indo–européens la temporalité repose sur la projection narrative
d’un présent, d’un passé et d’un futur, l’aspectualisation spécifie cette
projection en se concentrant sur l’un de ses aspects particuliers. Par
exemple, en italien, tout comme dans d’autres langues romanes, les
journalistes sportifs typiquement rapportent des actions de football
(qui ont déjà eu lieu dans le passé et sont donc complètes) non pas
en utilisant des formes verbales perfectives (« al trentesimo minuto
del primo tempo, il giocatore ha passato il pallone », « à la trentiè-
me minute de la première mi–temps, le joueur a passé le ballon »),
mais ils adoptent bizarrement des formes verbales imperfectives (« al
trentesimo minuto del primo tempo, il giocatore passava il pallone »,
« à la trentième minute de la première mi–temps, le joueur passait le
ballon »). L’effet pragmatique de cette distorsion aspectuelle consiste
à transmettre aux destinataires la sensation que l’action de football,
bien que terminée par définition, continue toujours sous leurs yeux
comme au ralenti. Cela augmente la capacité évocatrice du discours
du journaliste. C’est précisément pour expliquer ces effets rhétoriques
que la sémiotique Greimassienne a développé une étude systémati-
que de l’aspectualisation narrative. En même temps, en ligne avec
l’ambition saussurienne de concevoir la sémiotique comme une gé-
néralisation de la linguistique, les sémioticiens greimassiens ont aussi
exploré le deuxième niveau de l’enquête sur l’aspectualité. C’est-à-dire
qu’ils se sont demandés si la grille analytique élaborée pour expli-
quer l’aspectualité temporelle pouvait être généralisée pour expliquer
également des formes d’aspectualité non–temporelle, comme par
exemple l’aspectualité « spatiale ». L’école gremassienne a généralisé
l’étude de l’aspectualité temporelle surtout en introduisant l’« actant
observateur ». L’école greimassienne, c’est bien connu, théorise que
le signifié dérive essentiellement des oppositions culturelles qui sont
exprimées dans des formes narratives. Sur la base des intuitions précé-
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dentes de Propp, Lévi-Strauss et autres, Greimas analyse les narrations
comme des structures typiquement composées d’un certain nombre
de rôles narratifs ou « actants » (sujet, objet, destinateur, destinataire,
adjuvant, opposant). Par conséquent, le signifié circule dans la société
par le biais e récits dans lesquels la valeur incarnée dans l’objet corre-
spondant, est poursuivie par un sujet encouragé par un destinateur et
sanctionné par un destinataire, aidé par un adjuvant et mis en difficulté
par un opposant (souvent au service du programme narratif parallèle
mais diamétralement opposé d’un anti–sujet). Cependant, les disci-
ples de l’école greimassienne, et en particulier Jacques Fontanille, ont
ensuite compris que, afin d’expliquer complètement cette structure
narrative, il fallait introduire un actant ultérieur, une sorte d’« œil
abstrait » qui observe l’action de l’histoire en se concentrant sur l’un
de ses aspects particuliers. En changeant la perspective de cet « actant
observateur », le signifié rhétorique d’une narration peut subir une
altération substantielle.
Dans une époque où les représentations globales et locales du
temps et de l’espace semblent changer dramatiquement, « Lexia »,
la revue internationale de sémiotique publiée par CIRCE, le Centre
Interdisciplinaire pour la Recherche sur la Communication de l’Uni-
versité de Turin, Italie, lance un appel à contributions sur le thème de
la sémiotique de l’aspectualité. Les contributions concernant un ou
plusieurs des axes de recherche mentionnés ci–dessus sont les bienve-
nues. D’un côté, les articles peuvent étudier la sémiotique spécifique
de l’aspectualité temporelle en se concentrant sur la façon dont diffé-
rents types de discours présents et passés représentent l’action dans
le temps et modèlent rhétoriquement l’interprétation du destinataire.
De l’autre, les articles peuvent chercher à étendre le champ de l’étude
sémiotique de la temporalité aspectuelle à des sujets différentes et plus
amples, qui concernent l’aspectualité de l’espace et celle de langages
non–verbaux.
Une liste non exhaustive de thèmes potentiels inclut :
a) l’histoire de la recherche sur l’aspectualité en linguistique et/ou
en sémiotique ;
b) relations, similarités et différences entre l’analyse linguistique
et sémiotique de l’aspectualité ;
 Call for papers: Aspettualità / Aspectuality
c) les notions de respect et d’« objet dynamique/immédiat » chez
C.S. Peirce ;
d) l’analyse de l’aspectualité temporelle et non–temporelle au sein
de l’école greimassienne de sémiotique ;
e) la notion d’« actant observateur » ;
f ) la rhétorique de l’aspectualité dans les média traditionnels
et/ou dans les nouveaux média ;
g) l’aspectualité dans les discours non–verbaux (musique, commu-
nication visuelle, langage gestuel, etc.) ;
h) idéologies aspectuelles en sémiotique culturelle : articles sur la
prévalence de tel ou tel « régime aspectuel » dans des sociétés
et cultures spécifiques ;
i) « Figures » aspectuelles spécifiques : commencements ; con-
clusions ; réitérations ; achèvements ; inachèvements ; durée ;
instantanéités ; etc.
j) connotations morales ou religieuses spécifiques des représen-
tations aspectuelles (genèse, apocalypse, renaissance, retour
éternel, catastrophe, etc.).
El tópico del próximo número es el siguiente: “Semiótica de la
aspectualidad
El objeto de estudio tradicional de la semiótica, el signo, se origina a
partir de una selección realizada por el propio significante. El signifi-
cante del signo, en este sentido, no se limita a reproducir el significado,
sino que selecciona uno de sus aspectos. El “aspecto” (del Latín aspi-
cere, “mirar”) designa etimológicamente lo que aparece, lo que se
presenta a los ojos, así como la forma en que esta presentación se rea-
liza. En el idioma inglés, la palabra “aspect” entra en uso a finales del
siglo XIV como un término astrológico que indica la posición relativa
de los planetas según como se ven de la tierra (es decir, según como se
“miran” a sí mismos). En términos generales, en semiótica, el aspecto
es todo lo que hace que la realidad se convierta en una significación
“en algún respecto a”. La palabra “respecto”, elegida por Peirce para
su definición canónica del signo, puede considerarse como una va-
riante epistémica de la palabra “aspecto”. Si el “aspecto” es una forma
particular de mirar las cosas, el “respecto” es una forma particular de
Call for papers: Aspettualità / Aspectuality 
pensar las cosas. El término “respecto” es la contraparte introspectiva
del aspecto. El aspecto es, valga la redundancia, la contraparte exterior
del término “respecto”. Sin embargo, ambos se refieren al mismo
proceso en donde el significado deriva de una selección, y el acto de
mirar es su modelo y su metáfora máxima. La distinción de Peirce
entre “objeto dinámico” y “objeto inmediato” no tendría sentido sin la
intervención de alguna forma de “aspecto” o de “respecto”. De hecho,
la mayoría de los intérpretes de Peirce describen el objeto inmediato
no como un objeto adicional distinto del dinámico, sino solo como
una “copia informativamente incompleta del objeto dinámico gene-
rada en alguna etapa intermedia de una cadena de signos” (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy -traducción propia). El hecho de que esta
“copia” sea incompleta es la consecuencia del hecho de que algunas
fuerzas cognitivas y culturales dan forma al signo como resultado de
una serie de “aspectos” y “respectos”, destacando ciertas cualidades del
objeto dinámico y restando importancia (o simplemente ignorando)
a otras cualidades.
Si el “aspecto” (y, más precisamente, en Peirce el “respecto”) es
una característica general de cualquier dinámica semiótica, la “ aspec-
tualidad” es, a la vez, un objeto y un área de investigación que tradicio-
nalmente se ha centrado en un dominio particular de la misma (“un
aspecto del aspecto”; también se podría decir): el tiempo. De todas las
categorías de objetos dinámicos que se transforman en objetos inme-
diatos a través de la selección de un aspecto, el tiempo es el que más ha
atraído la atención de los estudiosos. Las primeras reflexiones sobre el
lenguaje verbal llevaron a los lingüistas a afirmar que las palabras no se
limitan a representar el tiempo de la realidad (distinguiendo entre lo
que ocurre antes y lo que ocurre después), sino también a representar
dicho tiempo desde un punto de vista particular, como si se proyectara
un “ojo verbal” en la representación lingüística de la realidad. El lingüi-
sta indio Yaska (aprox. VII siglo a.C.) se ocupó, a partir de lo anterior,
de la precitada característica del lenguaje verbal, distinguiendo las
acciones que son procesos (bha¯va), de aquellas en las que la acción se
considera como una totalidad completa (mu¯rta). La observación de
que muchos lenguajes verbales contienen mecanismos que permiten
a los hablantes representar el tiempo de una acción de acuerdo con
diferentes aspectos de la misma, ha dado lugar al desarrollo de un área
específica de estudio lingüístico, la del “aspecto gramatical”, la cual
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considera el “aspecto” como una categoría gramatical que expresa
cómo una acción, un evento o un estado, denotado por un verbo, se
extiende a lo largo del tiempo. Tradicionalmente, los expertos distin-
guen entre diferentes aspectos dependiendo de la forma en la que
representan la duración de un proceso (durativo o puntual), su finali-
zación (perfectivo o imperfectivo), sus etapas (incoativo, intermedio,
terminativo), su potencial iteración (singular, iterativo, cíclico), etc.
Aunque la mayoría de las reflexiones sobre el aspecto gramatical se
refieren a los verbos, los estudiosos han destacado anteriormente que
las cualidades del tiempo de la realidad pueden ser verbalmente ex-
presadas, también, a través de otros medios semánticos, incluyendo
adverbios o elecciones lexicales específicas.
Desde el principio, el estudio de la aspectualidad se ha llevado a
cabo por medios teóricos y prácticos. Por un lado, desde una perspec-
tiva abstracta, es interesante averiguar cómo cada idioma (bajo una
ideología lingüística específica) ofrece a los hablantes una serie de op-
ciones en relación a la representación de las cualidades temporales de
la realidad. Por el otro lado, los estudiosos comprendieron prontamen-
te que la elección entre estas opciones genera, a menudo, un efecto
retórico: el análisis verbal de un proceso para poner en relieve su ca-
rácter inicial, terminal, completo, incompleto, etc., es, muchas veces,
un medio para llevar el receptor e intérprete a conclusiones pragmá-
ticas específicas. Por ejemplo, el periodismo contemporáneo adopta
a menudo una aspectualidad de emociones que es diametralmente
diferente a la del clásico “periodismo de papel”; las redes sociales
están llenas de expresiones tales como “te indignarás cuando te des
cuenta de lo que dijo el político X”, invitando al lector a hacer clic en
la imagen, muy a menudo tentadora, que acompaña el mensaje. Tal y
similares expresiones conllevan a, y al mismo tiempo provocan, una
dinámica receptiva en la que una reacción emocional prejuiciosa a los
hechos precede su comprensión cognitiva (los lectores son empujados
a indignarse antes de conocer la razón por la cual están indignados,
de alguna manera atingiendo al “depósito de indignación” que se
encuentra en la sociedad y se activa automáticamente a través de la
adhesión legataria al marco interpretativo propuesto por el periodista).
La centralidad de los “aspectos” y “respectos” en la definición mi-
sma del signo (tanto en la tradición de Peirce como en la de Saussure),
la acumulación de observaciones sobre los aspectos verbales en la
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historia de la gramática y el estudio de la aspectualidad en la lingüística
estructural han originado, en la semiótica contemporánea, un interés
específico en el estudio de las dinámicas aspectuales. El precitado inte-
rés se ha manifestado en dos niveles diferentes, pero interconectados.
En un nivel más específico, la semiótica, y especialmente la escuela
greimasiana, se ha centrado en las implicaciones narrativas de la aspec-
tualidad. En el modelo de Greimas, sustancialmente de acuerdo con la
literatura lingüística anterior y paralela, la aspectualidad es una súper–
determinación de “temporalización”, es decir, la construcción, a través
de la enunciación, del marco temporal en el que se sitúa e imaginaria-
mente tiene lugar la acción de la narración. En efecto, mientras que
en la mayoría de las lenguas indoeuropeas la temporalización consiste
en la proyección narrativa de un tiempo presente, pasado o futuro, en
la aspectualización dicha proyección se precisa, centrándose en uno
de sus “aspectos” específicos. Por ejemplo, en italiano, así como en
otras lenguas romances, los periodistas deportivos cuentan de forma
característica las acciones de fútbol (que ya han ocurrido en el pasado,
y por lo tanto están cumplidas) no mediante el uso de formas verbales
perfectivas (“al trentesimo minuto del primo tempo, il giocatore ha
passato il pallone”, “en el minuto treinta del primer tiempo, el juga-
dor pasó la pelota”), sino adoptando extrañamente formas verbales
imperfectivas (“al trentesimo minuto del primo tempo, il giocatore
passava il pallone”; “en el minuto treinta del primer tiempo, el jugador
pasaba la pelota”). El efecto prágmatico de esta distorsión aspectual
consiste en transmitir a los receptores la sensación de que la acción de
fútbol, aunque por definición ya cumplida, aún continúa bajo sus ojos
como si fuera en cámara lenta, potenciando, por lo tanto, la capacidad
evocadora del discurso del periodista.
Es precisamente con el fin de tener en cuenta estos efectos retó-
ricos que la semiótica greimasiana desarrolló un estudio sistemático
de la aspectualización narrativa. Al mismo tiempo, de acuerdo con la
ambición de Saussure de concebir la semiología como una generaliza-
ción de la lingüística, los semiólogos greimasianos han explorado el
segundo nivel de investigación sobre la aspectualidad, considerando
si el marco analítico elaborado para explicar la aspectualidad tempo-
ral podría generalizarse con el fin de explicar, también, las formas
no temporales de aspectualidad, como por ejemplo la “aspectualidad
espacial”.
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En la escuela greimasiana, tal generalización del estudio de la
aspectualidad temporal se desarrolló principalmente a través de la
introducción del así-llamado “actante observador”.
Como es bien sabido, la escuela greimasiana concibe el significa-
do esencialmente como el producto de oposiciones culturales que
encuentran su expresión en formas narrativas. Basándose en aproxi-
maciones anteriores de Propp, Lévi-Strauss y otros, Greimas analizó
las narrativas como estructuras característicamente compuestas por
un cierto número de funciones narrativas o “actantes” (Sujeto, Ob-
jeto, Destinador, Destinatario, Ayudante y Oponente). Por lo tanto,
el significado en la sociedad circula a través de relatos en los que el
valor correspondiente, encarnado por un objeto, es perseguido por
un sujeto, el cual es animado por un destinador y sancionado por un
destinatario, ayudado por un ayudante y contrastado por un oponente
(a menudo al servicio del programa narrativo paralelo, pero opuesto,
de un anti–sujeto). Seguidores posteriores de la escuela greimasiana,
sin embargo, y, en particular, Jacques Fontanille, se dieron cuenta de
que, para poder explicar completamente esta estructura narrativa, hay
que introducir en ella un actante más, una especie de “ojo abstracto”
que observa la acción del relato, centrándose en un aspecto particular
de la misma. Si cambia la perspectiva de este “actante observador”, el
significado retórico de una narrativa puede quedar sustancialmente
alterado.
En una época en la que ambas representaciones globales y locales
del tiempo y del espacio parecen sufrir un cambio drástico, Lexia, la
revista internacional de semiótica publicada por el Centro Interde-
partamental de Investigaciones sobre la Comunicación (CIRCe) de la
Universidad de Turín (Italia) invita a una reflexión sobre la semiótica
de las aspectualidad. En particular, se convoca a la presentación de
artículos que propongan o traten uno de los dos (o ambos) niveles
mencionados anteriormente: por una parte, los artículos pueden inve-
stigar la semiótica específica de la aspectualidad temporal, centrándose
en la forma en la que los distintos tipos de discurso presente o pasado
representan y dan forma retóricamente a la interpretación del receptor
de la acción en el tiempo. Por otra parte, los autores pueden intentar
ampliar el marco semiótico del estudio de la aspectualidad temporal
en ámbitos diferentes y más amplios, por ejemplo, en relación a la
aspectualidad del espacio o la de los lenguajes no verbales.
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Una lista no exhaustiva de posibles temas incluye:
a) la historia de la reflexión sobre la aspectualidad en la lingüística
y/o la semiótica.
b) las relaciones, similitudes y diferencias entre el análisis lingüísti-
co y semiótico de la aspectualidad.
c) las nociones de “respecto” y “objeto inmediato/dinámico” en
C.S.S. Peirce.
d) el marco analítico de la aspectualidad temporal y no temporal
en la escuela greimasiana de semiótica.
e) la noción de “actante observador”.
f ) la retórica de la aspectualidad en los medios de comunicación
de masas y digitales.
g) la aspectualidad en los discursos no verbales (la música, la comu-
nicación visual, los lenguajes gestuales, etc.).
h) las ideologías aspectuales en la semiótica de la cultura: artículos
sobre la prevalencia de tal o cual “régimen aspectual” están
presentes en sociedades y culturas específicas.
i) análisis de específicas “figuras” aspectuales: inicios; conclusio-
nes; reiteraciones; terminaciones; inconclusión; duraciones;
instantaneidad; etc.
j) análisis de específicas connotaciones morales o religiosas de las
representaciones aspectuales (génesis, apocalipsis, renacimien-
to, eterno retorno, catástrofes, etc.).
Schedule / Calendario / Calendrier / Calendario
Here is the expected publication schedule of the volume:
Questo è il calendario previsto per la pubblicazione del volume:
Voici le calendrier prévu pour la publication du volume :
Éste es el calendario previsto para la publicación del volumen:
— December , : deadline for contributions
 dicembre : deadline per i contributi
 décembre : date limite pour les articles
 diciembre : fecha límite para los artículos
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— January , : deadline for referees
 gennaio : deadline per i revisori
 janvier  : date limite pour les réviseurs
 enero : fecha límite para los revisores
— March , : deadline for revised versions of contributions
 marzo : deadline per le versioni rielaborate dei contributi
 mars : date limite pour les versions révisées des contribu-
tions
 marzo : fecha límite para las revisiones de los artículos
— June , : publication of « Lexia » n. .
 giugno : pubblicazione di « Lexia » n. 
 juin : publication de « Lexia » n. 
 junio : publicación de « Lexia » n. 
***
Contributions, , characters max, MLA stylesheet, with a 
words max English abstract and  English key–words, should be sent
to massimo.leone@unito.it.
I contributi, max . battute, foglio di stile MLA, con un abstract in
inglese di  parole max e  parole chiave in Inglese, dovranno essere
inviati a massimo.leone@unito.it.
Les articles, . frappes max, feuille de style MLA, avec un résumé
en anglais de  mots max et  mots–clé en anglais, devront être
envoyées à massimo.leone@unito.it.
Los artículos, . caracteres max, hoja de estilo MLA, con un
resumen en inglés de  palabras max y  palabras–llave en inglés,
deberán ser enviadas a massimo.leone@unito.it.
Languages / lingue / langues / lenguas:
English, Italiano, Français, Español (other languages if reviewers are
available).
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